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Abstract 
 
Public sector
1
 reform is about improving the management of the public sector. Such 
reform has no universal framework. What can be done in any country is a product of 
its history, structure and culture. Moreover, public sector reform is not simply simple 
‗technical‘ change. It depends upon, and actually comprises reform of a nation‘s 
political system.  
 
The main focus of this thesis is administrative reform in Sri Lanka (SL). The key 
research question is why this has encountered so many problems in the SL public 
administration system despite many attempts at reform since 1950. And, why and 
how have key historical, structural, sociological economic and political factors since 
Independence contributed to this current impasse?  
  
Answers to key questions investigated were sought through qualitative and 
quantitative research. Using a combination of official documents and interviews with 
senior political elites, public officials and academics, this thesis analyses the current 
situation of public administration in SL. In order to better understand the current 
situation, the history of public administrative reform in SL is investigated. The focus 
of the analysis lies in understanding the complexity and specificity of the present 
situation in order to better assess prospects for future reforms. This provides a 
backdrop to effective future agendas and highlights issues in the present system that 
must be addressed within that agenda. In this process this thesis examines when, how 
and why administrative reforms took place in SL since the 1950s, which political 
parties were in power, and who gained and lost due to reforms. The, Administrative 
Reform Committee Reports (ARC) of 1986/88 are central to this analysis because 
they made comprehensive recommendations on all aspects of administrative reform. 
The experience of the ARC carries valuable lessons to administrative reformers.  
 
                                                 
1
 Public sector includes : Government and the Organs of State (Organs of State includes Presidential 
Secretariat, Legislature, Public Service Commission, Police Service Commission, Commission to 
Investigate Allegation of Bribery and Corruption,  Attorney General Department, Auditor General 
Department, Finance Commission and Salaries and Cadre Commission) and Public Enterprises. 
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Because this thesis is exploring historical and political questions, the Pollitt and 
Bouckaert model of public management, which focuses on historical institutionalism, 
is used as the theoretical framework.  
 
This thesis finds that all reforms in SL from 1950-2005 were isolated, ad hoc, and 
reactive to crisis situations, not proactive. On many occasions such changes lacked 
adequate examination as to their effects on the administrative system as a whole. 
This further resulted in more problems and even greater complexity, with the ARC 
recommendations not fully implemented. This thesis analyses underlying factors 
responsible for thwarting efforts to create an effective and efficient public 
administration system in SL. 
 
The originality and significance of this thesis lies in two areas: (a) it is the first 
systematic historical analysis of public sector reform in SL that pulls together a wide 
range of evidence from divers sources; (b) this thesis confirms the importance of 
understanding the history and political dynamics of a country before serious and 
wholesale attempts at public sector reform are attempted. I hope that future SL 
reformers will be able to learn the lessons of history in that respect.  
 
This thesis concludes that this state of affairs remains a product of complex 
interactions of many different historical, social, political, and cultural conditions. 
Therefore, this thesis argues, any future programme of reform must take full account 
of those specifics. 
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        Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and Interest  
 
After obtaining the Master‘s degree in Development Administration from the 
Australian National University (2000), my determination and curiosity in learning 
public policy and day-to-day aspects of public administration in Sri Lanka (SL) grew 
more and more over the years. Being a career bureaucrat attached to the Sri Lanka 
Administrative Service (SLAS) I was very keen to find out how public 
administration and public policies contribute to the daily life of Sri Lankans. The 
media very often criticises the public service as inefficient. With each passing year 
criticisms of the public service grow. Both the United National Party (UNP) and the 
Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), which have alternated in power since 
Independence (1948), when in power and/or in Opposition have always voiced their 
intentions to reform the public service; and they have established various reform 
committees and altered the Constitution but nothing has happened. What has in fact 
really happened is that the public service has been politicised and made not only 
more inefficient but also corrupt. Furthermore, the World Bank and Central Bank of 
SL (CBSL) continuously highlight in their reports that the Sri Lankan Public Service 
(SLPS) has been overstaffed. According to the 2009 annual report of CBSL, the 
public service cadre accounts for over 1.2 million to serve the population of 20.4 
million (mid-year population in 2009). The excess of staff
2
 in the public service is in 
fact wastage of ‗the workforce‘. The wastage of ‗the workforce‘ is wastage of 
money. Furthermore, it badly affects the private sector development because there is 
a shortage of educated manpower for private sector employment (World Bank, 
2004). These criticisms and ideas encouraged me to explore the following puzzle in 
this research.  
 
                                                 
2
 SL‘s per capita employment in the public sector is the largest in South and East Asia: 57 per 1000 
population (India -19, Pakistan – 19, Nepal – 37, Bangladesh – 10, Indonesia – 21, Singapore 0- 23, 
Philippines -23) (World Bank, 2004).     
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1.2 Research Puzzle 
 
SL follows an executive President style of government but with Cabinet members 
chosen from Parliament. A system of provincial councils and village level local 
bodies provide the base. SL recognises the value of investing in human resources and 
promoting gender equity. As a result, SL has achieved human development outcomes 
more consistent with those of high income countries; the literacy rate is 91.3% and 
life expectancy is 74 years despite its low income level (Central Bank, 2009). It also 
liberalised its economy in the late 1970s, ahead of other developing nations. SL is the 
most open economy in the South-Asia region (Sarvananthan, 2005; World Bank, 
2000). Despite the civil conflict over two decades, the annual growth rate of GDP 
has generally been maintained at 4 -5%. Its per capita income at market prices (US$ 
2014) in 2008 remains the highest in the region after the Maldives (Central Bank, 
2009). However, there is a growing realisation that SL‘s development has been well 
below its potential. In the 1960s SL had the same per capita income as Korea, 
Malaysia and Singapore (World Bank, 2000). Today these countries have per capita 
incomes that are several times higher than SL‘s.  
 
Several attempts have been made at reforming the SLPS in recent decades 
particularly in the 1980s and 1990s. For example, the government introduced 
privatisation of public enterprises in early 1980s. By mid 1994, 43 industrial 
enterprises and 92 bus depots had been privatised (Salih, 2000). By 1997, the number 
increased, which included several plantation companies, and mega utilities such as 
telecommunications and gas. By December, 2004, in addition to 92 bus depots, 
approximately 98 public enterprises had undergone privatisation (Public Enterprises 
Reforms Commission, 2004). The total sale proceeds amounted to SLRs. 69,008 
million. It was pushed to the top of the government policy agenda as a part of the 
Structural Adjustment Reform Programme (SAP) of the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank. The SAP programme also introduced several other measures: 
tariff and industrial policy reforms, liberalisation of trade and payments, 
rationalisation of public expenditure, de-control of prices and interest rates, 
promotion of the private sector, foreign investment promotion, and financial sector 
reforms, civil service rationalisation and enhancement of public sector efficiency 
(Adam, Cavendish, & Mistry, 1992).  
 3 
In addition, in the 1990s the government invited two missions, UNDP and ADB, to 
improve public sector management. These missions consisted totally of foreign 
experts. The UNDP mission submitted a report within three months and formulated a 
project at the cost of US$ 1.3 million (Nadarajah, 1997) and established a 
Restructuring Management Unit in the Ministry of Policy Planning and 
Implementation which continued for three years (Wanasinghe, 1994). The ADB 
Team consisted of consultants from the USA and New Zealand, and focused on the 
reorganisation of public administration structures, rationalisation of public sector 
cadres, introduction of results-based management systems and procedures, training 
of staff and separation of policy-making, service delivery, and regulatory functions 
of government (Root, Hodgson, & Vaughan-Jones, 2001). 
 
Further, in 1996 the government introduced an individual performance appraisal 
system for government. The main reason for the evolution of the performance 
appraisal system in the government was to rationalise the important decisions on 
individual employees such as promotion, training, and granting of salary increments, 
which were hitherto based on subjective judgements. Another reason was to give 
individual employees a sense of direction.  
 
In addition, in 2003 the government implemented a Fiscal Management Reform 
Programme in order to respond to the fiscal challenges. This was intended to 
improve the effectiveness of tax administration, the budget framework, public 
expenditure management and control systems, and to strengthen fiscal discipline 
(ADB, 2004a, p. 11).  
 
Despite these reform attempts major problems still remain. The first major problem 
in the SLPS is lack of delegation of authority (Root, et al. 2001, ADB 2004b). The 
13
th
 Amendment (1987) to the Constitution of 1978 led to the establishment of 
Provincial Councils as a means of devolution of power to sub-national levels to meet 
the aspirations of the Tamil community. Even today adequate autonomy in the area 
of financial and human resources decisions have not been granted to these councils. 
Central government retains ultimate control (Leitan, 1992; World Bank, 2006).  
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The second major problem in the SLPS is that there are a large number of public 
enterprises and ministries. The current number of operational public enterprises is 
221 of which 90% are persistent loss makers (Department of Public Enterprises, 
2004; Public Enterprises Reform Commission, 2004).  Around 2% of the GDP is 
spent annually for their survival (Knight-John & Athukorala, 2005). In an interview 
the Chair of the Administrative Reform Committee (ARC) of 1986/89, S. 
Wanasinghe said ―every government that comes into power creates new ministries 
without any rationale in order to satisfy the ruling party politicians and changes are 
made to the administrative set-up‖ (Interview, 9.11.2007). As at 2007 there were 56 
Cabinet Ministers and 35 non-Cabinet Ministers and 20 Deputy Ministers in the 
central government (Government of Sri Lanka, 2007a). In addition, there were 40 
Ministers in the Provincial Government (Appendix 1). As a result, a large number of 
government ministries consume a considerable amount of taxpayers‘ money 
burdening the government budget and wasting financial, human and other scarce 
resources (see 4.3.1 for details). Further, the creation of large number of ministerial 
positions, gives undue privileges to politicians and their personal staff
3
 at public 
expense when the vast majority of people in the country are struggling to meet their 
basic needs. More than 15% of the population in SL is still under the poverty line 
(Department of Census and Statistics, 2006/7). In addition, this situation paves the 
way for misuse of public resources, duplication of functions, cronyism and nepotism. 
 
The third major problem in the public sector is corruption (Auditor General, 2006; 
Committee on Public Accounts, 2007; Committee on Public Enterprises, 2007). 
Certain government departments responsible for the issuance of licences, permits, 
deeds, revenue collection, and law enforcement are very corrupt (see 4.4.2 for 
details). A Bribery and Corruption Commission was established in 1994 to 
investigate allegations of bribery and corruption; to date the Commission has failed 
to investigate and bring about the successful prosecution of even a single significant 
case. Furthermore, the public sector suffers from political interference in the 
government decision-making process (Root et al., 2001). In 1999, the Human 
Development Centre ranked SL very low at 47
th
 in a group of 58 countries in 
                                                 
3
 A minister‘s personal staff consists of a private secretary, two coordinating secretaries, public 
relation officer, media secretary, personal assistant, security staff and drivers. In addition, there are 
many consultants. 
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economic governance, particularly due to increased politicisation, a bloated 
bureaucracy, insufficient decentralisation and weak financial control and public 
accountability. In 2007, the Human Development Index ranked SL at 102
nd
 among 
182 countries (Central Bank, 2009). In 2009, the Transparency International, the 
global coalition against corruption, ranked SL at 97 (3.1 CPI)
4
 in a group of 180 
countries (Corruption Perception Index, 2009). 
 
The fourth major problem in the SLPS is overstaffing (Root et al., 2001). SL‘s per 
capita employment in the public sector is the largest in South and East Asia: 57 per 
1000 population (see Footnote 2 above). Despite the existing overstaffing, in 2001, 
twelve thousand graduates were recruited to the public service. From 2005-2007 over 
hundred thousand including fifty thousand unemployed graduates were recruited to 
the public sector (Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2007, p.85). By the end of 2008, 
the total number of government employees was around 950,000 excluding semi-
government sectors, standing at around 13% of the labour force of the country 
(Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2008, p.67). 
 
The implicit conclusion is that the governments of the past have not effectively 
tackled the problems. Therefore these problems persist despite many attempts at 
reform over the last 30 years including one major systematic and far-reaching 
review. With great enthusiasm, an ARC was constituted in 1986, under the directive 
of the President, as an integral part of the 1980s economic reforms (Wanasinghe, 
1994). The committee was composed entirely of Sri Lankans with outstanding public 
administration expertise (Nadarajah, 1997). The committee viewed administrative 
reform as the reform of a system, not merely the addressing of an individual problem 
or limited group of problems within such a system. For example, it was not limited to 
a salary review or a cadre review, or an examination of work systems and procedures 
of government departments. It was a comprehensive review and evaluation of the 
public administrative system as a whole. Its recommendations would have led to an 
effective and independent public service. However, no serious attempt has been 
taken to implement its recommendations as a whole (Wijesinghe, 1998). 
Nevertheless, the ARC‘s assumptions and recommendations are still valid and 
                                                 
4
 Corruption Perception Index scored below 5 on a scale from 0 (perceived to be highly corrupt) to 10 
(perceived to be low level of corruptions). 
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critical in the SL administrative reform context. This will be dealt with in detail in 
Chapter 6.   
 
The changes that have been made so far were isolated, ad hoc, and reactive to crisis 
situations rather than proactive. On many occasions such changes were often made 
without an adequate examination of their effects on the system as a whole. This 
resulted in more problems or even greater complexity. As such, solutions to the 
above problems are obviously not simple; otherwise improvements would have 
already occurred. So the answer has to lie deeper in the historical, structural, political 
and cultural underpinnings of the society that shape the institutions and functioning 
of SL‘s government (the executive and the legislature) and the public sector.  
 
In short my key research puzzle is: SL did well in the past during the 1960s. Several 
serious attempts have already been made at reforming aspects of the SLPS in recent 
decades particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, yet major problems remain. There 
seems to be few prospects for their elimination, much less for major improvement. 
Why is this so? What explains this situation? 
1.3 Research Objectives  
 
The objectives of this research are as follows. 
 
To understand the complexity and specificity of the current situation of the public 
administration in SL; 
 
To analyse the past in order to derive historical, sociological and political- 
economic explanations of the present, with special reference to the 
recommendations of the ARC; 
 
To understand the major drivers for historical administrative reforms and 
resistance to reforms; 
 
To understand how ideas about reform developed and were chosen for 
implementation; 
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To identify the causes of their successes and failures and consequences of these 
to explore what are the prospects for today and tomorrow. 
 
The objectives above are pursued by focusing on the following main areas and 
investigating a number of questions.   
1.4 Main Focus and Research Questions 
 
This thesis is built on the assumption that a system of government reflects the 
specifics of the country out of which that system emerged and that any attempt at 
‗reform‘ must be built on those specifics. In the course of my literature review, I 
found that the ARC was based on the same assumptions. The ARC, therefore, 
provides a useful point of entry for this thesis. An understanding of how and why the 
ARC took the approach it did and how and why its major recommendations were not 
implemented provide important clues regarding the larger question this thesis 
explores. Therefore, this thesis pays considerable attention to the ARC as a way of 
giving direction and focus. Accordingly, my main research questions are:   
 
Why are there still so many problems in the SL public administration despite 
various approaches to reform?  Why and how have key historical, structural, 
sociological economic and political factors since Independence contributed to 
the current situation? Depending on that explanation, what prospects for 
reforms in SL exist now and in the immediate future? 
 
Why did the government establish the ARC? How did ARC construct the 
problem which it recommended for fixing? How and why did it derive its 
recommendations? Why have the ARC recommendations not been fully 
implemented?  
 
1.4.1 Subsidiary Questions 
 
The study, and especially the data gathering process, is guided by the following 
questions: 
What major public sector reforms have been introduced in SL since 1956?  
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What have been the primary causes of reforms? What have been their 
impacts?  
 
Were these really the most important things that should have been 
reformed? 
 
Are there others more important? If so, why are they more important? 
 
Which groups in Sri Lankan society stand to gain or lose through public 
administrative reform? 
 
In what way are public administrative and constitutional reforms linked in 
SL? 
 
How was the civil service during its early history, and after 1970s? Why 
did it develop in that shape?  
 
Can public sector reform be independent from governmental reform?  
 
What kinds of reforms can be considered in SL in the light of present and 
past experience? 
 
The prospects for improving SL‘s public administration provide the final focal point 
in this study. Although many attempts to reform aspects of public administration 
have been made, there is still plenty of room for significant improvement in 
administrative structure, systems and processes in terms of efficient service delivery 
and effective localised services.  
 
It should be noted that this analysis covers the period from the 1950s to the recent 
past, stopping at 2005. Since my interest was the historical context of previous 
attempts at reform, especially the ARC, choosing 2005 allowed me enough time for 
review any initiatives in the 1990s and 2000s that followed the wide-ranging ARC 
agenda. But that does not mean that work on public sector reform in SL has stopped 
since then. The current initiatives started after 2005 have not had sufficient time to 
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mature, so that they are not yet ready for a proper analysis. It is certainly true that 
some significant events have occurred recently (e.g. the military defeat of the LTTE 
on May 2009), but these are not the main concern of this thesis. Notwithstanding, I 
comment on these in the post-script.   
 
1.5 Chapter Outline 
 
The rest of this thesis is organised into six chapters. The conceptual framework and 
the methodology of this research are developed in Chapter 2.  
 
Chapter 3 provides background on the SL administrative system. It introduces the 
current structure and process of government in SL. It examines the power invested in 
the three arms of the government machinery: the Executive, Legislature and 
Judiciary and their operation in relation to public administration.  It also discusses 
the provincial government and gives a brief account of the composition of the public 
service. 
 
The current situation of the public administration is explored in Chapter 4 with a 
view to provide a backdrop to the agenda that lies ahead and highlights issues in the 
present system that need to be addressed as a part of that agenda. Chapter 4 has three 
parts:  
 
Part 1 focuses on the roles and scope of public administration under devolved 
polity and market economy, and highlights the structural and service delivery 
deficiencies in the current administrative setup;  
 
Part 11 critically discusses staffing matters in public administration; and  
 
Part 111 focuses on major critical factors in public administration such as 
discipline, corruption, trade unionism, deficiencies in systems, procedures and 
financial management functions.  
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The focus of the analysis is to understand the complexity and specificity of the 
present situation in order to finally assess the prospects for reforms in the future.  
 
Chapter 5 also has three parts. Part I describes the post independence administrative 
reform initiatives during the 1950s and 1960s while part II and III deal with the 
1970s-1980s and 1990s-2000s respectively.  
 
The ARC reports of 1986/88 which are central to this thesis are reviewed in Chapter 
6 while examining why the recommendations of the ARC have not been fully 
implemented by successive governments. This analysis will provide a basic 
foundation for this thesis and show the specifics of the SL situation.  
 
Chapter 7, the final chapter, analyses the overall research findings, evaluates the 
applicability of theoretical model used in this thesis, revises the theoretical model 
based on SL‘s reform experiences, highlights key issues to be addressed in future 
reforms, draws some conclusions, and highlights major policy challenges for future 
reforms in respect of public service, including the political system.  
 
Chapter 8, the Post-script Chapter, tries to update the reader on public sector reforms 
since 2005 because this thesis has been focused only on  public sector reforms from 
1950-2005. There were two events in particular that had a potential impact on the 
matters raised in this thesis. The first of these events was the election of President 
Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2005 and the subsequent work on the ―Mahinda Chintana‖ 
(Mahinda‘s Vision)5 and the second, the military defeat of the Tamil Tigers in May 
2009. This Post-script chapter discusses whether either of these enable the 
government to address the particular issues of public administration and government 
identified in this thesis? 
 
The thesis argues that public sector reform, per se, has no universal framework. What 
can be done in any jurisdiction is a product of its history, structure, culture and the 
polity of the country. Therefore, one cannot contemplate future reforms in SL‘s 
                                                 
5
 ‗Mahinda Chintana‘ is the Presidential election manifesto submitted by the present President, 
Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2005.  
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public sector unless one understands the full complexity and specificity of what has 
happened in the recent past. The ‗specificity‘ is the central part of this thesis.  
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Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework and 
Methodology 
 
 
[E]xcluding useful [memories and histories] because they carry an 
undesirable residue from the past renders public administration dialogue 
weaker and less effective in dealing with current problems for the future. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
                                                                           (Quoted in Raadschelders, 2009, p. 1) 
2.1 Introduction  
 
As will be seen in following chapters, SL has already attempted several reforms of its 
civil service and public administration, some of them being ‗new public 
management‘ in character. But, in general, these reforms have been only partially 
successful. This thesis attempts to understand why and what these conclusions say 
about future prospects. One set of reforms flowing out of the work in the late 1980s 
of the Administrative Reform Committee (ARC) were holistic in character and, in 
theory, could and should have worked and so the reasons for failure are a particular 
focus in this thesis. Despite all these efforts, there is plenty of room in the SL‘s 
public administration and management for improvement. 
 
Sections 1.4 and 1.4.1 in Chapter 1 indicate the key questions that this thesis tries to 
answer. Those questions demand historical answers. Thus, the question that arises at 
this stage is which perspective to adopt in understanding why particular approaches 
to reform were adopted at certain times, why so little progress has been made and 
what to do about it?  
 
In general terms, two possible approaches are (1) a normative approach based more-
or-less on mainstream public management and/or rational choice theory; and (2) an 
historical and institutional approach. 
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2.2 Historical vs. Rational Choice Approaches, and a 
Rationale for Adopting the Former 
 
Most public management analysis is analysis of the present, for the future, and the 
analysis is generally prescriptive – a paper examined later from Bale and Dale (1998) 
is a good example (others are ADB, 2004; Boston et al., 1996; and the World Bank, 
2000, 2004).  
 
However, there is another school of thought which argues that there is a need to 
understand the past in order to effectively address the present problems (e.g. Pollitt & 
Bouckaert, 2000, 2004; Raadschelders, 2009, Thelen, 1999). These writers argue that 
to improve the understanding of government‘s role and position in society, public 
administration scholarship needs to reacquaint itself with the nature of time. For 
example, Raadschelders (2009, p. 1) argues:  
Most publications are focused on current problems (the present) and desired 
solutions (the future) and are concerned mainly with organizational structure (a 
substance issue) and outputs targets. There is much less consideration of how public 
administration (organisation, policy) unfolds overtime and how the present both 
limits the range of possibilities available for the future and yet provides certain 
possibilities for action. History and administrative history is regarded as a ‗past‘ that 
can be recorded for its own sake but has little relevance to contemporary 
challenges‖.   
 
According to Raadschelders (2009), there is a lack in probing the meaning of the 
past.  He is critical that ―many people are not particularly interested in how the past 
has shaped the present‖ (Raadschelders, 2009, p.1). He further emphasizes that 
discarding the past as mere baggage runs the risk of throwing the baby (present and 
future) out with the bathwater (past). Illustrating the point, Beyer (1959) notes that 
better understanding of current personnel practices requires a longer historical 
perspective than is normally displayed in studies in this field (Raadschelders, 2009). 
 
According to Raadschelders (2009), history is the memory of a collective past 
through learning about previous achievements. Analysing administrative changes in 
SL over time is essential to understanding why the present is the way it is. We cannot 
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fully understand our present without understanding our past. And we cannot fully 
imagine change in the public service without a sense of how our public services 
change over time. Our ability to understand the past gives a solid background to the 
existing problems in the public service. It provides a wide range of explanations and 
the sociological, cultural, historical, political, and economic factors that led to 
present impasse and their complex interaction, which have shaped the system of 
government over time. One could say that, public administration scholarship lingered 
between ―exploring the past for understanding the present‖ and ―analysing the 
present in order to create a better future‖ (Raadschelders, 2009, p. 3).A persistence 
and thoughtful study of a past provides potential clues, not definitive answers, to 
understanding, not explaining, present challenges and potential solutions to present 
problems. Studying administrative history helps understanding of government and 
the limitations within which any practitioner has to work (Raadschelders, 2009). 
 
Raadschelders (2009, p. 10) identifies three reasons why understanding the 
administrative past is important to anyone. First is that government is a product and 
function of human action and a consequence of natural forces, thus human behaviour 
is purposive, focuses on progress and dealing with the challenges of daily life. The 
outcome of that behaviour can only be understood when that what motivated 
particular action is placed in its temporal and geographical context. Second is that 
many aspects of social reality are best comprehended as a temporal process. The 
impact of what is started now often doesn‘t come clear until a significant amount of 
time has passed. Social realities unfold over time and without a historical perspective 
the why and meaning of this unfolding is lost. This is problematic for political 
officeholders because they focus on short term solutions to problems due to short 
electoral cycle, pressure from interest groups, and desire to show results. However, 
many of the national and international challenges play out in the longer term. To 
balance this pressure for quick result with long-term perspectives is the biggest 
challenge faced by the administrators. Considering the past will facilitate such a 
balancing act. Third is that national cultures are shaped by political and 
administrative traditions. Many cultures are still shaped by the traditions of various 
institutions of governance such as government, corporate business, organised 
religion, tribe or clan. These institutions are underpinned by deeply embedded ways 
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of acting that are regarded as ‗normal‘ in those cultures and which influence what, 
how and why people act in the present.      
 
In contrast, rational choice theory is another approach used by social scientists to 
understand human behaviour. This approach has been dominant in economics, but in 
recent decades it has become widely used in other fields such as sociology, political 
science, and anthropology. Rational choice perspectives all begin with individual 
behaviour located in a perpetual present (Marsh & Stoker, 1995, Scott, 2000). The 
central theme of the public choice perspectives is that individual behaviour in an 
organisation is based on rational calculation of self interest. Rational choice theory 
assumes that all actions is fundamentally ‗rational‘ in character and that people 
calculate the likely costs and benefits of any action before deciding what to do. It 
further assumes that the society tries to achieve equilibrium. Furthermore, the public 
choice theory embraces a functional view of institutions (Thelen, 1999).  
 
Rational choice theory adopts a methodological individualist position and attempts to 
explain all social phenomena in terms of the rational calculations made by self-
interested individuals. It sees social interaction as social exchange modelled on 
economic action. People are motivated by the rewards and costs of actions and by the 
profits that they can make. Some rational choice theorists have seen rationality as a 
result of psychological conditioning. Others have adopted the position that it is 
simply necessary to assume that individuals act as if they were completely rational 
(Scott, 2000). However, collective actions in society and organisations make this 
assumption problematic. Accordingly the problem of collective action poses 
considerable difficulties for rational choice theory, which cannot explain why 
individuals join many kinds of groups and associations. In addition, rational choice 
theory cannot explain the origins of social norms, especially those of altruism, 
reciprocity, and trust. Furthermore, rational choice theory is deductive; it tends to 
start from general theory and work downwards, descriptively and prescriptively, to 
particular cases. 
 
In contrast, the historical institutional approach which is one of the central pillars of 
the discipline of politics focuses on structures, rules, procedures and formal 
organisations of government. It adopts the techniques of the historian and seeks to 
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explain the relationship between structure and democracy and the ways in which 
rules and procedures of formal organisation succeed or fail in constraining political 
behaviour (Rhodes, 1995). Homans argued that ―human behaviour, like all animal 
behaviour, is not free but determined. It is shaped by the rewards and punishments 
that are encountered‖ (Scott, 2000, p.2). This means that peoples‘ behaviour is not 
always based on rational choice but it is governed by institutional standards. 
Therefore, Durkheim (1983) argued that all rational economic actions occur within 
an institutional framework of norms that cannot itself be explained as the result of 
rational action alone (Scott, 2000).    
 
Accordingly, adopting historical institutionalism in order to find sequences of social, 
political, economic behaviour and change across time is very useful in understanding 
the current situation in public administration in SL. Even though historical 
institutionalism provides a comparative approach to the study of all aspects of human 
organisations, it is also applicable in analysing the history of public management 
reforms in a single country like SL. According to Thelen (1999), the historical 
institutionalist starts from evidence (empirical work) unlike rational choice theorist 
who starts from theory. It means that the historical institutionalists begin with 
empirical puzzles that emerge from observed events. This is the approach adopted in 
this research. 
 
For these reasons, this study adopts an historical institutionalist position in analysing 
public administration reform in SL. 
2.3 Generic Prescription and Policy Transfer 
Approaches  
 
This thesis seeks to describe and explain public sector reforms in Sri Lanka but it 
also identifies critical present-day issues in order to understand the prospects for 
ongoing reform. As also seen, an historical and institutionalist approach looks for the 
origins of the present in the past and argues that the way forward must focus on the 
specifics of the situation. 
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This is in contrast with mainstream approaches to public administration that adopt a 
generic and prescriptive approach to ongoing reform, in effect, arguing that even 
developing countries can and should define their problems in standard terms and 
apply a more-or-less generic 'new public management' model as the solution. An 
example of this type of approach can be found in Bale and Dale (1998). They take 
the view that: 
 
Poorer countries can indeed extrapolate from the experience of their higher income 
neighbour despite the different conditions under which they have to operate. New 
Zealand‘s comprehensive overhaul of its public sector affords both general 
principles and specific elements relevant to countries looking to improve the quality, 
efficiency, and cost effectiveness of their public service sectors, and a careful 
analysis of those reforms can ascertain what might be transferable and what 
principles might apply (Bale & Dale, 1998, p. 103)  
 
Bale and Dale in the first instance claim that any developing country can adopt a 
developed country model despite the different cultural, political or socio-economic 
conditions.  An historical institutionalist approach would reject this view. But it is 
also noteworthy that even a well-known admirer of the New Zealand system does the 
same. 
 
Schick (1998) in his World Bank paper on ‗Why developing countries should not 
adopt the New Zealand model‖ disagrees with the Bale and Dale type of approach – 
and does so in terms that support the intent of this thesis. He argues that NZ does not 
offer practical guidance on how developing countries should surmount deficiency in 
public management. NZ has implemented a large number and range of reforms since 
1998.  This includes accrual-based accounting and appropriations, budgeting for 
outputs rather than for inputs, decoupling service-delivery functions from the 
provision of policy advice, replacing department heads with chief executives 
appointed for a fixed term, discretion for managers to spend  their operating budgets 
as they deem fit, individual employment contracts for most senior (and many middle) 
managers, a charge on the use of  capital by government departments, annual 
purchase agreements between ministers and their departments, annual reports, and 
audited financial and performance statements (Schick, 1998, p. 2).  
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Each of these innovations are specific and can be considered on their own (Schick, 
1998). Further, every element of reform has been designed to establish or strengthen 
contract-like relationships between the government and ministers as purchasers of 
goods and services, and departments and other entities as suppliers. A chief 
executive negotiates with employment contract with managers while promising 
results in negotiating purchase agreements with ministers and performance 
agreements with the State Services Commissioner. Contract-like agreements have 
been extended to policy advice by the ministers who opt to obtain information and 
ideas from external sources. Before the start of the year the outputs are specified in 
purchase agreements signed by the chief executive and the minister purchasing the 
services and after the year each department publish annual report that specifies the 
outputs actually produced, so that the government can determine whether the terms 
of various contracts have been fulfilled.     
    
Schick is of the view that ―there are important preconditions for successfully 
implementing the new public management (NPM) approach; these should not be 
ignored by countries striving to uplift themselves after decades of mismanagement‖ 
(1998, p. 124) – clearly, SL is an example of this. He argues that greater the 
shortcomings in a country‘s established management practices, the less suitable these 
reforms are. He particularly points out the danger of application of the ‗NZ Model‘ 
which gives public managers broad discretion to operate within an accountability 
framework that specifies the results to be achieved and closely monitors 
performance.  According to Schick (1998, p.5), formal contracts and internal markets 
were feasible for NZ because the country already was developed – it had a robust 
market sector and established mechanisms for enforcing contracts. He points out that 
if contracts and the rule of law are underdeveloped in business relations, it is highly 
improbable that they can be effectively applied in the conduct of the government 
business.  Schick further emphasises that developing countries with weak rule-based 
governments and market structures that are less robust should consider 
improvements before experimenting.  Therefore, developing countries should 
consider their established structural and management settings first, before application 
of any foreign model. In other words, Schick seems to be arguing that something like 
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an historical and institutional perspective is more appropriate in looking at any 
particular country and its attempts at reform.  
 
The approach adopted in this thesis also contrasts with another well-known approach 
in explaining the origins of public sector reform in developing countries, namely the 
'policy transfer' approach. From this perspective, the fact that some reforms in Sri 
Lanka in recent times have reflected aspects of the 'new public management' agenda, 
could be explained by the fact that international agencies in their relationships with 
Sri Lanka, have created the conditions for a 'transfer' of ideas about public sector 
reform to that country. Authors such as Dolowitz and Marsh (1998) define 'policy 
transfer' as ―the process by which knowledge of ideas, institutions, policies and 
programmes in one time and/or place is fed into the policy making arena in the 
development of policies and programmes in another time and/or place‖ (Dolowitz & 
Marsh, 1998, p. 38). For example, Shamsul Haque (1996, pp. 206-7) argues that the 
international agencies such as the World Bank, the US Agency for international 
Development, and the British Overseas Development Administration have influenced 
Third World countries to adopt pro-market policies; and John Campbell (1977) 
demonstrated how the institutional legacies of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia 
helped account for different national outcomes when IMF  attempted to impose neo-
liberal policies on these countries as a condition for a loan guarantee (Dolowitz & 
Marsh, 1998, p. 38).  
 
Dolowitz and Marsh (1998, p. 38) ask the following questions: ―Why and when do 
actors engage in policy transfer? Who transfers policy? What is transferred? From 
where are lessons drawn? Are there different degrees of transfer? When do actors 
engage in policy transfer and how does this affect the process?  and What restricts 
policy transfer?‖  
 
In this framework, Dolowitz and Marsh emphasises the need to consider policy 
transfers between national, sub-national and international (cross country) units. They 
also consider the need for examination of the global past, more importantly research 
on their own nation‘s past because this type of search save time and resources both 
political and economic associated with cross-national policy transfers. These are the 
types of questions that might be asked in this thesis. 
 20 
However, this framework has a limited focus, only on public policy transfer. It does 
not cover other broad questions which are critical in analysing management change. 
This thesis raises several critical questions which need answers to analyse the history 
of public administration reform in SL such as what are the drivers for historical 
administrative reform, how ideas about reform developed, what are the causes or 
successes and failures and consequences of reform and who won and loss due to 
reform. This drawback led to a search for a more comprehensive theoretical 
framework for this study.  
 
Instead, the conceptual and analytical framework developed for this study is one that 
is historical and institutionalist in character and which begins from the idea that 
empirical analysis of the actual history and dynamics of SL‘s political and 
administrative system is critical to understanding the present. One comparative 
model that is also based on these preferences can be found in the work of Pollitt and 
Bouckaert (2004) and the next section summarises this framework. 
2.4 Historical Institutionalism: Pollitt and Bouckaert  
 
Pollitt and Bouckaert argue that in the field of public management reform the broader 
forces of economics and politics are always mediated through networks of 
institutions. ―The specific characteristics of these networks, and of the individual 
institutions which compose them, frequently have a profound shaping effect upon 
what actually happens during the course of reform, therefore, upon the final results 
and outcomes of the change process‖ (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004, p.23).   
 
The basic assumption of this model is that the pattern of management change and the 
causes of influence differ from country to country because the effects of global and 
domestic forces are not uniform (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000, 2004). Accordingly, the 
socio-economic forces, political systems and administrative systems of the individual 
country are specific in the determination of the change agenda of a particular 
country. From this model the authors develop more detailed sets of typologies and 
specific theories that classify and explain specific patterns and trends, both within 
individual countries and across group of countries. This model is originally created 
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through country specific experiences. Therefore, it represents a combination of the 
reform experiences of 12 developed countries (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000, p. 4). 
Figure 1 reproduces their diagrammatic representation of the model. 
Figure 1: Pollitt and Bouckaert Conceptual Model 
 
Source: Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004, p. 25) 
 
Figure 1 indicates the broad forces which are driving and resisting changes. It 
stresses that most of the changes in the public sector originate from the top, 
particularly executive politicians and/or senior civil servants. This is illustrated in the 
middle of this model (Box J).  Therefore, it is the first place to start in understanding 
any reform. For example, the 1980s reform in NZ was driven by) a small group of 
ministers who advocated neo-liberal economic solutions and Treasury officials who 
thought along similar lines (Boston 1991).  In Box J, elite perception is differentiated 
between elite discernment of what reforms are desirable and what reforms are 
feasible. What is desirable is not always easy to achieve due to various 
environmental factors. Elites therefore have to make judgements on what is feasible 
as opposed to what is desirable to avoid any resistance and make change happen 
A. Socio-economic forces E. Political system 
J. Elite decision-making 
   What is  
(a) desirable? 
(b) feasible? 
I.Chance events,  
e.g.scandals, 
disasters 
B.Global 
economic 
forces 
C.Sociode-
mographic 
change  
D.Socio-economic policies 
F. New 
management 
ideas 
G. Pressure 
from 
Citizens 
H.Party political ideas 
K. Administrative system 
L. Content of reform package 
M. Implementation process 
N. Results achieved 
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according to the current political, socio-economic, and cultural milieu.  Otherwise, 
elites in decision-making in the centre (Box J) are influenced by two large elements 
in the reform: socio-economic forces and political system (components of Boxes A 
and E).  
 
In this model, surrounding elite decision-making are three clusters of factors. In the 
top left the first cluster is socio-economic and demographic elements: Box A (Boxes 
B, C and D). In the top right the second cluster is political and scholarly elements: 
Box E (Boxes F, G, and H). In the bottom part, the third cluster is administrative 
elements: Box K (Boxes L, M and N). The management reforms emerge from the 
interaction between these three major elements.  
 
Box A illustrates the general set of factors. Some of these can be considered to be 
structural and long-lasting while other factors may be short-lived, such as economic 
cycles of upturns and downturns. The elements in B, C and D are likely to have 
definite and apparent effects on public administration.  Socio-economic policies (Box 
D) are derived from global-economic forces (Box B) and socio-demographic changes 
(Box C). Based on the experiences of 12 selected countries, Pollitt and Bouckaert 
argue that the most influential factor in reform is the global economic forces. The 
global capital markets and multinational corporations control the individual 
governments, thus 12 developed countries that the model is based on cannot entirely 
design their domestic policies their own way. 
 
In this model the second group of influential factors is concerned with the political 
system (Box E). These elements may make management reform more or less 
straightforward. For example in Germany constitutional laws make it difficult for 
robust restructuring to take place at the federal level, whereas in the UK changing the 
structure is less difficult (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). Thus, the political system and 
laws affect the process of management reforms. New management ideas (Box F) also 
heavily influence management reform. Over the last two decades a variety of schools 
of thought emerged in the area of the new public management. According to Bovaird 
& Loffler (2003, p. 42), this approach has many names such as ―New Public 
Management‖ (Hood,1991), ―Market-Based Public Administration‖ (Lan and 
Rosenbloom,1992), ―Managerialism‖ (Pollitt,1990),―Reinventing Government‖ 
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(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) and ―Post-Bureaucratic‖ model (Barzelay,1992), and 
has been adopted across countries based on economic rationalism and private sector 
management practices (Hughes, 1994). Thus, the US re-invention process, the 
Canadian ―′La Rele′ve‖, the UK ―Next Steps‖, the NZ and Australian versions of 
―Contractualisation‖, the Irish ―Strategic Management Initiatives‖, the German 
―Lean State‖ reform programme and the Scandinavian reforms, despite significant 
differences, were all seen as part of the new public management phenomenon. 
Overall, these reforms sought to achieve smaller and better government with less 
cost. These ideas are significant for the pace of public management reform.  For 
example: 
 
in Australia, North America, and the UK generic approaches and techniques such as 
Management by Objectives, TQM, benchmarking, outsourcing, and business process 
re-engineering have been widely adopted in the public sector‖ (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 
2004, p. 30).  
 
Along with these ideas, organisational design principles based on macro economic 
theories have also been used; for example, in NZ public choice theory
6
, agency 
theory
7
 and transaction cost theory
8
 were all influential (Boston, 1991). These new 
concepts were popularised too by international agencies such as the World Bank and 
the OECD (particularly its Public Management (PUMA) division) through 
international networks.  
 
                                                 
6
 Public choice theory seeks to explain how voters, politicians, bureaucrats, and lobbyists will behave 
in different institutional settings with different incentive rules. It is based on the idea that human 
behaviour is dominated by self-interest. For example, bureaucrats attempt to enlarge their 
departmental budget. Politicians pursue their own objectives at the expense of many of their 
constituents (Bale & Dale, 1998, p.118).  
7
 Agency theory is based on the idea that interchange between parties can be characterised as a series 
of contracts where one party, the principal, enters into agreements with another party, the agent, who 
agrees to perform tasks on behalf of the principal in return for compensation. This theory also assumes 
rational, utility-maximising behaviour by individuals hence, conflict will arise between principals and 
agents as their self-interest differ. The theory is useful to analysing the selection of agents, designing 
incentives and pay systems, and choosing between in-house or outside contractors (Bale & Dale, 
1998, p.118). 
8
 Transaction cost theory provides an important adjunct to agency theory and another set of tools and 
insights for exploring not merely the operation of firms, but also nature, structure, and activities of 
bureaucracies. It is useful for evaluating the efficiency of alternative governance structures or 
institutional arrangements (e.g. considering when it is more efficient for the government to provide 
services directly rather than contracting them out to private sector providers) (Boston et al., 1991). 
 24 
Box G represents pressure from citizens. However, this factor is not always powerful 
and active in the public management reform in those selected countries, but on some 
occasions citizens do bring pressure to bear for change. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) 
point out that, although citizens seldom seem to be the driving force for particular 
reform, there can be instances in which they form an important background 
influence.  
 
Box H represents party political ideas as another influential factor in the public 
management reform. Political parties have ideas about how they would like to 
govern. These include issues of structure, style, and process; for example, a party 
may decide that it wishes to ―reduce the civil service‖ or ―decentralise and bring the 
administration to the grass root level‖ (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). Political parties 
also derive new management ideas (Box F) and ideas from citizens (Box G) which 
influence the reform agenda.  
 
The other influential factor in this model is chance events (Box I). This includes 
scandals and disasters (Tsunami, floods and droughts). These factors motivate 
political and civil service elites to make decisions on changes. 
 
In the bottom part of the framework there is a cluster of administrative factors (K), 
content of reform package (L), implementation process (M), and results achieved 
(N). Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) point out that administrative system (Box K) is 
often difficult to change in more than incremental ways because the culture and 
discipline is embodied into the system. Structural differences are also remarkable. 
Some countries have centralised administrative systems while others have more 
decentralised systems. Reform from centralisation to decentralisation is somewhat 
difficult in those countries. Furthermore, rules and regulations are also significant 
because the civil service cannot change them so readily.  
 
The content of reform package (Box L) is the output of the interaction between the 
desirable and feasible by the reform elites. Box M illustrates the implementation of 
the reform: attempt to put reform ideas into practice. This is the important part of the 
whole reform programme. The implementation of reform through a top down 
approach involves a number of layers in the decision-making and many levels of 
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administration, from Cabinet level to the agency level, so that the chance of effective 
implementation of the reform programmes depends on the willingness and incentive 
of the politicians and the senior civil servants‘ to implement them.  The complexity 
of the implementation process may increase because many of the programmes are 
delivered through networks of organisations rather than by a single implementer. 
Another problem in the implementation is that individual reforms may detract from 
other reforms. Sometimes governments implement reform piecemeal so that it may 
affect the other structures as a whole.  
 
In addition, implementation itself is crucial in deciding future prospects of reforms 
by the elite — whether to continue or change track. For example, in New Zealand a 
sophisticated output-oriented performance management system was put in place from 
the mid 1980s onwards. By the mid 1990s, NZ recognised the danger of a strict focus 
on measurable outputs and changed the focus from outputs to outcomes. Box N in 
Figure 1 represents the result achieved from the reform. This might, or might not be 
the anticipated outcome of the ‗reformers‘ due to an uncertainty of the 
implementation process. Therefore, the final result of the reform is not easy to 
identify.  
 
To summarise: Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s conclusion from their 12-jurisdiction study 
that the outcome of reform initiatives differ from country to country according to the 
differential impact of a range of key factors, seems to be important, and negates any 
suggestion that the passage of reform in SL should be assessed against a single 
generic model such as Bale and Dale‘s. The Pollitt and Bouckaert model is also 
persuasive in another respect; unlike the prescriptive approach of much public 
administration research, it emphasises the importance of observing the presence (or 
absence) and effect (or otherwise) of a wide range of economic, political, social and 
cultural factors in a manner that encourages historical analysis over time. As we have 
seen, parts of Schick‘s and Dolowitz and Marsh‘s argument seem to point in the 
same direction.  
 
Accordingly, this thesis proceeds by adopting the Pollitt and Bouckaert model as a 
basis for organising the collection and analysis of evidence to examine the 
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circumstances prevailing over time and their effects in relation to public sector 
reform in SL. 
 
The next section explains the research methodology in this study. 
2.5 Methodology 
 
2.5.1 Research Approach and Methods of Data   
         Collection 
 
For the reasons mentioned above, the approach of this thesis is essentially 
exploratory and so the research design is historical and qualitative (Rhodes, 1995). 
Given the theoretical exploratory nature of the research in question, predominantly 
qualitative research is merited (Cresswell, 2003, p. 22). Qualitative research is 
conducted through an intense and/or prolonged contact with a ―field‖ or life 
situation, reflective of the everyday life of individuals, groups, societies, and 
organisations (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 6). Also, qualitative research provides 
theories, models and descriptions of human experiences and perceptions within 
particular contexts. The researcher‘s role in a qualitative study is to gain a holistic 
overview of the context under study, and attempt to capture data on the perceptions 
of local actors. It is primarily descriptive and interpretative, concentrating on a few 
selected individuals or phenomena in some detail (Borland, 2001). Denzin and 
Lincoln (2005, p.4) explain that qualitative researcher use ―a wide range of 
interconnected interpretive practices, hoping always to get a better understanding of 
the subject matter at hand‖. 
 
According to Patton (2002) qualitative findings grow out of three types of data 
collection: direct observation, written documents and in-depth, open-ended 
interviews. In order to answer the research questions identified earlier in this chapter, 
several different types of evidence needed to be collected and analysed, particularly 
documentary and interview evidence.  
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Evidence regarding the history of reform in SL required the collection and analysis of 
a wide range of government documents of the time, supplemented by academic and 
practitioner research; 
 
Evidence regarding the reasons why certain reforms were initiated, the intentions 
behind them and the reasons why they succeeded or failed required talking to a 
selection of individuals who were involved or who observed them at first hand. 
 
Given its exploratory nature, this thesis adopts a ―pluralist methodology‖ which was 
based on extensive literature review on past reforms and present situation of public 
administration, primary (qualitative interviewing) and secondary (official and 
unofficial documents) data collection in SL. My long term work experiences
9
 in the 
SL public administration gave me a deep understanding of the form and content of 
these documents and interviews – in that sense I was an ‗insider‘ and able to interpret 
the material from the same perspectives. To ensure I have not inadvertently brought 
biases to bear in those interpretations, wherever possible, I checked my key 
interpretations with my interview subjects in formal and informal discussion (more 
on this below).  
 
Further, qualitative research was supplemented or supported by quantitative 
secondary data in this research. Quantitative secondary data was analysed graphically 
to support qualitative evidence (see Chapter 4). 
 
2.5.1.1 Documents 
 
A review of public administrative reform literature from 1950 to 2005 is the major 
part of this study. Therefore, this study used several sources of historical data:  
 
Government official and unofficial documents including confidential reports,  
legislation, country reports, project reports, the Parliamentary Hansard, 
                                                 
9
 I, the researcher, was involved in public sector environment from 1984 up-to-date in various 
capacities as an Assistant Commissioner, a Director and Senior Assistant Secretary. This familiarity 
allows me to understand what the interviewees were saying and interpret the events. 
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annual reports, administrative review reports, budget estimates and speeches, 
circulars and statistical data;  
 
Policies, including Cabinet papers and policy documents;  
 
Public reports including online newspaper articles, and opinions including 
editorials, speeches, and TV discussions; and  
 
Published research, bilateral and multilateral donor agency documents and 
books.  
 
Most of this documentary data was collected before the field work. A significant 
proportion of the research project, the first phase of documentary analysis, involved 
reading and analysing the materials, constructing a history of reform from 1950 to 
2005, and identifying what seemed to be key issues and moments, for example, the 
conduct of the ARC and the subsequent lack of implementation of its 
recommendations. This history, particularly the gaps, pointed the way to the key 
questions to ask the participants and observers to be interviewed in the second phase. 
 
These documents provided me with answers to some research questions particularly 
relating to official rationales and justifications on post-colonial reform attempts, 
dates, personnel, and history of implementation and about the public service during 
its early history and after reforms; major reforms initiatives to administrative system 
and structure; how reforms ideas developed and were chosen for implementation; 
and major forces for resistance. However, evidence regarding the reasons why 
certain reforms were initiated, the intentions behind them; the reasons why they 
succeeded or failed; which group gained or lost from reforms; and key consequences 
of reforms were not adequately available in documents, so the gaps had to be filled 
from other sources. In this regards interviews with a few people who were 
knowledgeable with the subject were used as a method of data collection.    
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2.5.1.2 Interviews  
 
In addition to document analysis, this study gathered data from semi-structured 
interviews with political elites and senior bureaucrats. The collection of data through 
interviews was imperative in this study for three reasons. The first reason is that ―the 
nature of management reform is such that an assessment cannot be grounded solely 
on hard evidence of what succeeded or failed. One‘s own judgement must be brought 
to bear, as well as that of others— participants and observers—who have seen the 
reforms in operation and have thought much about how the system is operating‖ 
(Schick, 1996, p.9).  
 
The second reason is that the official documents tell only half the story. The 
interviews were conducted to fill the gaps and the backgrounds. The historical 
documents also may be based on official rationalisation or may have been interpreted 
incorrectly by the writers. Lilleker (2003, p. 207) writes that ―interviews provide 
insight into events about which we know a little, activities that take place out of the 
public or media gaze, behind closed doors…interviews can provide immense amount 
of information that could not be gleaned from official documents or contemporary 
media accounts‖.  
 
The third reason is that historical research tradition demands procedures to verify the 
accuracy of statements about the past, to establish relationships, and to determine the 
direction of cause-and-effect relationships (Marshall & Rossman, 2006). Therefore, 
interview data analysis along with the documentary analysis enhances the 
trustworthiness and credibility of this study.  
 
Mayan (2001) suggests that semi-structured interviewing is useful when knowledge 
is limited and a topic needs to be explored from the subject perspectives. Aberbach 
and Rockman (2002, p. 674) state that ―elites especially—but other highly educated 
people as well—do not like being put in the straightjacket of close-ended questions‖. 
Therefore, this research used semi-structured interviews to collect data from 
individual participants through a set of open-ended questions. Appendix 2 shows that 
there are two questionnaires used in this study (one for the Chair of ARC and the 
other for the rest of the interviewees). The interviewees were more comfortable in 
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answering these questions because they were given a chance to express their 
opinions freely. 
2.5.1.3 Interview Sample and Subjects  
 
The sample for this research had two types of respondents. One sample comprised 
political elites. The other sample comprised officials, and academics. The views and 
perceptions of these two sets of individuals are vital, as they provide the impetus for 
past reforms and their implementation in SL. Accordingly, thirty-five senior 
politicians, academics and current and past senior public officials were selected for 
interviews. The sampling for this research was not random. The selection was 
undertaken, in a careful manner based on following criteria (combined with a small 
amount of snowball sampling (also called chain sampling), to obtain the deepest and 
widest range of reform experiences over recent years (particularly in relation to the 
ARC) (Gray, 2004). It was thought necessary to concentrate on those who: 
 
were involved at the time in decision-making and have subsequently reflected on the 
changes which took place and observed the reform process; 
 
can cast their memory back, and have a deep interest in the future of SL; 
 
have made an outstanding contribution to research in the area of public sector 
management and/or;  
 
are currently working in the public sector in the context of being able to render a 
qualified opinion. 
 
Appendix 3 shows the list of people and their positions in alphabetical order. 
Interviewees were contacted by letter to seek their agreement and participation in the 
study. The purpose of the study was explained in the letter. Interview subjects 
(Chapter 1) were enclosed together with the Informed Consent Form. The letter, 
schedule of interview subjects and the Informed Consent form had been approved by 
the Victoria University Human Ethics Committee. Interviewees were informed that 
the research would not be conducted on a strictly anonymous basis and where 
appropriate, their comments would be directly attributed to them.  The participants 
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were also asked to sign the consent form to indicate that they were comfortable with 
the data collection methods, storage, analysis and the use of the information they 
gave me in the interviews. They were assured that they were able to withdraw at any 
time in the research process. The respondents were very generous and forthright in 
explaining the consequences of past reforms, and also on current situation of public 
administration and governance in SL.  
 
Of 35 individuals who were contacted 31 agreed to be interviewed but 3 political 
individuals were not available in the time for the interview. The interviews were 
spread over four months from early November 2007 to late February 2008.  
 
The interview questions were designed to grasp the respondents‘ reform experiences 
from 1950-2005 and the current governance and management practices (2009) and 
varied according to the individual‘s experiences of the reforms (Appendix 2). The 
interviews were in-depth. Several follow-up interviews were held with some 
respondents. Each individual was interviewed for an average of three-and-a-half 
hours, a longer interview in one visit or split into two-to-three shorter visits until the 
entire questionnaire and follow up matters were discussed. The interviews were 
conducted in English, and where appropriate, Sinhala Language was also used. A 
translation was done soon after the interviews by me. Every interview was tape-
recorded and transcribed for analysis purposes.  
 
The interview responses augmented the already available information on past 
reforms from the documents. The interview responses have been integrated into the 
related chapters of this thesis to provide insights from those who were actively 
involved in the reforms as decision makers, implementers or observers. Throughout 
the text, key respondents have been directly quoted with their consent by their names 
and positions held at the time of interview as indicated on the consent form.  In such 
cases a copy of the interview transcript was sent to them for corrections and 
comments. Some of them have made a few corrections.  
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2.5.1.4 Analysis of Empirical Data 
 
Empirical analysis is ―the process of moving from raw interviews to evidence-based 
interpretations that are the foundation of published reports" (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, 
p. 201). The use of multiple sources of information, methods and techniques was 
sought to validate the data and information using a triangulation process for their 
reliability (Cresswell, 2003, pp. 195-196).  
 
Interpretation or drawing conclusions of the documents as described by Cresswell 
(2003) was combined with ―explaining the findings, answering the research 
questions, attaching significance to particular results, and putting patterns into an 
analytic framework‖ (Patton, 2002, p. 438). Analysis of the data and information 
collected through documents, semi-structured open-ended interviews, discussions 
and direct observations was mainly undertaken manually, through tabulating in tables 
and graphs and narrating in the most suitable way.  The collected official materials 
and other statistics have been analysed mostly in chronological order; for example, 
reform initiatives during the 1950s-1960s, introduction of Political Authority in 1971 
and abolition of Public Service Commission in 1972, which gave clues to underlying 
social forces and trends. The historical analysis was further improved with the 
interview data. 
 
Only the most relevant information from recorded interviews was transcribed 
verbatim. Each of the transcribed interviews was read through more than once, 
without coding. For each of the transcripts, the raw data were reduced by 
highlighting the relevant materials, classification of common ideas into certain 
themes, discarding, and organising the data into relevant text and transferring to a 
data reduction sheet. Each relevant text from the transcripts was then coded and 
summarised into a theme (group of repeating ideas that had something in common). 
Since my questionnaires focused more on past reforms, case by case, the 
classification of interview data has been essentially subjective. Wherever possible, I 
checked and confirmed my interpretations with the subjects but, inevitably, the final 
analysis in this thesis is subject to whatever framework my professional and 
academic experiences have given me. In that respect, it may show systematic 
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leanings in one direction or another; I will leave the reader to decide whether my 
interpretations of the evidence are reasonable or contestable. 
 
The primary data findings have been presented in a narrative form while the 
secondary data were analysed and interpreted mainly by charts and graphs so as to 
validate the primary data. In the presentation of the primary findings, direct quotes 
are used to allow the reader to confirm the conclusions. The Pollitt and Bouckaert 
analytical framework was used in collecting and analysing data in this research.  
 
Finally, qualitative criteria, such as credibility, transferability, dependability and 
conformability have been used to ensure the trustworthiness of this research. One of 
the important challenges confronting qualitative researchers is how to assure the 
quality and trustworthiness of the research. The use of quantitative criteria such as 
validity and reliability is largely irrelevant to substantiate the findings in the case of 
qualitative research. It is crucial ―to use qualitative evaluation criteria to assess 
qualitative methods within the qualitative paradigm‖ (Leininger, 1994, p. 96). 
Further comments on this follow in the next section. 
 
2.5.2 Limitations 
 
There are two particular methodological issues that need to be noted. The first relates 
to the reading of historical and official documents. 
 
A researcher has to be careful that in reading in the present what were produced in 
the past, that their contents are interpreted correctly - that the researcher is able to 
understand their contents in the terms intended. In this case, the documents are all 
official documents produced in SL since the 1950s. I, the researcher, in this case is 
Sri Lankan, a speaker of Sinhalese and English and a public servant of many years 
standing as mentioned above. This gives me the interpretative status of an 'insider' 
able to read these documents as they would have been intended (Schwartz and Jacobs 
1979, Parts I and II; see also Minichiello, Aroni, Timewell and Alexander 1995, 
Chapter 8) in the SL context. Where possible, to avoid the possibility of researcher 
bias in interpretation, my interpretations have been checked against the writings of 
SL public administration academics (as cited in the text) and, in some cases, in 
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discussion with them during the field work. In other instances throughout the text, 
interpretations are offered but with acknowledgement that they are those of the 
author - so that if biases are apparent, the reader can contextualise them. 
 
Similarly, the adoption of semi-structured interviews as a way of getting the insights 
of some key participants in the reform processes of the past in SL raises other issues. 
In this case, to be efficient in data collection, questions were devised that asked the 
subjects to speak to matters that are absent in the historical record and matters that 
called on their expert judgement regarding the intentions and outcomes of reforms, 
particularly those surrounding the ARC. Again, the professional experience of the 
interviewer enabled me to ask questions that shared the world-view of the interview 
subjects and to interpret their responses within the meaning-frameworks in which 
they were intended (Minichiello, Aroni, Timewell and Alexander 1995, Chapters 4 
and 5). Moreover, as the analysis proceeded, the subjects were sent drafts of how 
their responses were interpreted and asked to confirm or correct them. However, it 
must be acknowledged that while the subjects were generous with their support, time 
and resources limited the time during which fieldwork could be undertaken. Many 
topics other than those selected for discussion could not be discussed or were 
discussed only briefly. If this work is only exploratory, it is to be hoped that others 
will follow and fill out what has been missed or covered only lightly in this study. 
 
The third methodological limitation of this study lies in the sample of past and 
present participants in SL's reforms. The interviews were spread over four months 
from early November 2007 to late February 2008. During this period many bomb 
explosions occurred in the capital city, Colombo, and suburbs due to intensity of 
violence by the Tamil militants. One MP was killed on the 1
st
 of January 2008 in a 
Hindu temple. Another cabinet minister was killed on the way to Parliament. 
Another minister escaped death for the twelfth time when a female suicide bomber 
detonated a bomb in the minister‘s private office while he was consulting his clients 
(Personal observations). I, the researcher, narrowly escaped from the Slave Island 
bomb blast while I was travelling to meet one of the respondents. Accordingly there 
was a .political constraint on the participation of others. But I tried hard to select a 
group most closely involved and those who, by virtue of their experience, would be 
able to bring a wise and expert view and sharp memory to my questions. However, 
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some of the core figures who might have been good to interview were impossible to 
contribute due to failing memory of the past. 
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Chapter 3: Structure and Process of 
Government 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
At Independence (1948), SL inherited a centralised administrative structure with two 
layers: the central government and local government uuntil 1987. This structure was 
continued, with ad hoc modifications, which will be discussed in Chapter 5.  The 13
th
 
Amendment to the Constitution (1987) changed this structure in an attempt at 
devolving power to the Provinces with a view to addressing the ethnic conflict and 
building a three-layer structure: the centre, the province, and local level. 
 
This chapter introduces the current structure and the process of government in SL. It 
examines the power invested in the three arms of the central government machinery: 
the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary, and their operation in relation to public 
administration.   
3.2 Current Composition and Structure of           
Government  
           
3.2.1 General Overview 
 
For administrative purposes SL has been divided into 9 provinces, 25 districts, 312 
Divisional Secretariat divisions and 11,818 Grama Niladari (village officer) 
divisions. Maps of SL indicating provinces and districts are depicted in Appendices 4 
and 5 respectively. Table 1 summarises the composition of the government. 
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Table 1: Composition of the SL Government in 2008 
 
Central Government Provincial Government Local Government 
Presidential Secretariat 
Parliament -225 members 
Judiciary 
Ministries -91             
Departments-85                             
DistrictSecretariats-25            
Divisional  Secretariats-312                 
Grama Niladari Divisions-  11818 
Institutions not coming under any 
ministry - 21 
Public enterprises - 210 
National Public Service Commission 
Provincial Councils- 9  
(elected-8- only 8 are 
operating)  
417 councillors 
Provincial Ministries - 40            
Provincial High Courts 
Provincial Public Service 
Commissions - 8      
Municipal Councils-18 
Urban Councils - 42 
Pradeshiya Sabhas-270 
Total number of members – 
4054 
Sources: Auditor General, 2006; Ministry of Provincial Councils and Local 
Government, 2008; Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs, 2007; and 
Estimates, 2009 
 
In 2001, the 17
th
 Amendment to the Constitution introduced a Constitutional Council 
(CC) and several independent Commissions such as the National Public Service 
Commission (NPSC) and the National Police Commission (NPC) to the 
administrative machinery. This will be discussed in Chapter 5 in detail. The present 
administrative structure is depicted in Appendix 6. 
 
The following sections examine the key elements of this structure, starting from the 
executive president followed by the Parliament, Judiciary, Provincial and Local 
Governments, and the Public Service. 
 
3.2.2 Executive President 
 
The Executive President system came into effect from February 4, 1978 (Parliament, 
2008).  According to Articles 30(1) and 30(2) of the 1978 Constitution, the president 
is the Head of State, the Head of the Executive and of the Government, and the 
Commander in-chief of the Armed Forces.  Unlike the role of earlier Governors 
General and the President, the new role of the Executive President is more powerful 
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and political than ceremonial. The President is elected directly by the people for a 
period of six years, and can hold office only for two terms. As the Head of the 
Executive and of Government the President derives enormous powers and 
functions
10
 from the Constitution which make him/her ―more powerful than the 
Prime Minister could have been under the former system‖ (Wilson, 1980, p. 43).  
 
In addition to the ceremonial role, the President has the power to appoint a prime 
minister, cabinet ministers, non-cabinet ministers, and deputy ministers. The 
President also has the power to determine the number of ministers and assign 
portfolios to them and change such portfolios.  In the absence of a constitutional cap 
on the number of ministers, the President can appoint any number of ministers to the 
Cabinet and outside the Cabinet. The President has the right to assign himself/herself 
any portfolio. For example, President Jayewardene held the portfolios of Defence, 
and Plan Implementation (Wilson, 1980). The present President holds the portfolios 
of Highways and Road Development, Finance and Planning, Defence, Nation 
Building & Estate Infrastructure Development, and Religious Affairs. Most 
importantly, the President can dissolve Parliament after it has served a minimum 
period of one year (Article 70 of 1978 Constitution).  
 
Under this authority the President can undermine the Government if the Prime 
Minister and the President do not belong to the same political party. For example, the 
2001 UNP Government was weakened by the President Kumaratunga, who was the 
leader of the SLFP, by taking over the control of the defence, interior and 
communication ministries from the UNP ministers  and  suspending Parliament in 
late 2003 (De Votta, 2003).  In this particular incident, the President created a more 
complicated situation by taking over the Defence portfolio while the Prime Minister 
had reached a Ceasefire Agreement with Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
11
 
in 2002. In February, 2004, President Kumaratunga sacked the UNP government 
which was expected to govern until 2007 and dissolved Parliament, calling for an 
election (De Votta, 2004). She did this by using her power of proclamation to 
                                                 
10
 Please see Articles 33(a-f), 34,41(1),43(3),44(1a,2 and 3),45(1a),46(1),51,54,65(1),107(1),153(1), 
54 and 156(2) of the Constitution, 1978 for more details. 
11
 LTTE is a terrorist organisation which fights for a separate state in the north and east part of SL. 
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summon, prorogue and dissolve Parliament. This shows that ultimate responsibility 
for maintaining continuity in government lies with the President. 
 
The Constitution empowers the President with some legislative and judicial powers. 
In relation to legislative powers, the President can act on his/her own to determine 
when a Declaration of a State of Emergency becomes necessary.  Parliamentary 
approval comes afterwards. In regard to judicial powers, the President is empowered 
to grant pardon to any offender convicted of any offence in any court within SL.  
 
The President is also empowered to appoint other key positions in government for 
example, Secretary to the Cabinet, Secretaries to Ministries, the Chief Justice and 
other judges of the higher judiciary, and the Heads of Army, Navy, Air Force and the 
Police Force. In addition, the 13
th
 Amendment to the Constitution gives the President 
more power for appointment of Provincial Governors. However, an attempt was 
made to curtail some of the President‘s power under the 17th Amendment to the 
Constitution (Section 3.2.8).  
 
Article 35 of the Constitution provides immunity to the President from law-suit. 
Firstly, no legal action can be instituted against the President (whilst he holds office) 
in any court on any matter. Secondly, the Standing Orders of Parliament do not 
authorise any reference to be made to him/her or for his/her conduct to be questioned 
except on a substantive motion (Wilson, 1980). For the last 30 years the president‘s 
actions were not challenged by any court of law while he/she was in office.  
However, in 2008, for the first time the Supreme Court faulted the former president 
Kumaratunga for abuse of power while she was in office and fined her (Ians, 2008). 
Thirdly, the President can be removed only through a resolution or an impeachment 
adopted by two thirds of the total membership of Parliament. Fourthly, the President 
will not be affected by any adverse vote of confidence against the government in 
Parliament i.e. ―Cabinet goes but the President remains‖ (Wilson, 1980, p. 44).  
 
Under the present structure, the power of government has shifted from the legislature 
to the Presidential Secretariat. For example, ―the President ignored the existing 
strictures passed by the Parliamentary Select Committee for selecting the candidates 
for top public offices‖ (Wijeweera, 1989, p.294). On many occasions the President 
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gave directives on matters and subjects that had been functionally and 
constitutionally assigned to ministers and some occasions President made decisions 
on appointments of Chairmen and Board of Directors to public enterprises (Personal 
observations from 1984-2009, Wijeweera, 1989; Wilson, 1980,).  According to 
Perera (1979), ―It is his policy that prevails and has to be carried out by all the 
ministers including the Prime Minister‖ (as cited in Wanrnapala, 2004, p.24).   
 
The President maintains firm control on the administration and the ministers through 
appointing secretaries to ministries at the centre and appointing Governors at the 
provinces. President Jayewardene obtained undated resignation letters from the 
Members of Parliament of his party as a control mechanism. The most critical factor 
of the Executive President System is that Parliament came to be devalued and the 
Executive ‗one man show‘ overrides collective responsibility of the Cabinet.  
 
In summary, the Executive President is the apex of the SL government structure and 
is over-empowered by the 1978 Constitution, leading to dictatorial tendencies.  As 
the former President Jayewardene boasted, the only thing that the executive President 
cannot do is to turn a woman into a man (Rahman, 2005, p.8). 
  
3.2.3 Parliament 
 
The Parliament of SL is unicameral with 225 members of whom 196 are elected and 
29 nominated by competing political parties in proportion to their share of the 
national vote. Elections are held under universal suffrage and proportional 
representation involving preferential voting for a state of candidates nominated by 
different political parties/groups. Parliament‘s term is for a maximum period of six 
years. Constitutionally, Parliament is the supreme institution that has control over  
legislative agenda and budgetary allocations. However, in practice effective control 
over legislation and budget has been taken over by the President. There are no checks 
and balances by the legislature over the actions of the President, except of course, a 
very difficult procedure of Impeachment.  
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Parliament is highly susceptible to presidential dictates and to the political 
circumstances of the day. This brings a high degree of uncertainty and instability. 
There were political conditions which forced elections before the expiration of the 
period government; for example, both the 2000 SLFP and 2001 UNP governments 
fell and fresh elections were held due to volatility in party politics in Parliament and 
the use of the power of dissolution held by the President respectively.   
3.2.3.1 Organisation of the Parliament 
 
The formal organisation and procedures of the SL Parliament follow British 
parliamentary practices. The majority of legislative responsibilities are delivered 
through Committees.  Currently there are seven committees for special purposes:  
Committee on Selection, Standing Orders, Public Accounts, Public Petitions, 
Privileges, Parliamentary Business, and Public Enterprises. In addition, there are 55 
Consultative Committees (Parliament of Sri Lanka, 2008). The underlying concept 
for having these committees is that they provide adequate safeguards to secure the 
proper use of delegated legislative powers by executive bodies.  
 
Of those Committees, three are important in this study: the Consultative, Public 
Accounts, and Public Enterprises, because they represent parliamentary oversight of 
the executive and allow a direct relationship between public officials and legislature. 
3.2.3.2 Consultative Committees 
 
The Committee of Selection, at the commencement of every session of Parliament, 
appoints consultative committees based on the number of cabinet ministries. This 
number has been increased due to proliferation of ministries over the years; for 
example; in 1996 there were 25 consultative committees. In 2000 this number was 
increased to 45 (Warnapala, 2004). Today this number has further increased to 55 
(Parliament of Sri Lanka, 2008).The objective of these committees is to discuss both 
the formulation and implementation of policies of ministries, thereby increasing the 
efficiency of public institutions. However, in practice participation of members in 
committee meetings is very week, and they discuss matters relating to their 
individual interests rather than implementation of policies, so that the performance of 
these committees so far is inadequate. (Personal observation). 
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According to Warnapala (2004, pp. 49-50),  
A few interested MPs with a number of issues which have a direct relevance to 
constituency needs and grievances attended the meetings for example, appointments, 
promotions, and basic electorate needs such as construction of schools, hospitals, 
shortage of teachers dominate in meetings. They got the opportunity to criticise or praise 
the members of bureaucracy who were present and their commissions and omissions were 
discussed. The Committees did not play a role in reviewing administration and they failed 
to play a role in initiating any legislation though on certain occasions certain initiatives 
were taken on as matters of national importance.  
 
In essence it is the intention of the members to discuss specific administrative 
decisions rather than function as legislative oversight committees. As expected, these 
committees do not seem to exercise their legitimate role i.e. legislative oversight over 
administrative activity.  
 
3.2.3.3 Committee on Public Accounts (COPA) and   
Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE) 
 
The parliament, through COPA and COPE, examines the Auditor General‘s (AG) 
report thoroughly to ensure financial accountability in public business. Both 
committees are composed of 24 members, 12 each from the ruling party and the 
Opposition, nominated by the Committee on Selection. The committees' main 
mandate is to review the annual audit reports of the Office of the AG. COPA is 
responsible for reviewing annual reports of the AG in regard to ministries, 
departments and other government agencies while COPE is entrusted with 
overseeing public finance in regard to public enterprises (PEs) such as Ceylon 
Electricity Board and SL Ports Authority.  
 
These Committees emerged from the notion of public accountability that  
on behalf of the public, the Parliament, is fully empowered to exercise highest level of 
supervisory control over public resources including public finance made use by the 
executive in conformity with legislative provisions made by Parliament through the 
Annual appropriation Act and all other applicable statutes, in order to make sure that such 
resources are being made use economically, efficiently, and effectively, i.e. To (sic) 
ensure optimum utilisation of the resources for achieving the intended objectives for 
improving the well being of the general public, the owners of these resources (Auditor 
General, 2006, p.19).  
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Figure 2 below describes how COPA and COPE fit into the process of public 
accountability in SL. 
Figure 2: The Process of Public Accountability 
 
Source: Auditor General, 2007, p. 10 
 
Formally, Parliament has power to approve the budget of the Government each 
through the Annual Appropriation Act. Once it is approved, the Ministry of Finance 
is responsible for its effective implementation in its entirety while other ministries 
are liable for implementing their respective components. The AG is constitutionally 
responsible for the review of accounts of public institutions: ministries, departments, 
public enterprises and business undertakings and report to parliament. This report 
includes findings on matters related to non-compliance, deficiencies in systems and 
procedures, misuse of money and other resources, corruption or fraud. However, this 
report does not cover the overall efficiency and the effectiveness of the use of public 
money due to a lack of performance audit system.  The SL financial management 
system does not classify expenses by output or outcome. Therefore, the expectation 
of the use of public funds efficiently and effectively (in the SL context) as mentioned 
by the AG is limited. The Standing Orders of parliament facilitate the COPE and 
COPA to request any information they need to carry out their functions effectively. 
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Conventionally, investigations are confined to those points highlighted in the AG‘s 
report, but the committee has the power to go beyond that if needed.  
 
COPA and COPE summons the Chief Accounting Officers (Secretaries of 
Ministries), Accounting Officers (Heads of Departments), and executives of Public 
Enterprises in their deliberations. The increased involvement of government 
activities in all spheres in the economy and the proliferation of ministries have 
increased the volume of work of COPA.  The complexity of issues in the public 
organisations such as changes of functions and changes in ministries and departments 
are so often key challenges faced by the COPA today (Auditor General, 2006; 
Warnapala, 2004).    
 
Professor Wiswa Warnapala who has been the Chair of the COPA from 1995-2000, 
in his Parliament and Public Accountability in Sri Lanka (2004),  mentioned that 
there are a number of deficiencies that hinder effective deliberation. These include 
poor attendance, inattention to policy matters, lack of interest due to bulky nature of 
estimates and tiring processes to go through them, few opportunities to discuss 
matters in detail,  no clear understanding among political parties on matters 
pertaining to the proper utilisation of the Committee Stage, inadequate technical 
capabilities of the parliamentary staff in facilitating the members, limited 
information, hesitancy of Chief Accounting Officers to divulge sensitive information, 
narrow scope of their functions, and lack of time to study the reports submitted by 
the ministries.   
 
In addition, there are other policy issues in relation to committee meetings. Unlike 
other Commonwealth countries, COPA and COPE deliberations in SL are not 
transparent. ―Because of provisions in section 130A of the Standing Orders and 
section 17 of the Parliamentary Powers and Privileges Act, neither the public nor the 
media are allowed to witness the proceedings‖ (World Bank, 2003, p. 40). They are 
held ‗in camera‘. This situation hinders their effectiveness. There is no incentive for 
the members of these two committees to meet regularly, prepare adequately for 
meetings, conduct qualitative performance review, and have useful and meaningful 
dialogue. Meetings were postponed owing to lack of a quorum, and the Committee 
faced the problem of a backlog of audit reports for review. Therefore, the Committee 
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was inclined to bunch reviews together. The World Bank (2003, p.40) highlighted 
that, 
on review of COPA agenda for a particular meeting, it was revealed that just over an hour 
was allocated for reviewing the audit reports of four agencies with expenditure over $11.5 
million, while COPE, for just one day summoned 15 corporations.  
 
However, unlike in the past, the committee reports have now been published. The 
COPA and COPE 2007 reports are noteworthy and will be discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
Overall there is a lack of commitment in the operation of committees. According to 
Warnapala (2004), during 1948-1970 there were seven Select Committees to embark 
on the revision of the Constitution but none produced a report on the revision. 
 
3.2.4 Judiciary  
 
The Judicial system also plays a key role in the public sector. The Constitution of 
1978 guarantees the independence of the judicial system, which has the fundamental 
responsibility to preserve democratic values (Articles 107,110,112, 115, 116, and 
117). Appointment, transfer, dismissal, and disciplinary control of judicial officers
12
 
and other public officers serving within the judicial system are vested with the 
Judicial Service Commission, which is composed of three members: the Chief 
Justice as the Chairman and two other Supreme Court Judges. In addition to 
independence, the Constitution requires the judiciary to be open in their proceedings 
by requiring every court to be held in public, and all persons being entitled to attend 
freely.  
3.2.4.1 Role of the Courts in Administrative Matters 
 
Public officials and institutions are required to be ‗fair in action‘ and maintain the 
―principles of administrative law in decision making: principle of natural justice13, 
the rule that requires a decision maker to hear both sides, and the requirement that a 
                                                 
12
 ―Judicial officer‖ includes all officers except a judge of a Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeal 
or of the High Court. 
13
 Natural justice is the concept of fairness: justice must not only be done but must appear or seen to 
be done. 
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person must not be a judge in his own cause and the doctrine of ultra vires or beyond 
the powers‖ (Weerasooria, 2004, p. 146). Public organisations, including courts, are 
obliged to safeguard the fundamental rights of the people in their decisions and 
actions.  When their decisions and actions are flawed the higher courts namely the 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal have the power to correct them. Article 141 
of the Constitution empowers the Court of Appeal to issue writs
14
. 
 
As in the case of other countries the court system in SL is costly and experiencing 
excessive delays in concluding proceedings (Weerasooria, 2004). Therefore, the 17
th
 
Amendment to the Constitution (2001) introduced an Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal (AAT). A separate Act, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act, No. 4 
was passed in 2002 and the members were appointed by the Judicial Service 
Commission for a term of three years. It is composed of three members, including 
the Chairman, and vested with powers to hear any appeal referred to it by an 
aggrieved public or police officer regarding any order or decision made by the 
National Public Service Commission (NPSC) and the National Police Commission 
(NPC) respectively. It also has the power to alter, vary or rescind any order or 
decision and to call for any reports, documents, or other materials. The decisions of 
the AAT are final and cannot be questioned in any court of law. The independence of 
the Tribunal is ensured by the Constitution. In this respect, no suit can be filed 
against the Tribunal in any lawful act done or omitted to be done in good faith. 
Therefore, it is an improvement on the provisions of the 1972 and 1978 
Constitutions, which will be discussed in Chapter 5. Accordingly, public officials 
and police officers now have the opportunity for further appeal without much cost or 
delay.  In the recent past, the involvement of judiciary in public administrative 
matters has been limited. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  
 
                                                 
14
 Writ of Certiorari: quash or cancel an illegal, unjust or a wrongful decision; Writ of Prohibition:  
stop a public officer or a body from arriving at a wrongful decisions; Writ of Habeas Corpus: direct 
people to be produced before courts when any person improperly detained in public or private 
custody; Writ of Mandamus: direct the public official or state body to arrive at a particular decision. 
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3.2.5 Provincial Councils (PCs) 
 
The PCs have become the second tier of the administrative structure of SL from 
November 1987 with the devolution of political and administrative power to the sub-
national level under the 13
th
 Amendment to the Constitution. The evolution of PCs 
will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
This constitutional reform brought radical changes to the centralised form of 
governance which SL inherited from its colonial masters. The 9
th
 schedule of the 13
th
 
Amendment to the Constitution indicates the ‗devolved subjects‘ under List I, whilst 
categorising the ‗reserved subjects‘ for the central government under List II. It 
specifies the reserved subjects as ―national policy on all subjects and functions‖. List 
III specifies the ‗concurrent subjects‘ coming within the jurisdictions of the centre 
and the provinces. Subjects in List I and List III
15
 can overlap and have been matters 
for controversy as well as conflict between the central government institutions and 
the PCs. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  
 
Until 2007, there were 7 elected PCs with 380 members - Central (58), Western 
(104), Southern (55), North Central (33), North Western (52), Uva (34) and 
Sabaragamuwa (44). The North and East provinces which were merged by the Indo-
Lanka Accord in 1989 have separated, as per the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
October 16, 2006, into two separate provinces (the North Province and East 
Province) after a period of approximately 20 years (Eastern Provincial Council, 
2009). The administration of the two provinces was brought under two Governors 
from January 1, 2007. After the liberation of the Eastern Province from the LTTE, 
the PC election was held in May 2008. A break-away faction of LTTE contested the 
election in alliance with SLFP (governing party) and established the Eastern PC, thus 
a former LTTE insurgent in the East became the Chief Minister of that province 
(Wickramasinghe, 2009).  Accordingly, there are eight elected PCs functioning at 
present.  The setting up of an elected PC in the North, which has been run by public 
officials since 1990, may be possible after resettlement of the displaced people of the 
North.  
                                                 
15
 For details see the ninth schedule of the 13
th
 Amendment to the Constitution of 1978. 
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3.2.5.1 Organisation and Powers of the Governor  
 
The PCs are organised in the way that the ARC of 1986/88 recommended. 
Accordingly, each province has its Governor appointed by the President, a Council 
elected by the people of the Province, and a Board of Ministers, headed by a Chief 
Minister (CM), who is responsible for the Council (Appendix 5). The Provincial 
Governor is the apex in the PC set-up. He holds office ―during the pleasure of the 
president‖ for a term of five years (―The Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978‖).  
 
As in the case of Executive President of SL, the Governor of the province derives 
direct executive powers from the Constitution. They include the powers to appoint 
the CM, summon, prorogue or dissolve the Council (subject to the advice of the 
CM), make laws, rules and regulations, and make a report to the President on an 
errant PC. Furthermore, he is empowered to determine all matters relating to 
members of the Provincial Public Service, including the formulation of schemes of 
recruitment, appointments, promotions, transfers, dismissal, and disciplinary control 
for such officers (―The Provincial Councils Act No. 42 of 1987‖). The Governor can 
delegate these powers to the Provincial Public Service Commission (PPSC). The 
PPSC in turn can re-delegate its delegated power to the Chief Secretary or to any 
officer in the province.  
 
The PC Act requires the Governor to appoint three persons for a period of five years 
to the PPSC. One of them will be nominated as the Chairman of the Commission by 
the Governor. Accordingly, the PPSC is not an independent body. According to 
Article 33 (8), the Governor of the province has the power ―to alter, vary, and rescind 
any appointment, order of transfer, or dismissal or any other order, relating to 
disciplinary matters made by the PPSC of that province.‖ As such the Governor can 
legally manipulate the decisions of the PPSC and bring political justifications into 
such matters. Thus, the future of a Provincial public servant is dependent on the 
decision of the Governor, who is a nominated political figure, sometimes a singer, 
actor, lawyer, retired member of the police service or armed forces, a defeated MP or 
minister, or anybody.   
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The legislative power of the province is vested with the Council. Each PC functions 
through a Board of Ministers consisting of the Chief Minster and four other ministers 
appointed by the Governor. The Board of Ministers is collectively responsible and 
answerable to the PC. 
 
The Governor allocates responsibilities among the Ministers on the advice of the 
CM; for example the CM, Western Provincial Council is entrusted with Finance, 
Planning, Employment, Law and Order, Education, Cultural and Art Affairs, Local 
Government and Provincial Administration and Transport- Western Province. The 
other four are: 
 
Lands, Agriculture, Minor Irrigation, Animal Production, Health and 
Tourism activities; 
 
Health, Indigenous Medicine, Social Welfare, Probation and Child 
Care; 
 
Electricity, Provincial Roads, Co-operatives and Trade, Food and 
Water; and  
 
Sports, Youth Affairs, Women‘s Affairs, Fisheries, Rural Industries, 
Rural Development and Rural Institutions, Housing and Constructions 
(Western Provincial Council, 2009). 
 
The allocation of tasks to ministries has no coherence; for example, Animal 
Production is dealt with by one ministry while Fisheries are dealt with by another 
ministry.   
3.2.5.2 President’s Power over PCs 
 
The President also has power in regard to PCs. Under the 13
th
 Amendment to the 
Constitution the President is vested with powers to take over the administration of 
the PC under himself or the Parliament if the President ―is satisfied on a report from 
the governor or otherwise, that a situation has arisen in which the administration of 
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the Province cannot be carried on in accordance with the provision of the 
Constitution‖ (Article 154L of the Constitution, 1987). When the powers of the PC 
are conferred on Parliament, the President is empowered to authorise expenditure 
from the Provincial Fund with the approval of Parliament. 
 
Furthermore, in times of emergency the President can declare that all executive and 
legislative powers of the PCs will be exercised by him or by Parliament. In addition, 
the central government can pass regulations to override, amend, or suspend the 
operation of a PC‘s statute. These provisions are inevitable because the PCs are set 
up under the unitary structure of the Republican Constitution. These powers have 
been highly criticised by the Tamils since the inception of PCs because they expected 
full autonomy in PCs‘ administration. Therefore, the role of the President in 
maintaining the balance between central government control to safeguard the unitary 
structure and fulfilment of the aspirations of the Tamils through the PC system, even 
after winning the war against the LTTE in May 2009, is not insignificant but vital. 
3.2.5.3 Divisional Secretariats  
 
The unique feature in the administrative decentralisation was the creation of 
Divisional Secretariats. The powers enjoyed by the Government Agents (GA) in 
districts under different legislations were statutorily transferred to the Divisional 
Secretaries (DSs) by the Transfer of Powers (Divisional Secretary) Act No. 58 of 
1992. This position gives autonomy to DS. Under the delegated power of the NPSC, 
the Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs deals with the appointment, 
promotion, transfer, disciplinary control, and dismissal of the DS. Accordingly, the 
primary loyalties of the DS lie with the centre. The DS, being an officer of the 
central government, becomes core administrator in the periphery by fulfilling dual 
roles – central and provincial. He/She reports to the Chief Secretary at the Province 
on devolved responsibilities but maintains the role of Assistant Government Agent, 
representing the GA for non-devolved subjects. This office facilitates almost all the 
public services to local people; for example, issuance of birth, marriage and death 
certificates, licences, and provision of social services.  
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3.2.6 Local Government 
 
With the introduction of the PC system, local governments became the third tier of 
the administrative structure in SL. They consist of Municipal Councils (MCs), Urban 
Councils (UCs) and Pradeshiya Sabhas (PSs) with 4054 elected members (Ministry 
of Finance and Planning, 2009). Basically, the MCs are established for major cities, 
UCs for large but less urbanised towns and PSs for the rural areas. Although it is 
usually considered that MCs and UCs are ‗urban‘ and PSs are ‗rural‘ local 
authorities, there is no formal definition of the terms ‗rural‘ and ‗urban‘ in the SL 
context (Commission of Inquiry on Local Government Reforms, 1999, p.39). 
 
These three institutions execute their legitimate functions deriving powers from their 
respective Ordinances and other laws: the Constitution (Article 154), various 
enactments, Provincial Council Statutes, subsidiary legislations. The central Ministry 
of Provincial Councils and Local Government formulates the major policies in 
relation to local governments while exercising close scrutiny over their activities. As 
a result, there have been occasions where the chairmen of council were removed, or 
an entire council suspended or dissolved on Ministry findings of malpractices and 
incompetence; for example, the Colombo MC was dissolved in November 2008 and 
its affairs is administered by the City Commissioner (―Sri Lanka Government 
suspends Colombo Municipal Council ‖, 2008).  
 
The 13
th
 Amendment to the Constitution puts the ‗local government‘ in List I as 
mentioned before. Therefore, PCs also have the power to make statutes in relation to 
local authorities. However, that power is limited. Under Article 154G of the 13
th
 
Amendment to the Constitution, the PCs are empowered to legislate ―additional 
power on local authorities but not to take away.‖  Therefore, PCs cannot reduce the 
powers of local authorities.  
   
3.2.7 Public Service 
 
The SLPS is the major contributor and key employer in realising development goals. 
History reveals that at the dawn of Independence (1948) SL had a well trained, 
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experienced and capable bureaucracy, independent public service and a coherent 
administrative system (Kearney, 1973).  
 
Since then SLPS has expanded with an extensive range of new functions and 
responsibilities. As a result, the public service has been confronted with many 
challenges and serious repercussions over time and has been subjected to political, 
economic and social stresses. Ever-increasing political involvement and interference 
in all sectors in the public service have been the major bottleneck for development 
and reforms, and have ―impaired internal systems and processes‖ (Presidential 
Commission on Youth, 1990). Many elements of the bureaucracy and administration 
also led to this situation. The public service has been subjected to criticism by the 
public, private sector, international agencies, and politicians for lethargy, 
inefficiency, ineffectiveness, insensitivity to public needs and wants, corruption, lack 
of initiatives and being reactive rather than proactive, and backward-looking (ARC, 
1986/88; COPE, 2007; Kearney, 1973; Root et al., 2001; Presidential Commission on 
Youth, 1990; World Bank, 2003).  
 
Despite these problems, the SLPS comprises much of SL‘s talent and inspired 
expertise, men and women with diligence, which is an important factor for the 
progress achieved so far, and hope for future reforms and progress, despite 
uncertainty in the country. 
 
SLPS is composed of the State Sector, the Provincial Public Sector, and the Semi-
Government Sector. The State Sector includes all the ministries and departments 
coming under the purview of the central government while the Provincial Public 
Sector includes the ministries and institutions functioning under the PCs. The Semi-
Government Sector includes the Co-operations, Statutory Boards, Authorities, and 
State Banks under the Central Government, and Public–Private Companies.  
 
SLPS is stratified into three levels on the basis of status and pay: managerial, 
subordinate employees, and minor office employees. The managerial level is 
composed of administrative, professional, and technical officers, termed ―staff 
officers‖ with managers in the ‗All Island Services‘ (AISs), managers not belonging 
to any of the AISs and managers who do not come under any Ministry. The AISs 
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include 11 parallel services (Appendix 7). The ―subordinate employees‖ include 
management assistants, translators, and a number of other categories of public 
servants. The Management Assistants Service was created in 2005 by the 
amalgamation of several parallel subordinate services. This will be further discussed 
in Chapter 5. At the bottom of the hierarchy, termed ―Office Employees‖, are lower 
grade workers such as peons, messengers, and labourers. 
 
All these services are called ‗Combined Services,‘ which supply human resources to 
the government ministries, departments and institutions in the central government as 
well as to the provincial governments. Thus, employees in these services are 
transferable to any part of the country.  
 
3.2.8 The Constitutional Council (CC) 
 
The CC was added to the administrative structure in 2001 by the 17
th
 Amendment to 
the Constitution.  It is the apex of the new constitutional regime in relation to the 
public service. The CC comes within the ambit of parliament with the Speaker as its 
Chairman and nine other members: the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, 
one person appointed by the President, five persons appointed by the President on 
joint nominations of the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, of whom 
two shall be nominated to represent minority communities and interests, and one 
person nominated by the MPs of the small political parties or independent groups 
who do not belong to either the PM‘s or the Leader of the Opposition‘s parties. The 
Constitution requires a mandatory process of consultation with the leaders of 
political parties and independent groups represented in Parliament for these 
nominations.  
 
Article 41B (1) of the 17
th
 Amendment to the Constitution states: 
No person shall be appointed by the President as the chairman or a member of any of the 
Commissions specified in the schedule to this Article, except on a recommendation of the 
Council.  
 
With the agreement of the CC, therefore, the President can appoint the members and 
chairmen of the Election Commission, National Public Service Commission, 
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National Police Commission, Human Rights Commission, Bribery and Corruption 
Commission, Finance Commission, and Delimitation Commission.  
 
Article 41C (1) states,  
No person shall be appointed by the President to any of the offices specified in the 
schedule to this Article, unless such appointment has been approved by the Council upon 
a recommendation made to the Council by the President. 
 
The schedule includes the Chief Justice, Judges of the Supreme Court, President and 
the Judges of the Court of Appeal, members of the Judicial Service Commission 
other than the Chairman, Attorney General, Auditor General, Inspector General of 
Police, Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (Ombudsman), and 
Secretary General of Parliament. According to this Amendment, the President now 
cannot appoint anyone to those positions without the approval of the CC. Under 
Article 41C(4) the Council has to obtain the views of the Chief Justice and the 
Attorney General relating to the appointments of Judges of the Supreme Court and 
the President and Judges of the Court of Appeal. In the execution of its functions on 
recommendation, approval or decision, the Council should try to act unanimously. In 
the absence of unanimity at least five members should support a decision.  
 
Accordingly, the President‘s power in relation to key appointments envisaged by the 
1978 Constitution was restricted by the 17
th
 Amendment. Although the Amendment 
was passed in 2001, the CC was finally established in March 2002. It recommended 
members for the NPSC, Police Commission and Election Commission to the 
President. The President appointed members only to the first two Commissions 
(Wijeweera, 2006). Due to a controversy between the President and the CC over the 
nomination of the Chair of the Election Commission, this was not established and is 
yet to be realised.  
 
The tenure of the CC members was three years, which ended the first Councillors‘ 
term in March 2005. From that date up to this writing, the CC ceased to operate due 
to non-appointment of its members by the President. Until January 2007, this was 
delayed due to non-consensus of the minority parties over one member (one person 
nominated upon agreement by the majority of the MPs belonging to political parties 
or independent groups other than the respective political parties or independent 
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groups to which the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition belongs and 
appointed by the President).  
 
Dr. B.S. Wijeweera, former GA, in an interview responding to the claim of minority 
parties said that, 
Ultimately what you have to have in the CC are good people of integrity.  It matters very 
little whether that person of integrity is nominated by one party or the other. They are 
sticking to the claim that this person should be appointed by me or no one else. In my 
view, it is a silly argument. What you have to find are good people of integrity who can 
be vested with that responsibility. Does not matter who proposes ultimately if you can 
agree that the individual is good (Interview, 09.01.2008).  
 
He further said, 
On the first occasion when it was implemented, Parliament was very magnanimous and 
they supported by nominating their representatives to the Council. On this occasion 
because of the disunity of the Parliament they were unable to nominate one person. The 
unity which gave rise to the setting up the Council was not there now, then somewhere it 
will breakdown.  That was made use of by the President (Interview, 09.01.2008)  
 
Because of this problem, the two Commissions, the NPSC and the Police, were out 
of office with the expiry of the terms in November and December 2005 respectively. 
In the absence of the CC, there was an uncertainty in their re-appointments. As a 
result, the President took the liberty and used his discretionary power to appoint 
members to these institutions on his own because of the urgent need of such action, 
although it was not the correct procedure to follow.  
 
Eventually, in January 2008 all the minority parties agreed to nominate the former 
AG to the CC, but this nomination was not accepted by the government, saying that 
he is currently employed in one of the Projects in Parliament. In the meantime, the 
Prime Minister announced in Parliament that the government will not establish the 
CC until the recommendations of the Parliamentary Select Committee appointed on 
September 6, 2006 ―to look into the operation of 17th Amendment to the 
Constitution‖, finalise and make further amendments to the Constitution addressing 
the existing shortfalls. According to one respondent
16
 of this study, the report of the 
Select Committee was lying on one of the desks in Parliament. The Opposition is of 
the view that the President should act according to the present Constitution, thus he 
                                                 
16
 In this case the respondent is to be anonymous. 
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violates the Constitution by not appointing members already nominated and he 
should not wait until further amendments. The lack of political will on reform due to 
unwillingness of the executive to lose his power has jeopardised the spirit of the 
reform. This also shows that accountability is lacking in the political system of the 
country.  The evolution and problems of CC will be further discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
In other jurisdictions such as New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Australia public 
sector reforms were initiated by ministers, public servants or major reviews.  Against 
the above backdrop, it is very difficult to imagine that such initiatives in SL could be 
made without the support of the Executive President. 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter introduced the structure and functioning of the SL‘s government at three 
levels, the centre, province and the local level. It also explained the powers of the 
executive, legislature and the judiciary in relation to public administration which is 
the main focus of this study. Further, it described composition of the public service 
in brief along with the introduction of the new agency, CC.  
 
The outstanding feature of the structure is the power of the President. The position 
has wide-ranging, centralised executive power. It flows through the administrative 
structure from the central government agencies, through the ministers and the 
secretaries of ministries to the provincial administrative set-up through the 
Governors and the President‘s reserve powers in respect of provincial councils. The 
effective growth of the President‘s power over legislature and in some areas of the 
judiciary is also enormous. This authority of the President over all spheres of the 
administrative machinery undermines the legislative power to a greater extent and 
hinders the effective checks and balances by the legislature over the executive. 
Moreover, the current structure lacks an overall coordination body for central, 
provincial and local government functions.  
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Chapter 4: The Current Situation of  
Public Administration in SL  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Having discussed the structure and process of government in SL, this chapter reviews 
the current functioning of the public administration in SL and highlights issues in the 
present system that need to be addressed. Therefore, the main objective of this 
chapter is to identify and discuss the current problems in public administration in SL.  
 
This chapter has three parts. Part I discusses the scope of public administration, 
structural and service delivery deficiencies in the current setup, both central and 
provincial governments, and their implications for public administration. The 
interventions of the Supreme Court in correction of mistakes in service deliveries are 
also highlighted. This part then discusses some positive aspects of country‘s public 
administration with a view to highlighting that there are possibilities for future 
reforms. Thereafter, it evaluates the performance of public enterprises. 
 
Part II examines the numbers of people deployed to carry out those roles and 
responsibilities, their costs, the manner in which those cadres are managed including 
appointments, manpower planning, transfers, promotions, performance management 
and training. Part III reviews other critical areas in public administration such as 
corruption; trade unionism; shortfalls in systems and procedures and financial 
management systems. The objective of the analysis is to understand the complexity 
and specificity of the present situation. 
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4.2 Part I: Scope of Public Administration, 
Structural and Service Delivery Problems, 
Positive Aspects of SL’s Public Administration 
and Public Enterprises 
 
4.2.1 Scope of Public Administration 
 
The key tasks performed by the government through the administrative system are: 
provision of public goods, and services:  fiscal management: maintenance of law and 
order; facilitation of economic activities; policy management; regulatory measures 
that need to be taken to safeguard the consumers, industries, labour force, investors, 
and the environment. 
 
The primary objectives of the government are the promotion of economic 
development and social wellbeing of the citizens through effective policies, and 
efficient delivery of such roles and functions. Accordingly, public administration has 
an implicit and explicit role in achieving the above objectives.  
 
Nevertheless, many of the functions that are currently performed by the 
administrative institutions could, after almost three decades of a changeover to a 
market economy, be equally effectively performed by the private and non-
governmental agencies (Wanasinghe, 2005) or through public-private partnerships 
with proper guidance and regulations. The continuous retention of those functions by 
the government is a major setback due to lack of willingness to cede the advantage of 
power by the political and administrative cadres.   
 
Therefore, the role of the SLPS has to be viewed in the context of policy changes that 
have been taken place in the economy in 1977, and also administrative apparatus in 
1989, which had direct bearing on public administration. When market liberalisation, 
deregulation, corporatisation and privatisation commenced in 1977, state intervention 
and the role of the government should have been reduced to the role of a facilitator 
and a regulator. However, these reforms were done in isolation, without 
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commensurate changes in the administrative system, which was a necessity for its 
effectiveness.   
 
Vijitha Herath, MP, JVP, in an interview, remarked, 
With the open economy policy our Financial Regulations, Establishment Code and 
administrative systems should have been changed in commensurate with that change. But 
it did not happen. In Singapore when they open the economy they changed the 
management of the administrative system in parallel to suit that change. Since SL did not 
do such things, people faced problems. When they go to a public office, there are always 
delays in service and there are no systematic approaches. When they go to a private 
institution they found that they are treated better. Therefore, a strong criticism emerged to 
say that public sector is inefficient and useless (Interview, 18.01. 2008).     
 
The open economy policy has been carried out by successive governments 
irrespective of the political party in power. However, privatisation was abandoned 
with the change of government in 2005 under the ‗Mahinda Chintana‘ philosophy 
(Minister of Finance and Planning, 2006), so that the role of government once again 
was set back to pre-1977 period: the policy maker, service provider, facilitator, 
controller, and regulator.  
 
Similarly, SL followed the policy of decentralisation of administration from the early 
1970s which created deconcentrated administrative structures. The policy of 
devolution was adopted with the passing of the 13
th
 Amendment to the Constitution 
in 1987. With devolution of power some of the powers and responsibilities of the 
centre were handed over to newly-created Provincial Councils as mentioned before. 
Accordingly, the administrative units of the central government had to be reduced in 
theory but in practice they have increased and continue to perform through central 
agencies. Thus, the control of such functions is still retained by the ministries 
because this change did not accompany a vigorous institutional restructuring - ―What 
was effected was an attempt to tinker with the existing partially deconcentrated 
institutional structures that were directed from the centre‖ (Wanasinghe, 2005, p. 3). 
This attempt was unplanned, hurried, and manipulated by India, mainly as a solution 
to the ethnic problem in the country with a desperate urgency to show that devolution 
had taken place from the centre to the provinces (see 5.4.10 for details on evolution 
of PC). This unplanned exercise generated many deficiencies in current public 
management which will be discussed next.  
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4.2.2 Structural and Service Delivery Problems  
         (Centre and Provinces)  
 
At present, there are several deficiencies in the administrative structure and service 
delivery mechanisms. The lack of real autonomy below the centre and proper 
coordination, parallel institutional structures, proliferation of ministries, duplication 
of functions and a large numbers of public enterprises are some of them which will 
be discussed in detail below.  
4.2.2.1 Structural Problems 
 
Lack of Real Autonomy of Authority and Responsibility below the 
Centre  
 
The essence of devolution depends on the extent to which it allows the PCs to take 
decisions in the exercise of powers that are explained in the enactment 
(Gunawardane, n.d). The ‗national policy on all subjects and functions‘  in the 
Reserved List of the 9
th
 schedule of the 13
th
 Amendment to the Constitution has been 
always used by the Centre to control the actions of the PCs.  In addition, the lack of 
effective authority over finances, human resources, and enactment of statutes by the 
Provinces has contributed to the weakening of the provincial administration. 
 
Financing  
 
Each PC has a Provincial Fund for financing. It is composed of revenue earned by 
the province from the devolved subjects and financial grants and loans from the 
Centre. The Provincial List does include a narrow revenue base for most of the 
Provinces except the Western Province
17
, thus imposing serious financial constraints 
on the Provinces. According to the World Bank (2003, p. 21), the PCs depend on the 
Central Government for more than 80% of their financing needs.  
 
 
                                                 
17
 The Western Province composed of Colombo, Gampaha and Kalutara administrative districts with 
5.6 million population (2007) is the economic hub of the country. .  
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In an interview, Dr. B.S. Wijeweera, former GA, said, 
Another major issue which is unresolved yet is centralisation of revenue in the central 
government. Import duties, taxes and excise duties are centralised. The provinces find it 
difficult to get the wherewithal to carry out their functions and administration, so any 
strategy to devolve functions to outstations you have to give them viable financial 
mechanisms where they can generate sufficient revenues in order to run their 
administration. Now it is not there (Interview, 09.01.2008). 
Administratively those funds are transferred to the PCs through the account of a 
central line ministry, the Ministry of Provincial Councils and Local Government by 
the Treasury, which is also a matter of concern. Of even greater concern is the 
involvement of the Finance Commission which is appointed by the President for the 
recommendation of the budget transfers to the Provinces. It represents only the 
central views. One of the interviewees
18
 of this study mentioned that the decisions of 
the Finance Commission are influenced and dominated by its two ex-officio 
members, the Governor of the Central Bank and the Secretary to the Treasury. 
 
According to the World Bank (2003), the financial constraints at the Centre, weak 
capacity of the Finance Commission, and dependency on the Central Government 
have made provincial budgeting ineffective. According to Fernando, the financial 
constraints in the Centre further exacerbated timely disbursement to the provinces 
(Interview, 09.01.2008).  
Figure 3: Financial Releases by the Treasury to PCs from 2005-2008 
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2009 
                                                 
18
 In this case the interviewee wanted to be anonymous. 
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According to Figure 3, a large sum of money (88%) has been allocated and released 
for recurrent expenses including salaries and other maintenance costs whilst 
insignificant amount has been allocated and released to PCs by the Treasury for 
capital work (12%) from 2005-2008. The current civil service salaries of the PCs 
alone accounts for over 65% of their total expenditures. The limited fiscal 
decentralisation has resulted in limited progress in the PCs, thus, their existence is 
problematic. In an interview, Dr. Abeywardene, former GA said, ―Huge amount of 
money is spent for survival of the PCs. It is in fact a waste of money‖ (Interview, 
22.11.2007). However, under the present circumstances in the country effective PCs 
would be desirable. 
 
According to the Ministry of Provincial Councils and Local Government (2008), 
there are regular delays in disbursements of funds by the Treasury. These constraints 
ultimately contribute to negative effects and shortfalls in the development agenda of 
the Provinces. The PCs complain that the monthly disbursement of funds is hardly 
sufficient to meet their commitments and liabilities which in turn affect their 
credibility and image. However, in certain instances a lack of proper financial control 
by the PCs has led to mismanagement of funds.  
Vijitha Herath, MP, JVP, commented on the flow of finance to the PCs,  
The finance flows from the Centre to the Provinces‘ duplicate functions. Funds comes 
from the Treasury to the Line Ministry [Provincial Council and Local Government] and 
then to PCs. There are people to handle such function in each set-up, thus duplicating 
work.  
In addition, if the Central Government is one party and the PC is another party, the 
financial allocation is always curtailed. This is same even for Pradeshiya Sabha. If the PC 
is SLFP and the Pradeshiya Sabha is UNP money is cut to prevent them strengthening 
their political base.  Unfortunately the public does not get required service due to conflict 
in the political authorities in three levels (Interview, 18.01.2008). 
 
Further, there is an inequality of revenue base. In 2008, the total revenue of PCs was 
SLRs 21455 million, of which Western PC accounted for SLRs 13147 million 
whereas Uva only accounted for SLRs 618 million. According to Figure 4, the 
North/East accounted for a negligible amount of revenue, SLRs 41 million. 
Accordingly, the inequality of revenue base in provinces leads to inequality in 
development. This huge gap between provinces in the development ultimately leads 
to discrimination of access to opportunities for goods and services to the public in 
those areas. 
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Figure 4: Devolved Revenue by the Provinces from 2004-2008 
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Although the PCs are not allowed to negotiate directly with donors for foreign 
assistance, certain PCs get foreign funds with the help of central ministries for their 
development projects, for example, health and education (Gunawardena, n.d). Those 
initiatives are mainly based on the quality, ability, and the commitment of the 
leadership of the Province and the goodwill it enjoys with the government. However, 
at present rural road development projects implemented by PCs are funded by 
foreign aid.   
 
Nevertheless, the divisional level takes on a new meaning and significance in the 
scheme of decentralised administration. From a public policy perspective, merely an 
administrative devolution will not be effective with limited fiscal decentralisation. 
Today the PCs suffer from inadequacy of financial resources due to limited financial 
decentralisation. The self-sufficiency of PCs was impossible, despite granting 
spending and revenue powers to PCs. Their own revenue accounts for less than 17% 
of their expenditures (ADB, 2004a). Therefore, they heavily depend on the centre. 
Table 2 shows the degree of decentralisation in SL which was 16% of total 
expenditure of government in 1990. This has substantially reduced thereafter. 
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Table 2: Degree of Decentralisation 1990-2004 
Year Revenue ratio 1 Revenue ratio 2 Expenditure ratio 1 Expenditure ratio 2 
1990 n.a n.a 13.5 16.3 
1991 13.7 2.5 8.7 10.7 
1992 13.9 2.7 9.8 12.1 
1993 13.5 2.7 9.7 12.6 
1994 14.2 2.6 9.6 12.6 
1995 13.4 3.0 8.3 11.1 
1996 13.8 3.1 8.5 11.5 
1997 12.2 2.8 8.6 11.7 
1998 15.1 3.2 7.8 10.2 
1999 14.5 3.4 8.6 11.2 
2000 17.6 3.4 8.2 10.6 
2001 15.7 1.8 8.2 10.6 
2002 16.1 3.3 7.5 8.9 
2003 16.0 3.8 7.4 8.6 
2004 17.4 4.0 8.3 10.2 
Notes: Revenue ratio 1: Ratio of provincial revenue to total government revenue 
                                   2: Ratio of revenue of all PCs less grant in aid to total    
                                       government revenue 
Expenditure ratio 1: Ratio of provincial expenditure to total government expenditure 
                             2: Ratio of expenditure of all PCs to total government expenditure  
                                 less defence and social security expenditure 
Source: Ministry of Provincial Councils and Local Government and Central Bank of  
             SL (as cited in Herath, 2006, p.14) 
 
According to Herath (2006), as measured by expenditure, the degree of 
decentralisation in SL was well below that in both developed and developing 
countries. He points out that Argentina the share of state government expenditure in 
total government expenditure was 40% in 1987 and some developing countries 
similar to SL with unitary form of Government reported higher percentages than SL, 
for example, Poland (29%), and South Africa (25%).  
 
The annual report of the Central Bank 2009 shows the budget expenditures and 
revenues of PCs as follows. 
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Table 3: Budget Outturn for Provincial Councils (SLRs. Millions) 
 
Item 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
Provisional 
Total Revenue 
   Tax Revenue 
   Non-tax revenue 
19,481 
16586 
 2,895 
  25868 
 21,473 
   4,395 
  31,368 
  25,992 
    5,376 
     29,433 
     24,907 
       4,526 
Total expenditure 
  Current expenditure 
  o/w personal emoluments 
  capital expenditure 
94,470 
76,428 
60,497 
18,042 
113,067 
  92,721 
   74711 
  20,346 
120,011 
103,199 
  79,717 
  16,812 
130,260 
111,336 
85,855 
18,924 
Central Government Transfers 
  Block Grants
19
 
  Criteria Based Grants
20
 
  Matching Grants
21
 
  PSDGs
22
  
  Foreign Grants for Special   
  Projects   
79,029 
62,342 
     790 
     221 
  7,345 
  8,331 
 
  88,317 
  70,742 
    1,208 
       205 
    6,995 
    9,167 
  88,942 
  76,773 
    2,304 
         - 
    7,262 
    2,603 
93,999 
77,386 
  2,276 
     - 
10,945 
  3,393 
 
Source: Central Bank, (2009, p.140) 
 
According to Table 3, 82% of the PC‘s expenditures were from the central 
government. In 2009, the central government transfers to PCs increased by 6% to 94 
billion. The total capital expenditure of PCs in 2009 was increased by 13%.  
 
During 2006-2009, the total government expenditures were SLRs. 713.6, 841.6 and 
996.1 billion respectively (Budget, 2009). Accordingly, the total expenditures of the 
all PCs as percentages to total government expenditures were 13.6% in 2006, 13.1% 
in 2007 and 12.4% in 2008. These figures further prove that the degree of 
decentralisation in SL is low as pointed out by Herath in the above section.  
 
Provincial Human Resources  
 
As with the provincial financing, provincial staffing is not without complexities 
because provincial cadres comprise of cadres of both the Combined Services and  
                                                 
19
 Block Grants are given to meet recurrent expenditures, e.g. salaries. 
20
 Criteria Based Grant are given to meet capital expenditures based on certain criteria: the population; 
the per capita;  the need of each province;  
21
 Matching Grants is an award for good revenue collection. Such transfers were stopped from 2008. 
22
 PSDGs: Province Specific Development Grant   
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provincial appointees. The key positions in the provinces are held by the All Island 
Services (AIS) cadres. The Centre not only approves cadres for provincial ministries, 
departments, and other institutions in terms of structure, service delivery systems and 
positions but also determines the posting of officers of the respective AIS in core 
areas. The provincial authorities have no discretion in making any internal 
adjustments and deployment once cadres are approved (Gunawardena, n.d.). For 
many reasons junior AISs officers quite often occupy senior positions in the 
Provinces specially those of the DSs, despite the fact that the magnitude and 
complexity of responsibilities have grown over the years. The DS is a scheduled post 
for Class 1 of the SLAS, but out of 312 DSs only 110 officials are in that Grade 
(Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs, 2008). There were instances 
where those powers have been abused due to lack of hierarchical supervision or 
proper accountability arrangement, and posting of junior officials to such posts.  The 
Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs sought Cabinet approval to 
amend the Act in 2006
23
 with a view to empower the GAs to entertain appellant 
jurisdictions against decisions of the DSs. This matter has not been resolved as yet.  
 
In regards to the provincial staff, however, the Governor of the Province has the 
authority to determine appointments, transfers, dismissals and disciplinary control, 
which are delegated to the PPSC. The provincial public service has not been covered 
under the 17
th
 Amendment to the Constitution, which created the independent NPSC. 
The PPSC is appointed by the Governor, so that any political decision in regard to 
personnel management of the provincial staff can be taken, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
The Treasury can control appointments of provincial staff by controlling the 
budgetary allocations; otherwise the Governor has full control and authority.  
 
V.K.Nanayakkara, former Secretary to the Ministry of Education mentioned that,  
There were instances where after 60 years of age we have to re-employ some people, like 
Tamil, Aesthetic and English teachers because those teachers are scarce.  If we want to 
re-employ the officers after 60 years of age we have to get the approval from the NPSC. 
The NPSC never approves such re-employment. So, we couldn‘t get the approval from 
the NPSC for a particular appointment. But the interesting thing was that the same request 
was made to the Western PPSC and got the approval. Even today all PPSCs are under the 
governors and they can take any political decisions (Interview, 06.11.2007)).  
                                                 
23
 Cabinet Memorandum dated 27.03.2006 on ―Strengthening the District Administration to cater to 
the needs of the government development programme‖  
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Similarly, the provincial staffing and inter-provincial transfers are matters of 
concern. There were instances where new appointments (teachers and health 
professionals) have been made to provinces by the line ministries without any 
consultations. Further, some developed provinces have excess staff and less 
developed provinces have shortages; for example, significant excess cadre over the 
approved number of teachers in the Southern and Central Provinces. Inter-provincial 
staff transfers have led to this situation. In order to effect inter-provincial transfers, 
one has to obtain the concurrence from both provinces, which creates problems for 
some individuals who do not have political or bureaucratic back-up. The procedure 
for inter-provincial staff transfers is thus complicated and time consuming. This led 
to corruption and malpractices. There is a need to rationalise cadres in each province, 
if PCs are going to operate more effectively in the future. At present, total number of 
provincial cadre is 293,416 (Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2009). 
 
Other problems in the Provinces are limited opportunities for positions for AIS 
cadres and lack of other facilities.  
 
Dr. B.S. Wijeweera, former GA in an interview responded, 
Avenues available in the provinces are little. The GAs and provincial secretaries are in 
the provinces. Nothing compared to what is available in Colombo; all the top jobs, all 
ministries and departments are in Colombo. Provincial Secretaries are few.  
He further said, 
The most important thing we have to think about is infrastructure, for the benefit of 
public servants, for instance, schools. One of the most important things in the mind of the 
public servant is how to give good education to his children. All the good schools, except 
a few, are located in Colombo [and the main cities]. In every district, if you have a top 
quality central school, having all the facilities (the teachers and equipment that you have 
in the best Colombo schools), that will encourage the public servants to work in the 
provinces. The education system of the country also should be changed along with this 
(Interview, 09.01.2008).  
Accordingly, the arrangements in the staffing in provinces clearly show that there are 
negative implications in the country‘s public personnel management system. 
 
Legislative Powers 
 
The 13
th
 Amendment gives legislative powers to the PCs to pass statutes with regard 
to subjects that are listed in the Provincial List, and the Concurrent List in 
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consultation with Parliament. These statutes give legal authority to PCs to exercise 
executive powers that are vested in the Centre on the basis of existing laws; thus, 
they are necessary preconditions for the province to step in to derive executive 
authority. However, the PCs are facing problems of exercising this legislative 
authority at present due to three reasons: the ambiguity in interpreting the three Lists, 
lack of capabilities in the provincial staff in drafting statutes, and poor access to 
central legal authorities in getting advice (Gunawardena, n.d). 
 
There is an ambiguity in interpreting subjects in the List I (those devolved to the 
PCs) and List III (those concurrently managed by the centre and the province). This 
creates a major bottleneck in making statutes by the Provinces because there is no 
uniformity in defining and describing the subjects. This ambiguity of defining 
subjects was highlighted by the Attorney General in his undated letter to Secretary 
Ministry of Public Administration, Provincial Councils and Home Affairs, in relation 
to the Agrarian (Amendment) Bill. The second paragraph of the letter says,  
Agriculture and Agrarian Services are two matters set out in the Provincial Council list of 
the ninth schedule. An examination of the ninth schedule indicates that matters devolved 
are those that are expressly stated in List I or List III. As stated in the Supreme Court 
special determination No. 2 and 4 of 1991 the headings in List I and III are not 
comprehensive or all inclusive. The Court has held that it is not possible to determine 
whether a matter is a List I or List III subject by merely looking at the headings of those 
Lists. ….the ambit matters to be included or excluded in terms of the ninth schedule 
should not be determined in the abstract but by consideration of the nature and scope of 
each individual item (Committee to Study the Operation of Provincial Councils, 1996, 
Annexure 4).  
 
Therefore, it is necessary to study the scope of each individual item when PCs make 
statutes to ensure the content of the statute is within the scope of the Listing and 
refers the same matter. Hence, Statute making is a complex task in the PCS which 
needs such skills in legal drafting.  
 
Furthermore, statute making is hindered by the Province due to the non-existence of 
legal advisory bodies in the province and lack of access to Legal Draftsmen‘s 
Department or the AG‘s Department since they are Central Government 
Organisations. PCs face acute snags in obtaining legal advice on the constitutionality 
of statutes. Accordingly, due to lack of legal environment ―PCs have failed to pass 
statutes that would vest themselves with powers to take executive actions in respect 
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of key devolved subjects‖ (Gunawardena, n.d, p. 50) but 40% of statutes passed are 
in categories of finance and administration which provide for day-to-day 
housekeeping matters. This situation is further aggravated by incapacity and 
reluctance to challenge the central authorities by the provincial authorities due to 
their political relations and concern for personal survival.   
 
In the absence of necessary statutes by the Provinces, the central government has 
taken back some of the schools and hospitals which were formerly devolved to the 
PCs.  
 
Dr. H.A.P. Abeywardene, former GA, commented, 
If you are giving more power there is a possibility of a threat to the central government. 
Therefore, the centre did not give full authority to the PCs. In effect what happened was 
the PCs were not given all the powers, education, and police. The centre is pulling even 
the powers given. In education sector, schools are made national schools, overnight 
without the knowledge of the people in the area till the board is declared opened, even the 
MP in the area doesn‘t know. Hospitals are made national hospitals, Matara, Kegalle, 
Rathnapura overnight without consultation and valid reasons. What they should have 
done was to strengthen these institutions, give resources, staff and see how they are faring 
with their performance. Government is playing a safety device (Interview, 22.12. 2007). 
 
The above discussion clearly highlights the issues in relation to legislative functions 
in the Provinces due to lack of clarity in devolved functions. In fact, these issues 
have direct negative implications for public management, thus needing immediate 
attention. 
  
Coordination Issues  
 
The lack of a constitutional or administrative mechanism to coordinate between the 
government and the PCs as well as between provinces is a major bottleneck in the 
present system. In such a lacuna, interpersonal and administrative relationships 
depend on informal political and administrative personal relationships.   
 
The Report of the Committee to Study the Operation of the PCs in SL (1996) has 
indicated several shortfalls in coordination at the top level, intra-provincial and inter-
provincial level. I interviewed two of the five Committee members during the field 
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work. They mentioned that most of the issues they highlighted in their report remain 
unresolved. These are highlighted below. 
 
At the Top Level 
 
There is no regular institutional forum to discuss crucial matters that should be dealt 
with by the highest officials such as President and the Chief Minister, President and 
the Governor, and the government ministries and the PCs. As such, firstly, the Bills 
relating to devolved subjects are sometimes introduced in Parliament without 
consulting the PCs (Committee to Study the Operation of Provincial Councils, 1996). 
Secondly, the central government decides an increase of salaries and allowances for 
certain cadres without the knowledge of the PCs which aggregate financial problems 
in the PCS. Lastly, there are staff transfers by the central ministries without 
consulting the relevant provincial ministries (Gunawardena, n.d). 
 
Due to the lack of coordination between the Centre and Province, there are several 
ambiguities in some of devolved tasks. This leads to conflict between the Centre and 
the Province and also the non-compliance of national policies by the Provinces.  
 
In an interview, Vijitha Herath, MP, JVP, said, 
The policy of one subject is different from province to province and sometimes does not 
comply with the National policy; for example, the Education Policy of the Central 
Ministry of Education regarding the issue of new text books to school children. If a 
Province wants to introduce new text books it should be under the authority of the 
Secretary of the Central Ministry of Education. Nevertheless, the North Central 
Provincial Secretary of Education gave authority to introduce a new text book which is 
recommended by the NGO called Pan Sri Lanka. The school teachers were given training 
in this respect by that NGO. This book was not recommended by the National Institute of 
Education.    
Another good example is regarding environmental policy. There is a National 
Environmental policy and a Central Environmental Authority in the centre. Some PCs 
have their own statutes for environmental matters, for example, the Wayamba PC [North 
Western] has a statute on the environment. According to that statute the PC is not 
accountable to the Central Environmental Authority. There was an environmental 
problem in Chilaw area due to the digging of clay. The Provincial Environmental 
authority has issued permits for digging clay while the Central Environmental Authority 
took a decision to stop people doing so. The police were helpless because the people who 
engaged in the digging were issued with permits by the PC. When the Central 
Environmental Authority sent a letter asking officials to be present to discuss the 
particular matter, they replied that they were not going to be present because they are not 
accountable to that Authority. The people of the area were not bothered whether it is PC 
matter or a Central Government matter, to them, the digging of clay is an environmental 
 71 
problem. This happened during the regime of UNP, both the PC and the Central 
Government were ruled by them. Ultimately, the PC officials were summoned to 
Parliament to discuss the matter entirely on an amicable basis (Interview, 18.01.2008).  
 
He went on to say that there are a lot of other examples where central government 
and the PCs are having clashes. These problems are inevitable when there are two 
parallel systems without proper demarcation of functions and their coordination. 
 
Intra-Provincial Level 
 
There were and still are coordination issues due to the non-integration of District 
Secretaries, Divisional Secretaries and Grama Niladaries into the PC system. As 
mentioned above there are two parallel systems running through the service delivery: 
PCs through the provincial ministries and departments, and the Central Government 
through the District Secretaries, Divisional Secretaries and Grama Niladaries 
(Appendix 6). 
 
Capital investments in the Provinces are politically driven without a coherent plan or 
coordination. For example, each MP gets SLRs. 5 million (2008) annually from the 
Decentralised Capital Budget (see Chapter 5 for detail). This budget allows the MPs 
to determine development activities in which they are personally interested in their 
respective electorate. The Provincial Councillors also exercise similar influence in 
the prioritising of provincial capital investment. At the Divisional level the members 
of the Local Government make decisions in regard to small-scale capital works in 
areas of their individual interests. Thus, the national and provincial planning is 
poorly coordinated. This results in an unbalanced development within the country 
and also has a divisive effect on the people which clearly have negative implications 
on the country‘s public administration.  
 
Inter-Provincial Coordination 
 
Provincial service deliveries are further hampered due to the lack of institutional 
arrangements for matters between provinces. In certain instances the lack of inter-
provincial coordination led to delays in service deliveries as well as causing disputes 
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and wasting of resources, for example, the sharing of irrigation and river waters, and 
the inter-provincial road and communications (Gunawardena, n.d).  
 
In summation, at present the government machinery for public administration has 
extended to almost every activity within the society. As a result the government 
organisations have increased enormously and their structure and the process of 
service delivery have become complex and diverse. Due to the lack of proper 
coordination of functions at three levels, a lot of problems encountered for the last 
two decades have led to negative implications and complexities in the public 
administration.  
 
                         Parallel Pre-devolution Institutional Arrangements  
 
In addition to the coordination issues, there are other issues in relation to the 
institutional arrangements in public administration due to use of central service 
delivery structures in most goods and service deliveries in the Provinces. Their scope 
and content of activities are largely determined by the respective central government 
ministries; for example, the Divisional Secretariats (Chapter 3), Zonal Offices in 
Education, District and Divisional Planning Secretariats and Health institutions. The 
heads of these institutions are central government appointees. Despite ‗provincial 
planning‘ being a devolved function, the district and divisional planning secretariats 
of the central government have been strengthened (Gunawardena, n.d). As such, pre-
devolutionary systems in the Provinces have further deconcentrated the provincial 
administration (Gunawardena, n.d; Wanasinghe, 2005). Thus, Gunawardena argues 
that because the provincial service delivery structures have been created by the 
Central Government as ―National Policy‖ and adopted by the Provinces by staffing 
them through cadres released to the Provinces from respective AISs, there can be no 
provincial responsibility or accountability in such a system.  
 
Since development functions of the PCs have been carried out through the DSs, the 
administrative authority of the Provincial Ministries tends to be ignored in practice. 
Furthermore, the Grama Niladari, who is the general service officer at the village 
level and also a central government officer, comes under the Ministry of Home 
Affairs. He usually works under the supervision of the DS. The system remains the 
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same, before and after the devolution, in carrying out services to the public. All these 
aspects are remarkable impediments to provincial autonomy, and thus create negative 
implications for the country‘s public administration.  
 
Overlapping/Duplication and Irrational Grouping of Subjects 
 
Furthermore, due to the reluctance to rationalise and restructure institutional 
arrangements at the centre, there is considerable vertical and horizontal overlapping 
and duplication of institutional structures and functions at the three levels 
(Wanasinghe, 2005): the centre, province and local. This is most evident in the 
proliferation of ministries and attendant institutional structures at the centre. In the 
devolved environment in 2008, there were 57 Cabinet Ministers, 35 non-Cabinet 
Ministers and 15 Deputy Ministers at the centre, making it the largest Cabinet in the 
world in the 21
st
 century (Appendix 1), plus 40 ministries in the Provinces.  India, 
with a population of over 1 billion and many times bigger than SL, only has 45 
ministries. China, which also has around 1.3 billion people, had 45 ministries in 
1983, 41 in 1993, and 28 in 2003 (Uswatta-arachchi, 2008). 
 
The main reason for proliferation of large number of ministries at the centre is that, 
as discussed in Chapter 3, the President is vested with powers to determine the 
numbers of ministers in the Central Government, unlike the PC system. In the 
Provinces the number of ministers for each PC is restricted to five, including the 
Chief Minister, by the 13
th
 Amendment to the Constitution. This discipline is lacking 
in the Centre.  
 
In the Government Gazette No.1482/9 dated January 29, 2007 which contained the 
subjects and functions of government ministries, there were critical lacunae in 
defining functions and allocating tasks under devolved polity.  Some ministries do 
not have clear mandates while others did not have adequate tasks to perform, for 
example, the Minister of Special Projects, and Minister of Youth Empowerment and 
Socio-Economic Development. The only task assigned to the Minister of Special 
Projects was ―Assisting other ministers in the implementation of Special Projects‖.  
There are in fact two ministers for youth: (a) Minister of Youth Affairs and (b) 
Minister of Youth Empowerment and Socio Economic Development. The Ministry 
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of Plantation Industries which hitherto dealt with roles relating to tea, rubber, 
coconut, sugar, palmyrah, cashew, and state plantations has been broken into three 
ministries: Ministry of Supplementary Plantation Crops Development, Ministry of 
Plantation Industries, and Ministry of Public Estate Management and Development. 
Most of the institutions coming under the Minister of Supplementary Plantation 
Crops Development have been defunct industries for more than a decade, for 
example, Kantale and Higurana Sugar Industries Ltd. The Higurana Sugar Industries 
was earmarked for sale in 2005 by the Public Enterprises Reform Commission due to 
non-availability of financial resources to restart operations. Approximately eight 
million rupees are spent annually on maintenance of its assets and the staff without 
any production (Budget, 2008, 2009). These are matters for future reforms. 
 
The confusion over ministerial responsibilities is evident at recent Cabinet meetings. 
A cabinet paper presented by the Minister of Irrigation and Water Management on 
July 4,
 
2008 to market water was challenged by the Minister of Agricultural 
Development and Agrarian Services, who presented a cabinet paper No.55/2008 
stating that water management affairs come under the purview of his ministry 
(―Sirisena squabbles with Chamal‖, 2008). 
 
The allocation of roles is further complicated in the way they have been undertaken. 
For example, ‗disaster management‘ is performed by one ministry and ‗disaster relief 
services‘ are performed by another ministry at the centre. The rationale might be 
decoupling of policy and service delivery.  If so, disaster relief services should be 
handled by the provinces where disasters occur. Furthermore, Social Service is a 
devolved subject as well as a concurrent subject. There is a separate cabinet minister 
for ‗social services and social welfare‘ at the Centre. On the one hand, disaster relief 
services are also a type of social service under the Provincial List. Each PC has its 
own ministries for social services. In this manner the roles and functions of the 
Centre and the Province are not clear enough but overlap, wasting scarce resources. 
   
Furthermore, the proliferation of ministries not only duplicates functions but also is 
an extravagance and a major obstruction to effective devolution. The expansion of 
the public services, vertically and horizontally, virtually is beyond control under this 
political culture. The number of ministries continuously has been expanded from 
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2005 with the crossing over of the MPs from the Opposition to the Government. This 
situation led to fragmentation of functions of the existing ministries. They have 
become a burden to the Treasury which has to finance
24
 them.  
 
V.K. Nanayakkara, former Secretary, Ministry of Education, said 
We have 100 odd ministries from 2005, for example, in 2005 fertilizer imports were 
handled by one ministry, Ministry of Agriculture, and the distribution was handled by 
another ministry, the Agrarian Service Ministry. Same with education and plantations.  
How many ministries are there for Plantations now? Sugar cane, cashew, palmyrah is 
allocated to one ministry; tea, rubber and coconut is handled by another ministry, state 
plantations by another. How can the country progress? How can one coordinate 100 
ministries and make cohesive work? Each ministry is independent (Interview, 
06.11.2008). 
 
Professor S.W. Ranasinghe expressed his view on the large Cabinet, 
We have the largest cabinet in the world. The legislature has 225 members, among them 
108 are executives. It has changed the mechanism. The members of the legislature should 
be bigger than the executive. The members of the executive should be small in number. 
But here the executive is half as big as the legislature.  They didn‘t see the logic of that. 
There was a high level of fragmentation of functions. There are several ministers for one 
function. For example; agriculture and plantation, there are several ministers; they are 
riding on the people. All that‘s happened due to poor governance. 
He further said, 
Now people look at ministers sarcastically. The politicians are like commodities. They 
can be purchased. Some ministers do not have work. But they have offices on exorbitant 
rent with 4 or 5 employees. There are no properly defined functions. Anybody who 
jumped across is given a ministry. A MP can become a minister easily when he crosses 
over to the government. Secretaries are losing credibility. The concept of ministers is 
diluted. The executive is losing their credibility. People do not take them seriously. This 
is a kind of political game. This is very serious. Anyone can go to the Courts and 
challenge decisions of the government because their subject matters are not clearly 
defined. There are lots of duplication of work.  In the plantation sector there are so many 
ministers. It is a joke (Interview, 11.12.2007). 
 
The Editorial of the Island newspaper (2007, December 26) illustrates that,  
The people have begun divisively calling Parliamentarians ‗Kotipahe Kaeli‘- pieces 
worth 50 million Rupees- the worst that can happen to democracy. The people lose faith 
in public institution like national legislature. Crossover led to the deterioration of the 
people‘s verdict at election. In the present parliament some of the politicians the people 
wanted to keep in the opposition are in the government as ministers and those whom they 
voted to power are in the Opposition. There are already 24 UNP MPs‘ in the Government 
                                                 
24
 Rentals for office spaces, housing (SLRs 100,000 per month for individual minister who are not 
provided a government bungalow) , personal staff and their perks, vehicles , fuel allowances, postal 
and telecommunications (unlimited), extra security personnel and vehicles for back-up security (more 
than five vehicles and security people per head depends on the needs). 
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and about 40 ruling party (UPFA) MPs‘ in the Oppositions. It is … feared that before 
long there will be a government of Ministers! 
 
V.K. Nanayakkara, former Secretary to the Ministry of Education, in an interview 
said, 
We have governments that are dependent on coalition partners due to the electoral 
system. You cannot expect a lean cabinet under this situation (Interview, 06.11.2008).  
 
In this sense, there is a problem in the electoral system in SL too, which leads to 
unstable coalition governments with the switching over from the First-Past-the Post 
(FPP)  electoral system to a more competitive Proportional Represent (PR) system by 
the 1978 Constitution. A Parliamentary Select Committee has been appointed and 
proposed some changes to existing PR system to remedy the situation, but even 
under the FPP system it has been shown there had been weak governments and 
crossovers (Island, 2007, December 26). In the past, however, the crossovers were 
not necessarily offered with ministerial portfolios like today. 
 
However, the proliferation of ministries is welcomed by the politicians and the 
bureaucrats because they can enjoy privileges at the expense of the general public. 
The bureaucrats, especially the Class I officers of the AISs, have many opportunities 
for promotions: Secretaries, Additional Secretaries, Senior Assistant Secretaries, and 
Directors. According to K.H.J. Wijayadasa, former Secretary to the Prime Minister 
and the President (1984-94), ―We spend lots of the money for the provision of perks 
of politicians and bureaucrats, nothing else. We cannot find funds for development, 
erecting bridges, and hospitals‖ (Interview, 10.12.2007). 
 
In addition to proliferation of Ministries, there has been a trend to increase the 
numbers of departments and agencies in ministries too, further fragmenting core 
functions. As the public choice theory claims, bureaucrats tend to enlarge their 
territory, budget and patronage. For example, the Treasury had eight departments (in 
house) in 2002; now it has gained five more departments by breaking down the core 
functions of the existing departments, adding legal affairs and upgrading the Internal 
Audit Unit (2008). The major underpinning of these developments might be to 
satisfy Class 1 officers of AISs to avoid any resistance when accommodating 
outsiders (favourites) for high positions on patronage rather than a necessity. Some 
 77 
departments have only 10-15 employees with a Director General at the top.  Each 
department has its own administrative and account division which wastes public 
funds. 
4.2.2.2 Service Delivery Problems 
 
Over time, SL governments retained the monopolistic role in the delivery of public 
goods and services that are essential for the people‘s daily life. This includes 
education, health care, a remarkable portion of bus transport and total ownership of 
rail transport, infrastructure facilities such as power, water, highways and roads, and 
consumer services and agricultural marketing. Education and healthcare are provided 
free of charge. The rail services are on subsidy. Although the government gives high 
priority in service delivery, it is also evident that ―the quality of goods and services 
in terms of access, equity, efficiency and sustainability has progressively 
deteriorated‖ (ADB, 2004b, p. 15). This situation led to erosion of public faith and 
―particularly given the prospect of the potential for social unrest‖ (ADB, 2004b, p. 
15). There is lack of transparency and access to information for citizens in service 
delivery. The citizens do not have access to information about individual 
responsibility of public officials for service delivery. The Official Secret Act No.32 of 
1955 also paves the way for lack of transparency and openness, which are added to 
by the bureaucratic culture. Citizens‘ organisations are also inadequate to initiate 
campaigns for securing their rights and to arrest this situation without political 
initiatives.  
 
Kannangara (2008) was very critical of the country‘s education system and 
ineffective management, which failed to provide adequate teachers to rural schools 
and provide school text books in time to the students while the Ministry of Education 
had three political leaders at the top, a Cabinet Minister, a non-Cabinet Minister, and 
a Deputy Minister.  
 
Dr. H.A.P. Abeywardene, former GA, commented on the present situation of the 
service delivery system, 
There is no transparency. It is lacking. The service delivery is weak because of the 
corrupt practices that have crept into public administration (Interview, 22.12 2007). 
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Dr. Lloyd Fernando, Former State Secretary for the State Ministry of Policy Planning 
and Implementation (1989-1993) elaborated, 
In the modern state, the public service has to perform fundamentally two inter-related 
functions - service delivery and development promotion. Service delivery covers, issuing 
of licenses and permits, registering of property and the performance of similar regulatory 
functions. The development function is more complex. It involves promotion of economic 
growth, employment creation and price stability through the private sector and where 
necessary through public investment. The performance of the public service in SL has 
been declining in respect of all the above functions for at least more than two decades.  At 
the end of each financial year, we see funds allocated for projects being returned to the 
Treasury due to shortfalls in implementation. Even where funds have been fully utilised, 
there is very little impact assessment. Even though the Ministry of Plan Implementation 
has established a very elaborative progress monitoring and post-evaluating system, its 
effectiveness is low, due to weak monitoring by the implementing agencies and ministries 
concerned. One of the major reasons for this situation is the lack of leadership provided 
by the ministry secretaries, themselves. They are preoccupied with routine administrative 
functions which could be delegated to subordinate staff. Similarly they spend a large 
amount of time at meetings, both internally and at external venues, which are often 
unproductive and could be dispensed with (Interview, 06.01. 2008). 
 
The issues identified in this section have significant implications for the country‘s 
public administration. 
4.2.2.3 Implications for Public Administration  
 
According to Wanasinghe (2005), exercises in regard to institutional arrangements 
have so far tended to ignore the local community level. Even though the actual 
delivery of public goods and services should occur at the local level, whatever 
powers have been devolved, so far it has been clogged at the Provincial level. In that 
background, he argues that local people have almost no participation in the decision-
making, or the activity of delivery of goods and services. Rather this reflects the 
continuing strong influence of the politico-administrative culture of a centrally 
controlled and administered economy.  
 
The overlapping and duplication, both vertical and horizontal, have contributed to 
delays, corruptions, malpractices, confusions and coordination problems, and 
bottlenecks in the flow of public business (Gunawardane, n.d, Institute of 
Professional Public Administrators, 2007).  
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Citizens are in a desperate situation when they have a problem, as to whether they 
should go to the central government institution, PC or local government body to 
settle it. This situation was highlighted by Lionel Fernando, Co-Chair of the Salaries 
Commission, in an interview: 
Things are very difficult to the people yet. They do not know where to go. When there is 
electricity failure whether you go to the Pradeshiya Sabah, or Electricity Board or PC. 
The power through devolution is not implemented for the wellbeing of the citizens. I am 
in trouble sometimes. When I have a problem I do not know actually where I should go. 
Recently, just a week ago, I had a problem. They asked  me to go to Pradeshiya Sabha. I 
asked whether I have to go to Kotte PS. somebody told ‗no‘, you should go to Kaduwela. 
Somebody else told that it is not in Kaduwela now it is in Malabe. So you are in trouble. 
Those days we knew when you did not receive letters to whom you should go. Now we 
do not know where to go, Kotte, Malabe or Kaduwela. The functions are not clear enough 
(Interview, 06.01. 2008). 
 
This shows that the information available to citizens on the details of the public 
services that are provided, on the level of performance in the delivery of such 
services, on the processes of decision-making in regard to the planning of such 
provision, are inadequate. Division of powers, roles and responsibilities between 
central ministries, PC and District Secretaries/GA and DSs has been a subject of 
conflict. According to Vijitha Herath, MP, JVP, ―the overlapping of roles and 
responsibilities between central and provincial departments of the administration has 
resulted in wastage of scarce resources and misuse of authority by the political and 
administrative executives to a substantial level‖ (Interview, 18.01 2008). The AG‘s 
Report 2008 (pp 161-162) highlighted several deficiencies in the PC system. 
Information required vouching transactions valued at SLRs. 650.75 million relating 
to 14 institutions of the PCs had not been furnished for audit; replies to 834 audit 
queries in respect of the year and the preceding years had not been furnished (the 
value of quantifiable transactions relating to those audit queries amounted to SLRs. 
460.77 million); and 569 transactions valued at SLRs. 381 million were either 
fraudulent, uneconomic, unauthorised or irregular. Thus, citizens‘ expectations and 
the capacity of service delivery by the government has a large gap.  
 
To sum up, the present administrative structure of SL reflects many deficiencies due 
to lack of top level coordination, cohesive national policies, and clear demarcation of 
roles and responsibilities. The information provided on the PCs show that their 
existence is not without problems. The main objective of setting-up the PC was to 
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solve ethnic conflict in the country, but this has become a myth without real political, 
administrative and economic devolution. The North-East PC ceased to operate from 
the very beginning, and the conflict since then changed from ethnic strife to 
nationwide armed struggle with intensive violence from 1983 to 19 May 2009 (the 
government defeated the LTTE on 19 May 2010). However, the devolution is still a 
desirable goal for SL in order to address Tamil interests, even though the LTTE war 
is over. 
4.2.2.4 Supreme Court (SC) Intervention 
 
Another aspect which this study will discuss is the increased intervention of SC in 
matters relating to public administration. The SC in the recent past gave landmark 
rulings on several matters due to failure of the relevant administrative authorities.  
Dr. H.A.P. Abeywardene, former GA, commented,  
For the slightest provocation people go to Supreme Court. Now SC is going far away 
from their normal work. Even for school admission. This shows to what extent the 
administration has broken down (Interview, 22.12.2007). 
. 
The following examples elaborate on this situation. 
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Box 1: Grade 1 School Admission for the year 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Grade 1 school admission in SL has become an annual public policy 
fiasco (Samarasinhge, 2008). The process of selection led to many 
irregularities, malpractices and corruptions each year due to competition of 
parents to enrol their children in to so called ‗national schools‘. SL has 9,714 
government schools, out of which 324 are national schools, island wide, and 
with better facilities than other schools governed by the central government 
(Ministry of Education, 2009). Due to this structural problem in the 
education system, the demands for admission to these schools are always 
higher than that of the supply. It is a popular secret that some parents who 
are not residing close to these schools can still enrol their children by 
forwarding false documents. In some instances children who reside near such 
schools are not selected for enrolment. The parents whose children were not 
selected for 2008 enrolment and reside near schools have sought the SC 
intervention. Having considered the policy framework of selection, the SC 
pointed out that existing quota system for children of military and police 
personnel is inconsistent with constitutional provisions. Then the SC ordered 
the Secretary to the Ministry of Education to revise the policy framework 
and issue a new circular according to the guidelines set by the SC (SC 
No.289/2007).   
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Another occasion where the SC had to intervene in the public administration was 
on the matter of the ―teachers‘ salary anomaly‖. The evaluation of answer papers 
for the General Certificate of Education (Advanced Level) examination held in 
August, 2008 was delayed due to the teachers‘ boycott. Their main demand was 
to remove the long-standing salary anomalies.  Eventually, the teachers sought 
SC intervention due to the failure of the proper authorities to solve the problem. 
In principle, the SC recognised that there is a salary anomaly with regard to the 
Teachers‘ Service and directed the Salaries and Cadre Commission to place the 
teachers‘ salary on the proper scale. Then, the SC as an interim relief ordered the 
Education Ministry to pay the teachers a salary increment immediately until the 
teachers were placed on proper salary scales and requested the respondent 
teachers‘ unions to commence Advanced Level paper marking (Ramanayake, 
2008). 
     Box 2: Teachers’ Salary Anomaly 
 
 
 
Ironically, SL has maintained Salaries Commissions since Independence with the 
specific objective of revising salaries and allowances of government employees. 
They are Poulier Commission (1953), Wilmot Perera Commission (1961), L.B. de 
Silva Commission (1974), B.C. Perera Commission (1995), Tissa Devendra 
Commission (2000), and Salaries and Cadre Commission (2007) (Devendra, 2008).   
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Box 3: Health Sector Strike 
 
 
 
In sum, public sector involvement in the economy has increased over the years after 
Independence (1948) and retained the monopolistic role in the delivery of public 
goods and services that are essential for the people‘s daily life. Nevertheless, the 
quality of service delivery in terms of access (e.g. public hospitals), equality (e.g. 
education), timeliness (e.g. transport), and affordability (e.g. gas, electricity) has 
been overlooked over time, thus public dissatisfaction and erosion of faith of the 
government institutions have increased simultaneously. For example, some of the 
public institutions have failed to solve even simple problems in the recent past such 
as enrolment of school children to year 1. At the breakdown of the normal channel 
people tended to seek the SC intervention to settle their problems. Hence, the current 
process of delivery of public goods and services needs urgent attention in any future 
agenda of reforms. 
 
However, there are few signs of improvement. The following section discusses them.   
Health sector strike was scheduled in mid 2007 by health sector trade unions 
against the introduction of the ―finger print machine‖ to mark attendance. 
In this case the SC banned the strike, considering the fundamental right 
violation application submitted by a patient. According to the Daily Mirror 
Editorial (―Reforming the Public Service,‖ 2007, p. 8), 
The introduction of this method has now given rise to much controversy 
and conflict at certain government departments. The controversy 
continues to persist in the health sector where the system is now 
operating. Having first introduced it to 14 institutions under the Health 
Ministry the authorities have extended it to all state hospitals. In protest 
against this system, the hospital employees unions have decided to come 
out today and tomorrow. Their rejection is that the authorities have 
exempted certain sections in the health sector from the scheme. This, 
they view, as an act of discrimination.  
The new system meanwhile has yielded good results. Employees‘ 
attendance has improved and overtime bill has been reduced by 30 
percent, according to the authorities. The ministry authorities have quite 
rightly insisted on the full implementation of the scheme and asserted 
that the system will not be withdrawn under pressure. 
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4.2.3 Positive Aspects of Public Administration   
4.2.3.1 Productivity Improvement  
 
One of the positive attempts taken so far to improve efficiency and the productivity 
in the public service was the introduction of productivity improvement programme in 
the public sector. SL obtained the membership of the Asian Productivity 
Organisation (APO) based in Japan in 1966. However, until 1994 this initiative had 
not been used properly due to lack of attention and leadership. After a lapse of many 
years, in 1994 the then Minister of Industrial Development of the SLFP-led 
government took initiatives to launch a productivity improvement programme in the 
public sector. However, that initiative did not move forward adequately because the 
minister was killed in a 2002 bomb explosion. In 2003 the UNP-led government 
gave prominence to productivity improvement in the public sector and reactivated 
the National Productivity Secretariat (NPS) under the Ministry of Employment and 
Labour.  
 
The Ministry of Employment and Labour developed a National Productivity
25
 Policy 
for SL, aiming to achieve accelerated growth in the economy. This policy has two 
components: the private sector and the public sector. Under this policy, it is expected 
to achieve 5% annual growth of productivity for the nation. In order to achieve these 
targets, this Ministry took steps to formulate strategies and action plans. The NPS of 
the ministry is functioning as the catalyst in this endeavour.  
 
The NPS attempts to inculcate an awareness of productivity enhancement and to 
cultivate a productivity culture in the nation, mainly through four programmes: 
productivity at schools, public sector, private sector, and the community. The NPS 
uses various methodologies to disseminate knowledge on productivity and make 
every citizen aware of productivity concepts (National Productivity Secretariat, 
2005). These include: organising training programmes, delivering lectures, and 
                                                 
25
 Productivity is defined as the effective and efficient use of resources to achieve desired outcomes. 
Effectiveness refers to the level of outputs or outcomes from a process, job or an organisation‘s effort. 
Outputs refer to immediate results, and outcomes are related to long-terms goals or long term 
consequences of outputs. Efficiency refers to the ratio of outputs to inputs (Ministry of Employment 
and Labour, n.d). 
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conducting workshops and seminars.  It also organises competitions and awards the 
best people and organisations that participated in the innovation for showing the 
ways to greater productivity. The NPS obtains the assistance of local and foreign 
expertise in promoting a culture of productivity. It realises the importance of raising 
the awareness of school children as a long-term strategy to improve productivity, so 
the NPS closely works with the Ministry of Education to realise this. According to 
the Director, NPS, ―around 500 school programmes have been successfully 
conducted each year and the students‘ participation in productivity competitions are 
great. There are several ‗productivity model schools, offices and work places‘ 
throughout the country, including both public and private organisations‖. The NPS 
has established a ―Best Practices Network‖ comprising all winners of the 
productivity competition. It organises a monthly meeting to share their experiences 
with others who are interested in improving productivity in their organisations. The 
NPS also organises study tours to those model offices and work places to motivate 
others in the productivity improvement programme.  
 
In an interview, Director of NPS said,  
We try to change the work attitudes of the people. We want to have behavioural changes 
in an incremental manner but the impact is wide. We give this message to the whole 
country through media, and video campaign. We were able to make some progress in 
some government institutions to increase customer satisfaction, reduce waiting time in 
service delivery and giving information to public through this movement (Interview, 
27.12.2007).  
 
Accordingly, the NPS is focusing more on the human aspect of productivity rather 
than technologically-driven process improvements.  Once awareness is made, other 
aspects can be easily adopted to the administrative apparatus in the country because 
bureaucratic changes are not easy in SL. 
4.2.3.2 E-Government Project 
 
The other attempt to increase efficiency and effectiveness of the public service 
delivery was the introduction of E-Government project. E-Government has become 
an important policy agenda for governments around the world with key 
transformational objectives such as public service transformation, transformed public 
engagement and establishing citizen-focused government (Lips, 2008). SL also 
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recognised the importance of the E-Government initiatives in 2002 and established 
the Information and Communication Technology Agency (ICTA) under the 
Information and Communication Technology Act of 2003. It attempts to introduce 
ICT in the delivery of public services while redesigning the ongoing delivery 
processes in order to make government business more citizen-focused and friendly, 
and avoid delays and malpractices that have crept into the service delivery process 
over the years. Accordingly, this project expects transformation of major aspects in 
public management and sustainable improvements in efficiency, openness, 
effectiveness, and quality of services 
 
(ICTA, 2009). The E-Government project is at 
the infant stage. It provides a base for future reforms.  
 
However, the ICT literacy levels and personal computer penetration within the 
government and the society is extremely low. The ARC (1986/88) noted that public 
awareness regarding the impact of IT has been limited, so a concerted attempt would 
need to be made to make the end users computer literate. Therefore, an attempt has 
been made to create an enabling environment in government and society by installing 
IT infrastructure in the government institutions, and the community organisations in 
villages in the first phase of this programme. Accordingly, by 2007, the majority of 
government institutions, including the district and divisional secretariats, were 
supplied with IT infrastructure and connectivity in parallel with providing key citizen 
and government services using ICT. Around 500 ―Nanasala‖ (knowledge centre) 
were established with internet, email, telephone facilities throughout the country, and 
computer training was given to citizens in the use of internet and email and to share 
knowledge without much cost to them. The building up of the institutional capacity 
and the skills of the public officials are paramount to managing the process, and to 
achieving E-Government objectives.  
 
Accordingly, some of the service delivery has been already improved over the last 
few years; for example, issuance of passports, visas, birth certificates, motor vehicle 
revenue licences and provision of airport and bank services, and some government 
information. The Department of Immigration and Emigration has made considerable 
progress in transformation of procedures and processes in keeping with the 
international standards of issuance of passports, visas and provision of airport 
services (National Council for Administration, 2006). At present anyone can get a 
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passport within a day with an additional fee. In addition, a motor vehicle revenue 
licence can be obtained in two minutes in Colombo and a copy of a birth certificate 
can be obtained in 10 minutes. The state banks also have modernised their 
transaction processes by using ICT (ICTA, 2007). The Government Information 
Project won the international award for excellence in Singapore in 2006. These are 
great achievements in the public sector service delivery when compared with the 
situation earlier when it took a long time to provide these services even with bribes. 
The SL Institute of Development Administration, a partner of ICTA, is carrying out 
E-Government projects in parallel.  
  
Dhammike Amarasinghe, Advisor to the President, commented,   
In practical terms we have to think whether the people get services in a timely manner, 
whether the quality of services is high. In the annual issue of revenue licences for motor 
vehicles, earlier you had to fill a form. Every year you had to repeat this procedure. But 
now the data is in the system, public do not have to provide. The procedure is easy; it 
takes only two minutes to issue a new licence. People are happy (Interview, 14.11.2007).  
At present, several projects are underway: E-Divisional Secretariat, E-Population 
Register, E-Pension, Laksala, a pilot E-HRM project for the Ministry of Public 
Administration, and E-Foreign Employment Project for SL Bureau of Foreign 
Employment. These projects will no doubt improve the public sector decision-
making and service delivery.   
4.2.3.3 Citizen-Client Charter 
 
Another attempt was the introduction of Citizen-Client Charter programme in the 
public sector. In 2007, the Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs 
initiated a ―Citizen-Client Charter‖ under the banner of let’s dedicate to service for 
protecting the rights of citizen[s]. This is one step forward by a public sector 
institution for providing citizens with access to information which is lacking in the 
public service delivery as mentioned in the earlier discussion. This Charter provides 
citizens with information about the task profiles, the objectives of the ministry and 
what citizens can expect from service delivery. In addition, it specifically elaborates 
the officer and decision maker responsible for each task, the time frame of the 
service to be delivered, and the relevant documents to be forwarded by the client to 
obtain the relevant services during the time frame included in the charter. There is no 
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doubt that this Charter would minimise the transaction cost and enhance the 
transparency, efficiency and productivity of the ministry and the trust of the people 
in its service delivery. If other government institutions would follow the same, it may 
contribute to efficiency, effectiveness, and enhance transparency and access to 
information to the citizens.  
4.2.3.4 Social Indicators 
 
Although there are deficiencies in the administrative structure and service delivery 
systems, SL has achieved remarkable progress in social development which Sri 
Lankans can be proud of, specially achievements in education and health. SL has 
achieved human development outcomes more consistent with those of high income 
countries (World Bank, 2000). The Free Education Act of 1944 (pioneered by 
C.W.W. Kannangara), the change of medium in class instruction in 1945 and various 
reforms introduced in the education system contributed to this effect. Female literacy 
progressively improved from 43.8% to 90.6% whilst male literacy increased from 
70.1% to 92.5%, thus, adult literacy increased from 57.8%  to 90.8% from 1945- 
2008. Life expectancy at birth increased from around 55 years in 1948 to 73.4 years 
in 2008. There have also been remarkable achievements in maternal and infant 
mortality rates: the maternal mortality rate decreased from 560 in the 1950s to 100 
per 1000 live births in 2002, while infant mortality declined from 82 to 12 per 1000 
from 1945-2008. These improvements are reflected in the Human Development 
Index (HDI) that measures the development of a country from a broader perspective 
than per capita incomes. According to the HDI (0.755 in 2004) SL stands at 93 out of 
177 countries (Economist, 2008, February 3). This ranking is higher than those of 
other South Asian Countries except Maldives. It is also higher than most countries at 
similar income levels. These achievements are quite impressive considering the 30 
years of conflict in the country.  
 
The other feature in the administrative structure is the large number of state-owned 
enterprises. The following section discusses their existence in the present context.  
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4.2.4 Public Enterprises (PEs)  
 
At present, SL has a approximately 210 PEs, of which 78 are commercial and the 
others are non-commercial, engaged in a wide range of economic activities covering 
trading, regulatory, research, promotional and educational activities. These 
enterprises must fulfil dual objectives: meeting the government‘s social 
responsibility and achieving an operational profit (Administrative Reforms 
Committee, 1986/88, Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2006). Nevertheless, certain 
enterprises must fulfil social objectives, so they cannot expect reasonable rates of 
return on capital employed. In 2004, twelve commercial enterprises were brought 
under the purview of the Strategic Enterprises Management Agency (SEMA)
26
, 
which comes under the President, in order to improve their efficiency and 
effectiveness and another eight enterprises were included in 2006.  
 
The PEs are expected to be accountable to multiple agencies: the President, SEMA, 
minister, supervising ministry, board of directors, regulator, Parliament, public, and 
the Treasury (as the sole owner of equity). In addition, the Strategic Enterprises are 
accountable to the President and SEMA. The AG reviews accounts while the COPE 
oversees the public accountability matters in respect of a majority of enterprises, 
except government-owned companies numbering 35 (World Bank, 2003).  
 
There are several problems in regard to these enterprises at present. One of the key 
problems is that the majority of enterprises lack full-time professional Chief 
Executives, for example, the State Plantation Corporation. Instead, tasks are being 
carried out under the umbrella of the politically-appointed full-time Chairman and 
Board of Directors. Chairmen and the Board of Directors change along with changes 
                                                 
26
 Strategic Enterprises include: Peoples‘ Bank, Bank of Ceylon, National Savings Bank, State 
Mortgage & Investment Bank, Lanka Puthra Development Bank, Sri Lanka Transport Board, Sri 
Lanka Railways, Ports Authority, Airports & Aviation Services (Ltd), Ceylon Electricity Board, 
Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, National Water Supply & Drainage Board, State Pharmaceuticals 
Corporation, Janatha State Development Board, State Plantation Corporation, Elkaduwa Plantation 
Ltd, Kurunagala Plantations Ltd, Chilaw Plantations Ltd, National Livestock Development Board, and 
Cashew Corporation.  
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in government or ministers. This hinders continuous and consistent functioning of 
day-to-day management and development.  
 
The other issue is that the PE is under strong political influence. This is mainly 
because each minister is the apex of the administrative system of the PEs. According 
to the State Corporation Act of 1957, ―the minister shall appoint the directors from 
among persons who appear to the minister to have had experience of and shown 
capacity in industrial, administrative, commercial, financial, or legal matters, applied 
sciences, or the organisation of workers‖ (Section 12). The provision ―capacity to 
organise workers‖ enables the ministers concerned to appoint anyone, other than 
MPs who are ineligible, on political patronage. SL experience has shown that 
instances where this flexibility has been taken for granted by some ministers, who 
have appointed unqualified persons to boards (Weerakoon, 1995).This is even more 
relevant today despite the fact that the Rajapaksa Committee of 1971 on Public 
Enterprises (Weerakoon, 1995) and ARC of 1987 emphasised the need to appoint 
competent people to the boards to facilitate the success of the enterprises. In one 
instance, the minister amended the National Youth Council Act to expand the 
number of board members from 8 to 24, thereby expanding the opportunity for 
patronage.  
 
Another problem is the lack of financial accountability. Several studies and reviews 
have already been undertaken in this sector, including a national review by leading 
members of the private sector, professions and civil society in 2003: Auditor 
General, 2006, 2007, 2008; Parliamentary Committee on Public Enterprises, 2007, 
2008; Department of Public Enterprises, 2004; and World Bank, 2003. All these 
reviews found that the public financial accountability of these enterprises is weak 
and ineffective. The Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2008 highlights that over the 
years many of PEs has become loss making
27
 entities, thereby becoming dependent 
on excessive state subsidies
28
 or bank borrowings rather than paying levy/dividend
29
 
                                                 
27
 For example, in 2008 Ceylon Petroleum Corporation incurred a loss of  SLRs. 14320 million while 
Sri Lanka Ports Authority made a significant loss of SLRs. 10035 million (Ministry of Finance & 
Planning, 2008, pp. 159-162). 
28
 Subsidies to public corporations (SLRs. millions): 2005 –10412; 2006 – 18,336; 2007 – 10,639; and 
2008 – 12,942 (Ministry of Finance & Planning, 2008). 
 91 
to government. Transfers to public enterprises in 2001 accounted for US$446 
million, about 3.1% of the GDP excluding borrowing. This situation is crucial due to 
many deficiencies observed by these reviews: absence of properly executed 
Corporate Plans (81% of public enterprises); delays in recovery of debts; 
underutilisation of assets; lack of transparency in transactions, attention to 
profitability, liquidity and financial viability and effective internal audit; political 
interference in all aspects including pricing of goods and services; inadequate 
systems and procedures, and mismanagement (Auditor General, 2006, 2007, 2008; 
COPE, 2007; National Review Committee, 2003). 
 
The key problem highlighted by the AG was that non-adherence with financial, 
administrative regulations and accounting standards by the PEs. The PEs are required 
to submit their Annual Financial Statements for audit within 60 days of the closing of 
financial year. In addition, the Chief Accounting Officers (Secretaries of Ministries) 
are obliged to submit Annual Progress Reports to Parliament in relation to the PEs 
under their purview within 5 months after the financial year. In spite of this 
obligation, the AG‘s Report 2006 highlighted that out of 210 PEs, only 76 had 
submitted their financial statements for audit within the stipulated period and the 
total number of Financial Statements received for audit was 165.  Another 43 had 
been submitted later and 2 sets were yet to be submitted at the time of the AG‘s 
Report. The AG‘s report (2008) revealed that 20 entities had not submitted their 
financial statements for audit in 2008.  
 
The lack of proper human resource deployment is another major issue identified by 
the National Review Committee (2003). The senior management positions have been 
functioning on an acting basis for a long time while having surplus staff in 
semiskilled and unskilled categories. In addition overstaffing has been recognised;  
for example, ―the Ceylon Fishery Harbours Corporation increased its staff from 129 
to 640 in 2001‖ (Department of Public Enterprises, 2004, p.5). Owing to this 
situation some enterprises spend 89% of their budget on salaries such as the 
                                                                                                                                          
29
 Total levy/dividend paid by the public enterprises (SLRs. million): 2008-7070; 2007-7682; 2006-
6951; 2005-5929 (Ministry of Finance & Planning, 2008, p.145). 
. 
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Samurdhi Authority and the National Youth Services Council, leaving limited funds 
to achieve organisational objectives, uplifting the poor and youth. It is observed that 
these two bodies have similar objectives i.e. promoting economic and social 
conditions of youth, so there is a duplication of efforts and wastage of money. The 
ARC already observed this dilemma, and mentioned that one of the main causes was 
the uncoordinated initiatives of different ministries (ARC, 1986/88, Report No.10). 
 
Another key issue identified by COPE was the corrupt activities of the PEs which 
will be discussed in detail under Corruption in this chapter (COPE, 2007). The most 
controversial discoveries of COPE are on privatisation of some PEs, which will be 
discussed in detail under privatisation in Chapter 5. The COPE report (2007) 
criticised executives over unlawful transactions in their PEs and highlighted many 
deficiencies over the failure on the part of the relevant secretaries of ministries and 
ministers in the supervision of the affairs and follow-up of the performance of 
institutions which come under their purview. The recommendations of COPE were 
accepted by Parliament and submitted to the Bribery and Corruption Commission. 
However, no action has been taken by the relevant agencies, the Ministry of Finance 
and Planning, the supervising ministry, Parliament, and the Bribery and Corruption 
Commission. Therefore, the Chair of COPE, Wijayadasa Rajapaksa, MP, crossed 
over to the Opposition at a crucial moment, one day before the 2008 Budget was 
passed, criticising the government for not taking action on their findings. Dr. H.A.P. 
Abeywardene, former GA, in an interview said ―Non implementation of COPE‘s 
recommendations will give the impression that the government is supporting the 
people for misappropriation of funds‖ (Interview, 15.02.2008). Since its inception,  
―COPE has continued to examine the public enterprises and has been making 
recommendations relating to the weak financial management, planning and 
performance of public enterprises but  those recommendations were not given due 
consideration either by the Ministry of Finance, supervising ministry and Parliament‖ 
(Weerakoon, 1995, p.314) 
  
Although COPE is a powerful Committee in Parliament, it has no power to translate 
its recommendations into actions. Therefore, the Parliamentary power to oversee the 
PEs has now become a fruitless and a wasteful exercise. Its activity is confined to a 
‗fact finding mission‘. The cumulative outcome of non-implementation of COPE 
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findings and to act on AG‘s reporting to Parliament was the increase of irregularities 
and inefficiency in PEs. 
 
Another issue is that there is no consistency of government policy in relation to PEs. 
Rather, there is a tendency towards changes in policy with changes in government or 
ministers. This was commented on by Dr. H.A.P. Abeywardene: 
The Ceylon Transport Board (CTB) was divided into regional boards and established SL 
Transport Board. In that background the private sector came in. Now again this 
government tries to reactivate the CTB (Interview, 15.02.2008). 
 
According to Daya Liyanage ―Due to this type of behaviour, the private sector is still 
reluctant to operate fully in development activities‖ (Interview, 07.01.2008). In 
addition, there is a tendency for non-adherence to policy; for example, the President 
has appointed a 75-year-old person to LankaPutra Bank, a government-owned bank, 
as its Chair in contravention of the Code of Governance introduced by the Central 
Bank (―Appoints 75 year old‖, 2008).  
 
Although existing PEs are a burden to the government, it has established several 
other enterprises, e.g. Mihin Lanka (PVT) Limited. However, the performances of 
the Strategic PEs overseen by the SEMA have not shown remarkable improvements 
so far. According to the Department of Public Enterprises (2005), the total revenue of 
these enterprises increased by 18%, but the net profit of the 10 strategic enterprises 
before interest and tax has declined by 64%. 
 
In summary, local and foreign agencies have identified problems with the 
performance and functions of the PEs in SL which have adverse effects on the 
country‘s administration. Given the high prominence to PEs in the administrative 
structure and the economy, these issues should immediately be addressed in any 
future agenda of reform.  
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4.3 Part II: Public Service Cadres, Cost & 
Personnel Management 
 
4.3.1 Public Service Cadres and Costs 
 
The data in regard to cadres in SLPS reflect two aspects, (a) the confusion with 
regards to roles and responsibilities, and (b) the overlapping and duplication of 
structures and functions as discussed in the previous section.  
 
Despite the strong recommendations by the ARC of 1986/88, UNDP (1990), ADB 
(1996) and World Bank (2000, 2003, 2004) that cadre rationalisation is a necessity, 
the cadres have continued to grow. SL‘s per capita employment in the public sector 
is the largest in the South and East Asia as mentioned in Chapter 1. Several aspects 
of current situations together with recent history illustrate this. As described in the 
ARC report the cadre strength of the public service was 406,359 in 1985. It 
progressively increased in later years as depicted in Figure 5 below. 
Figure 5: The Public Sector Employment from 1990 to 2008 
 
Note: Government: Central Government, Local Government, and Provincial 
Council Semi-Government: State Corporations, Statutory Boards, and State 
Authorities 
Source: Central Bank, 1993, 2002, 2006, 2007 and 2009 
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The current strength of the public service is 1.2 million, consisting of 990,410 in the 
central, provincial and local governments and 261,318 in the semi-government sector 
as at 2008 (Central Bank a, 2009, p.90).  Figure 5 illustrates declining trends of semi-
governmental employment over the period and proliferation of the government 
sector. Since 1990 the numbers of public sector employees have increased by almost 
more than 37% amounting to 13% of the total labour force at the end of 2008.  
 
However, there was a slight decline between 2000 and 2005. In 2001 there was a 
suspension of recruitment to the public service by abolishing existing vacant posts by 
the UNP government (Management Services Circular No. 16, 2002). This 
government was dissolved by the President by using her executive power as 
mentioned before. One of the election pledges of the SLFP related to public sector 
employment. They promised to give government employment to all unemployed 
graduates.
30
 The election 2004 gave power to UPFA led by SLFP. One of the reasons 
for the defeat of the UNP was the suspension of recruitment to the public service. 
This was emphasised by senior Ministers of the UNP in the aftermath of the election. 
Finally, 19 members crossed over to the government accusing the UNP leadership of 
suspending recruitment, among other things.  
 
In 2004, this suspension was withdrawn in respect of staff posts in the public service 
(Management Services Circular No.23, 2004) by the new government which 
recruited 12,000 unemployed graduates in 2004 and another 41,480 in 2006 
(Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2005 & 2007).  
 
According to the Report on SL Development Policy Review by the World Bank 
(2004, p.12),  
This bureaucracy is large, costly and suffers from low effectiveness and efficiency. The 
incentive system is perverse.  Government workers with the lowest levels of education on 
average earn almost double the wages of their private sector counterpart. Top policy-
makers and professionals are insufficiently compensated. Controls on recruitment have 
weakened over time. Despite the growing role of the public sector and increased 
privatisation, government employees have risen in both absolute numbers and as a 
proportion of labour force…politicisation of public recruitment has weakened the norms 
                                                 
30
 The youth unemployment is very significant in SL. It was never below 8 percent (Ministry of 
Finance and Planning, 2006).  It was reported around 45,000 graduates are unemployed at the time.    
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prevailing in the administration, bloated its numbers and reduced the effectiveness…. 
Rising government recruitment has gone hand in hand with the proliferation of 
government institutions in the past 20 years.  
 
The Central Bank figures in relation to semi-government employment for the years 
1998 and 2002 were different from that of figures provided by the Department of 
Census and Statistics. According to the Central Bank, in 1998 there were 300,654 
employees in this sector whilst it was 213,789 according to the Department of 
Census and Statistics. In 2002, the employment data of the Central Bank was 
264,355 whereas it was 272,441 according to the Department of Census and 
Statistics. In the first instance the variation is huge. The Central Bank figures show 
increased employment in this sector in 1998 and decreased employment in 2002 
when compared with the data of the Department of Census and Statistics which is 
―the central statistical agency in SL, responsible for collection, compilation, analysis 
and dissemination of all statistical data needed for planning, policy formulation and 
to monitor the progress of various development activities and also to measure the 
impact of various governmental policies‖ (Department of Census & Statistics, 2009). 
In this scenario one may puzzle over which data is accurate or which data is to be 
used in decision-making. This is only one area. Other data may also have the same 
ambiguity. Due to the lack of a management information system on public sector 
employment in the Ministry of Public Administration, the apex body for Public 
Administration, which was established 36 years ago, the ambiguity of data on public 
sector will persist, thus management decisions will be handicapped.  Therefore, it is 
necessary to rely on coordinated statistical database for the country in order to make 
coherent and consistent policy decisions. This should be taken into account in the 
formulation of future reforms. 
 
The salary bills were increased accordingly; the expenditure on salaries in 1995 was 
SLRs 25,340 million. They were raised to SLRs 121,841 million in 2005,  SLRs 
175,031 in 2006, SLRs 214,160 in 2007 and SLRs 239,078 in 2008 (Ministry of 
Finance and Planning, 2008, National Council for Administration, 2006). According 
to the Annual Report 2008 (p.67) of the Ministry of Finance and Planning, the 
expenditure on salaries and wages is the highest single expenditure item of the 
national budget. It represented 5.4% of GDP and 32% of the total recurrent 
expenditure in 2008. Salaries and wages absorbed 36% of total revenue in 2008. 
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The public personnel management policy has direct bearing on the increase of the 
public sector cadres and expenditures. The next section examines the current 
situation of the personnel management system of the public service. 
 
4.3.2 Personnel Management  
 
The personnel management policies and approaches in the public service 
demonstrate the degree of efficacy of the country‘s public administration to a large 
extent. This section discusses the agencies involved in personnel management 
functions of the SLPS with special reference to NPSC and current personnel 
management modalities including recruitment, transfers, training, and promotional 
policies, in order to understand whether they contribute to organisational efficacy 
and efficiency of the country‘s public administration. Furthermore, it outlines the 
fundamental policy issues, weaknesses and outcomes in an attempt to address them 
in any future agenda of reforms.  
4.3.2.1 Agencies Involved in Personnel Management  
 
The personnel management powers and functions of the SLPS are vested with the 
National Public Service Commission (NPSC) and nine Provincial Public Service 
Commissions (PPSCs) and the Police Commission. The evolution of NPSC and its 
associated constitutional reform will be discussed in Chapter 5 in detail. The 
National Salaries and Cadre Commission (NSCC), which was established in 2006, is 
entrusted with advising and assisting the Government in formulation and 
development of a wage policy and cadre management in the public sector (Gazette 
No. 1444/8, May 9, 2006). The Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs 
is dealing with the delegated functions of the NPSC relating to Combined Services 
(Appendix 7). The approval and review of cadre are the main task of the 
Management Services Department, thus the ambit of its functions is more or less 
duplicating the tasks profiles of the NSCC. The National Budget Department also 
becomes involved in the field of personnel management of the public service by 
controlling the cadre in terms of the manpower budget in the annual estimates. This 
section does not attempt to discuss the functions of each organisation mentioned 
above but will discuss the composition and role of the main agency, NPSC. 
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National Public Service Commission (NPSC) 
 
The NPSC in its present form was established in 2001 under the 17
th
 Amendment to 
the Constitution. It is composed of nine members, appointed by the President on the 
recommendations of the CC. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the CC is now ineffective, 
thus the current members are directly the appointees of the President. The NPSC is 
responsible for appointments, promotions, transfers, disciplinary control and 
dismissals of the public officials except members of the police service, provincial 
public service, secretaries of ministries, heads of departments and employees of 
public enterprises (see Chapter 3). In this sense the NPSC has no power over key 
positions of the public service. This could lead to nepotism, allegiance, and political 
patronage by the executive over such appointments.  
 
However, the NPSC has the power to make rules, regulations and procedures relating 
to the public service as a whole, while the Cabinet of Ministers have the power to 
make policies. Until the Commission made its own rules which came into effect from 
April 2009, the existing Establishments Code had served as the guiding principles of 
NPSC from 2001.   
 
According to Articles 56 and 57 of the Constitution, the NPSC has the power to 
delegate its powers to committees or public officers subject to the conditions and 
procedures determined by the Commission (Appendix 7). Any public officer 
aggrieved by an order made by a delegated authority in relation to appointment, 
transfer, dismissal and disciplinary control, can appeal to the NPSC in accordance 
with such rules made by the Commission from time to time. The Constitution gives 
the NPSC power ―to alter, vary, rescind or confirm‖ an order against which such an 
appeal has been made. Article 61A of the Constitution does not allow any 
Court/Tribunal to intervene in decisions of the NPSC other than fundamental rights 
applications and appeals to the AAT which was discussed in Chapter 3. The 
immunity conferred by Article 61A has already been recognised judicially by the 
Court of Appeal (CA), for example, CA No. 283/2003 - Katugampola vs. 
Commissioner General of Excise; CA No.16/2004 - Ratnasiri vs. Ellawala; and CA 
No. 18/48/2006 - Perera vs. Director General Customs and others (Goonawardene, 
2007, May 21). In these cases the Court ruled that a decision taken by the NPSC 
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cannot be challenged, except at the AAT. Accordingly, the NPSC has been given full 
autonomy in relation to the matters of personnel management in the public service.  
 
The independence of the NPSC is also guaranteed by Article 54 (2) of the 
Constitution which prohibits the appointment of MPs, Provincial Councillors or 
members of local authorities to the NPSC. Secondly, the removal of members can be 
done only by the President on the recommendation of the CC or if convicted by a 
court of law for any offence, or by the imposition of civic disability. Thirdly, the 
independence is ensured through the determination of the emolument of 
Commissioners by Parliament. Fourthly, the independence was ensured through 
Article 61(c) of the Constitution, which states that any person, without authority 
under the Constitution, who attempts to interfere or influence the Commission or any 
public officer, shall be guilty of an offence and subject to imprisonment or a fine. 
The Cabinet of Ministers have the powers of appointment, transfer, dismissal and 
disciplinary control over Heads of Departments (HODs) under Article 55(3) of the 
Constitution subject to ‗ascertaining the views‘ of the PSC. This is a major departure 
from the previous Constitutional regime in which Cabinet had sole authority in all 
aspects of personnel management functions, not only the HODs, but also the whole 
public sector. Accordingly, it is now expected that Cabinet would consider views of 
the NPSC in taking a final decision.  
Hence, the Cabinet retention of powers over HODs is a concession made by the new 
constitutional change for the convenience of the Government of the day. According 
to D. Wijesinghe, Secretary to Cabinet, ―there have been instances where the Cabinet 
had to reverse its earlier decisions due to the contrary views expressed by the NPSC. 
However, there is still a school of thought that these powers also should be taken 
away from the Cabinet and vested in the NPSC‖ (Interview, 12.11.2007).  
The powers for appointments, transfers, dismissal and disciplinary control of 
Secretaries to Ministries are with the President. Article 52(2) states that, 
The Secretary to the Ministry shall, subject to the direction and control of his 
Minister, exercise supervision over the departments of government or other 
institutions in charge of his minister. 
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This Constitutional provision has several shortfalls. It undermines the impartial and 
effective discharge of advice by the highest official in public offices. Since the 
Minister has been given powers constitutionally to direct and control the Secretary as 
he/she wishes, the Secretary may be reluctant to give ‗free and frank‘ advice rather 
than implementing the orders of the Minister. As such, a Secretary is ambivalent 
about public values versus political interests in policy formulation. On the other 
hand, a Secretary may expect direction from the Minister, which can handicap 
innovativeness in the public sector.  This situation becomes worse due to the fact that 
the power of appointment and dismissal of the Secretaries is vested with the 
President. Dr. B. S. Wijeweera, former GA, commented, 
The public sector individual feels that he will be obliged to be a mere instrument of 
the government once he gets to that office. Although it is not a political 
appointment
31
 but the position or the post itself has got immersed in politics and 
people reacting in a political way when they are invested in that office. [In order to 
survive in the high office] (Interview, 09.01.2008). 
Currently several retired public officials hold secretarial posts. This is a matter of 
concern which obstructs other people from getting into those positions.  
In summation, the powers of appointment, transfer, promotion and disciplinary 
control of public officers are currently vested with the NPSC. The NPSC has 
delegated some of its powers, such as disciplinary control and transfer, to public 
officials subject to some conditions. Its original powers of appointments and 
promotions have not been delegated. However, the NPSC does not have personnel 
management powers over the Secretaries of Ministries, Heads of Departments, 
employees of Public Enterprises, and provincial cadres.  
4.3.2.2 Appointments 
 
As discussed, the power of appointment of personnel to the national cadres of public 
service is constitutionally vested with the NPSC. However, there are instances where 
this formal approach has been avoided, and various forms of informal modalities 
have been adopted in the recent past. The major difference between formal and 
informal approaches to appointments is that the former recognises the merit of the 
                                                 
31
 Majority of the Secretaries of Ministries are career bureaucrats. 
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person and selects the best following systematic approved procedures (advertising 
followed by the competitive examinations and structured oral tests according to 
‗service minutes‘ and schemes of recruitment), while the latter ignores those and 
selects people either on patronage or based on subjective judgments and criteria. 
Nevertheless, recruitment of personnel to the SLPS following the approved 
procedure is not without problems.    
 
Formal approach 
The current modality of recruitment to core managerial  groups is based on the 
concept of ‗All Island Services‘(AIS) which recognises the uniformity of recruitment 
to countrywide groups and lifetime permanent employment, rather than emphasising 
the specifics of the job.  
Despite the fact that the present administrative system (development administration) 
demands more specific skills, this recruitment to island-wide groups continued after 
Independence; for example, from the Ceylon Civil Service to the present Sri Lanka 
Administrative Service and expanded to every other profession: planners, 
accountants, teachers, scientific officers, architects, and medical cadres (Wanasinghe, 
2005). The outcome was the proliferation of 11 AIS in managerial groups (Appendix 
7) and four major subordinate groups (Management Assistants, Librarians, Drivers 
and Office Employment) in the administrative machinery (excluding teachers and 
armed forces). For general administration there are two services: the Sri Lanka 
Administrative Service (SLAS) and Educational Administrative Service.  
The appointments to the AIS are carried out by the NPSC and their management is 
performed by several other agencies; for example, the Combined Services 
Department is delegated with the transfers and disciplinary functions of the SLAS, 
while the Planning Service Board and the Scientific Service Board are entrusted with 
Planning Service and Scientific Service cadres respectively. There is no consistency 
in this administrative arrangement because some services are managed by boards and 
some by the Department of Combined Services. These are additional costs to the 
government. 
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Though the country-wide recruitment policy has some positive outcomes such as 
reduced cost, easy coordination of recruitment and induction training, and reduced 
time-wasting, its negative outcomes are overwhelming and hinder efficient and 
effective public service. They include highly centralised recruitment; insufficiency of 
specialisation; absence of commitment to the institution in which one serves; 
difficulty of enforcing accountability for task performance; proliferation of several 
management bodies in the administrative system, and service orientation rather than 
job specificity. 
Because of the centralisation of appointments, public sector institutions have become 
just passive recipients of personnel from the services which are assigned to them. 
Public institutions have to manage with the personnel supplied and they lack 
authority to match those supplied with specific job requirements (Wanasinghe, 
2005). The outcome is that the right person is not always in the right place, thereby 
creating organisational inefficiency. In addition, the authority of the immediate 
organisation in relation to personnel management of the AIS cadres is insignificant: 
no personnel responsibility in regard to recruitment, disciplinary matters, and 
transfers. The trend of centralisation is exacerbated by the dominance of the AIS in 
the bureaucracy, even in the provincial governments. There is also an insufficiency 
of specialisation. This becomes worse due to lack of job-specific training for the 
higher echelons
32
 who are supposed to run the ministries and departments.  
 
Similarly, service orientation hinders cohesiveness within the bureaucracy; for 
example, in the Treasury, the External Resources and National Planning Departments 
are dominated by the Planning Service cadres, National Budget and Fiscal Policy are 
dominated by Administrative Service cadres, and Treasury Operations and State 
Accounts Departments are dominated by Accountant Service cadres. They are 
reluctant to have cadres of other services in their respective departments. In 2004, the 
Treasury transferred some newly-recruited SLAS officers to those departments in 
order to have multi-skilled people to improve productivity, but those posted to the 
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 A current Secretary of a Cabinet Ministry commented that he has no specialisation in the functions 
of his ministry, so that he has to learn on the job. He further mentioned that when he masters the 
subjects and becomes specialised, there may be a Cabinet reshuffle with a transfer of Secretaries. 
Thus, there is no point to study hard, so it becomes a learning exercise again and again because the 
higher echelons groups are not readily available to take up specifics of jobs. This problem persists 
because of failure to create the Senior Management Group as recommended by the ARC, 1986/88.  
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State Accounts and Treasury Operations Departments were not given meaningful 
tasks, so later they moved to other departments where they felt they were not being 
discriminated due to two different services (personal observation).  The service 
orientation in the public sector badly affected the utilisation of cadres. Engineers and 
medical cadres, too, are engaged in administrative tasks irrespective of their 
specialisation, for example, in the Department of Irrigation and Ministry of Health. 
This wastes their talents.  
 
Dr. B.S. Wijeweera, former GA commented,  
I personally feel that we have now come to the stage when AIS are an anachronism. The 
management of them is very difficult. We must now swing to a decentralised set of  
services where people prove their allegiance to a particular province and the staff within 
the province become transferable within the province, but not on  an all island basis. The 
main weakness of AIS now is that it tends to centralise talents in Colombo because all the 
top jobs are in Colombo. People tend to migrate to Colombo when they mature [reach 
senior]. That is not good for the administration. The mature [senior] people should be 
encouraged to be in the province where development takes place (Interview, 09.01.2008). 
In conjunction with these issues of recruitment is the tenure of employment of public 
officials. The lifetime employment is the main pillar of the SLPS. Though it 
contributes to attraction and retention of officials and security in the public service, it 
also: 
Poses considerable impediment to the rationalisation and restructuring of public 
administration institutional structures; 
Contributes to considerable surplus staff when their jobs become unnecessary 
consequent to such rationalisation; 
Inhibits possibilities of inducting personnel for new specific short term contract; 
and 
Introduces a situation of rigidity and inflexibility thus, impeding administrative 
reforms (Wanasinghe, 2005).  
However, this formal approach to recruitment has been ignored sometimes by SL 
government; further complicating matters and undermining the new constitutional 
provisions and merit principles, and even ignoring future needs of public 
administration. This process undermines the ‗Mahinda Chintana‘ which pledged ―I 
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will restore the dignity and independence of the public service‖ (Rajapaksa, 2005, p. 
9). The next section examines informal and ad hoc approaches to recruitment in the 
SLPS. 
Informal and ad hoc Approaches  
There have been some irrational appointments to the AISs irrespective of the merit 
principle. These appointments are based on the recommendations of the committees 
appointed to give redress to public servants who complained of political 
victimisation. This approach was not only for recruitment but also extended to 
promotions in the public service too. However, it is evident that most of such 
appointments in the past were patronage politics rather than genuine cases of 
political victimisation (personal observation).   
As mentioned, the Cabinet of Ministers currently does not have power over 
appointments but they manage to make ad hoc appointments, for example, since 
2005 the Ministry of Science and Technology is running ―Vidatha‖ Programme 
(Transfer of technology to village), recruiting people completely outside the public 
service.  
 
The Secretary to the Cabinet, D. Wijesinghe, said that although all public service 
appointments, below the rank of Head of Department, are to be made by the NPSC, 
there are occasions when ministers have to get persons appointed outside this 
stipulation, either due to the delay in following NPSC procedures or as persons in 
whom the Minister has personal confidence are required. Hence, some appointments 
have been made on a contractual basis, for a limited period of time, on the approval 
of the Cabinet of Ministers. He cited the example above to illustrate the point 
((Interview, 19.11.2007). In addition, there are many appointments such as advisors 
in many ministries and departments based on political patronage. The Cabinet 
Secretary further said, 
There are also instances where, at a higher level, personnel have to be hired, to attend to 
specific duties outside the routine functions of public officers. Here, this is not possible 
within the strict procedures laid down by the NPSC. Therefore, several ministries have 
appointed, again with Cabinet approval, a number of advisors/consultants, on contractual 
basis, for a limited period of time (Interview, 01.11.2007). .   
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The Cabinet Secretary has, in respect of both cases mentioned above, advised the 
Cabinet of Ministers, on the constitutional and legal positions, but, such 
appointments continue to be made.  
Although the numbers of political advisers in ministries and departments escalated 
after 2005, this study focuses more on other general appointments which were 
eventually made permanent without due qualifications to handle the positions. 
Inducting personnel for new specific time-bound tasks may become necessary as the 
task demands on public administration continue to change. However, those 
appointments should be terminated at the end of their contract. Nevertheless, it has 
never happened. The recent past experience shows that in general temporary 
appointments were later made permanent by the Cabinet. Public Administration and 
Home Affairs Circulars: 21/2006 and 21/2006 (i, ii, iii and iv), have implemented 
such Cabinet decisions and granted permanent status to all temporary appointees who 
have completed 180 days satisfactory and continuous service irrespective of having 
the required qualifications. The decision to recruit people temporarily and then grant 
permanent status to them in such a manner gives priority to patronage and needs of 
individuals rather than the needs and interest of public administration. This leads to 
public service disarray. 
Furthermore, it leads to other issues: lack of discipline and degradation of the quality 
in the public service, demoralisation of the existing staff, and further distortion of 
neutrality and impartiality principles which are the guiding principles of withdrawing 
the Cabinet of Ministers from personnel management by the 17
th
 Amendment to the 
Constitution. This informal practice further undermines the authority of the NPSC 
given by the Constitution, thus hindering good governance.  
Moreover, despite the bloated public service, there were countrywide appointments 
for graduates by creating unnecessary posts in the recent past to ease the 
unemployment problem. V.K. Nanayakkara, former Secretary for the Ministry of 
Education responded:  
The government recruited 43000 graduates in the recent past. The entire Art graduates 
who were in the Private Sector also have joined the public service. I asked one graduate 
why he joined the public service with a low salary. He replied, in the private sector I had 
to work very late. I joined the public service because I want to be free. Even with a low 
salary people like the public service because you get a pension. You can go up without 
even doing anything, sign the book and draw your salaries. There is no performance 
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based promotional system. Everybody gets a satisfactory evaluation at the end.  You are 
free.  In the private sector they have to learn IT, acquire marketing skills and so on. In the 
public service there is no such requirement. So the government gave a wrong signal to 
youth. 
He went on saying that,   
They appointed 10,000 Arts graduates [from 43000] to the teacher service. Those 
teachers are not required by the ministry. We needed aesthetics, science, maths, Tamil 
and English teachers who are in short of supply, but none of them had that background. 
Unnecessarily we filled the teachers‘ cadre with graduates who are in excess. It is a 
political decision (Interview, 14.11.2007)  
   
The ARC (1986/88) had foreseen this situation and pinpointed that the Committee 
does not see the public service as the natural provider of employment for the large 
numbers who emerge from the educational system. Professor S.W. Ranasinghe 
observed that the academia today is not playing its legitimate role properly.  
 
This situation was reinforced by the former Secretary to Education, V.K. 
Nanayakkara:  
Our university system does not provide the necessary manpower for the country. This is a 
serious problem. Why do they produce lots of Arts graduates? The doctors cannot work 
without nurses, dispensers, technical officers, x-ray technicians, lab assistants so on. We 
produce doctors, and engineers; but we do not produce assistant staff. Our universities do 
not produce nurses, technical experts who are needed to the country. We can export 
nurses but we cannot send Sinhala graduates abroad. We do not have polytechnics. We 
should have more vocational training schools (Interview, 14.11.2007).  
 
Nevertheless, the public service has become the natural provider of employment for 
large numbers and the persistent platform for ‗state building‘. This problem will 
continue due to the accumulation of graduates each year. 
 
Though this kind of recruitment provides a temporary solution to the existing social 
problem of unemployment, it has several far-reaching negative outcomes. A major 
negative outcome is that it encourages unemployed personnel to search for 
government employment rather than adapt themselves to the needs of private 
employers, and then search for and accept private employment (World Bank, 
2000).This also affected the negative outcome of the labour deployment of the 
country (Central Bank, 2006). The large number of appointments further encourages 
the expectation that government employment could be achieved at any time, in any 
number, and any field. For example, in 2007, Indigenous Medical Graduates who 
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were supposed to be in private practice, also demanded public sector employment 
and the current unemployed graduates established a ‗Combined Unemployment 
Graduates Association‘ and conducted protests against the government in July 2008, 
demanding that the government fulfil its promises to unemployed graduates made 
during the period 2006-2008. 
 
The other negative outcome is underemployment of staff in the public sector. Ronnie 
De Mel, Senior Advisor to the President, said, ―Most of the new graduates do not 
have work. Go to a Kachcheri
33
 and see how many people are idling‖ (Interview, 
05.12.2007). The Minister for Education; Susil Premajayantha also commented, 
―They are not utilised because they are not required. They are appointed on a 
political decision. There was no actual necessity‖ (Interview, 19.02.2008).  
 
The wastage of manpower is wastage of money. Therefore, it is imperative that they 
must be properly utilised. 
 
There are other instances where Cabinet took decisions on such ad hoc appointments 
in the public service but the NPSC did not implement those decisions. The aggrieved 
public officials even sought SC intervention, for example, the SC Case No. SC F/R 
146/2003 –in respect of Cabinet decision of 12.10.2001:  
 
Grant approval to create 8 posts of Assistant/Deputy Directors of Pirivena
34
 in 
the Education Department;  
Appoint 8 persons holding the positions of Pirivena Coordinators to these posts; 
and   
Absorb 10 Lecturers serving in a Pirivena (Goonawardene, 2007). 
 
In this case the SC highlighted that the Cabinet does not have power to appoint 
certain people or categories of people but does have policy making powers, thus, the 
Court decided that only the first decision comes within the powers of the Cabinet 
according to the law. Nevertheless, the Cabinet took a similar kind of decision on 
                                                 
33
 Kachcheri or District Secretariat in the present context is the core administrative body in the district. 
34
 Pirivena is the place where Buddhist monks study. 
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December 13, 2004 (Goonawardene & Wijesinghe, Interviews, 11.02.2008 & 
12.11.2007 respectively).  
 
According to D. Wijesinghe, Secretary to the Cabinet (2007), in both cases the 
decisions were taken to address the grievances of two specific groups of public 
officers, but now they have to go to the NPSC. However, the NPSC cannot appoint 
them outside the Schemes of Recruitment which will not eventually fulfil the 
ambitions of the persons concerned. It is regrettable to note that in these two cases 
the Cabinet acted to fulfil the wishes of the persons concerned damaging the quality 
of the public service and its future.  
These are the examples of using the public sector for political gains by party politics, 
further bloating the already-bloated public service and posting those appointees 
irrationally throughout the country, creating a ‗winners take all‘ situation. The Daily 
Mirror editorial (―Unqualified teachers‖, 2007, p.8) disclosed that there were 12,000 
unqualified teachers in the country‘s education system from 1989. There has been no 
action taken by any successive governments in this regard. The current ad hoc 
appointment to the public service leads to organisational ineffectiveness and low 
quality outputs and outcomes. This eventually, no doubt, will be a bottleneck to the 
economic development of the country. 
The most probable main reason for intervention of the Cabinet of Ministers in the 
public service appointments and trying to maintain the pre-constitutional amendment 
modalities is expressed by the Secretary to the Ministry of Petroleum and Petroleum 
Resources Development, A.P.A. Gunasekara,  
Politicians failed to make development activities in the country in order to address the 
problems of the citizens. Therefore, they try to give something through the public service.  
During our time the appointment letter was delivered to us through the post. But now, 
they are handed over by the ministers at big functions. Same with other services such as 
Samurdi benefits [welfare], state land distribution, etc (Interview, 21.11.2007). 
. 
In summation, despite the devolution in late 1980s, centralised and countrywide 
recruitment to the public service still exists. The AISs dominate in every field of core 
managerial positions. The lack of organisational specificity due to the high rate of 
transfers (see 4.3.2.4), in conjunction with lack of job specific training for the higher 
echelon of public officials, needs immediate attention because they heavily impact 
 109 
on day-to-day administration. The current modality of ad hoc temporary 
appointments and later absorption to the permanent cadre without qualifications also 
needs special attention in any future reform in order to preserve the quality of the 
workforce and to enhance the achievement of the organisational objectives.  
4.3.2.3 Personnel Planning  
 
SL public administration suffers from lack of personnel planning. This is another 
area which needs immediate attention. The activities of the personnel planning 
include forecasting the human resource requirements in accordance with the needs 
for administration and development over a period considering retirement, and 
resignations, selecting the right persons to the right positions, training them to 
undertake specific tasks and retaining them by paying adequate salaries to live with 
dignity. However, in the SLPS personnel planning is marginal and nobody pays 
attention to it.  
 
One of the weaknesses of the lack of personnel planning in addition to the excess 
cadre already discussed is that it has led to an imbalance in cadres in public 
organisations. Although the overall cadre is excessive in the public sector, most of 
the organisations are reporting that they are short of staff in several categories. 
According to the Minister for Transport the number of directors in the SL Transport 
Board is much higher than the workers and there are other vacancies to be filled 
(―SLTB overstaffed‖, 2007). The health sector is short of specialists, qualified 
nurses, and technical staff. Furthermore, the public service has an excess in office 
employees (peons, messengers, and unskilled labourers, currently (2008-14,000) in 
the national cadre and drivers (5500)). This is because after every election the 
winning party appoints their political supporters to these positions.  
 
However, the public service acutely lacks translators, journalists and IT 
professionals. According to the present Constitution, both Sinhala and Tamil are 
official languages. In addition, English is being used as a link language. While 
communication with a citizen may be in one of these languages (depending on what 
language the citizen would like to communicate in), all official records and general 
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communications have to be in all three languages. The Cabinet Secretary, D. 
Wijesinghe, outlined the problem of working in three languages in an interview: 
This is especially so in a place like the Cabinet Office, where Cabinet papers – 
Memoranda, Minutes and Decisions, have to be maintained in Sinhala, Tamil and 
English. This presents not only logistical problems (like getting documents in three 
languages on time), but also finding competent translators to put documents prepared in 
one language to the other two. Consequently, Cabinet Office had to engage even 
translators, over the retirement age of 60 – one even 72 years of age (Interview, 
19.11.2007).    
 
In addition, due to the lack of a proper manpower planning system in the public 
service, there are regional imbalances in manpower supply.  
 
V.K. Nanayakkara explained his experiences in the Ministry of Education: 
In the teacher service there was overall excess staff in Sinhala medium. In the Southern 
province, there are regional imbalances. Galle and Matara have excess but Hambantota is 
short of teachers. Schools in Anuradhapura town have enough teachers but in remote 
areas like Kabilithigollawa and Padewiya teachers are in deficit. We cannot transfer from 
excess to vacant places because of politics (Interview, 14, 11.2007). 
 
Why does the ministry not transfer excess teachers to other vacant schools?  The 
Minister for Education commented, 
Because of many reasons, socio-economic and political, it is very difficult to implement a 
transfer policy. Most of the teachers want to work in towns for better facilities. They do 
not want to go rural areas. Their attitude also should be changed (Interview, 19.02.2008).  
 
This situation is not only confined to the education sector, but in other sectors too, 
including the district administration; for example, Divisional Secretaries in the rural 
areas are below required qualifications as mentioned. Out of 312 divisions only 110 
currently have Class 1 officers because most of the Class 1 officers are reluctant to 
work in divisions where they are more vulnerable to political interferences
35
. 
 
A.P.A.Gunasekara, Secretary, Ministry of Petroleum and Petroleum Resources 
Development, commented: 
Previously a public officer in the division had to satisfy the MP in the area, but today he 
has to satisfy many politicians, provincial council ministers, provincial councillors, 
pradeshiya sabah members and even the organisers in the ruling party. A Divisional 
Secretary (class 1 officer of the SLAS) who was posted  to… division faced a big 
                                                 
35
 For example, Matale, Wellawaya and Ampara Divisional Secretaries were transferred out on the 
request of the political elites recently (Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs, 2008) 
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problem on the very first day of his duty. A pradeshiya sabha member has come and 
asked him who are you? Then he replied that he is the new DS to this office. Then, he 
was asked ―how did you come to this office without my knowledge? The officer has 
replied that he didn‘t know, the Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs 
appointed him to this position. Then the politician threatened him and asked him to seek a 
transfer immediately, if not he would be in a trouble. How can one work in such an 
environment? (Interview, 03.01.2008). 
In summation, the above review of the current position of the personal management 
of public service reveals that there are no cohesive public sector personnel 
management policies. The cumulative outcome of the existing situation in regard to 
recruitment and placement functions is the increasing trend of organisational 
backwardness, inefficiency, inability to deliver the outputs which are expected from 
the government policies and programmes, continuous politicisation, and bloated 
bureaucracy. Due to the fact that the public administration has to maintain such a 
huge number, it has become an obstacle to socio-economic development because 
the money available is spent on maintaining huge cadres. The unwillingness to 
rationalise cadres in the public service, despite the recommendation of the ARC of 
1986/88, led to the current situation. Hence, the centralised countywide recruitment, 
failure to follow the standards of recruitment, proper placement on the job and 
personnel planning are matters for concern in any future reforms. 
4.3.2.4 Transfers  
 
According to the Establishments Code which sets out policies, rules and procedures 
of the Public Service, all public officers are obliged to work in any part of the 
country thus, they are subject to being transferred. The NPSC has delegated its power 
on transfers to relevant public officials (Appendix 7).  H.D. L. Goonawardene, 
Secretary NPSC, in an interview said, 
The Secretaries of Ministries can implement transfers according to the specified scheme 
approved by the NPSC, but the NPSC has received a lot of petitions on political transfers. 
Without any authority secretaries make ad hoc transfers. On such occasions the NPSC 
issues stay orders and go into the merits of the case and sometimes the NPSC stps them 
and try to rectify. Even under the urgency of work the secretaries now cannot transfer 
their staff in an ad hoc way (Interview, 11.02. 2008). 
 
Nevertheless, due to countrywide recruitment to the public service, the transfer of 
staff is inevitable despite the devolution of administration. It hinders the 
specialisation of tasks by public officials. It also develops lack of commitment on the 
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part of staff to the institutions in which they serve. A public officer has the feeling 
that the work station is only a ‗temporary place‘ for him. Public organisations lack 
people with organisational history due to the frequency of transfers. Sometimes 
transfers create psychological problems to public officials and their families. This 
creates additional costs and tasks to government departments.  However, as 
mentioned by the ARC, transfers are sometimes needed for the sake of the individual 
officer and the organisation.    
4.3.2.5 Promotions 
 
Promotion is another area where patronage is exhibited in the SLPS. Promotion is an 
instrument for selecting from amongst serving public officers those who are best 
equipped in terms of ability, aptitude and attitudes for the performance of tasks in a 
position at a higher level in the public service (ARC, 1986/88). Under the new 
constitutional regime powers of approval of promotions in the public service are 
vested with the NPSC. That power has not been delegated to any public official. In 
regards to Combined Services promotions are done according to ways that are spelt 
out in the Service Minutes. Those who fulfil the requirements of the service minute 
are promoted to the next Grade. However, as mentioned before, the powers of 
appointment to the higher echelons, Secretaries to the Ministries, Deputy Secretary to 
the Treasury and Heads of Departments, Additional Secretaries, are vested with the 
President and the Cabinet respectively. The promotional prospects of Class 1 officers 
of AIS are in their hands. Although one can go up to Class 1 on merit, one cannot go 
beyond such a position only with ability and merit.  
 
Daya Liyanage, chair of the National Procurement Agency commented:   
You can get the promotion but you cannot get a position unless you are recommended by 
the Cabinet. What is the use of having the promotion without a suitable position? 
(Interview, 02.01. 2008). 
 
Due to the lack of a proper performance appraisal system in the public service and 
performance-related systematic promotional systems, appointments to higher posts 
are not made without ‗patronage‘, politically or otherwise. In regard to public 
enterprises, promotions are done in an ad hoc manner. 
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4.3.2.6 Performance Management  
 
Although performance monitoring and evaluation provides the underpinning for a 
proper performance management system in the SLPS at all levels, it is yet to be 
introduced at macro and micro levels. In 1966, with the enlargement of government 
functions, a ―National Operation Room‖ was established to monitor the performance 
of vast area of development initiatives (ADB, 2004b). However, performance 
management was neglected thereafter. In 2003, the ―National Operation Room‖ was 
re-established by the UNF government, but due to it being short-lived that 
government initiative was interrupted. Performance management is further 
exacerbated due to the fact that the annual budget of the government is input-
oriented. Therefore, there is no outputs/outcomes based performance evaluation 
system in regard to public goods and services delivery at present. 
 
At the micro level, an individual performance appraisal (PA) system was introduced 
in 1998 (see Chapter 5 for details), to discard the confidential reporting system which 
was in practice, to promote accountability, and to bring the public sector service 
delivery to a high standard. The evaluation gave higher weight to work-related 
aspects to ensure a higher level of objectivity and fairness. 
 
Nevertheless, soon after it was introduced, the whole process of PA proved flawed 
due to many reasons: lack of knowledge of officials on how to formulate and use the 
appraisal results; inadequate participation of the appraisers in the preparation of work 
plans; unwillingness of appraisers to make accurate evaluations due to cultural 
norms, and lack of any feedback mechanism. Furthermore, the lack of consistency 
and commitment in the way PA is implemented; lack of incentives to high 
performers and/or sanctions to non-performers; lack of integration of PA with other 
human resource decisions such as promotions and training; political interference in 
recruitment, promotion and transfers; and the fact that PA generated a lot of 
paperwork, hindered the effectiveness of the PA system in the public service (De 
Alwis, 2000).  
 
At present individual PA system has become a form-filling exercise. Everyone gets a 
satisfactory rating irrespective of performance at the end of the year. The 
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performance of the Secretaries of the Ministries is not under any appraisal. Most 
importantly, there is no environment in the SLPS to seriously evaluate performance 
because appraisal results are ignored in key human resources decisions across the 
public sector.  
4.3.2.7 Training  
 
Public servants are needed to acquire updated knowledge and skills in diverse sectors 
in the economy in order to contribute effectively in socio-economic development of 
the country. In addition, overseas exposure is very important for public officials, not 
only to acquire relevant knowledge, skills and good governance practices overseas, 
but also to understand how they should be ready to face challenges of ever changing 
competitive global environment. Therefore, training should be an ongoing process 
for equipping cadres from entry throughout their career, facilitating them to perform 
responsibilities effectively and professionally.   
 
There is no National Training Policy for the SLPS to develop personnel 
systematically to gain professionalism. The need for professionalism is ignored. 
Accordingly, the overall current position in the human resource development in the 
public service is marginal and supply-driven. There is no consistent policy or 
direction on how one should acquire necessary skills over a total career period for 
specialising in a key career path or a couple of key areas; for example, development 
administration, and development of economic infrastructure,. This is particularly 
more relevant for the managerial cadres who are going to take up senior management 
positions. 
   
The training needs of SLPS depend on the individual officer‘s initiatives rather than 
on specifics of organisational needs. Those who are ambitious and enterprising in 
their career development, often undergo readily available training programmes whilst 
the majority undergo training just to comply with the requirements of the respective 
―service minutes.‖ Also, officers who are based in Colombo often take more such 
opportunities than cadres in divisional and district levels. The reluctance to release 
officers for training, non-availability of staff provisions for replacing released 
officers, inadequacy of budgetary allocation due to lack of priority for HRD and non-
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adequacy of provincial training mechanisms are at the heart of the present system of 
HRD in the SLPS.  
 
There are several national training organisations which deal with training and 
capacity building in public administration, namely: Sri Lanka Institute of 
Development Administration (SLIDA) for managerial staff; Public Service Training 
Institute for non-managerial staff; Rural Development Training and Research 
Institute for field staff; Institute of Government Accounting for Accounting staff; and 
the National Institute of Business Management for corporate sector employees.  
 
SLIDA plays a major role in training and capacity building in the public service In 
2003, it was granted postgraduate credentials by the University Grant Commission. 
Nevertheless, SLIDA‘s attention for training senior managers to handle the specific 
tasks is minimal. When it occurs, it assumes a generic and academic form, unrelated 
to the specific organisational objectives, task demands and performance 
enhancement needs of the specific organisation (Wanasinghe, 2005). Due to this 
reason and perhaps other factors, the scheduled posts of SLAS are occupied by other 
cadres; for example, Director General, Fiscal Policy of the Treasury is gazetted as a 
scheduled post of the SLAS (Minute of the SLAS, 2005), but for more than half a 
decade that position has been held, and is still held by the Central Bank official 
seconded to the Treasury. The Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs 
or the Treasury do not have any such training plan for administrators.     
 
The contribution to building administrative and management capabilities by other 
organisations mentioned above are marginal due to the financial constraints and lack 
of trained trainers. There is no coordination between these organisations in providing 
the training needs of the public service. They perform independently, so that training 
needs are not met and budgetary allocations are not optimally utilised.  
 
The Department of External Resources of the Ministry of Finance coordinates 
overseas training of the public service.  It is basically on the time frame of ‗Technical 
Assistance Programmes‘ of various donors, and as such is supply-driven. Annually, 
around 700 public officials get both short-term and long-term foreign exposure 
through this programme. A lack of a proper overseas HRD planning, high volatility 
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of transfers in the public service and lack of importance given for overseas training, 
lack of initiatives for demand-driven overseas programmes due to insufficient 
budgetary allocations, lack of proper placement on the job relating to the training 
obtained, and lack of performance evaluation after training and time constraints for 
the selection of candidates for some programmes are major drawbacks.  
 
Furthermore, the present process of selection of candidates for overseas training are 
ad hoc, and unequally distributed (more opportunities for centre than provinces). 
Thus, some public officers do not get any opportunity for overseas training for their 
entire career while a few enjoy many opportunities regularly (personal observation). 
The National Council for Administration (2006) also emphasised this situation and 
mentioned that ―there should be a fair and equitable distribution of such training 
opportunities‖.   
  
In summation, these are the key problems this study identified in the personnel 
management functions of the SLPS: lack of a properly constituted NPSC; delays in 
making decisions by the NPSC; inadequate manpower planning; lack of firm policies 
on human resources management functions; centralised recruitment to core 
managerial groups; ad hoc appointments without required qualifications; excessive  
recruitment; direct political control over the appointments of Secretaries of 
Ministries and Heads of Departments; underutilisation of human resources; low 
salaries of higher positions; lack of authority to the immediate organisation on 
personnel management aspects of the employee; high frequency of transfers; lack of 
a proper performance management and performance-based promotion system; lack 
of properly planned training aiming at specialisation and professionalism; 
inadequacy of financial assistance for training, and lack of trained trainers; and 
sporadic political intervention in public personnel management. These issues have 
negative impacts on public administration. 
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4.4 Part III: Other Critical Issues 
 
4.4.1Corruption 
 
During the fifty-five years of the independence period, Sri Lanka has experienced an 
expansion of the levels of corruption in public life…the public perception is that 
corruption is endemic in the political and administrative sectors of the government. 
Almost all activities related to the delivery of public goods and services are affected by 
varying levels of corruption, for example, the obtaining a driver license, the payment of 
poor relief, the expediting of processing in regard to most services, the awarding of 
contract, and processes of procurement and payments for supplies of goods and services 
(ADB,2004b, p.22).  
 
Corruption is not only institutionalised in the service delivery but it is also embedded 
in other areas, such as revenue collection, and privatisation processes. The recent 
reports by the AG (2006, 2007 & 2008), COPE (2007 & 2008) and COPA (2007) 
highlight many irregularities in public institutions and the privatisation process. 
COPE and COPA found that corruption and malpractices had risen to a high level in 
many government institutions.  
 
The following section illustrates COPE findings on the Board of Investment (BOI), 
Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) and the COPA finding on the Value Added Tax 
(VAT) fraud in the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) to point out the widespread 
nature and magnitude of corruption in the SLPS. COPE findings on privatisation will 
be discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
The BOI is the autonomous government body functioning under the President to 
promote foreign investment in the country. In carrying out its functions it has the 
power to grant to eligible companies specific incentives, such as tax holidays or 
preferential tax rates, exemption from customs duty and foreign exchange controls, 
which remain valid for the life of the enterprise. In regard to the BOI, the COPE 
report highlighted that the loans given for the BOI projects have been misused and 
thereby the BOI abused its authority. BOI officials failed to even provide statistics 
about imports and exports under the BOI banner. It was pointed out that companies 
registered in the BOI had imported Yellow Corn and Soya beans on the pretext of 
animal feed and siphoned them to the open market for human consumption over a 
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long period of time. In addition, BOI had entered into an agreement with an Indian 
company by giving extraordinary concessions, such as reimbursing tariff increases 
by CEB, and also customs duty paid to the Indian Government. The COPE report 
stated that BOI is not organised properly, thus it carries out important tasks in an ad 
hoc manner which leads to malpractices. 
 
Another example of corrupt practices comes from CEB. CEB is the state-owned 
enterprise having monopoly for generation, transmission and distribution of 
electricity in the country.  In regard to the CEB, the COPE report (2007) has pointed 
out that its Board of Directors is weak, and has been dictated to by the bureaucrats 
and Trade Unions on many occasions. As a result, corruption and malpractices have 
increased. However, the Board of Directors was later dissolved. The Deputy General 
Manager of the CEB was found guilty of serious charges and recommended for 
dismissal but this recommendation was not forwarded to the Board of Directors for 
necessary action by the former General Manager. Later this officer was appointed as 
the Head of the Tender Board. There were 74 officials who were charged with 
offences at the time of the COPE investigation. Furthermore, COPE found that the 
internal audit division had been weakened to prevent the disclosure of corruption and 
misappropriation, and the internal auditor pointed out that she cannot work due to 
non-submission of relevant documents to her.   It was found that electricity meters 
and light posts were purchased without adhering to the tender procedures. Due to 
corruption, malpractices and inefficiency, the CEB lost SLRs 15 billion in 2007.  
 
According to the Chair of COPE, as a result of inefficiency and corruption of the 
public institution, SL may have lost in excess of SLRs 100 billion (one billion 
dollars) for the year 2006 alone. The loss is about a fifth of government revenue 
(Daily Mirror, 2007, January 20).  
 
The parliamentary watchdog COPA which examines the accounts of public sector 
institutions other than public enterprises, investigated a multi-billion rupee fraud in 
2005 on VAT Refunds in the IRD. This is the largest fraud investigated in the history 
of SL.  However, it is revealed that the IRD detected the fraud long before the AG 
revealed it in June 2005, but took no action. Failure to take proper action allowed it 
to continue.  Accordingly, the IRD wrongfully refunded VAT to the amount of SLRs 
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3.648 billion during the period from October 1, 2003 to August 15, 2004 under one 
Commissioner General and, subsequently the AG brought to notice another SLRs 
0.274 billion fraudulent refund from November 15, 2002 to September 30, 2003 
under the next Commissioner General (COPA, 2007). The COPA noted that a 
Departmental Inquiry had not been initiated, pertaining to the issues raised by the 
AG despite the magnitude of the fraud. 
 
It was also revealed that the IRD‘s computer system had been manipulated to the 
extent that two VAT assessments amounting to SLRs. 200.6 billion issued by the 
department could not be viewed through the computer screen for control and audit 
purposes. Further, it was revealed that under the GST (Goods and Services Tax) 
system which was in place during 1998 to July 2002, a similar fraudulent refund 
amounting to SLRs 114.6 million had also been made. Another remarkable 
observation was that there was a heavy accumulation of tax in arrears during the last 
few years.  Accordingly, tax in arrears at the end of 2000 was SLRs 22.4 billion 
(19% of the total collection for that year), which increased to SLRs 67.3 billion at the 
end of 2003 and consequently to SLRs 157.6 billion at the end of 2006 (62% of the 
total collection for that year).  In addition, COPA (2007)  highlighted that  
documents relevant to 183 out of the 235 refunds were not made available for 
investigation and this was brought to the notice of the Accounting Officer (Head of 
IRD) and the Chief Accounting Officer (Secretary to the Treasury), but no action had 
been taken either to report to the police or to the AG. 
 
It is interesting to note that the then Head of the IRD, having carried out an initial 
investigation, reported to the Secretary to the Treasury in September 2005 that the 
issue of refunds is a collective activity of a number of officers and it is not possible 
to identify and single out any individual as being responsible. This provides an 
interesting point in public policy in the SL context, i.e. the lack of an accountability 
mechanism in place to hold an individual officer responsible for the tasks he or she 
does, especially in such an important department in the public sector.  
 
There are several reasons for this sad situation for which both UNP-led and SLFP-led 
governments and bureaucrats at the high echelons were and are equally responsible. 
Firstly, public institutions have been politicised over decades. Secondly, due to the 
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politicisation they have been mismanaged by politically-appointed personnel, 
particularly the public corporations and statutory boards. Thirdly, there is a lack of 
proper systems and procedures, lack of discipline, lack of seriousness and 
commitment in combating corruption, and lack of utilisation of secured IT, for 
example, in the IRD. Fourthly, there are many layers in the administrative hierarchy 
with varying degrees of authority, so there are many opportunities for malpractice. 
Fifthly, there is a lack of supervision by the heads of departments and the secretaries 
of ministries. Lastly, there is a lack of clear demarcation of responsibility and, in 
turn, accountability mechanisms in public organisations.  
 
It is also worth noting that all these corrupt practices are taking place in a country 
with the availability of anti-corruption institutional measures.  The Bribery and 
Corruption Commission was established in 1994, under the President, by the SLFP 
government, criticising the previous UNP-led government for corruption over a 17-
year reign (1977-1994). However, over the years bribery and corruption have 
increased in public life. The Annual Reports 2005/6 & 2007 of the Bribery and 
Corruption Commission show this situation. 
 
Table 4: Number of Complaints Received by the Bribery and Corruption  
               Commission from 2000-2007 
 
Year  No. of Complaints  
2000   975 
2001 1716 
2002 2052 
2003 1803 
2004 2285 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2118 
4267 
3985 
Source: Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption, Annual 
Reports 2005, 2006 & 2007  
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Accordingly, over the eight-year-period of, 2000-2007, the number of complaints 
received by the Commission is significant. Year 2006 shows an increase of 101% 
over the previous year. It was the highest number of complaints received by the 
Commission since its establishment. However, it has failed to prosecute and punish a 
single significant case. People have no faith in the Commission. It has been highly 
criticised casting the net not for ‗sharks‘ but for ‗sprats‘ (kind of small fish). In fact, 
it has no teeth. The Commission itself cannot initiate prosecution on probes without 
complaint from a person. There is no protection for whistleblowers.   
 
Although the Commission has been established with great interest and good faith, no 
President wants it to function effectively. The Commission was paralysed during the 
period from December 14, 2004 to March 29, 2005 due to the President‘s failure to 
appoint Commissioners (Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery and 
Corruption, 2005). Under the present President, the Director General (DG) of the 
Commission was transferred to the Presidential Secretariat in February 2008 and an 
Officer of the Assets Investigation Division was transferred out, while he was 
investigating a former minister‘s assets and the assets of several other politicians and 
higher echelon bureaucrats under the Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Law, No 1 
of 1975 (―President removes‖, 2008).  
 
According to the DG, the Commission lacks a permanent cadre for investigations. 
The investigations are carried out by officials of the Police Department who are 
seconded to the Commission. This situation is a bottleneck for its effective operation 
(Interview, 28.01.2008).  
 
In an attempt to rectify these concerns, in 2006, the current government established a 
Special Presidential Commission chaired by a retired High Court judge to probe the 
2005 VAT scam. The investigations are still underway. 
 
4.4.2 Issues in Systems and Procedures 
 
The volume of correspondence of the government institutions has increased largely 
due to the expansion of the public sector in all aspects of the economy. A delay in 
dealing with this correspondence is reported daily in the media and has been a cause 
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for considerable irritation to the public which led to public dissatisfaction of the 
public service over some time (ADB, 2004b; ARC, 1986/88). This is mainly due to 
the breakdown in the office systems in most departments and statutory bodies. The 
majority of the effective systems adopted in the past such as case registers, filing 
systems, and call-up diaries are not used by the public officials in most of the 
organisations. The lack of proper systems and procedures, the use of outdated forms 
without commensurate modification to meet modern-day needs and complicated 
work processes in the public service delivery mechanisms have led to malpractice 
and corruption and low productivity. The ARC of 1986/88 (Report No. 10, p. 1)  
pointed out: 
The defects in the work systems and procedures affect productivity, cause unnecessary 
inconvenience to the public and lead to overstaffing. …system improvement is an area to 
which serious attention should be paid. 
 
Although the ARC‘s recommendations on system improvement were not given due 
consideration at that time, a considerable priority has now been given by the National 
Administrative Reforms Council (NARC)
 36
. This council was established in 2003 
under the Prime Minister, and it was reconstituted in 2004 with the change of 
government. This Council is now operating under the President and is chaired by the 
Secretary to the President. It is composed of 13 members in total including several 
Secretaries of Ministries, a few academics, former senior public officials and a senior 
representative of the private sector.   
 
The NARC focuses on the flowing reforms: 
Re-examination and rationalisation of work content of government agencies; 
Re-engineering the business of government; 
Human resources development; and creation of a working environment 
conducive to continuing productivity enhancement  
 
Dhammike Amarasinghe, Advisor to the President, commented on NARC 
involvement: 
In an exercise carried out under the aegis of the ARC predecessor to NARC in 2005 quite 
a number of ministries and departments reviewed their functions and to a certain extent 
they identified functions to be dropped, added and things to be done in different ways, but 
                                                 
36
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that was not in many instances. Some ministries did not do so. We have to get them also 
into this process. A large number of ministries were involved in the system improvement 
programme. They improved some aspects. Systems and procedures in all agencies have to 
be reviewed and there should be continuous improvements. ….We try to follow the 
recommendations of the ARC, 1986/88, because they are still valid. The council has 
appointed the Secretary to the Ministry of Public Administration as the DG of the 
Administrative Reforms Council (Interview, 10.12. 2007).  
 
In addition, steps have been taken to transform several service delivery systems by 
using IT which was discussed before. The application of IT in service delivery has a 
greater effect on improving service delivery at present.  
 
There are also deficiencies in relation to the decision-making structure in the public 
service. There is a long chain of hierarchical layers as depicted in Figure 6 below on 
matters related to administration. 
Figure 6: Typical Hierarchy of Current Decision-Making in a Ministry  
 
 
The lack of delegation of authority to lower levels on matters in regard to routine 
services has contributed to considerable delays in attending to the needs of clients. 
Moreover, it consumes extra manpower which means extra costs. In addition, this 
contributes to the ineffective use of staff at executive level. 
 
Secretary 
Additional Secretary 
Senior Assistant Secretary 
Assistant Secretary 
Administrative Officer 
Chief Management Assistant 
Management Assistant 
 124 
The other deficiency in the system and procedures is the lack of management 
information systems in the public organisations. This affects negatively the quality of 
decisions in the public sector and trustworthiness of government data. This is evident 
in the previous discussion about data of the Central Bank and the other governmental 
organisations which were not compatible. In addition, there is a lack of management 
culture to disseminate information through e-mail. Letter writing is the most 
common mode of communication in the public sector, even within institutions, 
resulting in delays.  
 
Another deficiency in the work system and procedure is the lack of management 
culture to issue a job description to public officials. The result is lack of clear ideas 
about what to do and what is his/her responsibility and inability to hold the official 
accountable. This deficiency was apparent in the recent reply to the AG by the 
Commissioner General Inland Revenue Department, ―he has not come to know that 
there had been any arrangement to issue Duty Lists to officers of the Inland Revenue 
Service from the very inception, either in giving the letters of appointments to them 
or in making promotions. However, once they are assigned to the respective 
divisions by the Commissioner General, administration and other relevant functions 
of the division concerned should be performed by them. In addition, the duties to be 
performed by them are mentioned in various Acts and tax procedure manuals relating 
to the department‖ (Auditor General, 2006, p.50).  
 
4.4.3 Trade Unionism 
The SL Constitution ensures freedom of association. Every citizen is entitled to the 
freedom to form and join a trade union. SL currently has 1500 registered trade 
unions.  Unionisation is around 12-15% of the total workforce. These employee 
unions are generally organised by employees into a single service. Furthermore, in a 
single service there are many different trade unions. In the health and railway 
services there are over 50 unions (Daily Mirror, 2007, December 30), thus unity in a 
particular occupation appears to be remote. The majority of the unions ally with 
major political parties, thus, they have become mere components of the major 
political parties; for example, the leaders of trade unions are selected by the political 
parties concerned so those unions are not able to produce leaders within their own 
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rank.  However, there are independent trade unions too, for example, Government 
Medical Officers Association.  
The law grants workers the right to strike. Accordingly, strikes are more common in 
SL. These unions do strike only for better employment conditions, but mostly for 
political reasons and against public policy matters such as privatisation, restructuring 
and reforms. Many attempted reforms were resisted by trade unions on several 
occasions; for example, in 2003, they resisted the establishment of a Revenue 
Authority by amalgamating three existing revenue departments: the Customs, Inland 
Revenue, and the Excise. In 2004, the Railway Department was reformed and 
established as the Railway Authority. Due to strong resistance of trade unions the 
government restored the status quo once again. Currently trade unions are consulted 
in the formulation of the annual transfer schemes in the public service.  
4.4.4 Financial Management  
 
According to Article 148 of the Constitution (1978), Parliament is supreme in 
relation to matters of public finance. It says: 
Parliament shall have full control over public finance, no tax, rate or any other levy shall 
be imposed by any local authority or any other public authority except by or under the 
authority of a law passed by Parliament or of any existing law. 
 
Within Parliament, the financial initiatives and executive authority lie with the 
Cabinet, and only a Cabinet Minister has power to propose a ―money bill‖ such as 
the Annual Appropriation Bill. The Cabinet has delegated this authority to the 
Minister of Finance. Parliament retains the power of approval, amendment and 
rejection of proposals, while the executive (Cabinet) is responsible for the 
implementation of the annual financial plan (revenue and expenditure) of the 
government. Each Secretary of Ministry acts as the Chief Accounting Officer and 
each Head of Department acts as Accounting Officer in regard to public funds.  
 
The public financial operation is facilitated by the ―Consolidated Fund‖ created 
under an Order in Council of 1946 and carried over under subsequent Constitutions. 
All revenue not allocated by law to any specific purpose are paid into this fund and 
any expenditure deemed appropriate by the Parliament may be met from it. 
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Nevertheless, money cannot be withdrawn from this fund except on the authority of a 
warrant signed by the Minister of Finance (―The Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978‖).  
The framework of financial management is based on the Financial Regulations (FRs) 
which come from the colonial regime and Finance Act No. 38 of 1971. The FRs deal 
with all aspects of procedures and controls necessary for authorising, approving, 
executing (procuring), recording and reporting government expenditure. The Public 
Expenditure Management System Project in 2003 has identified some weaknesses in 
these regulations and concluded that ―problems with FRs ranged from complete 
absence of controls in some areas, to irrelevant control in others‖ (World Bank, 
2003, p.15).  Further, circulars are issued by the Treasury on occasion on the 
authority of the Finance Minister to secure uniformity and fairness in public financial 
management, especially in budget formulation and implementation.  
As explained in the previous sections of this chapter, especially under the headings 
of Public Enterprises, Fiscal Decentralisation to PCs, and Corruption, it is evident 
that there are weaknesses in the present financial management system. They also 
demonstrate the lack of financial accountability both at the centre and provinces and 
the use of public funds without due care for intended purposes, the economy and 
efficiency. In addition, the everlasting budget deficit (an average of 8% annually), 
contraction in the economy (4% in 2002), high amount of public debt (105% of GDP 
in 2002), high amounts of interest payment of government debt (peaked at 7.5% of 
GDP in 2003), and increased off-budget expenditure (US$ 457 million in 2000) 
shows the ad hoc nature of handling public finance in the country over time (ADB, 
2004b, 2008; Central Bank, 2006; Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2007). Against 
this backdrop, a prudent financial management system is essential to promote 
economic growth and its sustainability.  
 
The Fiscal Management Reform Programme (FMRP), which will be discussed in 
detail in next chapter, was launched in 2003 under the financial assistance from the 
ADB. Under this programme the Fiscal Management (Responsibility) Act No.3 of 
2003 was enacted.  
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4.4.4.1 Fiscal Management (Responsibility) Act of 2003 
 
The main objective of the Fiscal Management (Responsibility) Act is establishing 
fiscal discipline and reporting. In this context, the Act requires the Minister of 
Finance to account to Parliament and to the public, in five stages, its record in the 
management of the public economy: fiscal strategy statement, mid-year fiscal 
position report, final budgetary position report, pre-election budgetary position 
report, and statement of responsibility. Table 5 gives details. 
 
Table 5: Reporting Requirements under the Fiscal Management 
(Responsibility) Act of 2003 
Name of report Date of 
submission 
Core  Aspects/contents Objectives 
Fiscal Strategy 
Statement  
(Section 4.2) 
With the 
budget speech 
(second 
reading) 
Government‘s medium-term fiscal 
policy,  
Broad strategic priorities on which the 
budget is based,  
Key fiscal measures relevant for the 
implementation of the fiscal strategy,  
Fiscal objectives and targets related to 
fiscal indicators, especially government 
debt. 
Increasing public awareness 
and establishing standards for 
evaluating the Government‘s 
conduct of fiscal policy 
Mid-year Fiscal 
position Report 
(Section 10) 
End June or 
lapse of 6 
months from 
the date of the 
passing of the 
Appropriation 
Act, whichever 
is later 
Estimated and actual expenditure, 
revenue, and cash flow for the first 
months of the year. 
Estimated and actual government 
borrowing, and any other statements 
reflecting the Government‘s financial 
position for the first 4 months of the 
year.  
Providing updated information 
on the Government‘s fiscal 
performance in the first 4 
months to enable the public to 
evaluate it with the 
government‘s fiscal strategy. 
Final  
Budgetary 
Position Report 
(Section 13) 
End May of the 
year following 
the budget 
Estimated and actual expenditure, 
revenue, and cash flow for the year. 
Estimated and actual government 
borrowing, and any other statement 
reflecting the Government‘s financial 
position during the year. 
Reasons for shortfalls in the estimated 
revenue and overruns in expenditure 
and borrowings. 
Providing updated information 
on the Government‘s fiscal 
performance for the whole 
year to enable the public to 
evaluate it with the 
Government‘s fiscal strategy. 
Pre-election 
Budgetary 
Position Report 
(Section 16) 
Within 3 weeks 
of the 
announcement 
of a general 
election 
Estimates of revenue and expenditure 
and economic and other assumptions 
used for these estimates. 
Announcing the current fiscal 
position of the government to 
the public to avoid election 
handouts. 
Statements of 
Responsibility.  
(Section 19) 
 
With the pre-
election 
budgetary 
report 
Statement signed by the Minister to the 
effect that the Minister has disclosed all 
the known information required for the 
preparation of the pre-election 
budgetary report, within one week of an 
announcement of an election. Statement 
by the Secretary stating that the pre-
election report contains information to 
the fullest extent possible. 
Stating the responsibilities of 
the Minister and the Secretary 
in preparing the pre-election 
budgetary report. 
 
Source: Fiscal Management Responsibility Act No. 3 of 2003 
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 In addition, the Act stipulated targets for the overall budget deficit to 5% of GDP 
and the public debt to 85% of GDP by the end of 2006. Accordingly, from the date 
that the Act came into effect, successive Ministers of Finance have fulfilled the 
reporting requirements, but they could not achieve expected financial targets as 
stipulated. Instead, the government which came into power in 2004 revised these 
targets after the Tsunami Disaster. Accordingly, ―budget deficit is estimated to 
decline to 7.7% of GDP in 2007 from 8.1% in 2006 and 8.7% in 2005‖ (ADB, 2008, 
p. 40). However, the Fiscal Strategy Statement 2006 issued by the Minister of 
Finance and Planning, has reported that these targets would be possible by the year 
2008.  
 
The trend of these financial progress indicators has been unsatisfactory. The budget 
deficit has remained over 8% of the GDP from 2003-2007 (2003, 8.0, 2004, 8.2, 
2005, 8.7, 2006, 8.4 and 2007, 8.8). However, the budget deficit had dropped from 
8.8 (2007) to 7.7% of GDP in 2008 (Ministry of Finance and Planning 2008).  Public 
debt has also been reduced marginally up to 2007 (2002, 105; 2003, 105.9; 2004, 
105.4; 2005, 93.9; 2006, 93, 2007, 85.8) (ADB, 2008; Ministry of Finance and 
Planning, 2006 & 2008). Public debt was further reduced to 81.1% of GDP in 2008 
but it increased to 86.2% in 2009 (Central Bank, 2009). Accordingly the level of 
budget deficit as well as public debt could not be achieved as expected by the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act. The Figure 7 shows the trend of fiscal deficit and the public debt 
position of the government. 
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Figure 7: The Trends of Budget Deficits and Public Debt (% GDP) from 2003-
2009  
               Budget Deficit                                                Public Debt 
  
                                                                                                                     
Source: Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2009 
 
The main reason for non-achievement of targets might be deficiencies in public 
expenditure and revenue management. Nevertheless, this legal requirement paves the 
way for greater transparency of the economic management and fiscal policy of the 
government. It also has opened the door for the public and the private sector to 
access such vital information to assess the government‘s fiscal position and to make 
decisions. However, so far neither Parliament nor the public has pressured the 
Finance Minister to achieve the targets. The following section discusses the revenue 
management of the government followed by the expenditure management.  
4.4.4.2 Revenue Management  
 
Government revenue is mainly managed by four departments: the Customs, Inland 
Revenue, Excise, and Motor Traffic. The major shortcomings of the revenue 
collection of the IRD have already been discussed under corruption in this chapter. In 
the case of Customs, which is the second most important department, revenue 
collection has shown several shortcomings: system weaknesses such as irregularity 
in budgeting, and non-compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements 
(Auditor General, 2006). However, there was no such major adverse comment by the 
AG in regard to the revenue management of the Department of Excise in 2006.  In 
contrast, revenue management of the Department of Motor Traffic has shown many 
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deficiencies: poor budgeting (in 1998 budgeted revenue was SLRs 1275 million and 
the actual was SLRs 752 million, in 2004 budgeted revenue was SLRs 717 million 
whereas the actual was 1391 million), unsatisfactory maintenance of files (difficulty 
in tracing files when needed) and malpractices in vehicle registration. In regard to 
vehicle registration, the AG pointed out that motor ‗trucks‘ had been registered as 
‗cars‘ by making use of forged customs documents and licences had been issued 
without proper check.  He further says, 
This had been happening since 2004 and continuously pointed out in audit since 2005 but 
no effective remedial action had been taken and therefore this practice is continuing in a 
substantially large scale despite the fact this has been one of the root causes for most of 
the irregularities in the system including that of in the Department of Customs, resulting 
huge revenue losses (Auditor General, 2006, p.54). 
 
This shows that internal control is lacking in these institutions and there is 
indiscipline. Furthermore, the AG has reported that there is no proper database on 
revenue collection, thus the figures appearing in the revenue accounts of the IRD, 
government financial statements and the annual report of the Central Bank are 
different. Table 6 shows the discrepancy in revenue figures of the government. 
 
Table 6: Revenue Figures of IRD, Government Financial Statements and 
Annual Reports of the Central Bank 
 
Year Tax category Revenue 
Accounts of the 
IRD (SLRs mn) 
Government 
Financial 
Accounts 
(SLRs mn) 
As per Annual 
Report of the 
Central 
Bank(SLRs mn) 
2003 Income Tax 
Value Added Tax 
38,602 
97,754 
38,783 
97,754 
39,397 
97,230 
2004 Income Tax 
Value Added Tax 
41,956 
117,032 
41,372 
117,032 
41,372 
120,382 
2005 Income Tax 
Value Added Tax 
49,438 
141,878 
52,536 
141,887 
52,536 
138,660 
2006 
 
Income Tax 
Value Added Tax 
 
80,334 
164,071 
 
77,707 
164,277 
80,483 
164,555 
 
 
 
Source: Auditor General, 2006, p. 49 
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Accordingly, this shows that there is a necessity for a proper information 
management system to maintain high quality data integrity and accurate information 
for policy makers and other stakeholders. There is a lack of coordination in these 
institutions in finalising their reports. It is reiterated that the Central Bank figures in 
relation to public sector employment also differ from that of the Census and 
Statistics. 
4.4.4.3 Public Expenditure Management 
 
An effective public expenditure management system needs to operate at three levels: 
at the macro level to ensure overall aggregate fiscal discipline, at the mid-level to 
ensure the overall allocations match strategic priorities and at the micro level to 
ensure that resources are effectively allocated to produce the desired results. At the 
overall macro level of aggregate fiscal discipline, it is important that what is spent 
matches what is affordable and sustainable over the medium term. In this aspect the 
fiscal position of SL currently is barely sustainable (ADB, 2008, p. 13). As explained 
earlier, the budget deficit remains an average 8% of the GDP until 2007 and in 2008 
it was 7.7 well short of the fiscal target spelt out in the Fiscal Management 
(Responsibility) Act. However, the percentage of public debt/GDP declined from 
105.9% in 2002 down to 81.1% in 2008 and again increased to 86.2% in 2009.  
 
At the mid-level, priorities of government expenditure are currently on national 
security, debt servicing, humanitarian relief, pension and wages and salaries. Wages 
and salaries have increased by 26.4% per annum on average from 2006-2009. This is 
mainly because of massive recruitments, salary increases and the introduction of new 
allowances (ADB, 2008). The total interest and repayment of public debt as a 
percentage of total expenditure was 41.6 in 2006 (Auditor General, 2006). Further, 
the total debt service payments as a per cent of GDP increased to 17.1 from 13.4 per 
cent in 2008 (Central Bank, 2009, p.143). Therefore, debt servicing is a critical factor 
in budget management. The debt situation was further exacerbated in 2009 when 
total outstanding government debt increased by 16% to SLRs. 4161.4 billion as at 
end 2009 compared to SLRs. 3589 billion as at end 2008 (Central Bank, 2009, p. 
140).  The total outstanding foreign debt increased by 22% in 2009. As a percentage 
of GDP, foreign debt increased to 36.5% by end 2009 as against 32.8% in 2008.  
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Despite the fact that the SL economy depends on domestic and foreign debt for its 
survival, there is a lack of attention to handle this critical factor systematically. 
Currently, there is no proper institutional arrangement with skilled personnel to 
handle debt management, or at least in its coordination. The public debt functions are 
dispersed among three separate organisations: the Central Bank (CBSL), External 
Resources Department (ERD), and Treasury Operations Department (TOD).   
 
The CBSL has been given the responsibility of managing the public debt of the 
government under the Monetary Law. Accordingly, the Public Debt Department of 
the CBSL undertakes issuance of domestic debt in line with the Appropriation Act 
and servicing of both domestic and foreign debts. The ERD is responsible for 
negotiating and mobilising foreign debt to finance the budget deficit in term of 
concessionary and commercial borrowings and grants. It is also responsible to ensure 
the effective utilisation of foreign financing. However, it lacks skilled professionals 
in debt management. The TOD is responsible for cash management and accounting 
of debt transactions.  
 
There are two major weaknesses in the system due to disperse nature of debt 
handling.  Firstly, there is no aggregate database regarding public debt. Secondly, 
there is no systematic risk analysis to determine the effects of variations of exchange 
rates, interest rates or debt sustainability analysis when raising the debt (Project 
Team for Establishment of a Public Debt Management Office, 2004). Therefore, as 
indicated by the AG, the portfolio of public debt shows imbalance, which clearly 
shows that there is no proper evaluation of risks and cost effectiveness in selecting 
debt markets, foreign or domestic; rather they are mobilised in an ad hoc manner 
according to exigencies. In 2006, the government went for commercial borrowings at 
higher interest rates through HSBC, and National Savings Bank despite the existing 
scenario.  
 
However, the UNP government which introduced Fiscal Management Responsibility 
Act has realised the need for effective debt management system and established a 
―Public Debt Management Project Office‖ in August, 2003, in the Treasury with four 
officials. These officials studied the existing debt management system, the laws 
relating to public debt functions and helped the Commonwealth consultants to 
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establish an Independent Debt Management Office in SL. However, this project 
office was dismantled with the change of the government in 2004.  
 
The other factor in expenditure management is the unrealistic nature of expenditure 
budgeting. For example, the total actual expenditure for the year 2006 was SLRs 
1,072,782 million and the estimated figure was SLRs 1,177,766 million with a 
variance of SLRs. 104,984 million (Auditor General, 2006, p. 56). Similarly, the total 
capital expenditure difference between the actual and the budgeted figure, excluding 
the repayment of public debt was SLRs. 79,085 million. This was 28.6% of the total 
of the budgeted capital expenditure of 276,935 million for 2006. This shows that the 
budget estimates are not realistic. This bloated budgetary system leads to further 
accumulation of public debt, and an increase in the budget deficit leading to 
inefficiency of financial management of the country. Table 7 shows this position 
numerically.   
 
Table 7: Capital Budget and its Utilisation in 2006 
 
Description Consolidated fund 
(SLRs  million) 
Foreign funds 
(SLRs million) 
Total  
(SLRs  million) 
Total provision           261,679       15,256      276,935 
Actual expenditure           188,493         9,357      197,850 
Savings             73,186         5,899        79,086 
Utilisation rate               72.0%        61.3%          71.4% 
Savings rate                 28%        38.5%          28.6% 
Source:  Auditor General, 2006, p.56 
 
According to AG‘s report for the year 2008 (p. 39), the total estimated expenditure 
for the year was SLRs. 1580 billion and the utilisation was SLRs. 1413 billion, thus 
there was a saving of SLRs. 167 billion. The savings rate was 10.5% which was less 
remarkable when compared with 2006 figure of 28.6%. 
 
According to the AG, the Chief Accounting Officers have indicated to COPA at the 
examination of performance of government ministries and departments that 
inadequate cash provision led to this situation. Therefore, Treasury‘s cash 
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management system is also a matter for concern (Auditor General, 2006). The 
Ministry of Health Care and Nutrition, and the Ministry of Education, which are the 
main ministries for improving human capital, have capital expenditure savings of 
40% and 41% in 2006 respectively (Auditor General, 2006). This further shows 
unrealistic budget and planning, and under utilisation in the main ministries.  
 
Therefore, the framework for the recurrent and capital expenditure and cash 
management needs attention for any future reforms in financial management. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the current situation of public administration in SL in depth. 
The analyses were confined to the core areas: the roles and functions, structure and 
service delivery, cadre position, personnel management, corruption, trade unions, 
systems and procedures, and financial management. These key areas are critical in 
measuring the efficacy of the country‘s public administration. SL‘s performances in 
each of these areas are specific to its political, economic and cultural underpinnings 
and have profound negative implications for its public management.  
This chapter noted many deficiencies in all of these areas, including massive 
corruption and failures in systems and procedures. The current structure suffers from 
duplication of functions, and confusion due to lack of clear demarcation of roles 
among different layers. The lack of fiscal, human resources and statutory autonomy 
in the provincial level hinders efficiency in public administration. Decision-making 
structures in public administration are costly; consume excessive time in making 
decisions, and make ineffective use of officials. The current service delivery suffers 
from lack of proper service delivery mechanisms. The coexistence and use of 
deconcentrated service delivery structures, along with the provincial set-up and the 
control of the centre in every aspect of devolved tasks, hinders effective service 
delivery to citizens. The current bureaucracy is bloated, costly and suffers from low 
effectiveness and efficiency. It further suffers from low compensation. The ad hoc 
appointments have weakened the norms and the quality of public service. The 
recruitment to public services and the proliferation of ministries have gone hand in 
hand in the recent past dramatically, without even considering the required 
qualifications. There is a lack of attention to performance management. New public 
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enterprises are emerging despite the fact that the majority of the existing enterprises 
make losses and drain huge sums of money from the budget. There is a lack of 
performance culture. Outputs or outcomes are not considered in the allocation of 
funds. Lack of performance culture in the budget hinders the effective utilisation of 
public funds. The only expectation is spending. The cash management and debt 
management suffer from ad hoc arrangements in releasing funds and raising debts 
with unrealistic budget estimation. More importantly, corrupt practices permeating 
into public administrative functions as a whole are a major issue that need immediate 
attention.  There is no common programme for fighting corruption, wastage of 
resources and for rationalising expenditure.  
These problems have persisted in public administration from at least since 1986. The 
ARC identified the same problems and made recommendations to remedy them. 
Only the recommendation for salary increase has been implemented. The failure of 
timely interventions, together with other socio-economic and political underpinnings 
which will be discussed in the next chapter, led to the present chaotic situation. 
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Chapter 5: Public Sector Reforms in Sri Lanka 
from 1950- 2005 
 
 5.1 Introduction  
 
The origin of the current problems as illustrated in the previous chapter can be found 
in the recent history of public administration of the country. Therefore, any solutions 
to solve them must also be founded upon the specifics of this context. This chapter 
intends to provide an overview of some significant reforms already undertaken in SL 
and the factors that led to their development and progress. Further, this chapter 
illustrate a wide range of factors and their complex interaction, which have shaped 
the system of government. This illustration provides initial justification for assuming 
that designing the prospects for public sector reform in any country must begin with 
an understanding of the society itself and its history. 
 
I stopped the historical review at 2005. Since my interest was the historical context 
of previous attempts at reform, especially the ARC, choosing 2005 allowed me 
enough time for review any initiatives in the 1990s and 2000s that followed the 
wide-ranging ARC agenda to have been implemented and matured. But that does not 
mean that work on public sector reform in SL is stopped since then. The current 
initiatives started after 2005 have not had sufficient time to mature, and so historical 
analysis is not yet warranted. 
 
This chapter gives a brief overview of post-independence administrative reforms in 
SL and examines the major initiatives of successive governments from 1950 to 2005 
in detail. The discussion is organised in chronological order as follows.  
 
Part I: The reforms initiatives during the 1950s and 1960s 
Establishing an Organisation and Methods Unit - 1951  
Enactment of Language Act- 1956 
Creation of branch offices 
Setting up public corporations – 1955 
Abolition of Ceylon Civil Service and Village Headman system - 1963 
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Part II: The reforms initiatives during the 1970s and 1980s 
Introduction of Divisional Development Councils -1971  
Abolition of the independent Public Service Commission (PSC) - 1972 
Establishment of District Political Authorities - 1973 
Introduction of Decentralised Budget - 1974 
Initiation of District Ministers -1978 
Re-establishment of PSC under Cabinet- 1978 
Introduction of District Development Councils - 1980 
Privatisation of Public Enterprises - 1980 
Establishment of Administrative Reforms Committee -1987  
Introduction of Provincial Councils - 1988 
                Introduction of individual performance appraisal system - 1989  
 
Part III: The reforms initiatives during the 1990s and 2000s 
Invitation of UNDP mission - 1990 
Invitation of ADB team - 1996 
Initiation of Financial Management Reforms - 2000 
Re-establishment of independent NPSC - 2001 
Creation of Management Assistant Service - 2005 
 
5.2 Part I: The Reforms during the 1950s and 1960s 
 
During the 1950s and 1960s, at the highest level, reform efforts were establishing the 
Organisation and Methods Unit and public enterprises, introduction of the Language 
Act of 1956, abolition of the Ceylon Civil Service and creation of a unified 
Administrative Service. At the middle level, departments were decentralised and 
brought under the coordinative role of the GA at the district level, and at the bottom, 
the Village Headman System was abolished in 1963. As a consequence, the year 
1963 started a new era in the public sector. The following sections will examine 
these reforms in detail. 
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5.2.1 Introduction of O and M Approach to  
         Administration 
 
The first attempt at reforms took place in 1951 in order to improve the efficiency of 
the public service when the UNP Government was in office. A team from the U.K. 
Treasury was invited to advise on implementing the organisation and methods (O 
and M) approach to efficient administration, a world-wide phenomenon during that 
time, and the recruiting and training of O and M staff. They recommended 
establishing an O and M unit on the British pattern in the Treasury (Nadarajah, 
1997). 
 
The Government accepted their report, and an O and M unit was established in the 
Treasury the same year. The main responsibility of the unit was to investigate the 
organisational and operational methods of government departments and advise on 
their improvements. In this respect its sole function was of an advisory nature. 
However, it appeared that this effort failed soon after it was implemented due to lack 
of both political will and senior Treasury bureaucrats‘ support (Nadarajah, 1997). 
The main reason for this failure was partly justified by the fact that many of the 
Treasury senior officials who were entrusted with O and M functions were busy with 
immediate and demanding responsibilities. In addition, this reform lacked 
comprehensiveness to gain momentum across the public service. 
 
5.2.2 The Language Act No 33 of 1956 
 
Language has been a socio-political issue in SL since Independence. Thus, the 
second attempt at reforming the aspects of public administration was the introduction 
of the Official Language Act in 1956. In fact, until today this reform has had more 
far-reaching effects on public administration than any other reform, thus warranting 
discussion here.  
 
During the British period (1796 -1947) English was the official language in the 
country. Knowledge of English was essential to get into the public service, even after 
Independence. The Tamils in the North and East had acquired English education 
early through missionary education and obtained Government posts in relatively 
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large numbers (De Silva, 1993; Kearney, 1996; Warnapala, 1974). The majority of 
the population of SL (then Ceylon) was and still is Sinhalese (78%) and most of 
these people were educated in Sinhalese because, under the Donoughmore 
Constitution of 1931, vernacular education in Sinhalese expanded rapidly, producing 
a literacy rate of 65% in 1953.  However, few opportunities were available in the 
public service for those vernacular-educated Sinhalese. They found that they were 
under-represented in the public sector in comparison to the Tamils (Kearney, 1966). 
Furthermore, they missed opportunities in higher education, unlike the Tamils. The 
ordinary public throughout the country had to rely on ‗petition writers‘ (it was a 
somewhat lucrative business) to communicate with the government. The government 
officials, mostly British, communicated with the public with the aid of interpreters, 
the majority being clerks of their offices. The courts did the same, so that ―the 
destiny of a non-English speaking accused was dependent upon a group of people 
who spoke an alien language‖37 (Gunasena, 2006, p. 232).   
 
Under these circumstances several attempts were made by local political leaders in 
the Select Committee of the State Council:  
 
Ronnie De Mel, former Finance Minister (1977-1988), in an interview said, 
Earlier in the 1940s before independence Mr. J.R. Jayewardene had brought forward a 
motion in the State Council that the language should be Sinhala as the main language of 
the country. But nothing happened although the motion had been passed. The movement 
for language reform had gathered momentum after S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike broke away 
from the UNP in 1951. After 1952 the movement came from the people. It was led by 
number of national movements particularly speared by the Buddhist clergy. The Buddhist 
clergy had formed two very powerful organisations. One was Eksath Bikkuhu Peramuna 
and the other one was the SL Sangha Sabha. These two movements were supported by 
strong organisations of Sinhala Nationalists led by people like Mr. Philip Gunawardena, 
Mr. L.H. Meththananda and various others. All these forces combined after 1954 to bring 
down the UNP and to support Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike with the express promise 
that there would be an immediate shift to the Sinhala language as the language of the 
administration of the land. The primary motivation for reform was based on the argument 
that it was no longer correct for an independent country to have the language of the 
imperial conqueror, the English, as the language of administration in the land (Interview, 
05.12. 2007).  
 
In this sense people thought that the language of administration should be the 
language of the people in the country, but Sinhala was not the only language that 
                                                 
37
 This problem was dramatically articulated by Leonard Wolf in his novel Village in the Jungle. 
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prevailed in the country. This was clarified by the former Secretary to the Treasury, 
N. Pathmanathan, in an interview,  
Originally J.R.Jayawardene proposed the motion ―Sinhala the official language.‖ Then 
Tamil V. Nalliah, member for Kalkuda, Batticaloa, proposed an amendment saying 
―Sinhala and Tamil to be the official languages‖. It was accepted but there was no further 
development (Interview, 26.11.2007).   
 
This stalemate gave S.W.R.D Bandaranaike an excellent opportunity to gain power. 
He established a new political party, Mahajana Eksath Peramuna.  
 
Bradman Weerakoon, former Secretary to the Prime Minister (1956-1970, 2001-4), 
commented, 
The first government of Independent Ceylon was that of UNP, which continued in the 
style of the British.  The structure was the same. Mr. Bandaranaike saw the opportunity 
for rapid change. The language issue was a powerful emotional one. Sinhala only as the 
official language rather than the two languages was his way to electoral power. He 
mobilised all classes, sangha (Buddhist priests), teachers, peasants, Ayurvedic physicians, 
and labourers (Pancha Maha Balavegaya- five power groups) (Interview, 15.11.2007).    
 
Bandaranaike emphasised that ―over ninety percent of the [government] jobs of the 
country are restricted to ten percent of the people who know English. In this land of 
ours, those ignorant of English are capable of obtaining much less (sic) than ten 
percent of government jobs‖ (Kearney, 1966, p. 513). During the election campaign 
in 1956 he promised to change the language from English to Sinhalese in 24 hours if 
he was elected. He gained a landslide victory and immediately fulfilled his promise 
by introducing the ―Official Language Act No 33 of 1956‖, which declared ‗Sinhala‘ 
to be the sole official language of the country.  
 
This reform brought about a radical social transformation and, thereby, great 
problems to the bureaucracy and the country. A few Parliamentarians saw this, but 
the reformers did not. Dr. Colvin R. de Silva, at the debate of the Bill said:  
Do you want two languages and one nation or one language and two nations? 
(Rupasinghe, 2007, p. A9).  
 
He foresaw the future division of the people. J.R. Jayewardene who demanded a 
Sinhala policy in 1944 was also now critical: 
No government should and could make the Sinhalese the official language by trampling 
down the language rights of over a million of the permanent residents of the country… 
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The doors of the public service should not be closed to the thousands of youth who did 
not know Sinhalese for no fault of their own...surely that was the only way to sow the 
seeds of civil war (Rupasinghe, 2007, p. A9).   
 
The main problem of this change was that public servants who learned and worked in 
English now had to work in Sinhalese. This caused considerable tension for a long 
period. However, public servants were encouraged to learn Sinhala by using 
incentive bonuses or suspending their annual salary increments until they gained 
proficiency. According to the Wilmot Perera Report of 1961, five years after the 
reform a little under half the public servants were able to perform in Sinhalese (as 
cited in Warnapala, 1974). The public servants, who were recruited before 1956, 
were given a chance to retire on the grounds that they could not continue working 
due to the new language policy. As a result, more than three thousand public servants 
had been selected to retire by mid 1964 under these conditions (Kearney, 1966). 
According to the Wilmot Perera Report (as cited in Warnapala, 1974, p. 297), the 
number of officers retired was: 17 in 1956, 256 in 1957, 139 in 1958, and 116 in 
1959. Since then the ethnic composition of government employment was changed in 
favour of the Sinhalese. 
 
The Tamils expressed their discontent over their lack of public employment 
opportunities and the use of Sinhalese as the official language in governmental 
administration in the North and East where the majority of them live. The Federal 
Party which represented the Tamil-speaking communities vehemently influenced the 
Tamil officials not to learn Sinhalese
38
. They launched a severe satyagraha 
(agitation) campaign  which brought the civil administration to a standstill for more 
than two months in 1956, and the Government was forced to impose emergency law 
in Tamil-speaking areas (Kearney, 1966). 
 
Eventually, the Government took a firm decision in 1964. It gave authority to the 
Ministry of Finance to dismiss any public official who was not proficient in the 
official language (Warnapala, 1974). However, later public servants were given an 
                                                 
38
 C. Vanniasingam, Presidential Address, Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi Annual Convention, 1956 
(Jaffna, 1959, p.16), S.M. Rasamanikam, Presidential address at the national convention of the Ilankai 
Tamil Arasu Kacchchi, 1962 (Colombo, 1962, pp.7-8) and a statement by S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, 
appearing in Ceylon daily News, May 12, 1962 (as cited in Kearney, 1966, p.516).  
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additional two years to develop language skills and pass the proficiency examination 
in Sinhalese. After that, a number of Tamil officials who had failed to fulfil this 
requirement were served with notices of their compulsory retirement from public 
service (Kearney, 1966, p. 516). Accordingly, many public servants were 
disqualified from continuing employment.  
 
In summary, the language reform affected around 25% of the public service 
including Tamils, Muslims, and Burghers, but provided easy access to the majority 
of the Sinhalese to participate in the administration. This created many problems for 
the Government. The implications of the language reforms will be further elaborated 
in Chapter 7 due to its importance in the present context.  
  
5.2.3 Establishing Public Enterprises (PEs) 
 
The other major reform by the UF government was the establishment of PEs. Many 
countries around the world emerged from colonial rule wanting ownership and 
responsibility for the provision of essential goods and services as a part of the natural 
task of the state. SL was no exception. The PEs became one of the main devices of 
state involvement in economic development after Independence. The initiative of 
expansion of the public sector had existed during the previous UNP regime, but was 
not so vigorous (Warnapala, 1974). It gained momentum only after the 1956 social 
revolution.  
 
The primary motivation for the establishment of PEs was the willingness to 
transform the colonial structure and capture the commanding heights of the 
economy. This policy motivated the nationalisation of many services, such as bus 
transport, port cargo handling, insurance, petroleum distribution and plantations that 
had been handled by the European and Indian capitalists (Kelegama, 1992; 
Warnapala, 1974).  This motivation was coupled with great enthusiasm to generate 
employment for the increasing number of school leavers. In addition, there was a 
hidden political reason i.e. the UF government taking revenge on its political 
opponents. For example, one of the reasons for bus transport nationalisation was that 
the private bus companies had contributed substantial amounts of money to the UNP 
election fund (Warnapala, 1974).    
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Under this reform two important pieces of legislation were introduced: the 
Government–sponsored Corporation Act No. 19 of 1955 and its revision in 1956, and 
the State Industrial Corporation Act No. 49 of 1957. The 1955 Act provided for the 
takeover of existing industries, while the 1957 Act made provision for the 
establishment of new enterprises. With the new law, all existing corporations were 
dissolved and re-established under the 1957 Act. By 1964 there were 20 industrial 
corporations and several others were planned (Warnapala, 1974). Much of the 
foreign aid received from communist countries was utilised to strengthen these 
corporations.     
 
According to Warnapala (1974), by 1966 only 15 industrial enterprises were in 
operation. Some of them operated below the expected capacity for several reasons.  
One reason was the corporations had been established without proper feasibility 
studies and cost-benefit analysis. For example, the plant and equipment of the Sugar 
Corporation had been installed but remained idle until the sugar cane was harvested. 
A textile factory was located in Veyangoda 100 miles away from the cotton-growing 
projects of the Department of the Agriculture (Warnapala, 1974). Accordingly, the 
most suitable locations were not selected for projects under these corporations due to 
political considerations i.e. the need to locate a factory in a particular constituency 
(Warnapala, 1974). These reasons, together with other factors, contributed to the low 
performance of these corporations. As a result, they were highly dependent on the 
Treasury for funds, which placed a burden on the government budget. Further, 
overstaffing due to political patronage was a serious problem (Salih, 2000). Political 
influence and interventions were prominent in the day-to-day activities of most of the 
enterprises, which led to mismanagement (Public Enterprises Department, 2003; 
Warnapala, 1974).  
 
Consequently, most PEs operated at a loss for years. Examples of poor performers 
were: the National Water Supply and Drainage Board (loss in 1988, SLRs 400 
million), State Plantation Corporation and Janatha Estate Development Board (loss 
of SLRs. 820 million in 1988), Pelwatte Sugar Corporation (loss in 1988, SLRs 255 
million), Sri Lanka Transport Boards (loss in 1988, SLRs. 635 million) and Ceylon 
Shipping Corporation (loss in 1988, SLRs 374 million), (Adam et al., 1992). 
Although there were a few profit-making enterprises, Mineral Sands Corporation 
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(profit in 1988, SLRs. 300 million),  Lanka Milk Foods (SLRs 60 million), and 
Ceylon Electricity Board  (SLRs 1135 million), the overall loss of productivity paved 
the way for their privatisation in the 1980s, which will be discussed later.  
 
Despite their poor performance PEs began to grow while weakening the private 
sector in the economy. It was estimated that by the mid 1980s there were over 280 
PEs, out of which 165 were commercial (Central Bank, 1998, p.215).  Most of the 
respondents
39
 (60%) in this study commented that nationalisation programme created 
more economic and political problems, and was meaningless.  
 
Daya Liyanage, Head of the National Procurement Agency, commented, 
The nationalisation of private entities killed the entrepreneurship. That is why still our 
private sector is weak. In addition, nationalisation of plantations paved the way for the 
evolution of giant trade unions affiliated with the political parties (Interview, 07.01. 
2008). 
 
Furthermore, the establishment of PEs provided members of the bureaucracy and the 
politicians with an extra area for intervention and influence, and opportunities for 
nepotism and corruption.  
 
5.2.4 Creation of Branch Offices of Departments 
 
The other reform of the 1950s and the 1960s was the creation of branch offices of 
central departments in the districts. The departmentalisation resulted in the reduction 
of responsibility and authority of the GA who is the chief executive of the district 
(Wijeweera, 1988). The branch offices of the central departments operate in isolation 
as independent agencies, receiving orders from their respective head offices and 
reporting back on matters relating to the district, ignoring the GA. This hindered 
economic and social progress and increased waste of resources. The lack of 
coordination of various departmental activities at the district level created many 
problems for the decentralisation and devolution of the country, as discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
 
                                                 
39
 In this case the respondents are to be anonymous. 
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5.2.5 Abolition of Ceylon Civil Service (CCS) and Creation 
of Unified Administrative Service -1963 
 
The other administrative reform initiative undertaken by the UF Government was the 
abolition of the CCS  and the creation of the Ceylon Administrative Service (CAS) in 
1963, or Sri Lanka Administrative Service (SLAS) as it is called today (De Silva, 
1993; McCourt, 2001; Somasundram, 1997)). Until 1963, the public service 
managerial cadres were composed of two categories: CCS (All Island Service) and 
non-CCS (confined to departmental services).  
 
The CCS was composed of British nationals during the colonial rule, but at the dawn 
of Independence Ceylonese were gradually admitted into this cadre. A limited 
number of 22-24 year-old university graduates were recruited based on the result of a 
competitive examination. The annual intake was limited to four or five. The majority 
were from rich families and held almost all of the top positions in the public sector. 
At the time of Independence CCS was in a very strong position, with due respect and 
recognition. As a result, the officers enjoyed adequate autonomy and they became 
the most important segment of the administration. According to Weerakoon (2004, 
p.127), although rural intellectuals entered into this service after Independence, ―they 
tried to maintain the tradition of the impartial, learned, and omni competent advisor‖. 
 
The candidates who were not successful for CCS were recruited to non CCS cadres 
in various government departments. According to the Salaries and Cadre 
Commission – Wilmot Perera Commission – (1958/61), though they failed to secure 
places in the CCS, there was very little difference between their intellectual standards 
and those of the successful. However, they were subordinate to the CCS cadre. 
 
These two sets of bureaucrats were paid differently and were promoted differently. 
The CCS cadre could freely transfer among government agencies while non-CCS 
had to work at the same place until they retired. Their promotional prospects were 
limited.  
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V.K. Nanayakkara, Former Secretary to the Ministry of Education, in an interview 
said, 
A clerical officer could become Administrative Officer and could go up to Secretary 
Level [because CCS grade III was allocated to the promoters of the clerical cadres]. For 
example, V.C. Jayasooriya, a very exceptional bright individual, joined the public service 
as a local government clerk and ended up as the Secretary to the Ministry of Home 
Affairs and Local Government, whereas an Assistant Commissioner who joined as the 
departmental officer (non CCS), for example, an Assistant Commissioner of Co-operative 
or Agrarian Services, could only become a Deputy Commissioner. He could never 
become Commissioner because the commissioner posts exclusively for the CCS. In CCS 
you joined as a Cadet, and then were appointed as the Commissioner. But others cannot 
go to that level (Interview, 06.11. 2007).   
 
This meant that CCS employees were able to get a wider range of experience on 
various tasks and enjoy more privileges than their counterparts in departments. 
Therefore, there was a division among these two groups in the public service.  
 
Against this backdrop, there were two anti CCS Commissions in the public service 
due to the agitation by non-CCS cadres:  the Poulier Commission (1953) and the 
Wilmot Perera Commission (1961).The Poulier Commission proposed two levels of 
recruitment, but this scheme was unable to eliminate the problem of the ‗caste 
system‘ in the public sector (Warnapala, 1974). Similarly, the Wilmot Perera 
Commission also condemned the CCS ―as a perpetuation of a caste system in the 
higher public service‖ (Wijeweera, 1988, p. 289).  
 
The Wilmot Perera Commission (1958-61) realised the need for urgent reforms to 
unify all administrative grades in the public service and recommended abolishing the 
CCS and absorbing its members into a unified service. More importantly, as a part of 
moving away from a neutral bureaucracy, the UF politicians viewed the CCS cadre 
as elitist and not responsive to the needs of the general people. According to 
Weerakoon (2004, pp. 127-128), who was also an officer of the CCS until its 
abolition,  
The primary reason for the change seemed to be that, Felix particularly, [Minister of 
Justice] and a few of other ministers, were not too comfortable with having their chief 
administrative advisors being people with their own individual minds and opinions. They 
would have preferred less debate and more action once the political decisions had been 
taken…  
In addition,  
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A civil servant was a prized catch for the daughter of a successful businessman or a rich 
land owner. There were many CCS members of acute intellectual brilliance who had been 
snared by very rich bus magnates or owners of vast areas of coconut and rubber land [s]. 
Felix‘s point was that with all this acquired wealth behind them, would they [CCS cadres] 
be able to implement the programme of socialistic reforms the government had in mind? 
 
The UF government realised that it had to transform the colonial bureaucracy in 
order to ensure that its socio-economic development programmes were efficiently 
implemented. The timing was right for the UF government to introduce reforms 
because its assumption of power marked the end of colonial features in the 
independent nation. Its electoral victory gave the UF government the mandate to 
introduce comprehensive reforms to the public service, to change the civil servants‘ 
mentality and make them more sensitive to the population‘s needs.  In addition to 
favourable timing, the UF leaders had a favourable attitude towards administrative 
reforms.  The other most important motivation for administrative reform was to 
ensure its political survival. It needed a supportive civil service to ensure its re-
election to political office by helping it to fulfil its electoral promises.     
 
Accordingly, despite the CCS‘s reputation for honesty in service delivery, the 
nationalist politicians abolished the traditional structure of administration in 1963.  
They might have realised that the degree of risk involved in not reforming the civil 
service was greater than the risk accompanying the implementation of the reform due 
to resistance. They felt they had nothing to lose if the hostile and alienated civil 
servants were reoriented and persuaded towards the achievement of national 
development goals. On the other hand, the UF leaders were also uncertain of their 
long-term survival and their ability to deliver the goods if the status quo was 
maintained and if the civil servants would be allowed to behave as they had in the 
past.  Accordingly, all administrative cadres above the executive level, belonging to 
the CCS, and other departmental cadres were absorbed into a unified Administrative 
Service
40
 (De Silva, 1993). ―The civil servants were given the option to retire 
immediately ‗on abolition of office terms,‘ or of retiring within the next 10 years on 
the same generous terms‖ (Weerakoon, 2004, p. 128). 
                                                 
40
 At the time of setting up the CAS there were 209 members of the CCS, and 821 administrative 
officers of executive rank in the public service. They all brought together, despite their seniority 
(years of work). As such, those who recruited to the CCS in 1962 were given the same seniority as 
other administrative officers with 18 years of service. 
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K.H.J.Wijayadasa, the former Secretary to the Prime Minister and the President 
(1984-1994), who was also a member of CCS until its abolition commented, 
To my knowledge abolition of CCS was premeditated revenge by politicians because 
politicians couldn‘t interfere with CCS. They couldn‘t do things the way they wanted. 
The CCS was a hindrance to their political ego and self enrichment. Interference in day to 
day administration was not allowed, especially in appointments. What politicians of the 
post-Independence period wanted was for every person to come to them and get 
everything done through them from birth certificate to death certificate, jobs, and 
promotions, to keep the voter tied to them. The CCS was a hindrance for that, so they 
abolished it (Interview, 11.01.2008).  
 
It appeared that the abolition of CCS had many shortfalls soon after its 
implementation such as inter-service jealousy (Wijeweera, 1988), disappointment 
among the public servants, lack of morale, inefficiency in service delivery, gradual 
politicisation, political patronage, and lack of emphasis on training and career 
development (De Silva, 1993; Warnapala, 1974). More importantly SL lost the 
service of many high intelligent people due to the retirement of many CCS officers 
as a result of these reforms.  
 
However, there were some positive effects of this reform. The most positive effect 
was that rural Sinhala educated youth got a chance to enter the Administrative 
Service soon after graduation, and were able to advance their careers which were 
hitherto confined to elites and English-educated rich people. The study of ‗a 
Sociological Analysis of Present Recruitment to the SLAS by Amunugama in 1977,  
highlights that the new recruits to SLAS tended to come from rural schools and 
lower to middle classes of society. Therefore, rural middle-class youth directly 
benefited from this reform.  
 
The other positive effect was that the new system had several novel initiatives for the 
procedure of recruitment (Warnapala, 1974). Annually around 40 to 50 people, at the 
lowest level of the service, were recruited.  
 
The other important feature of the new system was allowing females the opportunity 
to enter the service for the first time since Independence, although this was limited. 
Only 20% of vacancies were opened to women (Warnapala, 1974). However, it was 
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a big achievement for females to hold higher posts in administration; thus qualified 
females directly benefited from this reform. 
 
Another significant aspect of change was the recognition of the three languages, 
Sinhalese, Tamil and English for the recruitment examinations (Warnapala, 1974, p. 
339). Applicants were given a chance to sit in the same language in which they had 
obtained their qualifications. These changes in the recruitment process and 
procedures indicated the need to recognise the changing social and economic 
environment. Therefore, the new system created a relatively wider base for people to 
compete in order to get a place in the administrative service.  
 
In summary, the creation of a unified CAS in 1963 ended the 150-year-old prestige 
of the CCS. The caste system embedded in the CCS gradually disappeared and 
public service recruitment was carried out on a broader base. This attempt was seen 
as a first step towards modernisation of the colonial administrative system, but the 
quality of service over the years since then deteriorated for many reasons which will 
be discussed throughout this chapter.  
 
5.2.6 Abolition of Village Headman System  
 
Another reform introduced by the UF government was the abolition of the office of 
the ‗village headman‘ (VH) in 1963 and replacing him with the Grama Sevaka 
(servant of the village) to cater to the needs of the villagers. The VH were used by 
the British for the duration of their rule. This system was considered an integral part 
of field administration and the focal point of all village level matters. (Warnapala, 
1974). Every department sought his help to initiate any programme at that level, 
irrespective of their district or regional organisations (Warnapala, 1974). The 
colonial rule retained the VH system for the smooth running of administration. The 
VH carried out multifunctional roles. The Chief Headman (CH) assisted the GA in 
general administration, especially in maintaining the law and order (VH has the 
authority to solve petty disputes in the village), channelling communication between 
illiterate masses, supervising minor headmen, supervising crown forests and issuing 
of licences and permits, supervising land colonisation schemes and irrigation works, 
revising list of voters, and providing information required by the Government 
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(Warnapala, 1974). Later, with the expansion of departments in the periphery, the 
headmen were relieved of some of their functions.  
 
The VH system was located in the feudal system of administration. The CH was 
selected from principal families, especially in the Kandyan Provinces. In the low 
country, government servants with good track records were sometimes appointed.  
However, high caste became the main criteria for appointment in addition to having 
wealth and influence in their divisions (Collins, 1951).  
 
 By the 1920s, despite their prestige, there was a demand for total abolition of the 
system. Two Commissions set-up in 1920 and 1935 investigated the system and 
concluded that it was corrupt (Warnapala, 1974). Wilmot Perera study (as cited in 
Warnapala, 1974)) further states that the system of recruitment entrenched privilege 
and suppressed the lower social classes. There were several possible reasons for this. 
The first reason was that VH worked without pay. As they were landowners who 
came from prestige families, they were able to give free services to government. over 
time this changed and minor headmen received fees and pecuniary rewards for 
various services. The Commission of 1920 (as cited in Warnapala, 1974, p. 345) did 
not encourage a salary payment for them ―on the ground that remuneration would 
convert the VH into entirely a different type of officer‖. Although there was no 
rationale for this decision, they continued allowances, fees, and reward payments. 
Their services were rewarded insufficiently in monetary terms, which led to 
corruption. Later in 1922, a remuneration system was introduced, but this did not 
improve the situation.  
 
Although there was an urge for reform, the system continued. The reason according 
to Warnapala was ―the manifold advantages it offered to the party in power‖.41 There 
was a view that the UNP politicians used the system as a political buffer. With the 
change of government in 1956, the need for reform became more crucial. The 
Government made no new appointments and allowed CH to retire at the age of 55. 
                                                 
41
 It was alleged that D.S. Senanayake convened a conference of VH to ―counteract the influence of 
S.W.R. D. Bandaranayaike in the Village Committee Conference‖.  It was also said that Sir Oliver 
Gunathilake, when he was the Minister of Home Affairs, convened a conference of VH and wanted 
them to support the UNP (Warnapala, 1974). 
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The government also abolished minor VH and transferred their functions to newly-
appointed Cultivation Committees. After that the Government decided to 
compulsorily retire all CH in 1961 (Warnapala, 1974).  ―The underlying assumption 
of these changes was that they were essential elements of a wider policy of eroding 
the support base of the UNP within the bureaucracy‖ (De Silva, 1993, p. 89). As 
such, the ultimate motivation for reform was political rivalry rather than 
administrative modernisation.  
 
In 1963, the VH system was replaced by the Grama Sevaka Service (servants of the 
village) (De Silva, 1993). A Grama Sevaka was selected through a competitive 
examination and he was transferable. N. Pathmanathan, former Deputy Secretary to 
the Treasury, in an interview said, 
A man who thought that he was a head of the village became a servant of the village with 
this reform. Later in the 1990s this designation was again changed into ―Grama Seva 
Niladari
42
 owing to high agitation of the Trade Union and in the recent past this post was 
redesignated as ―Grama Niladari‖ again on the same agitation. They are no more 
―sevakas‖ in the village rather ―Niladaries‖ or ―officers‖ in the village (Interview, 
02.01.2008).  
 
Under this reform four categories of village level field officers were brought into the 
Grama Niladari Service. They were: Grama Sevakas, Cultivation Officers, 
Agricultural Extension Officers, and Vishesa Seva Niladaris (Special Services 
Officers). Most appointments were done under the patronage of politics (De Silva, 
1993). Under this reform, each village was given a Grama Niladari to help villagers 
to receive many of the public services as easily as possible. Despite shortfalls in the 
system such as delays, corruption and malpractices in the service delivery, this 
reform changed the norms and style of administration at the periphery. The high 
caste, privileged village elite, lost the opportunity to be in the administrative system 
anymore. They lost all privileges and connections with higher bureaucrats in the 
divisional and district level. This negatively affected their status as well. In contrast, 
the reform benefited the village youth as it allowed them to enter the administrative 
machinery irrespective of their caste and position at village level. Introduction of 
competitive examinations for selection benefited all talented youth, thus the 
government also gained credit for the reform.  
                                                 
42
 The Sinhalese word ―Sevaka‖ means ―Servant‖ and ―Niladari‖ means ―Officer‖ which gives high 
recognition to the post and to the person who hold that post, in the SL context. 
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However, many respondents
43
 in this study mentioned that those who succeeded 
were not particularly good and the CAS and GS systems did not bring better results 
to the local people in the same way as in the old British empire. According to them, 
the present systems are riddled with inefficiency and corruption, which make it 
difficult for the poor men at village level to reap full benefits of government 
programmes.  
 
5.2.7 The Committee of Secretaries and the Standing  
         Committee on Administrative Reforms 1966/69 
 
In the late 1960s there was an increasing dissatisfaction about the performance of the 
public service. Thus, the UNP government, which came to power in 1965, created a 
number of institutions at ministry level such as a Plan Implementation Committee 
and a Foreign Exchange Committee. In addition, a Committee of Secretaries chaired 
by the Secretary to Treasury was appointed, to report on, 
Administrative reforms; 
New financial regulations; 
Tender procedure; and 
Procedures and organisational changes required in the context of development 
programmes‖ (Nadarajah, 1997, pp. 248-249).  
 
The Committee observed that there was a lack of systematic programme evaluation 
mechanism, and an ―individual performance‖ evaluation system in the public service. 
It also witnessed the reliance on seniority, not merit, in making promotions in the 
public service. The core recommendations of the Committee were: 
 
Establish a ‗Standing Committee‘ to examine the administrative set-up and to make 
recommendations on changes; 
 
Re-organise the structure of ministries and departments; 
 
Establish a staff training institute to carry out induction training and encourage in-service 
training; and 
                                                 
43
 In this case the respondents are to be anonymous. 
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Delegate financial responsibility and authority (Nadarajah, 1997)  
  
Some of these recommendations were implemented: a Standing Committee on 
Administrative Reform and an Academy of Administrative Studies were established, 
and the Financial Regulations were revised, enabling more delegation of authority to 
lower levels than before. Integration of departments with ministries was carried out 
in an ad hoc manner. According to the Secretary to Treasury who led the Standing 
Committee on Administrative Reforms (as cited in Nadarajah, 1997, pp. 249-250), 
The proposed integration of ministries and departments has been carried out in a few 
ministries with some measure of success, particularly where ministries and departments 
are located in close proximity to each other. In other ministries, departments‘ heads had 
not welcomed the proposal and ministers have not been inclined to implement them. 
 
This Committee lasted from 1966 to 1969. At the end of the three-year term, the 
Secretary to the Treasury (as cited in Nadarajah, 1997, pp. 250-251) admitted in his 
report that they could do very little in the area of administrative reforms, 
It is useful to review briefly how these recommendations were implemented and the 
measure of success they achieved in improving the quality of the administration. The 
standing committee on Administrative reforms has functioned from 1966-1969. Having 
been its Chairman, I must confess it has little achievement to its credit. The members 
were all senior officials preoccupied with heavy departmental responsibilities. Often they 
were unable to attend meetings. Most of them were so senior and so used to the existing 
institutions that they had ceased to be critical.  When a problem was brought up for 
consideration, the inclination was to reminisce rather than [to] critically analysed (sic). 
The arrangements for servicing of the committee were inadequate. Administrative 
reforms not having been assigned to any minister as a special responsibility did not come 
under any ministerial supervision or direction. A circular sent out to the public service 
explaining why the committee was appointed and inviting suggestions for administrative 
changes evoked little interest and very few suggestions emanated from the entire public 
service. 
  
Although administrative modernisation was recognised as a priority from 1956, this 
evidence suggests that until 1969, there was no proper institutional arrangement put 
in place to realise it; rather ad hoc arrangements seemed to have been made. 
 
In summation, the reforms during the 1950s and 1960s were mixed, largely political 
in nature with some elements of decentralisation of administrative functions. The 
language reform had far-reaching adverse effects on administrative functioning due 
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to its ineffective implementation, while abolition of the CCS and VH system had 
some overall positive effects. 
5.3 Part II: Reforms during the 1970s and 1980s 
 
The UF led by the SLFP came into power with a two thirds majority in 1970 and 
established a separate ministry called the ‗Ministry of Public Administration‘ to 
create radical changes in the administrative set-up. Until then, the public service 
functioned under the Ministry of Finance. The creation of a separate ministry was 
intended to give a new direction and recognition to public administration. 
Nevertheless, it failed to do so (Somasundram, 1997).  It is also noteworthy to state 
that after more than three decades from its inception, it was unable to direct public 
administration into a new era of public management, at a time when  other countries 
shifted from traditional ‗public administration‘ to ‗public management‘. 
 
In addition, this government focused on administrative decentralisation during its 
office because decentralisation of authority was seen as an essential feature of 
economic and social development of the post-independent era. The government 
wanted to change centralised policies and the bureaucratic systems set-up under the 
colonial time in order to meet the aspirations of the people (Wijeweera, 1988). 
Therefore, it established several institutions at local levels and delegated decision-
making authority to the lower level. In fact, all the reform initiatives during this era 
have had profound implications over today‘s public administration, thus it is 
worthwhile to examine their implementation in depth.    
 
5.3.1 Divisional Development Councils (DDCs) -1971 
 
The primary motivation for the introduction of DDCs was the youth insurrection 
which occurred in 1971 due to the unemployment problem and the social unrest over 
political interventions in all spheres in public administration. The unemployment 
increased from about 340,000 persons (10.5% of the labour force) by 1959/1960 to 
about 546,000 persons (13.9%) by 1969/1970 (Kearney, 1973, p.735) due to slow 
economic growth. It became a crucial problem because most of the educated youth 
sought white-collar jobs, particularly in the public service.  
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However, in the public sector job opportunities were under political patronage. Due 
to the lack of open methods for recruitment, government MPs were given 
tremendous power in these appointments. For example, in the appointment of 
teachers each MP was given a fixed quota to fill. Very often the person who got the 
job was a close relative to the MP or had access to the patronage network through 
their elite connections. In some cases, the wealthy people who were politically 
opposed to the MP got the jobs, due to bribery or power to manipulate the system. 
According to Leitan (1979, pp. 208-209), ―it was also revealed by the Co-operative 
Wholesale Establishment (CWE)  Commission of Inquiry that when the Chairman 
and Director of the CWE Board resigned on 9
th
 January 1965, there were over 100 
letters and chits, majority were from SLFP and LSSP Parliamentarians, requesting 
appointments in the CWE for various people, for example, a letter from a minister 
addressed to Chairman of the CWE requested him to ―fix him up in any capacity in 
the CWE‖, Another letter, ‗please give him a job in any capacity in Dikwella area. 
This is a must and it has got to be done. I have attended to your matters‖.  
 
The political patronage was not only confined to offering public sector employment 
but also spread to all other areas in the public sector, for example, the choice of areas 
for rural electrification or water supply schemes (De Silva, 1993). The youth 
insurgency was a social explosion against these unjust practices in public 
administration. 
 
In response, the SLFP Government (1970-1977) established DDCs
44
 in order to 
implement crash employment generation projects under the purview of the 
Divisional Revenue Officers 
45
(DRO). The DDCs were composed of both officials 
and non-officials, including local MPs (Wijeweera, 1988).  
 
                                   The main thrust of the DDCs was to promote small-scale industries using rural 
resources, with the aim of generating ―50 units of sustained employment‖ per DDC 
(Wijeweera, 1988). The DDCs were required to manage these projects through co-
                                                 
44
 For administrative purposes SL has been divided into 9 provinces, 25 districts and 320 divisions. 
The GA is the Administrative Head of the district while DRO was in the division.  
45
 This position was re-designated as Assistant Government Agent (AGA) in 1975 and Divisional 
Secretary in 1990.   
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operative institutions under the guidance of Divisional Development Assistants, who 
were public officials recruited from among the unemployed graduates. The GAs of 
the districts along with other relevant district officials coordinated these projects, and 
funds were released to the GAs by the Treasury (Wijeweera, 1988). Thousands of 
projects were implemented within a short period of time.   
 
However, this programme had its own deficiencies. According to Richards and 
Gunarathna (as cited in Herath, 1991),  many of the projects have been strongly 
criticised for poor initial choice of product, lack of facility for marketing, lack of 
enthusiasm by co-operative members, and failure to create significant additional 
employment. Furthermore, there was a lack of expert knowledge on project 
formulation and appraisal on the part of both the DDC‘s and GA‘s staff (Wijeweera, 
1988). In addition, the technical departments, such as the Department of Irrigation, 
Water, Agrarian Services and Small Industries, continued to maintain their 
‗departmental‘ orientation rather than ‗district‘ orientation. These reasons hindered 
the effective co-ordination at the district level. Moreover, this decentralisation 
programme remained merely an administrative exercise, failing to gather support of 
the beneficiary groups. In addition, the system itself was totally reliant on the 
personal initiative and leadership of the GAs and AGAs. The failure of the DDC 
system had negative consequences on the bureaucracy and public management which 
led to the introduction of political authorities in 1973 (Section 5.4.3).  
 
5.3.2 Abolition of the Public Service Commission (PSC) - 
1972 
 
Under the Order in Council of 1946, the public service personal management were 
placed under the independent PSC. This Commission was abolished and its powers 
and functions were transferred to the Cabinet of Ministers by the new Constitution in 
1972. 
 
The main justification for the legislation was that the government, which is 
responsible to Parliament for its policies and operations, needed to have full control 
of public officers who are required to implement them. Another argument was that in 
a rapidly developing society, the public service had remained a partial instrument of 
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the elite and unresponsive to the needs of vast majority of people (De Silva, 1993). 
This fact was reinforced by V.K. Nanayakkara, former Secretary, Ministry of 
Education, in an interview, 
Dr. Colvin R. De Silva [who was a lawyer by profession and one of the architects of the 
1972 Constitution] used to say that ‗as Ministers we are responsible for public servants. 
We defend the public officers in Parliament. If Ministers are responsible for the activities 
of the public servants they should be given the authority for their appointments, 
promotions etc‘…One of other reasons was that previous Governments, especially the 
1956 Government wanted to do drastic changes, but public officers, CCS, resisted them.  
Because of that they felt that they need some control over public servants (Interview, 
06.11.2007). 
 
Articles106 (1) and (2) of 1972 Constitution state: 
The Cabinet of Ministers shall be responsible for the appointments, transfer, dismissal 
and disciplinary control of state officers,  
Subject to the provision of the Constitution, the Cabinet of Ministers shall have the power 
of appointment, transfer, dismissal, and disciplinary control of all state officers. 
 
Under Article 106 (3), the Cabinet of Ministers also was empowered: 
to determine all matters relating to public service including the constitution of state 
services, the formulation of scheme of recruitment, and codes of conduct for the state 
officers, the procedure for the exercise and the delegation of the powers of appointment, 
transfer, dismissal, and disciplinary control of state officers.  
 
Accordingly, the Cabinet was empowered to deal with all personnel and 
administrative matters of public servants. However, the power vested in the Cabinet 
could be delegated to an individual Minister by Article 115 and this individual 
Minister in turn could delegate his authority to a state officer. However, the Cabinet 
kept its vested power over senior public officials such as Heads of Departments, 
Additional Secretaries and Senior Assistant Secretaries while delegating lower level 
staff matters to public officials. Nevertheless, under Article 116 of the Constitution, 
―the Minister with the concurrence of the Cabinet of Ministers could act in regard to 
any matter so delegated to a staff officer‖. In this manner an individual Minister was 
given exclusive authority over any matter in relation to public officers who are under 
his purview. 
 
To support the Ministers, this Constitution made provisions to create two bodies: the 
State Services Advisory Board (SSAB) and State Services Disciplinary Board 
(SSDB). Each Board consisted of three members for a term of four years and 
 158 
functioned merely as advisory bodies to Cabinet. The SSAB gave recommendations 
to the Cabinet in making decisions on matters related to appointments, and transfers, 
while the SSDB gave recommendations on matters relating to dismissal and 
disciplinary control. Members of Boards were appointed by the President but they 
cannot be removed by the President without advice of the Prime Minister. A member 
of one Board couldn‘t be appointed to the other. A Minister was supposed to make 
decisions after receiving recommendations from these Boards.  
 
The crux of this Constitution was Article 106 (5) which explained: 
No institution administering justice shall have the power or jurisdictions to inquire into, 
pronounce upon or in any manner call in question any recommendation, order or decision 
of the Cabinet of Ministers, a Minister, the State Services Advisory Board, the State 
Services Disciplinary Board, or a state officer, regarding any matter concerning 
appointments, transfers, dismissals or disciplinary matters of state officers.  
 
Furthermore, under Article 117(2) and (3), the decision of the Minister was final in 
appointment and transfer, but in a case of a dismissal a single appeal could be made 
to the Cabinet of Ministers, who had the final say. 
 
Accordingly, the Constitution protected the Cabinet, individual ministers, two boards 
and public officers responsible for the public service personnel management from 
any legal action in powers vested in them.  A public servant had no chance to use 
even conventional judicial institutions, if any injustice was done to him/her thus, the 
first step towards politicisation of the public service started in 1972, with proper 
legal backup.  
 
The results of this reform were seen soon after. The officers of the SLAS, involved in 
district administration, were transferred when they had problems with politicians in 
the districts (Somasundram, 1997). For a long time, the Ministry of Public 
Administration maintained a ‗pool‘ for such officers who were transferred on the 
insistence of politicians until they found another work station. On some occasions a 
SLAS officer, who wanted to work in the division, first had to talk to the local MP 
for his approval (Sirivardana, 2004). This process was significant at district and 
divisional levels but there were no exceptions at ministerial level as well (personal 
observation).  
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In this manner, the once independent SLPS has been progressively undermined. Its 
independence was further diluted by ignoring competitive examinations for 
recruitment to the public service due to the introduction of the ‗Chit System‖46 in the 
1970s by the UF Government and the ‗Job Bank‘47 system in the 1980s under the 
UNP Government.  
 
The senior public officials who succumbed to this radical transformation described 
this reform, in the words of K.H.J. Wijayadasa, former Secretary to the Prime 
Minister and President (1984-1994), 
The abolition of the PSC was really a disaster that engulfed the public service. The 
independent PSC served minorities better. This was also the start of the politicisation of 
the public service. This aggravated ethnic conflict. In the olden days everyone in the 
district respected the GA. But now it is not there. They think that the GA is a henchman 
of the politician. He may not deserve this label. The primary motivation was to make the 
public servant subservient to the politician. They wanted the public service under them. 
This was done purposely. It demolished the hierarchical order of the public service 
(Interview, 27.12.2007). 
 
A similar view was expressed by Professor, S.W. Ranasinghe, 
They opened the door for politicisation of the entire public service. Under the previous 
Constitution no politician could remove any public servant, and they held positions at the 
pleasure of the Crown. Under the 1972 Constitution it was at the pleasure of the Cabinet 
of Ministers. Again, here it is the Cabinet as a whole does not take decision. An 
individual Minister could  interfere and take decisions. It was politically justifying their 
decisions. It was not illegal. The Minister in charge of the subject had power to make any 
decision over public servant under his purview (Interview, 11.12.2007).  
 
 S. Ranugge, Secretary of Ministry of Export Development and International Trade, 
said,              
It is the worst piece of legislation. The content with regard to public service is not good. It 
killed the public service. It paved the way for institutionalisation of political ideas in 
public administration. Today also we suffer (Interview, 09.11.2007). 
 
                                                 
46
 Under the ‗Chit system‘ a candidate had to take a letter from the MP of the area to support his/her 
application for a job, promotion, or a transfer. It was extended to dismissal or disciplinary control 
matters too. If the MP of the area was not a member of the Government party, a letter from the Chief 
Organiser of the Government party was mandated.  This system was implemented by the SLFP 
government (1970-1977)  
47
 Under the ‗Job Bank‘ system, the MP of the area distributed job applications to his supporters and 
they were registered in the ‗job bank‘ set-up in the Ministry of Plan Implementation. Under this 
system even application for a job was restricted to MPs‘ wishes. This system was implemented by the 
UNP government (1977 to the1980s).  
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Daya Liyanage, former Deputy Secretary to the Treasury, in an interview expressed 
similar views, 
Not only public service people suffer. Abolition of PSC badly affected [everyone] 
(Interview, 07.01. 2008).  
 
Y.G. Wijerathna, Additional Secretary, Ministry of Plantation Industries, said that, 
Negative effects are more. Independent decisions cannot be taken due the fact that the 
Secretaries and Heads of Departments are appointed by the politicians. Even now. The 
quality of the public service deteriorated, it led to inefficiency of the public service, 
because suitable persons are not in proper places (Interview, 03.12.2007). 
 
As such, the abolition of independent PSC in 1972 had negative implications for 
public administration. It was the first step towards politicisation of the public service.  
 
5.3.3 District Political Authority (DPA) - 1973 
 
The third attempt at administrative reforms by the UF government was the setting-up 
of DPAs. The shortfalls in the DDCs discussed previously provided a base for 
politicians to adopt alternative ways to address the problems of bureaucracy. This 
meant that the UF government thought that the political intervention was a panacea 
for bureaucratic incapacity, inefficiency and delays. The politicians did not bother to 
reform bureaucracy or change their attitudes. Instead, they seemed to seize the 
opportunity for their own advancement at the time when the country faced a food 
crisis due to global food shortages and severe drought in the country.  So they 
established political authorities.  
 
The Prime Minister appointed a senior member of the National State Assembly 
(Legislature) in each district as Political Authority and assigned a special 
responsibility in regard to food production (Leitan, 1979). Accordingly, 20 DPAs 
were established: three were headed by Ministers, twelve by Deputy Ministers and 
the remaining five by senior backbenchers.Thus, political leadership was established 
in the district, replacing the GA‘s role by making him the secretary to the DPA. It 
had been the second attempt in politicisation of public administration in SL (the first 
attempt was the abolition of the independent PSC). Therefore, it was seen as a drastic 
change in the traditional administrative system.    
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One of the tasks of the DPA was to identify non-cultivated paddy lands and make 
arrangements to bring them all under cultivation while providing inputs, and 
facilitating marketing functions. The DPA was instructed to work with other MPs in 
the district cohesively.  Funds were allocated to the DPA by the Treasury via GA. 
The GAs were entrusted with financial management of the DPAs. However, there 
was no instructions on the demarcation of authority of the GAs and DPAs or 
reduction of the GAs‘ powers, but the GAs were required to work in accordance with 
the decisions of the DPAs in the districts (Leitan, 1979). 
 
A separate agency called the ―Prime Minister‘s Coordinating Secretariat‖ was 
created at the centre to direct and guide the district agricultural programme through 
DPA.  Its main tasks were the supervision of field operations, review of progress, and 
coordination of all relevant ministries on food drive programmes (Leitan, 1979). It 
was directly under the PM and led by one of the PM‘s daughters. She was assisted by 
the Deputy Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs, Deputy Minister of Defence, 
Army Commander and Director of National Planning of the Ministry of Planning and 
Economic Affairs, and as such, it was principally a mixture of political, military and 
bureaucratic officials (Wijeweera, 1988). They sorted out problems which arose 
between the DPA, the GA and the departmental officers (Leitan, 1979).  
 
However, the DPAs faced many problems. The main problem was the lack of 
enthusiasm by ministers to delegate ministerial functions (Wijeweera, 1988). 
Although there were two circulars of instructions, one for the DPAs and the other for 
the GAs, the scope of the functions of DPAs was not clear. The DPAs had to 
continuously depend on line ministers. According to Wanasinghe (Chair of the ARC) 
and Dr. Abeywardene (Former GA), some of the DPAs were very effective and the 
centre was afraid to delegate more authority to them (Interviews, 31.12.2007 & 
15.02.2008). 
 
Another problem was the drastic reduction of funds in later years. A further problem 
was that DPAs were given tremendous powers in various other activities which were 
widely misused, for example, selection of allottees in housing and lands distribution 
(Wijeweera, 1988). Furthermore, there was lack of support from the GAs; according 
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to Wijeweera (1988) some of the GAs did not provide office facilities for the DPAs 
in their premises, and only a few volunteered to be their secretaries. In an interview, 
this was confirmed by Andrew de Silva, a former GA in Kalutara (Interview, 
07.11.2007). Nevertheless, this system operated until the government changed in 
1977. This reform had far-reaching negative implications for public management. 
 
5.3.4 Introduction of Decentralised Capital Budget      
         (DCB) - 1974 
 
The UF government thought that mere delegation of authority to lower levels would 
not be meaningful without any financial support. Therefore, as a means of 
strengthening the decentralisation of development administration through DPA, the 
budgetary system was also reformed by the Cabinet decision of 13
th
 June 1973, 
granting formal approval for the commencement of the DCB in 1974 (Wijeweera, 
1988). The DCB is a programme that allocates public funds to MPs for development 
projects in order to address the needs of the people of the district that the MP 
represents and for which there is no allocation from other sources of funding 
(Ministry of Policy Development and Implementation, 2007).  
 
According to Weerakoon (as cited in Herath, 1991), the main purpose of the DCB at 
the initial stage was to increase food production and employment in the village level 
through development programmes and increase participation of people in the 
planning and implementation of such programmes. The hidden motive of the DCB 
was to encourage volunteer work and/or material resources in the area, for example, 
if a project costs SLRs 20, 000, the allocation was only 15,000. The balance could be 
made up by volunteer work. It is assumed that because the local MPs were the key 
players in the DCB, this could have been organised easily. This was evident in the 
DPA system (Wijeweera, 1988). Nevertheless, over time this concept got diluted.  
 
The implementation of the DCB has gone through several changes since its 
inception. Initially, a portion of funds was shown in the estimates as the 
‗Decentralised Budget‘. The Treasury released these funds to respective departments, 
on request through their functional ministries. Then the departments reallocated these 
funds to branch offices in the district. This system did not fully support the 
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development programmes submitted by MPs, thus MPs had to go through the same 
process that had prevailed in the previous system. In addition, the government MPs 
were able to press for a larger portion of the DCB, while Opposition members were 
neglected (Herath, 1991). Due to repeated requests from MPs, this system was 
changed several times.  
 
Accordingly, the Treasury allocated DCB money to the Ministry of Planning and 
Economic Affairs, which established a separate division for the DCB. This Ministry 
then allocated DCB funds to districts for capital work via GAs. The GAs reallocated 
these funds equally to electorates. With the establishment of the District Minister 
system which will be discussed next, this system further changed. Then, an allocation 
of SLRs 2.5 million was provided for a MP from 1979. During the 1980-1990s, the 
Ministry of Plan Implementation was responsible for the implementation of the DCB 
programme. Later the amount of allocation per MP was also increased to SLRs 3.5 
million in 2000, 5 million in 2003, and has continued until now. The responsibility 
for implementation was moved to the Ministry of Rural Livelihood Development in 
2005. Currently (2009) the Ministry of Nation Building and Infrastructure 
Development is entrusted with the implementation of the DCB.  Now MPs can 
sponsor projects throughout the district as they wish, not confined to electorates. 
Thus, the implementation mechanism changes according to the whims and fancies of 
the political party in power.  
 
According to Oberst (1986, p. 169), this reform put the local MPs ―in the position of 
development administrator‖. Before the DCB, the average MPs did not have any 
decision-making authority or power. Most of their time was spent on listening to 
their constituents‘ grievances and complaints. Their main role was only confined to 
vote for the party proposals in Parliament. The DCB augmented an important 
component to their job by putting them in the administrative structure. They now 
have the authority to plan and have decision-making powers (Oberst, 1986).They 
became a new force in development in the periphery. 
 
In addition, this reform gave the GAs the responsibility over the decentralised 
allocations as discussed by appointing them as Chief Accounting Officers (CAOs) 
from January 1980 (Wijeweera, 1988). This was a novel feature in the budgetary 
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system in SL, because normally CAOs are still the Secretaries of Ministries. In this 
respect the GAs were given high positions, such as secretaries of ministries, in the 
administrative system under the DCB. Therefore, this was a watershed in 
decentralised financial control. Prior to the DCB, most of the projects in the districts 
were implemented by the branch offices of the central departments. They ignored the 
GAs on many occasions (Oberst, 1986; Wijeweera, 1988) but under the DCB system 
the departmental officers have to work with the GAs, therefore they cannot ignore 
them as before. Now, the GA has the authority to allocate funds and thereby, 
monitoring of the projects. The progress reports were made available to local MPs so 
they clearly understood the implementation of projects.  
 
Currently the scope of the DCB has expanded, 76% of the DCB is expected to be 
spent on socio-economic activities, covering priority areas from economic 
infrastructure to fisheries, health and sanitation, religious, social welfare and sports. 
Out of 76%, 50% is expected to be spent on development of rural roads. The capital 
works on religious activities, social welfare and sports are limited to 10% of the total 
provision (Ministry of Policy Development and Implementation, 2007). The funds 
cannot be moved from district, to district but there is a flexibility to move funds from 
one project to another in the same district.  
 
The DCB necessarily calls for team work. For the effectiveness of the system, three 
key players, the GA, MP and officers of the branch offices, should carry out their 
legitimate role cohesively. However, the shift in power between these three key 
players badly affected the effectiveness of the DCB system. Oberst (1986, p. 170) 
explains, 
There has been a limited amount of co-operation from departmental officers involved in 
the DCB. This lack of co-operation has largely been felt by those who do not have` the 
power to force action from the departmental officers (some back benchers, most 
opposition MPs, GAs, and Planning Officers).  
 
It was evident that the progress reports were not sent in time to the GAs and the 
technical reports on potential projects were not filled in time by these departmental 
officers. The uncooperative behaviour of these departmental officers was the reason 
for the failure of the DDC System described in the previous section. These officers 
gave priority to their own projects rather than DCB projects. In addition, there was a 
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lack of delegation in the departmental structure. Those branch officers have not given 
adequate authority to make decisions on the spot to complete their projects; for 
example, their technical reports on potential projects must be forwarded to their head 
office at Colombo for approval first, before they can be submitted to the GAs. After 
this tenders must be forwarded to the Departmental Head Office on subcontracting 
labour and material for approval (Oberst, 1986). These delays were unavoidable 
under then administrative structure. Therefore, failure to reform this structure led to a 
situation where ―political power and influence determined the completion rate of the 
projects‖ (Oberst, 1986, p. 173). 
   
In addition to these consequences, this system had other shortfalls. It is argued that 
theoretically these projects were expected to be planned, administered and 
implemented by the local people, but in reality they were and are purely initiated by 
the local MPs and the elite in the community level organisations. According to 
Siriwardena (as cited in Herath, 1991, p. 148), people‘s participation in planning and 
implementation of projects is minimal. If there was any participation, it was partial to 
the governing parties, because MPs dominate the DCB system.  
 
As such, the DCB provides excellent opportunities to MPs to set their political 
priorities and wishes. Some of the respondents
48
 (10% in this study) mentioned that 
in theory the DCB is very good but in practice it was corrupted. Today a large 
portion, 50%, of the DCB is wasted. Today all contracts are awarded to political 
supporters. All projects are carried out by the relatives of MPs and the supporters. 
Therefore, the system has become corrupt. Political interference is strong in 
designing and prioritising projects. The GA get transferred if he/she does not comply 
with the political objectives (Fieldwork, November 2007-February 2008). Although 
the system has been in place more than 30 years, there has been no review done by 
the Ministry of Finance and Planning.  
 
 
 
                                                 
48
 In this case the respondents are to be anonymous. 
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5.3.5 District Minister (DM) System -1978 
 
The other reform attempt was the introduction of DMs in 1977 by the UNP which 
came into power with a landmark victory of five-sixths of the total number of seats in 
Parliament. According to Leitan (1979, p. 258),  
A major aim of this system was the coordination of all development activities within the 
district by the district minister who would act as the connecting link between the central 
government and the district and ensure that development work decided by the 
government for the districts would be carried out efficiently and smoothly.   
 
In order to facilitate this reform the government re-wrote the Constitution. A 
Presidential form of government was introduced. Article 45 (1) of the Constitution 
gave the President power to appoint ministers who are not members of the Cabinet, 
The President may, from time to time, in consultation with the Prime Minister where he 
considers such consultation to be necessary – (a) appoint from among Members of 
Parliament, Ministers who shall not be members of the Cabinet of Ministers and (b) 
determine the assignment of subjects and functions to, and the ministries, if any, which 
are to be in charge of, such ministers. (2) The President may at any time change any 
appointment or assignment made under (1) of this article. (3) Every minister appointed 
this article shall be responsible and answerable to the Cabinet of Ministers and to 
Parliament (The Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978).  
 
This is the main innovation of this Constitution to accommodate the DMs. 
Accordingly, after promulgation of the Second Republican Constitution 22 DMs 
were appointed, in October 1978, one for each district except for Jaffna and 
Mullaitivu, which were filled a little later. All of them were first timers to the 
Parliament (Wijeweera, 1988). As such, the DM system replaced the former DPAs. 
 
However, the functions of the DMs were not clearly demarcated. Similar to the 
situation in the DPA system, ―functions were left open, wide and flexible, under the 
broad understanding of coordination‖ (Wijeweera, 1988, p.154). According to 
Wijeweera (1988), at the outset, the President informed the DMs that they should 
work in close consultation and in liaison with the line Ministers and act according to 
programmes approved by them. This meant they had to depend on central 
Government Ministers. Their level of effectiveness became a function of the 
relationship they had with the individual minister. In this sense the powers and 
functions of the individual DM could be varied, wide or narrow, from district to 
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district on his administrative capability and wisdom. Against this background, the 
DMs acted merely as coordinators similar to DPAs.  
  
In most ways, this system was not different from the previous DPA system. The only 
dissimilarity was that the DMs had the legitimate authority under the Constitution to 
act in the district level as special ministers, which they had lacked under the DPA 
system which had informal authority from the Prime Minister. This difference had no 
significant impact on their respective roles.   
 
However, both the DPA and DM systems enhanced the political autonomy in the 
district administration while demoralising the bureaucrats at the district level. 
Therefore, in both systems politicians gained at the expense of the bureaucracy. Both 
systems paved the way for encroaching and eroding the legitimate authority and 
discretion of the public servants, thus continuing relentless politicisation of the 
public administration. The adverse effects of this political meddling were highlighted 
in the seminar organised by the SLIDA. The participants commented that; 
Political interference in day today matters of administration has tended to erode the 
authority of the heads of departments and supervisors thereby destroying their enthusiasm 
and will to work. It is useless delegating duties unless at the same time sufficient 
authority is conferred to carry out such duties without fear or favour. Political meddling is 
this sort takes away the required authority formally delegated and thus undermines the 
process of delegation without which no administration can carry on (Wijeweera, 1988, p. 
159).  
 
Similarly, the DM system did not attract the Tamil minority who continuously 
demanded more power to carry out their tasks in the North and East where the 
majority of Tamils live because the appointments of DMs were not done in a proper 
manner to represent the local people. For example, the MP of Dambadeniya 
(Sinhalese MP - U.B. Wijekoon) was appointed as the DM for the Jaffna district 
where Tamils were the majority. So Tamils thought there was no point in having this 
system if they cannot elect their own DM. In response to these agitations the 
government strengthened the DM system by introducing elected councils in the early 
1980s which will be discussed later. 
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5.3.6 Re-establishment of the Public Service Commission 
(PSC) - 1978 
 
The Constitutional reform in 1978 made provision for the re-establishment of the 
PSC which was abolished by the 1972 Constitution. However, powers vested in the 
Cabinet of Ministers by the 1972 Constitution on appointment, transfer, dismissal 
and disciplinary control over the public servants were not changed. The Cabinet 
chaired by the President retained the power in respect of higher grade officers such 
as ‗Heads of Departments‘ but it delegated its powers on ‗other public officials‘ to 
the PSC (Article 55(3)). The appointments of Secretaries in Ministries were on the 
sole discretion of the President as mentioned before.  
 
This situation was described by the former Secretary to the Prime Minister Bradman 
Weerakoon (1956-1970, 2001-2004), in an interview:  
The government of 1977 did not want to lose the advantages of 1972 Constitution, and 
they wanted to give the impression that they have done more (Interview, 20.11.2007).  
 
The PSC could sub-delegate its delegated authority, in respect of staff grades, to 
Secretaries of the Ministries and in respect of non-staff
49
 grades to Heads of the 
Departments. The PSC was composed of not less than five members appointed by 
the President for a period of five years, of whom one of the members was nominated 
as the Chairman. The membership of the PSC was disallowed to Members of 
Parliament. Any public officer aggrieved by any order of transfer, appointment, 
dismissal or any other disciplinary matter by a public officer, could appeal to the 
PSC. However, the PSC was not an independent body as it was previously under the 
Order in Council of 1946. It implemented delegated authority of the Cabinet and 
functioned under the Cabinet. Therefore, impartiality of its decisions was not 
guaranteed. 
  
Under Article 59, the Cabinet of Ministers had the power to alter, vary or rescind any 
decisions on appointment, transfer, dismissal or disciplinary order made by the PSC, 
or a public officer under delegated power or any order on appeals made by the PSC, 
                                                 
49
 Non-staff means non-managerial in the SL context. 
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or any transfer order made by a minister. In this sense the final say rested with the 
Cabinet of Ministers, as in the case of the 1972 reform.  
 
Similarly, Cabinet was empowered to determine all matters relating to public officers 
including formulation of principles in making promotions, which was not focussed 
on in the 1972 Constitution. These powers were not delegated to the PSC by the 
Cabinet. On behalf of the Cabinet, these matters were dealt by the Ministry of Public 
Administration.  
 
The other fundamental change in this Constitution when compared to the 1972 
Constitution was the appellate jurisdiction regarding affected public servants against 
decisions by the authorities. Article 55(5) stated that, 
Subject to the jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court under paragraph (1) of Article 
no court or tribunal shall have power or jurisdiction to inquire into, pronounce upon or in 
any manner call in question, any order or decision of the Cabinet of Ministers, a Minister, 
the Public Service Commission, a committee of the Public Service Commission or of a 
public officer, in regard to any matter concerning the appointment, transfer, dismissal or 
disciplinary control of a public officer
50
.  
 
Paragraph (1) of Article 126 stated that, 
The Supreme Court shall have sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine any 
question relating to the infringement or immanent infringement by executive or 
administrative action of any fundamental right or language right. 
 
Thus, the public servants were given the opportunity to appeal against decisions of 
the Cabinet or an individual Minister. The number of appeals was not specified by 
the 1978 Constitution as in the 1972 Constitution, but in practice only one appeal for 
a single case was applied by the PSC. Thus public servants were better off than under 
the 1972 Constitution, even with this limited appellant jurisdiction. This privilege has 
been used by many public officials. The following is an example: 
 
 
 
                                                 
50
 Public officer does not include a member of the Army, Navy, or Air Force. 
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Box 4: A Famous Historic Case of Ministerial Victimisation of a Public Officer    
Source: Weerasooria, 2004, pp. 347-357 
Elmore Perera vs. Major Montagu Jayawickrema, Minister of Public Administration 
(1985) (SL Law Reports p. 285) 
 
Elmore Perera was a Deputy Surveyor General who was seconded to the SLIDA at the 
time when he was maltreated and punished by the Minister of Public Administration on 
a personal animosity, which arose out of a private dispute at a tennis club where the 
Minister regularly played tennis and Perera was the President. The dispute was on a 
rule of the tennis club that restricted each member half an hour‘s play at a time which 
had been introduced to give a fair chance to all members, because there were only a few 
tennis courts. This rule had not been enforced against the Minister because of his 
position, but this changed after Perera became the President.  Perera was warned 
through his superior officer at SLIDA not to interfere with the Minister in playing 
tennis but Perera did not stop. 
  
As a result, Perera was informed that his services at SLIDA (which came under the 
purview of the Minister, Jayawickrema) were no longer required and he was reverted 
back to his original work at the Surveyor General‘s Department and prohibited from 
any lecturing at SLIDA. After a year he was transferred to the ―pool1‖ at the Ministry of 
Public Administration on the grounds of inefficiency and incompetence. 
Simultaneously, he was also placed on compulsory leave and asked to show cause 
within 30 days as to why he should not be retired on the grounds of general 
inefficiency. Eventually, on 2
nd
 October 1984, Perera was informed in writing by the 
Secretary of the Ministry of Public Administration that he had been compulsorily 
retired with immediate effect from public service on the ground of inefficiency. At that 
time, he had another nine more years of service before normal retirement. 
 
Since all the disciplinary actions against him were based on the Minister‘s personal 
grudge, Perera sought Supreme Court intervention for redress for breach of 
fundamental rights, under Articles 12(1) and 14(1g) of the Constitution. Article 12(1) 
states,  
All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law.  
Article 14 (1g) states:  
Every citizen is entitled to the freedom to engage by himself or in association with 
others in any lawful occupation, profession, trade, business or enterprise.  
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Although Perera sought redress under Article 14(1, g), at the hearing his lawyer 
argued entirely on breach of Article 12(1).   
 
A minority of the SC (three out of nine, including the Chief Justice) decided that 
Perera was entitled to be reinstated with compensation. However, the majority did 
not believe that Perera proved any similar discrimination in the public service. 
Accordingly, his case was dismissed on technical legal grounds but all judges held 
that: 
They regretted the way Perera was treated by all: the Minister and Secretary, of 
the Ministry of Public Administration, the Secretary of the Ministry of 
Land.
51
and the Survey General, 
 
The Minister had acted wrongfully in his personal anger over the dispute, which 
has nothing to do with Perera‘s work and conduct as a public servant, 
 
All the disciplinary steps taken against Perera by SLIDA and the two Ministries 
were illegitimate and revealed a grave miscarriage of justice resulting in palpable 
abuse of power by top officials, 
 
Perera‘s compulsory retirement for inefficiency was improper because the 
procedure was not followed. It was subjective, unreasonable, unjustifiable and 
not in good faith, and  
 
The Secretary, Ministry of Public Administration, had misused the powers 
delegated to him by the Cabinet in exercising disciplinary control over the 
petitioner as a public servant and wrongfully terminated his service prematurely. 
The various steps taken to punish Perera, who was innocent of any wrongdoing 
as a public officer, constituted a grave injustice.   
 
                                                 
51
 Survey Department where Perera worked came under the Ministry of Lands at that time. On any 
matter a public officer should communicate with the Ministry of Public Administration through the 
Head of Department, and the Secretary of the relevant Ministry.   
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This is only one case out of so many others which clearly shows how public officers 
were affected and suffered under unlawful decisions and punishments by the 
authorities and how politicians and top officials used the system to abuse power.  
 
5.3.7 District Development Councils (DDCs)
 52
- 1980 
 
Another reform attempt during the 1980s by the UNP government was the 
establishment of DDCs to give teeth to DMs already in existence and to meet Tamil 
interests.  
 
There had been several previous attempts (Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact in 
1957, District Council Bill in 1960, and Senanayaka-Chelvanakam Pact in 1965) to 
accommodate Tamils‘ interest (Wriggins, 1982). All failed due to resistance from the 
majority. The introduction of DDCs was the fourth attempt, and only one out of nine 
Commissioners on the Presidential Commission of 1979 favoured the government 
proposal.  
 
Dr. H.A.P. Abeywardene, former GA, commented on this commission, 
Presidential Commission on Development Council - Tennakoon Commission, wanted to 
establish Rural Councils in place of the village and Town councils. They identified 269 
units. There were differences in finalisation of the report arising out of political 
differences and class differences, that type of parochial reasons. The President did not 
want to have ‗rural councils‘. He wanted to give those powers also to DDC. The 
Commission in their report recommended against it. Seven out of nine members including 
the chairman said, this is not workable and not reasonable to combine the local 
government functions with the central government functions, therefore they are not 
recommending it.  One member i.e. A.J. Wilson didn‘t sign and Neelan Cheruchelvam 
supported the idea, signed it saying that this is the ideal. The President selected the one 
person‘s recommendation and accepted. The prestigious village councils which had been 
in the country for centuries were abolished with one stroke of pen (Interview, 15.02. 
2008). 
 
Nevertheless, the government passed the DDC Act in 1980 and the DDCs were 
established in 1981 (De Silva, 1993; Matthews, 1982).  
 
                                                 
52
 ‗DDC‘ connotation is also used in the previous section to describe Divisional Development 
Councils. 
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Thus, the DDCs took over the functions of existing village and town councils. The 
DDC was composed of the District Minister, an elected Chairman and a Council. As 
mentioned, the DM was appointed by the President and he was not always from the 
district of which he was a MP (Ministry of Local Government Housing and 
Construction, 1981). A key feature of the DDC was that they were composed of 
elected MPs from the district (Ex-Officio members) and elected councillors (elected 
members). 
   
Each Council had an Executive Committee which was comparable to a mini cabinet 
(Ministry of Local Government, 1981). It was composed of a Chairman and two 
other members appointed by the Minister of Local Government in consultation with 
both the Chairman and DM with the approval of the President (Matthews, 1982). 
This Committee was headed by the DM. The main purpose of this Committee was to 
reduce any conflict over development activities between the DM (a Presidential 
appointee) and the DDC (which was popularly elected) (Wriggins, 1982). The 
Committee was responsible for carrying out executive functions of the district while 
the DDC as a whole engaged in legislative tasks. Therefore, the DDC had to depend 
on the Executive Committee in preparing and implementing annual District 
Development Plans, for which funds were provided by the central government, and 
over fifteen development functions in consultation with the relevant line ministries. 
This created room for controversy.  
 
In order to assist the DDCs Gramodaya Mandalayas (GMs) and Pradeshiya 
Mandalyas (PMs) were established. The GMs were composed of Chairmen of 
voluntary organisations at village level recognised by the State and public officials at 
village level, while the PMs were composed of the Chairmen of GMs and 
government officials within the AGA division. The Chairmen of PMs were elected 
from among these representatives. The PMs decided the priorities of development 
proposals recommended by the GMs and referred them to the DDCs (Ministry of 
Local Government, 1981). According to Dr. Abeywardene, former GA, ―as a result, 
Voluntary Organisations came up overnight, like mushrooms‖ (Interview, 
15.02.2008). 
 
 174 
In the initial stage these DDCs were received by the locals with a lack of enthusiasm, 
but the DMs and Chairmen made them effective, even in the conflict areas in the 
North and East (De Silva, 1993). However, this lasted for only a short time. A lack of 
finance and authority for development work were the main complaints, especially 
from the DDCs in the North. The Tamil party claimed that ―the DDC did not go far 
enough in decentralising power from the centre to the periphery in relation to the 
problem of the Tamil community‖ (Wijeweera, 1988, p. 187). Therefore, DDCs in 
Tamil Districts became inoperative soon after they were established. They frequently 
demanded more powers.  
 
The other districts too did not welcome DDCs as a real need. This was mainly 
because there was less autonomy for their operation. For example, in all sections of 
the DDC law there was a need to consult central ministries on matters of the DDC. 
For example, Section 35 of the DDC Act required the DDCs to consult line 
ministries in the formulation of the district plan. Section 44 required the DDCs to get 
the final plan approved by the Minister of Local Government, Housing and 
Construction (―Development Councils Act No. 35‖, 1980). Section 25 and 27 
required the Council to get the approval from the Minister of Local Government with 
the concurrence of the Minister of Finance to raise taxes, rates or other charges 
locally, to borrow within SL, and to negotiate loans directly with external lenders. 
There was also a provision for the dissolution of an Executive Committee that failed 
to relate to the appointed DM. So DM (as an extension of the presidential arm) had 
powers to dissolve the council if there was evidence it was incompetent (Matthews, 
1982, p. 1121). Thus, sabotage from the centre was inevitable (Wriggins, 1982).   
  
The involvement of the DM in the Executive Committee of the DDC was another 
issue because he was the representative of the Central Government in a local body. 
Another weakness was the lack of genuine people‘s participation in formulation of 
the development plan. The three-tiered structures, consisting of the GMs at village 
level, PMs at division level and DDC at district level, theoretically created a sound 
base for people‘s participation, but some research showed that it did not happen in 
practice (only 7 out of 355 proposals submitted by the GMs reached DDC via the 
PMs) (Gamage, n.d). Most GMs, therefore, later became inoperative for this reason. 
Further, the local NGOs had been dominated by the village elites so they did not 
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genuinely represent the ordinary people. Another problem was that DDCs were 
highly dominated by the ex-officio members, MPs. The continuous dependence on 
the centre, along with these problems, made DDCs ‗a dead letter‘ (Wijeweera, 1988).   
However, the politicians gained much power in the district administration over the 
bureaucrats with the establishment of the DDCs. The GA was held accountable for 
the political decisions in the district as the Chief Accounting Officer. Although, the 
village and town councils were abolished, their staff were absorbed into the new 
setup; therefore the staff were not badly affected by the reforms. But they were under 
the direct control of the political leadership.  
 
All these decentralisation efforts discussed so far, DPA, DM, and DDC have several 
implications on public administration which will be analysed further in Chapter 7.  
They created complex problems in the political and administrative arenas and 
produced negative outcomes. 
 
5.3.8 Privatisation 
 
Another administrative reform initiative of the 1980s was the privatisation of PEs. In 
the SL context, privatisation is the ‗transfer of management and/or ownership of 
property from the public sector to private sector‘ (Central Bank, 1998, p. 215). It was 
initiated by the UNP government during 1977-1994. The fiscal difficulty and other 
economic drawbacks called for radical changes to the economy (Dunham & 
Kelegama, 1997). The key motivations for privatisation included improving 
efficiency and productivity through private capital investment, technology, and 
expertise. It also intended to reduce the burden of the government budget (Central 
Bank, 1998) and to maximise revenue to the government from assets sales in order to 
repay public debt.  
 
The government had taken several steps from the early 1980s in preparation for 
privatisation. These steps were: abolishing public sector monopolies, improving 
commercial orientation for PEs, transferring management of some of loss making 
PEs to the private sector under a contract system, and closing down some non-viable 
enterprises (Salih, 2000). In preparation for privatisation, the economy was reformed 
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in 1977. Accordingly, the 1977 budget devalued the rupee and introduced a managed 
float for the exchange rate, removed qualitative restrictions on imports and relaxed 
rules on domestic pricing. Interest rates were also adjusted (Adam et al., 1992, p. 
300). In addition, in 1979 trade liberalisation was introduced in the industrial sector. 
Furthermore, in order to stimulate non-traditional export goods and facilitate trade 
liberalisation, the Greater Colombo Economic Commission and Free Trade Zone 
were established (Central Bank, 1998). In 1987, the Public Enterprises Division was 
established in the Ministry of Finance and enacted the Public Corporations Act No. 
22 of 1987 for the conversion of government owned business units into public 
corporations and the Public Company Act No. 23 of 1987 for the conversion of 
public corporations and government owned business units into public companies 
(Kelegama, 1992, Salih, 2000). 
5.3.8.1 Reform Experience  
 
Initially, the privatisation programme was conducted in an ad hoc manner. The 
responsibilities for handling the privatisation process have undergone many changes 
until 1995. A number of line ministries carried out specific reform measures in their 
PEs during 1980-1986 before the policy was officially declared in 1987. For 
example, the privatisation of industrial enterprises was carried out by the Ministry of 
Industries (selling of SL Rubber Manufacturing Company, Co-operative Whole Sale 
Enterprise, Noorani Tiles Ltd., Shaw Industries Ltd., and Vijaya Tiles Ltd), while 
textile sector divestures were dealt with by the Ministry of Textiles (Adam et al., 
1992). These companies collapsed soon after the sale (Public Enterprises Reforms 
Commission, 2004). The Commercialisation Division of the Ministry of Finance also 
did some of the divestiture. In 1996, the Public Enterprises Reform Commission was 
established by enacting the Public Enterprises Reform Act No. 1 of 1996. In 1996, 
the government enacted the Rehabilitation of Public Enterprises Act No. 29 of 1996 
due to several failures. 
 
After the policy of privatisation was officially declared, the first candidate for 
privatisation was United Motors Ltd. (Adam et al., 1992). The transaction was 
handled by the Commercialisation Division (CD) of the Ministry of Finance. In 
1989, United Motors was converted into a public Company, the United Motors 
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Lanka Ltd., with a share capital of SLRs 100 million (SLRs 10, a share) through 
public offering. However, the government could sell only 3.3 million shares, of 
which 75% were taken up by two state-owned insurance companies. However, 5.7 
million was left with the underwriters, the majority of whom were government-
owned institutions (Adam et al., 1992, p. 310). Ninety-five percent of shares were 
once again in the hands of the public sector. In this way, the first attempt of 
privatisation did not make any substantial change in the ownership as expected in 
theory. Thus, it was unable to achieve the anticipated objective of privatisation.      
 
Nevertheless, many other public enterprises which were not economically viable or 
could not be made viable were closed down or sold to the private sector. Moreover, 
as of 2004, around 100 enterprises were transferred to private hands (Central Bank, 
1998).  
 
In the SL context, the legislation and policies that were introduced did not fully 
specify the details of the methods of privatisation. Therefore, different methods were 
used. SL experience shows that it was more reliant on asset sales, management 
contracts and contracting out public services over the other forms of privatisation. In 
addition, public floats were also used in order to have a wider base for share capital.  
There is some evidence that it used employee buyout in a very limited way, to please 
workers and to avoid resistance.  
5.3.8.2 Regulatory Framework   
 
The liberalisation of the economy and the subsequent reform in the PEs created a 
need for a competition policy and regulatory mechanisms to safeguard the interests 
of the consumers and competitors in the market. Although the need was urgent there 
was no enthusiasm from the policy makers to formulate effective competition policy 
and regulatory systems to assist the reform process. In the area of regulation the Fair 
Trading Commission was established in 1987, a decade after the trade liberalisation 
(Knight-John, 2002). The competition policy is yet to be formulated. However, the 
government has attempted to formulate sector specific regulatory principles, for 
example, the Telecommunication Act No. 25 of 1991, and the National Transport 
Act No. 30 of 1988. Accordingly, two sector specific regulatory bodies were 
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established: Telecommunication Regulatory Commission and National Transport 
Commission. Neither of them was independent or effective.  
 
The impact of privatisation on the government and the economy as a whole is mixed. 
The following section discusses the reforms outcome in detail.     
5.3.8.3 Reform Outcomes     
       
Economic Outcomes   
 
Privatisation has brought several positive and many negative outcomes to the 
economy. According to the Central Bank (1998, p. 219), there were many advantages 
in privatisation: reduced burden on the government budget and the size of public 
debt, and improved efficiency, productivity and management. In addition, employees 
became shareholders, and the employees who had voluntarily retired received 
attractive compensation benefits. Furthermore, several privatised PEs were 
purchased by reputed foreign companies helping to improve the foreign investor 
confidence in SL. However, the negative effects were ignored by the Central Bank in 
this report.  
Table 8 below illustrates the privatisation income as a percentage of the GDP in 
some selected years. Accordingly, the divestiture proceeds gradually increased from 
1990 onwards until 1997 and then dropped considerably. The highest amount was 
recorded in 1997. However, the overall net proceeds as a percentage of the GDP are 
very small, below 1%, except in 1997. Nevertheless, many PEs are currently 
operating in various sectors in the economy, around 221 accumulating losses which 
were around 2% of GDP in 2000 (Knight-John & Athukorala, 2005). This indicates 
that the burden of PEs as a percentage of GDP is higher than the revenue gained 
through the privatisation proceeds. In addition, this data shows that whatever the 
merits and demerits of privatisation, it has not improved the financial position of the 
government to a significant level. 
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Table 8: Gross and Net Privatisation Proceeds as a Percentage of GDP, Selected 
Years 
 
Year Gross proceeds     
(SLRs  million)  
Gross Proceeds 
(percent of GDP) 
Net Proceeds (GDP) 
1990 
1992 
1993 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
2001 
   588.3 
4,423.5 
4918.6 
3,124.6 
4,542.0 
        22,396.0 
4,516.0 
8,601.0 
0.2 
1.1 
0.9 
0.5 
0.6 
2.5 
0.4 
0.6 
0.10 
0.55 
0.45 
0.25 
0.30 
1.25 
0.20 
0.30 
Source: Knight-John and Athukorala, 2005, p.399 
One of the positive effects of privatisation was that it generated permanent revenue 
sources by way of lease rent, income tax, and dividends while reducing the subsidies 
to loss-making enterprises (Salih, 2000). Furthermore, some of the privatised firms 
also benefited from technological upgrading and new capital. For example, in the 
plantation sector, since 1999, average capital investment was Rs.500 million per 
company. SL Telecom has invested more than 40 billion in developing 
communication infrastructure during 1996-2001. Colombo Gas Company Ltd. 
(Shell) has invested around 7 billion after privatisation (Knight-John and Athukorala, 
2005). However, a study conducted by the World Bank on infrastructure privatisation 
in 2000-2001 illustrated that capital investments, measured in terms of capital 
expenditure to sales and capital expenditure to assets have decreased after 
privatisation. Table 9 below indicates that except for the Telecom, Colombo Gas 
Company and Air Lines, capital investments to sale have dropped after privatisation. 
In regard to capital expenditure to assets, all three companies have failed to adhere 
even to the status quo. Therefore, in order to make a general judgment there should 
be an overall inquiry.  
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Table 9: Capital Investment in Selected Privatised Companies  
 
Company Pre-privatisation       
(mean) 
Post-privatisation 
(mean) 
Change (mean) 
SL Telecom Ltd 
Capital expenditure to sales 
Capital expenditure to assets 
 
0.670 
1.420 
 
0.980 
1.050 
 
0.310 
-0.370 
Colombo Gas Company Ltd 
Capital expenditure to sales 
Capital expenditure to assets 
 
0.386 
0.180 
 
0.051 
0.060 
 
-0.335 
-0.120 
SL Air Lines 
Capital expenditure to sales 
Capital expenditure to assets 
 
0.386 
0.179 
 
0.089 
0.059 
 
-0.297 
-0.120 
Source: World Bank, 2001 (as cited in Knight-John & Athukorala, 2005, p. 403)  
Nevertheless, the impacts of reform on these industries and the economy in general 
have been considerable. With regard to telecommunications, the SLT has been one of 
the key players in the economic growth in recent years. Its annual growth rates were 
23.1% in 2001, 19.3% in 2002, and 24.5% in 2003 (Knight-John & Athukorala, 
2005, p. 43).  Its tele-density in the fixed market rose from 0.73 in 1991 to 5.1 in 
2004 while mobile penetration increased from 0.01 to 11.4 over the same period.  
Privatisation also contributed to the development of the Colombo Stock Exchange by 
bringing in 12 new companies into the stock exchange, and increasing the number of 
listed companies from 226 to 236 during 1996-1997 (Salih, 2000, p. 184). This was 
mainly driven due to the foreign investment attracted by privatisation.  
Despite some positive effects, there were more negative effects on the economy due 
to privatisation. According to the Annual Report of the Public Enterprises Reform 
Commission in 2004, out of 98 privatised PEs, 17 divestitures collapsed after 
privatisation. In terms of proportions about 16% of the privatised companies have 
failed to continue their services and closed down, leaving their employees abandoned 
without compensation or even salaries for many months. Some of these unsuccessful 
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ventures were rehabilitated in 1997 at the cost of SLRs 1 billion (Knight-John & 
Athukorala, 2005).  
In addition, the government has given exclusive concessions (tax holidays, income 
tax deviations, and price increases) to several privatised firms, for example Telecom, 
Shell Gas and Prima. This hindered the objective of privatisation. The economy, 
consumers, and competitors were all negatively affected due to this situation. In 
addition, the lack of effective regulatory mechanisms and a general competition 
policy prevented the effective operation of privatisation. If these mechanisms were 
organised earlier, the economy, consumers, input suppliers and general public would 
have been better off from the privatisation. 
Another negative effect was that the Government under-priced shares of the firms 
with a view to promoting popular participation in the privatisation programme to 
minimise new investors‘ financial risk, and to avoid over-burdening the domestic 
capital market.  This gave the government a high cost because share prices of many 
privatised firms increased soon after privatisation (Knight-John & Athukorala, 2005). 
This situation left a negative view about privatisation in people‘s minds. 
The recent COPE report, discussed in Chapter 4, investigated many irregularities in 
the privatisation process. The most controversial discoveries of the COPE were the 
sale of shares in SL Insurance Corporation and Lanka Marine Services Ltd (a 
bunkering firm attached to the state-owned Ceylon Petroleum Corporation) to SL 
conglomerate John Keels Holdings (JKH) in 2002. Since the government did not take 
any action against these incidents, a leftist former MP and Present Senior Advisor to 
the President, Vasudeva Nanayakkara, as a private citizen, filed fundamental rights 
cases in the SC. 
 
In the Lanka Marine case the former Chairman of the Public Enterprises Reform 
Commission and the Secretary to the Treasury, Dr. P.B. Jayasundara, was found 
guilty of neglecting to act in the interest of the government. The SC ruled that he 
acted arbitrarily and exceeded his authority. The Court also found that JKH 
Chairman, Susantha Rathnayaka and Jayasundara had worked in collusion to give 
illegal advantages to JKH adverse to the public interest (―SL rocked‖, 2008). The 
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Court said the entire privatisation exercise was flawed and was against the liberalised 
plan recommended by the Cabinet. 
 
The SC ordered Dr. Jayasundara to pay SLRs. 500,000 (which is the highest amount 
of compensation to the State ever in a fundamental rights case) on 21
st
 July, 2008, in 
relation to the transaction of Lanka Marine Ltd. This led to a serious ethical issue: 
Dr. Jayasundara as a civil servant who had been fined by a court of law. This was 
highlighted by the same former MP, Vasudeva Nanayakkara. His lawyers sent out a 
Letter of Notice to the Central Bank Governor with regard to Jayasundera‘s 
continuation on the Monetary Board in the light of the adverse judgment, because 
under Monetary Law Act No. 32 of 2002, the Treasury Secretary is a member of the 
Board. Eventually, Dr. Jayasundara under pressure tendered his resignation to the 
President on 28
th
 July, 2008 but it was only accepted on the 17
th
 September, 2008 in 
advance of the Parliamentary debate on the matter scheduled to be held on the 23
rd
, 
September. However, to date this is the only officer to be fined guilty in relation to  
privatisation matters.  
 
Similarly, the SC found irregularities in the privatisation of the SL Insurance 
Corporation.  The Court declared the privatisation null and void, claimed it had been 
privatised contrary to tender procedures during the UNP government in 2002. The 
Court directed that all shares sold to the private entrepreneur be vested back with the 
General Treasury (―Outgoing Sri Lankan‖, 2009).  
In addition, the former President Kumaratunga was fined in relation to privatisation 
of ‗Water‘s Edge‖ by the SC and the buyer was ordered to return the property to the 
government. The Court mentioned that the President had misled the Cabinet by 
indicating the property would be used for a public golf course but it was sold to a 
person close to the President. In all these cases the country lost millions. Vasudeva 
Nanayakkara requested the government to appoint a Presidential Commission to 
investigate irregularities in another 41 past privatisation deals. He mentioned that he 
has evidence on irregularities of those privatisation deals where the country lost 
billions. These actions have far-reaching adverse implications on public 
administration today. 
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Effects on Employees 
 
There are several positive effects on employees: employees became shareholders of 
the privatised companies, for example, United Motors Ltd and Buhari Hotel Ltd had 
given 5% and 80% of shares to employees respectively (Knight-John & Athukorala, 
2005; Salih, 2000). The other merit was that employees enjoyed windfall capital 
gains on shares due to undervaluation in the early stage of privatisation. For example, 
Ceylon Oxygen Ltd and Shell Gas Ltd share prices increased after privatisation 
(Salih, 2000, p. 186).  Employees who voluntarily retired before the age of retirement 
received attractive packages of benefits, such as Lanka Loha (a key industry in steel) 
(Salih, 2000).  
 
The main negative effect was employee redundancy. Since most PEs were 
overstaffed when privatisation was introduced, a considerable number of employees 
lost their jobs. A study done by Knight-John and Athukorala (2005) illustrates that 
many workers lost their jobs due to privatisation. Table 9 provides direct 
employment effects of privatisation for selected companies. According to Table 10 
the SL Telecom, SL Air Lines and National Development Bank have increased their 
staff after privatisation whereas others have reduced. The Colombo Gas Company 
reduced their staff by two-thirds and the Lanka Ceramics Ltd reduced their staff by 
half.  
 
Table 10: Direct Employment Effects of Privatisation for Selected Companies 
(Average Employment) 
 
Company   Year 
 
    Before 
privatisation 
    After 
privatisation 
Change 
SL Telecom 1997 7,599 8,499 900 
SL Air Lines 1998 4,358 4,908 550 
Colombo Gas Company Ltd. 1995 646 292 -354 
National Development Bank 1993 188 311 123 
Caltex Lanka Ltd 1994 320 275 -45 
Lanka Salt Ltd 1997 1,562 560 -1,002 
Total  38,786 33,367 -5419 
Source: Knight-John & Athukorala, 2005, p. 413 
 
The other negative effect was that most of the redundant employees were unable to 
find alternative jobs or sustainable income sources due to non-expansion of the 
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economy. This was particularly serious for non-skilled workers. In most cases the 
compensation package was not sufficient to reduce the welfare losses of the 
employees (Salih, 2000).  Furthermore, ―due to insufficient compensation and the 
non availability of sustainable alternative income avenues, retrenched workers faced 
a high psychological sense of dislocation and high susceptibility of old age poverty 
since gratuity has already been spent for other family commitments‖ (Salih, 2000, p. 
193). 
  
Essentially, there were few positive effects of reform for employees. Some of them 
became shareholders and enjoyed lucrative gains on shares and obtained attractive 
severance benefits.  However, there was no uniformity in this process. More often, 
many employees lost jobs, received inadequate compensation and were unable to 
find alternative jobs. Employees suffered from a psychological sense of dislocation, 
and in few cases their remunerations were also curtailed.               
 
Effects on Investors 
 
Overall, privatisation had positive results for investors. In some cases investors 
gained exclusive rights in the market place which paved the way for maximisation of 
profits; for example, In the SL Telecom privatisation, Nippon Telegraph and 
Telephone Corporation (NTT) received a five year monopoly to provide international 
telephony and the Colombo Gas company also received a five year monopoly 
(Knight-John & Athukorala, 2005, p. 405). The motive for this was to attract 
investors and make firm investment commitments for infrastructure development. In 
addition to exclusive rights, some investors benefited from tax holidays on income 
tax; for example, expatriate staff at Prima Flour Company Ltd were exempt from 
income tax for five years and enjoyed tax holidays for twenty years (Knight-John & 
Athukorala, 2005) as in Lanka Marine Ltd privatisation. In the case of air lines, the 
buyer, Emirates Air Lines was given the opportunity to pay  US$ 45 million out of 
US$ 70 million upfront, and the balance to be paid over 30 months (Knight-John & 
Athukorala, 2005).  
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In an interview, Daya Liyanage, Head of the National Procurement Agency, said, 
SL is the only country which gave government loans to private sector to buy Public 
entities (Interview, 07.01.2008). 
Due to exclusive rights granted to the incumbent firms with the privatisation, other 
investors were affected, for example, competitive investors in the 
telecommunications sector (Knight-John & Athukorala, 2005). Overall competition 
in the country is limited due to lack of competition policy and lack of effective 
regulatory mechanisms, along with the protection of monopoly. 
 
In summary, the investors benefited the most from privatisation and in a variety of 
ways. In the utility sector, due to large investments, the investors gained exclusive 
rights over the others including monopoly power in some markets, tax holidays, and 
income tax exemption. In the privatisation of Air Lines the investor gained lucrative 
incentives. However, a group of investors were negatively affected due to exclusive 
rights of the incumbent operators.  
 
Effects on General Public/Customers 
       
     Effects of privatisation on the public are mixed. There were a few benefits to the 
public in general. They benefited from the share ownership although this was mainly 
confined to the wealthy urban population (Knight-John & Athukorala, 2005). The 
public have the chance of receiving services quickly, without delays as in the case of 
PEs, for example, the telecommunication department took over one year to establish 
a land line, but after privatisation it was reduced to a couple of days. Similarly, 
consumers now have many choices due to the availability of a variety of goods and 
services in the market such as mobile phones. Due to the injection of new capital and 
technology through privatisation, consumers have better quality products which have 
improved their living standard to a certain extent.  
 
However, privatisation also has some negative effects on the public. Removal of 
state subsidies and price increases have adversely affected consumers, for example, 
bus transport (Knight-John & Athukorala, 2005). Underpriced shares of the 
privatised firms have caused tax payers to lose out at the expense of new owners. 
Furthermore, due to the exclusive rights granted to some privatised firms, customers 
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suffered from price hikes and non-access, for example, in the SL Telecom 
privatisation the government entered into an agreement with Telecom which allowed 
Telecom to increase the domestic tariff. Accordingly, during 1998-2002 telephone 
charges increased: 1998-25%, 1999-25%, 2000-20%, 2001-15%, 2002-15%.  The 
other fixed telephone operators also followed the same procedure so that the 
consumers were negatively affected (Knight-John & Athukorala, 2005). Similarly, 
gas consumers were also largely negatively affected due to price increases by the gas 
firm after privatisation.  
 
Furthermore, people as the owners of the PEs lost their assets and the ownership due 
to privatisation, without proper compensation by way of fair prices for goods and 
services, or better quality services and products. In addition, in some cases tax 
payers‘ money was spent to rehabilitate some of the privatised firms in the interest of 
their employees.  
  
In summary, despite many failures, PEs reform experience is significant. 
Privatisation was highly pushed to the forefront in the midst of the uncertainty in the 
country, with high tension caused by the ethnic violence in the north and the JVP 
violence in the other parts of the country with many strikes.  Many researchers 
(Kelegama, 1992; Knight-john & Athukorala, 2005; Salih, 2000) have concluded that 
overall the positive outcomes of privatisation outweigh the negative outcomes. 
However, whatever the merits and demerits of the reform, the SL experience shows 
that it was not able to bring remarkable revenue to the government as expected due to 
many flaws in the privatisation process. However, around 221 more public 
enterprises currently drain around 2% of GDP annually for their survival. This 
suggests that future reform in this sector is critical. 
 
5.3.9 Administrative Reform Committee (ARC) 1986/88  
 
As mentioned in the previous section, during the 1980s radical economic reforms had 
been introduced by the UNP government by deregulation, liberalisation and then 
privatisation of PEs in the country.  However, at the early stages, the economic 
reforms were not supported by the administrative reforms in a systematic and 
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conducive way. Having recognised the necessity of administrative reform in support 
of the economic reform, and to improve the efficiency in the public sector, the ARC 
was constituted by the President in October 1986, consisting of eight members with 
outstanding experience in public sector management.  
 
This committee suggested an overhaul of public administration, but those 
recommendations were not fully implemented. In fact those recommendations were 
very important from the perspective of this thesis, thus warranting a chapter of their 
own. Hence, the next chapter is devoted to discussing this initiative in detail and the 
reasons behind the non-implementation of its recommendations. 
 
5.3.10 Provincial Council System (PCs) -1989 
 
The establishment of the PCs can be considered as devolution
53
 of powers to the 
periphery. The existing DDCs which were discussed earlier in this chapter were 
about to collapse due to lack of autonomy to carry out their functions from their 
inception. However, by September 1982, the ministers of the Central Government 
had delegated some of their powers to DMs just before the Presidential election (De 
Silva, 1993). This did not make any difference to the Tamils who live in the North 
because their DMs were outsiders to them and also Sinhalese MPs. The Tamils want 
their own representative as their DM with more autonomy. Against this backdrop, 
their campaign for regional autonomy became more violent.  
 
The evolution of PCs was totally driven by external elements in President 
Jayewardene‘s second term which began in 1982. In July 1983 the ethnic conflict of 
the country became extreme with the killing of 13 soldiers by the Tamil militants in 
the North
54
 (Singer, 1990). The Sinhalese attacked Tamil shops and homes, and the 
violence spread from Colombo to other parts of the country, culminating in a civil 
war between the government and the military groups in the North and East. The 
conflict gained increasing international attention after this incident. The Tamil 
                                                 
53
 In SL context, devolution means transferring political and administrative decision-making authority 
from central government to elected bodies at lower levels.  
54
 Prior to this time Tamil militants had killed many Sinhalese, Muslims, and robbed banks (Singer, 
1990). 
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militants and refugees acquired ―sympathy, asylum, material benefits, and training in 
neighbouring India, especially in the Indian province in closest proximity to the 
island, Tamilnadu‖ (Shastri, 1992, p. 724).  
 
In particular, the Tamil expatriate and the Tamil Co-ordinating Committee in London 
and similar organisations in the U.S., Canada, and West Germany carried out 
campaigns, supporting ‗Tamil Eelam‘ and opposing the SL police (Matthews, 1982). 
Against this background by 1983, ethnic problem in SL, resulted in the emergence of 
five or more military groups
55
 in the North and East (Marasingha, 1988). According 
to Singer (1990, p. 417);  
After 1983, the Indian Central Government, Indian intelligence (the research analysis 
wing- RAW) and Tamilnadu State Government all supported one or another of these 
militant groups with arms, money, training, and most important of all for a time, safe 
sanctuary
56…Between 1987-89, Indians exploited the hatred of all these groups for each 
other by building up the EPRLF as an indigenous political alternative to LTTE, and they 
have even used its people to help hunt and kill LTTE members  
 
The LTTE started to kill members of the other Tamil military groups, and drive 
Sinhalese out from the East and thousands of innocent people were killed. The LTTE 
wanted to be the sole Tamil militant group and rule their own independent country 
(Singer, 1990).  
 
From 1983, SL security forces were well-trained and professionally developed, 
increasing their size by 250%. They counter-attacked LTTE bases in the North 
(Singer, 1990). Tamil residents in Tamilnadu (India) sympathise with Tamils in SL 
so that any attack on SL Tamils was seen as an attack on all Tamils, so the Indian 
Government felt that they had to intervene to solve the problem. The Indian Prime 
Minister, Rajiv Gandhi pressed the Tamil militants to talk to the SL government for a 
peaceful solution. 
                                                 
55
 The five organised military Tamil groups were People‘s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam 
(PLOTE), Tamil Eelam Army (TEA), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), - these three 
were joined together and formed Eelam People‘s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). The other 
two groups are Liberation of Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of 
Students (EROS). They did not join into one single group but formed a common military axis and 
thereby served each other to complement the joint war effort. In addition, to this there was a non-
combative research unit set up in Madras called Protection of Tamils from Genocide (PROTEG)  
(Marasingha, 1988, p. 564). 
56
 See Singer (1990). He personally met with all the major militant groups in Madras in both 1985 and 
1987 and they confirmed this was true although India denied it. 
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As a result, in late 1983 until end of 1984, the SL government and the representative 
of the Indian government negotiated with the Tamil United Liberation Front for a 
political solution to the problem. By this time they totally rejected the DDCs on the 
ground that they needed ‗traditional homelands‘ (De Silva, 1993). They proposed a 
supra-provincial entity encompassing the Northern and Eastern Provinces. President 
Jayewardene was persuaded to accept it with the support of the Indian 
Representative, but there was no support from the Cabinet and the governing party 
for this proposal (De Silva, 1993). Nevertheless, the government put forward the 
proposal at the All Party Conference. The Muslims strongly disagreed, since they 
would face problems with the dominance of Tamils in the East, because in the East 
Tamils were a minority of the population
57
 (only 40%) (De Silva, 1993). A Buddhist 
opinion was to strengthen the existing DDCs. As such, at the All Party Conference 
on 30
th
 September 1984, a draft Bill was submitted enhancing power of DDCs on a 
wider provincial basis (De Silva, 1993).  The TULF opposed it. The SLFP too did 
not participate at the discussion on the ground that the proposal would diminish the 
unitary structure of the country.  
 
Despite these failures, in December 1984, the government again presented a draft 
Bill on a district and provincial-based administrative system which was again 
rejected by the TULF (De Silva, 1993). However, it is worth mentioning that 
provincial administration was proposed by the Donoughmore Reforms in 1927. This 
was not implemented during that period because transferring governing power from 
the British to the Ceylonese was more crucial at that time.  
 
Nevertheless, the government again started diplomatic negotiations with the Indian 
Government which eventually led to a meeting between President Jayewardene and 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in June 1985 (De Silva, 1993, Rao, 1988). This meeting 
resulted in three months‘ cessation of hostilities and further negotiations with the 
Tamil militants. The negotiations between the SL Government and the LTTE were 
                                                 
57
 Tamils are mostly concentrated in the North. By the time of signing the Accord population in the 
Eastern province consisted of Tamils- 40.9%, Moors – 32.3%, Sinhalese- 21% and Indian Tamils 
1.1%. It is also pointed out that 38.2% of Tamils live outside these two provinces, especially in and 
around Colombo.  
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held in Thimpu, Bhutan in July and August 1985. India acted as mediator but 
negotiations ended with no result (De Silva, 1993). Shortly after, other negotiations 
were held in New Delhi with Indian Government officials and the SL Government 
Officials. Following the Indian Union model was agreed upon. The core of this 
proposal was to establish PCs ―within the framework of the country‘s 
constitutionally-entrenched unitary system‖ (De Silva, 1993, p. 118).  
 
5.3.10.1 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord 
 
Under pressure from India, and the increased violence, death and destruction on all 
sides of the country, President Jayewardene finally signed up the Indo-Sri Lanka 
Accord with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in July 1987 to solve the ethnic problem 
and bring peace to the country by devolution of power (De Silva, 1993; Marasingha, 
1988; Shastri, 1992; Singer, 1991). There was a disagreement with the Accord within 
the ruling UNP itself. The Accord immediately brought huge political repercussions. 
Violence erupted throughout the country in protest of the actions of the President and 
his invitation for Indian military personnel to the Island under the Accord.   
 
The Accord specified obligations for the Indian and SL Governments, but not the 
LTTE since they were not a party to the Accord. Under the Accord the SL 
Government agreed to establish PCs in the nine provinces before 31 December, 1988 
allowing the North and East Provinces to form one administrative unit temporarily, 
and allow people of the Eastern Province to decide whether they preferred to remain 
so linked or whether they wished to be separated, in a referendum to be held before 
31 December 1989. However, the President had the sole discretion to postpone such 
a referendum, so the referendum was never held. It also agreed to recognise ―the 
Northern and Eastern Provinces as areas of historical habitation of SL Tamil-
speaking people‖ while recognising ―SL is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual plural 
society consisting, inter alia of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims (Moors) and Burghers‖ 
.The Indian Government also agreed to provide military assistance on the request of 
the SL Government to implement the Accord, deport all SL separatists from India 
and not let them use India as a sanctuary.  
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Under the Accord, a cessation of hostilities was to take effect all over the country 
within 48 hours of the signing of the Accord, and all arms were to be surrendered by 
militants groups.  The government invited Indian troops to help disarm the militants. 
These will not be discussed here in details since they are out of the scope of this 
study.  
 
Although the necessary legislations were passed: the 13
th
 Amendment to the 
Constitution, the Provincial Councils Act, and Provincial Councils Election Act, the 
LTTE and the JVP violence in all parts of SL did not allow PC elections to be held as 
agreed. However, later PCs were established in 1988 for a period of five years.  The 
SLFP boycotted the election (Shastri, 1992). On the Tamil side some groups, such as 
the EPRLF accepted the system of PCs and contested for the North East Provincial 
Council (NEPC) with the help of Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) (Shastri, 
1992). The LTTE rejected the system as ―inadequate‖ (Rao, 1988). UNP won all PCs 
except NEPC. The Tamil Party, EPRLF, dominated in the NEPC which was 
established in December 1988, later than the others due to security problems (Shastri, 
1992). 
 
The NEPC however, existed until June 1990. During its short life, it struggled to 
acquire more powers. Finally, its administration was taken over by the Government. 
Bradman Weerakoon, former Secretary to Prime Minister (2001-2004), in an 
interview said, 
Most SL governments have shown an extreme reluctance to part with power. Survival is 
paramount for to be in is everything. To be out is to be nothing. This is so even today. 
President Premadasa saw that EPRLF and IPKF get together try to dominate power in the 
North. The IPKF marginalised LTTE, In the meantime, Wardaraja (Chief Minister 
NEPC) declared ‗Unilateral Declaration of Independent‘ in 1990 and by March President 
Premadasa dissolved the NEPC on the ground that it violated the Constitution (Interview, 
30.11.2007). 
  
Accordingly, the PC system failed from the start. It should not be expected that any 
newly-created organisation will be fully functioning within a year or two. 
Furthermore, this system was too radical for SL and the initiation period occurred 
during a time of political instability. The problem with J.V.P was similar to LTTE; 
no government could concentrate on devolution to be effective in such environment. 
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The EPRLF was in a hurry to acquire powers. Until now, the North PC has been 
operated by the government officials.  
 
In summary, the PCs were established as a means of devolving of administrative and 
political power to the periphery, mainly with a view to solve the ethnic problem 
which lasted three decades in the country. The other fundamental purpose was to 
make the government‘s development effort meaningful and relevant to the needs of 
the people by making them partners in the development effort (Ministry of Public 
Administration, Provincial Councils, and Home Affairs, 1990). However, the main 
purpose has not been achieved due to multiple reasons. Regardless of any degree in 
devolving power people view PCs as ‗white elephants,‘ another layer for 
bureaucratic and political malpractices and corruption. People‘s problems still 
remain with the people as discussed in the previous chapter. Although there is no 
need for decentralisation as in India because SL is a small country, there is a political 
need to do so. However, it seems that there is no national level consensus or a policy 
on devolution and political solution to Tamil strife even after the war is over in May 
2009.  
 
5.3.11 Introduction of Performance Appraisal (PA) System 
 
The other reform initiative was the introduction of PA system by the SLFP 
government (1994-2000) in 1998. In the SLPS, personnel decisions such as 
employee promotions, salary increments, important postings, training and so on, 
were subjective judgements and were based merely on the recommendation of the 
Head of the Department. In particular, the recommendations for promotions were 
made in the form of confidential reports, hence the employee had no chance to see 
how the Head of the Department was evaluating him/her. In most cases these 
evaluations were mainly based on personal attributes, not purely on good or bad 
performance (personal observations). The lack of a proper mechanism for the 
evaluation of performance, and its integration with other elements in human resource 
management, have contributed to lowering performance standards, reducing morale, 
causing inefficiency in service delivery, delays, corruption, and increasing frustration 
within the public service. Therefore, it was felt that instead of making these decisions 
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based on supervisors‘ subjective judgements, a well documented assessment can help 
the management to make reasonable and sound personal decisions. 
 
The other reason underpinning the reform was that, as already mentioned, the public 
sector was highly criticised for not meeting the demands and aspirations of the 
people effectively. There was a view that the public sector was giving more attention 
to inputs and following rigid rules, regulations and processes rather than looking for 
outputs or outcomes (Hughes, 1994). The SLPS has faced similar criticisms. The 
timeliness and quality of services were not anybody‘s responsibility in SLPS because 
everybody receives his or her salary at the end of the month regardless of whether he 
or she performed during that period or not, unlike the private sector (De Alwis, 2000; 
Guiza & Nem Singh, 2003). In the private sector, there are two main incentives for 
employees to work hard: dismissal or other punishment is likely to follow 
inefficiency, good work may bring speedy promotion regardless of seniority. In the 
SLPS both these incentives were practically absent. Dismissal for laziness or 
inefficiency is so difficult to follow except in the most glaring cases. Tolerating 
inefficient workers and poor performers until they retire, places a burden on the 
public sector. When there is no difference between good or bad performers in the 
form of rewards and punishments there is little incentive to work hard (De Alwis, 
2000).  
 
Therefore, the main drive for reform stemmed from the pressure for a greater 
accountability which is also an aim of public sector reform in general. So, 
performance appraisal can have a double advantage in the public sector where 
managers are being asked to achieve greater results for each dollar they expend on 
wage and salaries, and public servants are being held more accountable by voters and 
politicians (De Alwis, 2000). The other motivation for reform was to link 
performance to employees‘ promotions, salary increments and training. The current 
practice which discussed in Chapter 4 shows that none of these objectives have been 
fulfilled.  
 
In summation, the reforms during the 1970s and 1980s were primarily based on the 
concept of decentralising political and administrative authority of the central 
government and the introduction of a PA system in the public service. It is evident 
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that all these efforts failed due to lack of political and bureaucratic will to implement 
them effectively. 
5.4 Part III: Reform Initiatives from 1990 to 2000 
 
During this period there were a few reform initiatives in the country: invitation of 
UNDP and ADB missions, financial management reforms, re-establishment of an 
independent Public Service Commission, and creation of Management Assistant 
Service.    
 
5.4.1 UNDP Mission  
 
Despite the availability of the ARC report, in 1990 a UNDP mission was invited by 
the Treasury to develop a programme for improving public sector management. The 
Mission consisted of expatriates. Within three months they submitted a report and 
formulated a US$ 1.3 million project. This was approved by the government 
(Nadarajah, 1997), and it established a Restructuring Management Unit (RMU) in 
the Ministry of Policy Planning and Implementation without considering the policy 
unit of the Ministry of Public Administration which was implementing the ARC 
recommendations at that time.   
 
The RMU continued for three years with visiting expatriates and non-governmental 
personnel, but no governmental staff (Nadarajah, 1997; Wanasinghe, 1994). 
Therefore, this unit was not respected by the public servants. During its office the 
agenda of reform was itself changed according to the government priorities. Initially 
it worked in line with the UNDP programme and then shifted its focus on 
decentralisation to Divisional Secretaries at the request of the Secretary to the 
Ministry of Policy Planning and Implementation to support the decentralisation 
efforts. Then in 1992, again its attention was directed to the rationalisation of 
structures and cadres of central government ministries, departments and provincial 
ministries. Finally, the UNDP evaluation mission recommended terminating the 
project in 1994 due to its failure to contribute to the substantial changes in the public 
service. Consequently, another attempt towards public sector reform ended with no 
result. 
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5.4.2 ADB Team 
 
The SLFP government which was in power in 1996 attempted to reform the public 
sector by inviting international consultants from the USA and New Zealand under 
ADB sponsorship. This invitation was made on the direction by the then President 
Kumaratunga. The study focused on reorganisation of public administration 
structures, rationalisation of public sector cadres and introduction of results-based 
management systems and procedures. As such, there were six key components of this 
reform. They were: adaptation of strategic policy formulation and policy 
coordination to achieve policy outcomes more effectively; adoption of a result-
oriented philosophy as the guiding management principle; separation of policy 
making, service delivery, and regulatory functions of government; realignment of 
responsibilities to support the goals of the government more effectively; training of 
staff to respond more effectively to the new environment and thereby realise their 
potential; and redeployment of surplus staff (Root et al., pp. 1361-1362).  
 
This mission suggested establishing an Administrative Reform Management 
Division (ARMD) under the President and Management Council chaired by the 
President. The ARMD was responsible for the design of the detail of the reform and 
to direct and oversee the implementation of key reform recommendations. This was a 
new entity. It was supposed to be supervised by an Advisory Board on 
Administrative Reform consisting of three non-official members in addition to the 
existing ex-officio Committee of Secretaries to provide ―intellectual and professional 
diversity‖ (Root et al., pp. 1361). The additional members included personnel from 
the private sector, and public sector with professional experience in administrative 
reforms. The Management Council was responsible for ensuring the development 
and implementation of strategic policies, thus its main role was to rationalise and 
make more coherent policies rather than an ad hoc existing mechanism.  
 
These recommendations were accepted by the Government and ARMD was 
established to operate for a three-year period as recommended by the consultant. 
Within a short period some of their recommendations such as reduction in the 
number of ministries and streamlining of their tasks were implemented. However, 
―these reforms did not last long‖ (Root et al., pp. 1361). New ministries were created 
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and a number of Cabinet Ministers increased. Consequently another attempt to 
improve public sector productivity ended up with no result.  
 
It is pertinent to state that those recommendations were in fact not focused on real 
problems in SL‘s public administration given the history so far discussed this 
chapter. Those are all ―business-as-usual‖ reforms. Can they be successfully 
implemented in the absence of a proper system of government? In other words, can 
they be implemented independent of engineering governmental reforms?   
 
5.4.3 Fiscal Management Reform Programme (FMRP) 2001 
 
Another reform in the recent past was the introduction of Fiscal Management reform 
by the UNP government which came into power in late 2001. The major 
underpinning of this reform was the economic contraction. SL‘s economy, for the 
first time after Independence, recorded a 1.5% contraction in 2001 under the SLFP 
regime. Although the economy recovered later at the rate of 4% of GDP growth, the 
fiscal position was not sound with the increase of defence expenditure, weak tax 
administration, a narrow tax base and various tax incentives. In addition, the balance 
of payments problems led the exchange rate devaluations, and raising the local 
currency value of the external debt. As a result, the budget deficit reached 8.9% of 
GDP (excluding grants and privatisation proceeds) and public debt escalated to 106% 
of GDP in 2002 (ADB, 2004a).  
  
In this context, with the assistance of the ADB the government formulated the Fiscal 
Management Reform Programme (FMRP). Although the unexpected general election 
in 2004 changed the government, the programme continued with the support of the 
new SLFP government.  
 
This reform was based on three major pillars: strengthening fiscal framework under 
the Fiscal Management (Responsibility) Act; streamlining taxation policy; and 
strengthening of institutions in revenue administration supported by creating of a 
modernised revenue administration (ADB, 2004a). Accordingly, the Fiscal 
Management (Responsibility) Act was enacted. Under this Act the Minister of 
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Finance is legally obliged to report the financial position of the government in the 
five stages as discussed in the previous chapter (Table 5).  
 
This reform focussed on ―improving tax administration, budget framework, public 
expenditure management and control systems, fiscal discipline, and fiscal 
coordination including supporting the groundwork for fiscal decentralisation‖ (ADB, 
2004a, p. 11).  This project was completed in 2008. 
 
Accordingly, attempts were made to restructure and modernise Customs, Inland 
Revenue, Excise Departments, and the Ministry of Finance and Planning through 
improving systems and processes, enhancing human resource capabilities and 
complementing information technology improvements. Accordingly, around 1,200 
officers from the above four organisations, and the officers of the Finance 
Commission and the Provincial Councils were given foreign training on subject areas 
of relevance, new organisational structures were adopted, and job descriptions were 
formulated. In addition, ―tax holidays were rationalised and legal measures were 
taken to improve the tax policy regime, particularly to improve governance and also 
address issues related to tax avoidance and possible malpractices in the refund 
mechanism‖ (Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2007, p. 178). Similarly, features of 
result-oriented budgeting under a medium-term budgetary framework were 
introduced while establishing a revenue management IT system (Ministry of Finance 
and Planning, 2007).  
 
This project was initially designed to establish a Revenue Authority by 
amalgamating those three departments but it failed due to employee resistance 
(ADB, 2004a). Therefore, the SLFP government suggested establishing a ‗Unified 
Revenue Board‘ to coordinate common functions by giving more operational 
autonomy to those departments (ADB, 2004a) but no action has been taken in this 
context yet. In addition, the reform programme intended to establish an independent 
Public Debt Management Office which was dismantled with the change of 
government as mentioned in previous chapter (ADB, 2004a).   
 
Under fiscal decentralisation the government recognised the gap between provisions 
to PCs under the 13
th
 Amendment to the Constitution and the genuine fiscal 
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devolution (ADB, 2004a). Therefore, this project is expected to address the 
imbalance between the centre and the province and across provinces. However, the 
progress of these actions so far was not published, but could be seen in the previous 
illustration in Chapter 4.   
 
However, this reform facilitates the improvement of transparency, accountability of 
the government, and introduces good governance practices. It tries to develop a 
result-oriented management culture in the SLPS. The Minister is legally bound to 
carry out specific tasks. Since the reform was built into the administrative system, 
whoever holds the portfolio of the Minister of Finance has to comply with the Act. It 
is mentioned that around 600 officers in the Inland Revenue Department have been 
promoted from Tax Collectors to Tax Assessors due to this reform (ADB, 2004a). 
Therefore, they benefited from the reform. Overall the reform appears to be 
beneficial to the country as a whole. However, it is too early to make a final 
judgment.  
 
5.4.4 The 17
th
Amendment to the Constitution 2001: Re-
establishment of Independent Public Service Commission 
(NPSC) and Other Commissions  
 
The evolution of the independent NPSC and other commissions in the public service 
has a long history. The ARC (1986/88) highly criticised the personal administration 
of the SLPS. It highlighted that ―the recruitment and promotional procedure in the 
public service was subjective and subject to political patronage and decision-
making‖, thus strongly recommended establishing an Independent Public Service 
Commission (Administrative Reforms Committee, 1986/88). The Presidential 
Commission on Youth (1990, pp. 4-5) also repeated this recommendation, while 
emphasising that,   
We would emphasise that there are certain functions and services in public life which 
transcend political differences and short term interests of political parties. Appointments 
to the public service is indisputably one such area. The representations made before us 
suggest an alarming degree of dissatisfaction in this sphere, and we have considered 
several avenues for improving the situation.  The 1972 Constitution removed the power 
of appointment vested in the Public Service Commission and brought the responsibility 
for such appointments within the purview of the Cabinet of Ministers, thus triggering, 
with far-reaching repercussions, the process of politicisation. The Commission is strongly 
of the view that the reversal of this pernicious process is now an urgent necessity and that 
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the Public Service Commission, together with other similar Commissions, should be 
given full autonomy to work out their internal systems of regulation with regard to 
appointments, transfer, disciplinary control and dismissal and appeals ... 
 
This Commission also highly criticised the politicisation of civil society, including 
the public service, 
The politicisation of civil society appears to have its origins in the political practices 
associated with parliamentary victories involving large majorities, beginning with the 
1970 elections. These victories not only gave rise to an unprecedented level of post-
election violence but also to the perception that the ‗winners takes all.‘ As one 
representative before this Commission put it, ―the winners always acted in a manner so as 
to give the impression that the supporters of the loosing political parties ceased to be 
citizens of this country‖. This attitude served, and continued to serve, to polarize civil 
society at all levels, giving rise to the belief that members of the ruling party and their 
supporters have the exclusive right to all the rewards and benefits that society has to 
officer (The Presidential Commission on Youth, 1990, p. 1). 
 
The Youth Commission devoted a separate Chapter on De-politicisation of Civil 
Society and highlighted over-politicisation in four areas (a) the abuse of political   
power in the recruitment of personnel to the public service, (b) misapplication of 
political power in the granting of public contracts and licences to the supporters of 
the ruling party, (c) the abuse of political power in the undermining of existing 
democratic institutions, and (d) political interference in the day-to-day administration 
of government institutions.   
 
Accordingly, the politicisation of society as a whole and non-consideration of the key 
recommendations made by both Committees by any government led to deterioration 
of all sectors of the country, especially the public sector which is a part of this unique 
society and the main area of this study. Eventually, in 1997, the Opposition UNP 
suggested the Parliamentary Select Committee on Constitutional Reforms to 
introduce independent Commissions for Elections, Police, and Public Service and to 
strengthen the Judiciary. Those interventions were also confined to deliberations 
without any fruitful result. Nevertheless, that party did not give up the idea and 
decided to consult the views of the public in order to push these meaningful reforms 
forward. Accordingly, a Committee was appointed by the UNP in 1998 to further 
consult the citizens on these issues and to find a meaningful outcome.  
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5.4.4.1 Committee on Citizen Consultation on Free and 
Fair Elections and De-Politicisation of Key     
Institutions 
 
The Committee on Citizen Consultation was established to achieve two objectives: 
firstly, to consult citizens on free and fair elections, secondly, to depoliticise key 
institutions. Ranil Wickramasinghe, Leader of the Opposition and the UNP, in his 
letter addressed to all religious dignitaries, recognised political parties, non-
governmental organisations, professional bodies, and other civil society groups, had 
described the purpose and objectives of the Citizens Consultation as follows, 
 
This is a critical moment in the history of our country. The future of democracy and the 
multi-party system is under threat. Restoring public confidence in the electoral process 
has become an urgent necessity. I propose to convene a Consultation on Free and Fair 
Elections and  Depoliticisation of key Institutions in our country for the establishment of 
an Independent Elections Commission, an Independent Police Commission, and an 
Independent Public Service Commission. This consultation will be ongoing process. A 
non partisan committee will be appointed to facilitate the process…(Committee on 
Citizen Consultation on Free and Fair Elections and De-Politicisation of Key Institutions, 
1998, p. 1)  
 
The Committee was composed of eminent personnel of the public sector, private 
sector and judiciary. K.H.J. Wijayadasa, former secretary to the Prime Minister and 
the President (1984-1994) served as convenor. The Committee took two months to 
complete the given mandate (14.09.1998-30.11.1998). In response to the 
Committee‘s publicity for seeking public views, it received large numbers of 
submissions from the political parties, trade unions, non-governmental organisations, 
people‘s organisations and individuals. This clearly shows the gravity of 
politicisation of key institutions, and the citizens‘ expectations for their 
depoliticisation. In their report the Committee (1998, p. 10) mentioned, 
In the light of deteriorating law and order situation in the country, especially in relation to 
political violence, election malpractices and abuses, political interferences in the day to 
day administration and the victimization of political opponents, there is an urgent need 
for the depoliticisation of the major democratic institutions and processes.  
 
This Committee proposed the removal of existing provisions from the Constitution 
thus ‗freeing[d] the public service from the clutches of the Cabinet of Ministers and 
other politicians‘ and establishment of independent National Public Service 
Commission. The report further says that,  
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It is obvious that an efficient bureaucracy requires selection on merit and not on political 
patronage.  If the government is keen on restoring the pride, stability and resilience of the 
administration, then, the cabinet and the individual ministers must divest themselves of 
the powers they have taken over from the Public Service Commission (PSC). The PSC 
should be vested with the powers of appointment, promotion, transfer, dismissal and 
made accountable to Parliament. The members of the PSC should be selected by the 
Constitutional Council of Parliament to be appointed by the President or the appropriate 
appointing authority (Committee on Citizen Consultation on Free and Fair Elections and 
De-Politicisation of Key Institutions, 1998, p. 20). 
 
The Committee also recommended appointing Secretaries to Ministries from among 
persons of ability and quality by the President with the prior approval of the CC.  
 
In regards to the Police Service, the report highlights, 
After independence, the police continued to pride itself in its impartiality. But after 50 
years, the police have now become an instrument of the party in power to retain power 
violating democratic rights of the people. This process of politicisation has been going on 
for the last four decades.  Political patronage now supersedes merit, efficiency and 
integrity (Committee on Citizen Consultation on Free and Fair Elections and De-
Politicisation of Key Institutions, 1998, p. 11). 
 
However, it is noteworthy to mention here, after establishing the Independent Police 
Commission as recommended by this Committee, this situation changed. In an 
interview Vijitha Herath, MP, JVP, said, 
2004 general election was the best election in SL because of the independence in the 
Police Service (Interview, 18.01. 2008). 
   
In regard to the election administration the Report said among other things, 
Since the beginning of the election process in SL, there had been instances of election 
malpractices and abuses. However, in early days such abuses were confined, mostly to 
impersonation and sometimes to the prevention of voters from turning up at Polling 
Booths. The large scale abuse of the election process is a more recent phenomenon and 
manifested in its worst from during recent elections. Rampant thuggery, mass scale 
stuffing of ballot boxes, forceful eviction of polling agents of opposition parties and the 
creation of a fear psychosis by armed gangs were evident at these elections in fact, these 
elections gave rise to the fear whether free and fair elections can ever be held again in SL 
(Committee on Citizen Consultation on Free and Fair Elections and De-Politicisation of 
Key Institutions, 1998, p. 8). 
 
Accordingly, the Committee made historical analyses of key incidents of 
politicisation which undermined public confidence in key public institutions and 
arrived at several key recommendations to improve the situation along with critical 
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constitutional reforms. The outcome of this attempt was the 17
th
 Amendment to the 
Constitution in 2001 with a few modifications.  
 
It is interesting to note that although the report was made available in 1998, the 
implementation of its recommendations did not materialise until 2001. The PA‘s first 
regime ended in 2000 (1994-2000). The general election held in October, 2000, once 
again established a coalition government by the PA, led by President Kumaratunga 
but it soon encountered problems due to withdrawal of support by one of its coalition 
partners, the Muslim Congress, in June 2001.This instability led to crisis in 
Parliament (Wijeweera, 2006). In terms of Article 70(1-a) of the Constitution, the 
President is barred from dissolving Parliament within the first year from the date of 
the general election that voted it in. Otherwise, a motion of no confidence has to be 
passed, and by convention the President would have no option but to call upon the 
Opposition Leader to form the Government, or the President can make use of his/her 
power to prorogue Parliament for a period not more than two months to gain time to 
work out a strategy.  
 
The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) which was then seated in the Opposition took 
the opportunity to support the Government for a period of one year, subject to several 
terms and conditions.  The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by the PA 
and the JVP on  September 5, 2001, made the government tenure of office depend on 
implementing the provisions contained in the MOU, which created a ―Government 
on probation‖. 
5.4.4.2 Government on Probation  
 
The most critical provision contained in the MOU which is relevant in this study was 
the enactment of a 17
th
 Amendment to the Constitution already drafted by the 
Opposition UNP (subject to essential modifications) on or before September 24, 
2001, and the establishment of the CC envisaged in such Amendment before October 
5, 2001 (Wijeweera, 2006, p. 104). 
 
This timeframe of legislative endeavours in the MOU was significant in politics 
because the election was held in October 2000 and the President had the power to 
 203 
dissolve Parliament any time after October, 2001. The dates were fixed, forcing the 
Government to accomplish the agreed tasks before the President‘s power could be 
invoked. This position was reinforced by the JVP parliamentarian, Vijitha Herath,   
The President Kumaratunga was forced to bring this amendment. This is one of the 
agreements we made to join the coalition. If not we could topple down the government at 
this period because it was on probation. Not only JVP, but also the Opposition, the 
Organisation of Professional Association, and other organisations gave pressure to make 
this happen (Interview, 18.01.2008).  
 
The 17
th
 Amendment was taken up and debated in Parliament on September 24, 
2001, which was the last date spelt out in the MOU. But the CC was not established 
by the due date of October 5, 2001 as prescribed in the MOU.  
 
However, the enactment of the 17
th
 Amendment was welcomed by all the 
intellectuals because they viewed it as the introduction of a new political culture in 
the country.  
 
Dr. B.S. Wijeweera, former GA, explained this situation, in an interview,  
The 17th Amendment was a very rare display of parliament getting together for once and 
displayed the unity where they managed to put through the Constitutional Amendment 
after a lapse of 10 years, with a sole objective of curtailing the powers of President and 
abuse of that power. In that sense it was the one of the best pieces of legislation ever to 
have been passed by a contemporary Parliament (Interview, 09.01.2008).   
 
In this scenario, the 17
th
 Amendment was remarkable in the history of SL‘s 
Parliament for three reasons. The first reason was that a minority party, the JVP, 
having 10 members in a House of 225, dictated this event in the legislature. It seems 
that this historical event would not have occurred in that regime unless the Muslim 
Congress had left the government and the JVP joined it, with demands contained in a 
MOU. It is said that the President herself did not like the reform. Therefore, minority 
parties played a key role to put forward the Opposition agenda.  
 
The second reason was that it was passed without anyone voting against it, thus 
signifying a consensus among the main political parties (Wijeweera, 2006, p. 100). 
The present Constitution of 1978 had been amended 16 times, from its inception in 
1978 to 1988. That could have been done because the UNP Government which came 
into power in 1977, ruled until 1989 with more than two-thirds majority in the 
 204 
House. Articles 82(5) and 83 of the Constitution require two-thirds majority of the 
total number of MPs and, in some cases, there also has to be approval by the people 
at a referendum. After the introduction of the Proportional Representation Electoral 
System, no government has had that majority since 1989. In addition, this enactment 
was passed at a time when the government was in a precarious situation and in fear 
of losing even the simple majority, needed to pass the Annual Budget for the coming 
year (Wijeweera, 2006).  As such this Amendment was absolutely remarkable.  
 
The third reason was that, when analysing the objectives of all the Amendments to 
the Constitution (1-16), one can conclude that they were done merely to gain 
political advantages for the rulers. None were made to reduce any power vested with 
the Executive and to enhance the power of independent Commissions. On all of these 
three counts the 17
th
 Amendment was a significant landmark. 
 
However, the Coalition Probation Government did not last long because the 
Government did not like the dictatorship of the minor party, JVP in Parliament. 
Some senior MPs of the Government crossed the floor, which compelled the 
dissolution of Parliament, followed by a general election in December 2001. The 
Opposition, who drafted the Bill, came into power taking the responsibility of its 
implementation.   
 
The next section examines the objectives and the contents of the Amendment, the 
processes spelt out therein, how key players acted in the implementation of the 
reform and what factors so far underpinned its success or failure, in order to 
understand the gaps in the present system. This review will provide a better 
understanding of how future reforms should be shaped, avoiding such technical 
deficiencies, for the provision of better services in the 21
st
 century and to regain the 
neutrality in the SLPS. 
5.4.4.3 The Rationale  
 
The main rationale that underpinned the Constitutional Reform was to curtail the 
discretionary power of the President on key appointments of the public service 
(Auditor General, Election Commissioner, Inspector General of Police, Members of 
 205 
the PSC, Judges of the Supreme Court), as described in Chapter 3, because this 
power seemed to have been abused on several occasions when appointments had 
been made. According to Wijeweera (2006, p. 101), 
This discretionary power was absolute (i.e. anyone could be appointed at the sole will of 
the President). There were murmurs of protest that this power was not absolute and that 
such power was necessarily restrained by conventions of good governance and ought to 
be exercised within limits. This issue came to a head when Dr. Shirani Bandaranaike was 
appointed to the Supreme Court.  
 
According to Wijeweera (2006), this appointment was done by the President in 1996 
outside the normal practice. The normal practice was, with a few exceptions, to 
appoint the members of the Appeal Court, Official Bar (Attorney General‘s and 
Legal Draftsman Departments) or Unofficial Bar with extensive legal practice, to this 
high office. The appointee, Dr. Bandaranaike, who lacked experience in practising 
law in Courts, was a university academic with intellectual attainments. Therefore, 
this appointment was challenged in the SC, but there is a specific provision in the 
Constitution, that states ‗any action by the President cannot be challenged in any 
court‘ (Article 35). This appointment was among several other things, one of the 
causes that triggered this Amendment.  
5.4.4.4 The Objective and the Contents of the 17
th
 
Amendment to the Constitution 
 
The core objective of this Amendment was to alter the legal regime for the 
appointment, regulation of service and disciplinary control of Public Officers, 
including Police Officers, Judges and Judicial Officers and of certain Commissions 
that wield governmental power. It placed a restriction on the discretion vested in the 
President and the Cabinet of Ministers in relation to these matters and the exercise of 
that discretion subject to the recommendation or approval of the new body, the 
―Constitutional Council,‖ (Hansard, September 24, 2001) which was discussed in 
Chapter 3. Thereby it minimised the opportunities for abuse of such power by the 
President. The other motive was to re-establish the independence of the NPSC and to 
introduce new Commissions: the Election Commission, and National Police Service 
Commission.  
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The other motive was to give the public officials job security. Under the 1946 
Constitution public servants held office ‗at the pleasure of the Crown‘ whilst 1972 
and 1978 Constitutions they held office ‗at the pleasure of the Cabinet of Ministers‘. 
Article 54 (1) of the 1978 Constitution stated that, 
Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Cabinet of Ministers shall provide for 
and determine all matters relating to public officers, including the formulation of scheme 
of recruitment and codes of conduct for public officers, the principles to be followed in 
making promotions and transfers, and the procedure for the exercise and the delegation of 
the powers of appointment, transfer, dismissal and disciplinary control of public 
officers…all public officers shall hold office at pleasure. 
Accordingly, Cabinet used to have a lot more powers than currently. The 17
th
 
Amendment to the Constitution (2001) withdrew that pleasure principle by giving all 
the powers to the NPSC. This is a major initiative in the new constitutional change 
after Independence (Rathnasiri vs. Ellawala, CA No.16/2004). As such, the vast 
range of powers given to the Cabinet of Ministers relating to the public officers 
including the ‗pleasure principle‘ by the former Constitutions no longer exists.  
Accordingly, it was an attempt to insert a new formula to the Constitution of 1978 by 
introducing a new Chapter VIIA, immediately after Article 41, and repealing Chapter 
IX of the 1978 Constitution, which specified the provisions for the public service and 
substituting an entirely new Chapter IX, which came into effect on October 3, 2001.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3 the CC was inactive from 2005 due to the non-
appointment of its members by the President.  This shows the legal shortfall in the 
Constitutional Amendment.    
5.4.4.5 Conflicting Issues in the Amendment  
 
The actual exercise of governmental powers in regard to the matters of the 17
th
 
Amendment is different from what was envisaged by the Amendment. Those 
conflicting points are now being discussed in different forums. The first point of 
conflict between the Amendment and the actual practice was the executive power of 
the President. Although the objective of this Amendment was to curtail the absolute 
power enjoyed by the President on certain appointments (Judges of the SC , Court of 
Appeal, Attorney General, etc), there was no provision in the Amendment to make it 
mandatory (Wijeweera, 2006). ―The SC determination‖ on the constitutionality of 
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the Amendment was clearly stated by the Attorney General: ―it is a restriction on the 
exercise of the discretion by the President,...there is no removal of the executive 
power of the President.‖ Therefore, the Bill needed to be passed by the two thirds 
majority in Parliament. If there was a removal of executive power, in addition to the 
two-thirds majority in Parliament, it had to be approved by the people at a 
referendum, in conformity with other provisions in the Constitution. Article 3 of the 
Constitution states;  
In the Republic of Sri Lanka sovereignty is in the people and is inalienable. Sovereignty 
includes the power of government, fundamental rights, and the franchise.    
 
The provision of Article 3 is in certain respects interlinked with the provision of 
Article 4.  Article 4 (b) stipulates; 
Executive power of the people, including the defence of Sri Lanka, shall be exercised by 
the President of the Republic elected by the people. 
 
Therefore, the executive power of the people is exercised by the President through 
the public officers and commissions that have been mentioned above. It is in this 
context that the President is vested with the power of appointment, in relation to 
these officers and bodies. The SC considered the constitutionality of the 17
th
 
Amendment. The SC questioned whether the executive power of the President was 
removed by this Amendment.  The Attorney General found that whilst it was 
reduced, it was not removed. Thus, the ―real power of appointment is still with the 
President‖ (Parliament, 2001).     
 
The second conflicting area is the powers of the Cabinet. Under 55 (3) of the 
Constitution the Heads of Departments are appointed by the Cabinet of Ministers 
―after ascertaining the views of the Public Service Commission‖. Accordingly, 
consultation should be made with the NPSC before the appointment is made.  
However, according to Wijeweera (2006), the Cabinet of Ministers who initiated the 
17
th
 Amendment, have made appointments subject to the ascertaining the views of 
the NPSC and the NPSC views were ignored. It is a violation of the constitutional 
provision. 
 
The third conflicting area is the composition of the CC itself. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, the CC members are the PM, the Speaker, the Leader of the Opposition, 
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one person nominated by the President and five jointly appointed by the PM and the 
Leader of the Opposition. Of this five three have to represent minority community 
interests. Thus, the first three are directly members of different political parties, and 
the rest may have some form of political affiliation. Therefore, their decisions can be 
biased. Also, the governing party has no chance to dominate the CC. The failure to 
appoint one person from the minority parties for two years, lead to a situation in 
which the CC could not be established, clearly shows that there is a lacuna in the 
composition of the CC itself.  It seems that some respects, the CC is a political 
authority, rather than an independent body. 
 
The fourth conflicting area between the Amendment and the practice in reality is the 
provision in relation to the existing Commissioner of Elections. Article 27(2) reads 
as; 
The person holding the Commissioner of Elections on the day immediately preceding the 
date of the commencement of this act, continue to exercise and perform the powers and 
functions of the office of Commissioner of Election as were vested in him immediately 
prior to the commencement of this act, and of the Election Commission, until an Election 
Commission is constituted in term of Article 103, and shall, from and after the date on 
which the Election Commission is so constituted, cease to hold office as the 
Commissioner of Elections.   
 
The Election Commission has not been formed as mentioned above due to non-
consensus of the CC nominations and the President. Therefore, the Commissioner of 
Elections is in a desperate situation. He cannot retire even though he has already 
passed the retirement age. He made a very humble request to the incoming President, 
Mahinda Rajapaksa, to grant him retirement when he announced the presidential 
election results in 2005.  To this day, his request remained unanswered (mid 2009).       
 
In summary, the 17
th
 Amendment to the Constitution has some critical points that 
conflict with existing practices: the President‘s real power on certain appointments 
has not been withdrawn; Cabinet‘s real power has not been reduced in the case of 
appointments of HODs, the composition of the CC itself has some deficits, and the 
continuation in office of the existing Commissioner of Elections is problematic.  
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5.4.5 Introduction of the Public Management  
         Assistants’ Service (PMAS) 
The other reform initiative during the period of the 1990s to 2000 was the 
introduction of the PMAS. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the SLPS consists of many 
sub-services based on division of work which prevailed from colonial time. In 2004, 
five such services, namely General Clerical, Shroff, Book Keepers, Store Keepers, 
Typists and Stenographers, were amalgamated into a single service called PMAS 
(Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs, 2004 & 2005). Staff in the 
clerical service are now required to have competency in working with other office 
tools in relation to his/her speciality. Officers in other services such as typists and 
stenographers absorbed into this service should also acquire skills in the performance 
of duties which have not been entrusted to them under the old system (Ministry of 
Public Administration and Home Affairs, 2005). As such, an officer needs to gain a 
variety of skills.  
The main objective of the establishment of the PMAS is to create one service 
consisting of officers who are endowed with skills and knowledge on multi-duty 
systems in place of services which existed in government offices based on division of 
work.  Under the new system it is expected to achieve: improvement of efficiency 
and productivity in the public service, improvement of speedy service delivery 
through improvement of multifunctional professional skills; ensuring job 
satisfaction; reduction in recurrent expenditure; and optimum utilisation of human 
resources, office spaces and equipment. Therefore, the staff attached to this service 
have to develop multi-duty skills.  
However, the implementation of the reform was not without problems. Even after a 
lapse of two-and-a- half years from the introduction of the new system, it is observed 
that many public institutions are still confined to the old system. Some of the trade 
unions opposed this reform due to their vested interests and have taken legal action 
which is still pending (Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs, 2008). 
Similarly, existing staff of those services were reluctant to carry out multifunctions, 
saying that they do not possess necessary skills; for example, clerks resist doing 
typing and typists resist doing other work than typing. This is the main problem in 
the public service today, because the reform did not focus on skill development 
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before the reform implements. This reform moves towards the NPM-type of reforms 
in the SLPS. 
In summation, during the 1990s and 2000, the government reforms were confined to 
improving the public finance management system and the personnel management 
system in the public sector. The enactment of Fiscal Management (Responsibility) 
Act of 2003 was a remarkable achievement by which the elected officials were given 
clear responsibility to show results. This enhances good governance and public 
accountability. The 17
th
 Amendment to the Constitution has its own deficiencies and 
it is not as effective as expected by the reformers. This shows the political resistance 
to reforms. 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter examined the post-Independence public administrative reform 
initiatives by successive governments in SL from the 1950s to 2005. The principal 
aim of this examination was to identify the motivations and drivers of reforms, 
whether they were successes or failures, reasons for their failures, and consequences, 
in order to draw lessons from the past for future reforms. This examination illustrated 
the complexity and specificity of the SL situation beginning with the language 
reforms in 1956 which led to several other reforms later.  This speculates how the 
piecemeal reforms of the 1970s and 1990s inevitably failed and how their effects still 
shape the SL political and administrative systems and therefore, must be accounted 
for in any future attempt to reform the public sector. This analysis provides a broad 
base for the argument that one cannot contemplate future reforms in SLPS unless one 
understands the full complexity and specificity of what has happened in the recent 
past. In particular, the conceptual diagram of this study illustrated in Chapter 2 
developed by Pollitt and Bouckaert also shows that the effects of public sector 
reforms depend on the history, structure, culture, and political economy of the 
country.  The SL experiences align with this argument of specificity and illustrates 
why public sector reforms prove to be impossible in SL. The past reform experiences 
of SL demonstrate that public administrative reforms cannot be successful without 
commensurate reforms in the political system of the nation. In other words, public 
sector reforms cannot be independent of the political reforms. 
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Chapter 6: Review of the Administrative  
Reform Committee (ARC) Report of     
 1986/88 - An Overview  
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, many countries around the world, both developed and 
developing, embarked on vigorous and thorough re-evaluations of the role of the 
state and the public service. This was mainly driven by various factors including the 
growth and enhanced application of information technology, globalisation and 
competition, failures in the public sector service delivery mechanisms and strategies, 
economic crises of individual countries, emergence of new theories, increased 
intervention of outside consultants, and the impact of the World Bank, and 
International Monetary Fund‘s Aid and Structural Adjustment Programmes. 
Accordingly, many countries followed economic liberalisation and political 
democratisation during this era, SL was no exception.   
 
Thus, a Presidential Administrative Reform Committee was established by President, 
Jayewardene, in 1986 to examine and report on reforms required in government 
ministries and departments with a particular reference to the distribution of functions, 
policies relating to human resources management and development, administrative 
devolution, financial management and administrative systems and procedures. The 
Committee comprised of nine Sri Lankans with strong backgrounds as eminent 
practitioners in the public and the private sector. H.S. Wanasinghe was the Chairman 
of the Committee while V.T. Navarathna, then Director, Sri Lanka Institute of 
Development Administration (SLIDA) served as the secretary to the Committee. 
Other members were B. Mahadeva, S.M. L. Marikar, Willie Mendis, R. Peris, Asoka 
Senanayake, S.K. Wickramasinghe, and Eraj Wijesinghe. The first two members and 
the Chair of the Committee were prominent public administrators from the Ceylon 
Civil Service. Willie Mendis was a University Professor and an academic 
administrator.  Riency Peris was a medical doctor who chaired the Sri 
Jayewardenepura hospital at that time. The rest of the members were drawn from the 
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private sector. Therefore, the Committee had a good mixture of multidisciplinary 
professionals drawn from both the public and private sectors.  
 
The Committee undertook a comprehensive review of many aspects of the public 
administrative system in the country. In doing so, it invited representations from the 
public who were interested in sharing their views with the Committee on its agenda. 
It received 171 memoranda. Face-to-face discussions also were held with the 
representatives. In addition, the Committee had detailed discussions with secretaries 
to line ministries, heads of departments and trade unionists to gather information for 
the review. Furthermore, the Committee undertook 18 individual case studies with 
the help of the SLIDA to obtain empirical data on some aspects of public 
administration such as review of field staffing and financial management.  Thus, the 
Committee ensured the effective participation and consultation with all stakeholders 
within and outside the public service.  
 
The Committee functioned from July 1986 to December 1987 and made a number of 
recommendations to solve the problems identified by the Committee. It submitted its 
findings to the President on 31
st
 December 1987 in ten separate reports, each dealing 
with a specific issue or a group of issues. Subsequently, they were published on the 
orders of the government.  
 
In carrying out its task, the Committee analysed the problems in the public service in 
depth and aimed at fair and sound judgments which displayed a practical awareness 
of many difficulties encountered in the public service. The Chair of the Committee, 
H.S. Wanasinghe, in an interview recalled his experience, after 20 years, on how 
they constructed the problems which they recommended for fixing, why and how 
they took the approach they did,   
Basically as a group we met. Each of us started thinking about the problems in the public 
service at that time, wrote down, discussed them, analysed them and finally came to 
conclusions. We looked at the issues to be addressed and causes of such deficiencies in 
delivering services. We made separate reports on the assumption that it would facilitate a 
more comprehensive treatment of the different issues and also a more effective 
implementation of its recommendations. It also enabled the committee to submit its 
recommendations expeditiously on issues in its TOR which had assumed special urgency. 
We saw the committee‘s recommendations as an integrated agenda of reforms. We 
expected to implement the agenda as a whole by the proposed ministry of public services. 
We thought doing A without doing B or C would be counterproductive (Interview, 
09.11.2007).  
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However, the Committee recommendations were not fully implemented by the 
government of the day, but in a piecemeal manner despite the Committee‘s plea to 
implement them as a whole.  
 
In an attempt to discover future prospects for public sector reforms in SL, the ARC 
review provides a solid base and a starting point. Therefore, this chapter examines 
the background of the ARC and key areas of study, problems identified, key 
assumptions and recommendations in order to highlight its historical significance in 
administrative reform initiatives in SL. The principal aim of this analysis is to show 
that most of problems they identified still exist in the public administration arena 
after a lapse of 20 years with new issues as explained in Chapter 4 due to non-
implementation of most of its recommendations. Therefore, any future attempt must 
be based on the lessons learned from this.   
6.2 Why ARC and How it Came into Being? 
 
This question was answered by the Chair of the ARC, H.S. Wanasinghe, in an 
interview; 
Basically the productivity has been dropping. Overstaffing was recognised. The public 
service has gone without any direction. Quite a bit of achcharu (like a pickle). The 
Finance Minister, De Mel, himself was a Civil Servant and worried about what was 
happening in the public service.  
 
He went on to say, 
The 1977 economic reforms surfaced the inefficiency of the public service. In that the 
public sector has to help the private sector led economy. However, the public 
administration did not go along with the economic reforms. Completely it was a new 
world.  The public sector applied rules but not act as a facilitator to the private sector. So 
the World Bank triggered the reform. The reform idea came from the World Bank 
through B. Mahadeva who was the Director General in the Finance Ministry and Lloyd 
Fernando, the Director General National Planning.  There was also a report by the 
SLIDA. Director SLIDA also wanted to do some reforms. In addition, there was an 
administrative devolution underway. So, B. Mahadeva, Lloyd Fernando, V.T. Navarathna 
and also Thilakarathne of the Central Bank were the architects of the ARC. They 
prepared the TOR for the Committee along with the World Bank and pushed it through 
the Finance Minister, De Mel, to get the sanction from the President (Interview, 
09.11.2007). 
 
Accordingly, the ARC was a product of many people. Initially the SLIDA had 
recommended establishing an ARC by the President at its colloquium on 
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administrative reforms in 1983 (SLIDA, 1983). The World Bank also emphasised the 
same need in 1986 (Fernando, 2005). So, ―it was the IMF/WB, from their 
comparative experience saw the malaise and applied heavy pressure‖ (Marga 
Institute, 1995, p. 1).  
 
The move for ARC was neither politically nor public driven. ―The public did not 
perceive administrative reforms as affecting their daily lives or future well being – to 
them ‗the government‘ was something esoteric which did not concern them. Thus, 
there was no ‗public pressure group‘ for administrative reform‖ (Marga Institute, 
1995, p. 1). Neither the Cabinet nor the Minister of Public Administration were 
involved in the decision to establish the ARC, or knew the work of ARC.  Even the 
President did not think that it was important to notify and consult the Cabinet (Marga 
Institute, 1995), so the ARC came into being due to the external pressure backed by 
some of the reforming bureaucrats.   
 
As mentioned by the ARC Chair, the SLPS has gone without any direction, leading 
to a drop in productivity. This was due to various factors as already discussed in the 
previous chapters: the increasing role of state control on public administration and 
economic activities, introduction of political leadership to the district administration, 
abolition of the independent PSC and the complete transfer of its functions to 
Cabinet. Appointments, promotions, transfers, dismissal and disciplinary control of 
the public service and their policies were determined according to the whims and 
fancies of the politicians in power. This led to politicisation of the public service, 
bureaucratic lethargy, inefficiency and lack of morale. The effects of these policies 
could be seen from the fact that growth declined from 5.3% during the period 1966 - 
1970 to 2.9% during 1970 - 1977 (Wijesinghe, 1998).  This decline led to 
unemployment, shortage of essential food items and other materials, and unrest in the 
country which eventually led to the change of the government at the general election 
in July 1977.  
 
The change of government from the SLFP shifted the way of thinking on economic 
policies. The incoming UNP Government opened the economy and introduced 
outward-looking development strategies in 1977 by deregulating many aspects of the 
economy. This was partly driven by global pressures. During the first four years 
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since the opening of the economy the highest average growth of 6.5% was achieved 
(Wijesinghe, 1998). Along with the economic development, SL underwent 
considerable structural transformation in the economy, polity and society during the 
period from 1977 to 1994. The dependence on the agricultural sector decreased and 
service and manufacturing sectors were boosted, thereby increasing employment 
opportunities and income.  
 
However, there were some impeding factors because these economic reforms were 
not supported by administrative reforms for their smooth operation. With the market 
liberalisation, deregulation, corporatisation and privatisation, the role of the 
government should have been reduced to the role of a facilitator and a regulator, but 
it did not happen.  Rigid public sector systems and procedures hindered the effective 
and efficient delivery of services to the investors as well as to the general public in 
the open economic scenario. In this background the public sector got caught in the 
cross-fire (Wijesinghe, 1998). 
 
In addition, there had been pressing internal reasons for embarking upon a radical 
and comprehensive process of transformation and reforms. The youth insurrection 
during 1987 to 1989 in most parts of the country, and the demand of the Tamil rebels 
for greater devolution of political power in the North and East led for constitutional 
and structural changes. Accordingly, the government wanted to have an 
administrative system which would facilitate ethnic harmony and greater democracy 
to peripheral levels through devolution of power.  
 
It was in this context in the latter part of the 1980s, the government constituted the 
ARC to support the economic reforms introduced in 1977 and the constitutional 
reform of devolution. Given the poor status of state administration, it was not 
surprising that there was an urgent need of reforms in the late 1980s for a much more 
efficient, effective and impartial public service, improving the quantity and quality of 
service provision, redressing imbalances of the past and addressing the demands of 
the minority population. The ARC was expected to carry out comprehensive 
investigations of the operation and development of the public services, and to make 
recommendations for improving and accelerating the reform process in line with the 
government vision. It was argued such a Committee would play a role in adding 
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momentum to the economic transformation and devolution process. Therefore, the 
purpose of the ARC was to provide not a detailed plan but a broad policy framework 
to guide the public sector in introducing new policies and legislations aimed at public 
service transformation. The development of specific strategies would be the 
responsibility of the proposed Ministry of Public Services. The following section 
examines the key areas of study in detail and the key deficiencies identified in the 
ARC review.  
6.3 Key Areas, Findings and Recommendations  
 
The ARC was assigned seven priority areas for public service transformation in its 
Terms of Reference: public service cadres and salaries; management development; 
recruitment, promotion and transfers; decentralisation of administration; financial 
management; work systems and procedures; and distribution of subjects among 
ministries and departments. Accordingly, it was a broad review and evaluation of the 
whole system.  
 
The ARC identified deficiencies in three key areas which obstructed the progress: the 
structure; personnel system; and work systems and procedures. Under the structural 
deficiencies the Committee identified the lack of ―a system-wide focal point‖ to 
handle public service personnel functions and effective decentralisation, delegation 
and devolution of authority, and responsibility within the administrative system. It 
also observed the proliferation of departments, ministries, authorities and public 
enterprises over time, increasing the public sector involvement in economic 
activities.  
 
The key deficiencies in the personnel system include: weak cadre management and 
compensation especially in senior management; absence of national training policy 
for the public service and the shortage of institutional infrastructure and resources for 
training; lack of mechanism to redress grievances of public servants; and the absence 
of an objectively selected multidisciplinary group of senior managers to provide 
managerial leadership.  
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In regard to work systems and procedures the Committee found that they were 
ineffective, obsolete and client-unfriendly and the use of modern technology was 
inadequate.  
 
In addition, the Committee observed high levels of overstaffing, low salaries, poor 
morale and discipline, erosion of standards of integrity, lack of training and self-
improvement, low productivity, high cost of government operations, and erosion of 
public confidence.  
 
The ARC‘s recommendations for overcoming these problems, placing the 
administrative system on the right track and developing good governance in the 
government business in SL, are summarised below under eight main headings 
adopted in its report: cadres and salaries;  senior management group in the public 
sector; personnel management processes; training and management development; 
rationalisation of functions; restructuring of administrative system; financial 
management; and non-departmental organisations. The recommendations of each 
category are discussed below. 
6.3.1 Cadres and Salaries
58
  
6.3.1.1 Cadre Management  
 
The ARC argued that the number of cadres (406,359 in 1987 excluding armed 
forces) of the public service was beyond the reasonable requirement for efficient 
government operation. The ARC believed that there was no justification for the 
existing number, given the resources available and the priorities of government. The 
ARC further argued that the choice before the country was between a bloated, under-
compensated and ineffective public service or a lean, better compensated and 
effective service.  
 
The ARC observed several contributory factors for excess staffing: a lack of 
effective institutional machinery and a well-defined process for cadre determination; 
lack of staffing norms and standards and modern office equipment; and increasing 
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number of ministries, departments, and public enterprises.  The ARC observed 
under-utilisation of staff and narrow job definitions at subordinate levels as common 
practices in the government offices. In addition, ―the existence of more than one 
ministry which either covers a single sector (e.g. agriculture) or seeks to further a 
single development objective (e.g rural development) has led to overlapping and 
duplication of field staff at field level who perform tasks which are indistinguishable 
from one another‖. Furthermore, the ARC found that the quality of staff in the public 
service was poor. This was mainly related to the ―defective recruitment processes‖ 
and ―lack of induction training.‖ 
 
The ARC recognised that systematic cadre management was the immediate task of 
the government to realise administrative reform and performance improvement. It 
recommended:  
Establishing an independent Cadre Review Commission (CRC) immediately to 
evaluate structures, and to examine the existing cadres of all ministries and 
departments in the light of their current mandates. The CRC should be a permanent 
feature in the administrative system to carry out reviews on regular and continuing 
basis;  
 
Right-sizing the cadres in the public sector. The ARC recommended the 
retrenchment of cadres in a phase-out manner and consideration of alternative 
service delivery mechanisms such as outsourcing; 
 
Effective freezing of all recruitments for two years pending the completion of the 
first round of the review and rationalisation of cadres; 
 
Introducing a scientific manpower planning process in the public sector 
accompanied by rigorous organisational reviews, modernisation of work systems 
and methods, continuing training, and retooling of existing cadres to cope effectively 
with new as well as different tasks of the future, and termination of tasks which were 
no longer relevant as well as the divestment of functions which could be better 
absorbed by community organisations and the private sector; and  
 
Paying fair and equitable compensation to those who were to be retrenched. 
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Among these recommendations only the first, the setting up of the CRC, was 
implemented but it disappeared soon after so these problems continued. The other 
recommendations, right-sizing cadres, and introducing manpower planning did not 
eventuate. The recommendations concerning the salary structure are as follows. 
6.3.1.2 Salary Structure 
 
The ARC strongly believed that the salaries of the public service were not sufficient 
in relation to the cost of living. This was crucial in the managerial and specialised 
skills levels, when compared with the national and international comparable salary 
structures. For example, the SL annual salary level ranged from SLRs 13,248 to 
99,648 in 1987. Although, India‘s per capita GNP was lower than SL‘s, a public 
servant‘s salary ranged equivalent to SLRs 19,800 to 237,600 per annum. In 
Malaysia the range was from SLRs equivalent of 34,200 to 762,000 per annum. The 
ARC recognised high level of overstaffing and low salary structure as the ‗twin 
malady‘ which afflicted the administrative system of SL.  
 
The ARC‘s recommendation on salary structure was strongly based on the following 
assumptions:  
 
The need for the government as both the country‘s largest employer and the one engaged 
in the key tasks of nation building, to be in the position of being able to attract and retain 
qualified personnel to handle given tasks at given level of responsibility;  
 
The importance for the government as a ‗good employer‘ to ensure that it has a contented 
workforce by seeing to it that the physiological and psychological needs of its employees 
are reasonably met.  
 
The Committee believed that efficiency in the public administration depended on the 
integrity and commitment of the individual staff. The Committee was also of the 
view that the lack of association with the living standard expectations of the public 
servants detracted from such efficiency, integrity and commitment, leaving whole 
systems ineffective. 
 
Accordingly, the ARC recommended: 
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Increasing public servants‘ salaries; 
 
Linking the salary structure to country‘s cost of living index; 
 
Implementation of a uniform salary structure for the whole public service. The 
Committee assumed that this would attract equal calibre personnel to all jobs in the 
public service;  
 
Assignments of salaries to specific posts based on a process of job classification. 
The salaries should be linked to the job content and the responsibilities of the 
specific posts; and  
 
Reduction of number of salary scales.  
 
The first recommendation was immediately implemented without following the 
logical sequence i.e. review of cadres, retrenchment of excess cadres, and then 
increasing salaries to the right sized cadres. Instead, the government increased the 
salaries of the bloated cadres. The recommendation of linking the salary to cost of 
living index was implemented in 2006, but the rest of the recommendations are yet to 
be implemented.  
 
6.3.2 Senior Management Group (SMG)
59
 
 
The ARC viewed the public service as a systemic whole. Though different tasks of 
the government were performed by different occupational groups, they comprised an 
integrated, single service which served a common vision, mission and objectives. It 
was different from any other service due to its uniqueness in delivering public 
services.  
 
With this perception, the ARC observed that there was no planned or selected 
multidisciplinary leader group at the top to fill the most responsible positions such as 
Secretaries to Ministries and Heads of Departments to generate a cohesive and 
coordinated policy management in the public administration. Instead, those positions 
                                                 
59
 ARC Report No 3 of 1987, pp.1-15 
 221 
were filled by ‗a collection of individuals‘ selected according to patronage, thus 
lacking group spirit, leading to an ineffective administrative system.  
        
Therefore, it strongly recommended establishing a multidisciplinary, ‗leader group‘, 
small in number, at the top, to fill the most senior positions in the public sector. The 
Committee expected that this group would provide the public service with qualitative 
leadership, and would function as the interface between the public service as a 
whole, and the legislature and the political executives. The Committee had given 
special attention to this proposal.  
 
6.3.3 The Personnel System
60
 
 
The ARC argued that the personnel system is central to the effectiveness of the 
country‘s administrative system because it was the focal instrument for formulation 
and implementation of development plans and policies giving leadership and 
management to government business. It provided managerial, analytical, 
professional, technical and scientific support for carrying out the process of SL‘s 
development forward.   
 
In this context, the ARC observed several weaknesses in the personnel administrative 
system in the country: no cohesive public personnel policy; no institution to handle 
policy matters on personnel management and administrative reforms; no proper 
standards for recruitment; no promotions in the public service without political 
patronage and decision-making; and no effective performance appraisal system in the 
public service. Secondly, the committee found the personnel system over the years 
had failed to recruit and retain better qualified personnel. Thirdly, there was a high 
level of transfer of personnel from place to place, annually creating problems for the 
individual staff, family and the organisations.  
 
The ARC observed that as a result of these weaknesses, the public service had lost its 
vitality, credibility, and productivity. It witnessed an erosion of morale, lack of 
motivation and increased injustice in the public service. The ARC assumed that 
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better qualified candidates would have tended to be discouraged with the common 
perception of subjective and unprofessional personal management systems and the 
prevalence of political decision-making in the public service.  
 
Hence, the ARC arrived at two important recommendations: (1) establishing a 
Ministry of Public Services under the President as a focal point to handle policy 
functions on personnel management and administrative reforms with five 
directorates. Since the establishment of such a ministry might take time, the 
committee recommended that an effective secretariat under its purview with suitable 
senior staff to be introduced; (2) re-establishing an independent Public Service 
Commission (PSC) to perform public sector recruitment, promotion, transfers, and 
disciplinary functions.   
 
The ARC assumed that the introduction of the independent PSC would have several 
advantages: restore morale; enhance the sense of security among public servants; 
facilitate adoption of more integrated approach on personnel matters; enable Cabinet 
to devote more of their scarce time for policy formulation and review; and assist in 
re-creating an integrated, neutral public service free of divisions based on political 
considerations and loyalty. The first recommendation has never been executed. After 
many years, the second recommendation was partially implemented in 2001 as 
described in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
In addition to these main recommendations on the personnel system of the public 
service, the ARC made several other recommendations on various aspects such as 
recruitment, promotions, transfers, retirement, manpower planning, grievance 
procedure, performance appraisal, which are highlighted below.  
6.3.3.1 Recommendations on Recruitment 
 
Abolition of existing Job Bank scheme of recruitment through MPs for non-staff 
(non-managerial) grades;  
Introduction of open, competitive and merit basis recruitment procedure;  
 
Decentralisation of all recruitments to non-staff grades enabling recruitment by 
specific institutions or provincial services; 
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Formulation of job descriptions and schemes of recruitment for each post; and 
 
Stop appointments outside the schemes of recruitment. 
 
The first and second recommendations were partially implemented by the 
government in late 1989. The lower grade employees (peons and drivers etc) are 
exempt from merit-based recruitment. The third and fifth recommendations were not 
fully implemented. The fourth recommendation was introduced, but many 
organisations did not adhere to this policy.  
6.3.3.2 Recommendations on Promotions 
 
Typically the years of service (seniority) was the main criteria adopted in deciding 
promotions in the SLPS. The ARC regarded promotion as ‗an exercise in talent 
hunting‘. It viewed that an individual has to be measured against future demands 
with present and past performance. The ARC, therefore, recommended that 
promotions be based on such appraisal exercises which are designed to test 
candidates against the requirements of the new post to be filled.  
 
Today, Efficiency Bar examinations are held to promote staff from lower salary 
points to higher salary points. Obtaining postgraduate qualifications is a requirement 
for promotions in some of the AIS, for example SLAS. However, promotions to the 
most important posts are still done on an ad hoc basis as discussed in Chapter 4. 
6.3.3.3 Recommendations on Performance Appraisal 
 
The ARC observed that performance appraisal in the public service since 
Independence was confined to an annual confidential reporting system, which led to 
subjective judgments, personal bias, favouritism, and an outdated value system. This 
system was seen as a control mechanism and did not support career management or 
the formulation of training needs. Annual salary increments were automatic, not 
performance-based.  
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The absence of a proper performance evaluation system in the SLPS and the lack of 
integration with other human resource management functions such as considering 
promotions, granting salary increments and assessing training needs, had contributed 
to lowering performance standards, reducing morale and increasing frustration in the 
public service. In this context public servants had sought other ways of support to 
gain promotion and career advancement despite the ethical values of the public 
service. This meant that public servants at the junior or middle level sought personal 
favours from the politicians and higher echelon bureaucrats to gain promotions, 
while the higher echelon officials built up the practice of doing favours for the 
ministers.   
 
In this background, the ARC recommended introducing an objective, regular and 
continuous performance appraisal system to evaluate quality, quantity and style of 
performance of individuals in the SLPS and linking the appraisal to other aspects of 
personal management such as promotions, granting salary increments and training. 
 
In 1998, this recommendation was implemented, but there are still weaknesses in the 
process as discussed in Chapter 4.  
6.3.3.4 Recommendations on Transfers 
 
The ARC observed that there was a high volume of annual and ad hoc transfers in 
the SLPS: ―Generally around 25% of the public servants spend the second half of 
each year preoccupied with impending transfers and finding ways to avoid transfers 
which could be to their personal disadvantage‖ (Report No. 4, p 29). Almost all the 
public servants attached to transferable services suffered from this dilemma.  
 
The ARC stressed that the disadvantages of transferability outweighed the 
advantages. Disadvantages included additional cost to the government, and 
psychological cost to the individual staff and family. The transfers badly affected 
children‘s education. The transfers also led to lack of commitment to institutions due 
to ‗temporary attachments‘, and ineffective implementation of development 
programmes of the government. It also negatively affected accountability. However, 
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the ARC was of the view that there might be instances where transfers were needed 
for the sake of both the public service and the individual staff.   
   
In this scenario, the ARC was of the view that, if the second recommendation under 
the recruitment section above i.e. future recruitment should be institution based and 
province based, is implemented, this problem could be overcome over the next few 
years. Pending the implementation of that recommendation the ARC made following 
interim recommendations:  
Transfers between stations should be made only at the beginning of the year;  
 
The employee should be given minimum three months notice; and  
 
Transfers should never be used as a disciplinary measure. 
 
Accordingly, the government outlined its transfer policy enabling an individual to be 
in one place over a period of five years. However, due to non-implementation of a 
decentralised recruitment system in the SLPS, the annual transfer problem still exists.  
6.3.3.5 Recommendations on Retirement 
 
The ARC observed that 55 years was the compulsory retirement age in the SLPS and 
extensions thereafter were annual and at the discretion of the government. The 
Committee noticed increased re-employment of such retirees in the SLPS without 
any rationale. It also observed that public servants did not have any right to retire 
before the age of 55 except on the grounds of bad health or a government 
retrenchment project.  
 
The ARC noticed that these policies and practices had created several inter-related 
problems such as a sense of insecurity, lack of morale, and frustration in the SLPS, 
leading to low productivity. Thus, it recommended the following proposals. 
 
The compulsory age of retirement of public officers should be set at 60 years with 
full pension; 
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There should be no extension beyond that age. If it is essential, it should be done on 
a contract basis only for a one-year period. If it needed to be continued beyond that 
period, there should be a new appointment limited to another 12 months on the basis 
of performance, and there should be a condition of training of successors on such 
contracts. Salaries should be paid disregarding the pension, but such salaries would 
not be further pensionable.  
 
Any public officer should have the right to exercise early retirement prior to 55
th
 
birthday, having completed 20 years of service, and to draw a pension on the 
attainment of the age of 55; and  
 
The pensions should be linked to the cost of living index enabling the pensioners to 
live simply with dignity. 
 
The first and third recommendations were implemented. However, the most 
important second recommendation is yet to be implemented. Many senior level posts 
including Ministerial Secretaries and Heads of Departments are filled by retired 
personnel under patronage. This has been a common practice for a long time in the 
SLPS, demoralising subordinates and depriving them of promotions. In addition, 
Central Bank officials who retired under the special retrenchment scheme before the 
age of 55, with attractive compensation packages in 2000, have been recruited to 
various departments of the Ministry of Finance on a contract basis with higher 
salaries than the SLPS comparable posts, without any condition such as training of 
their successors.  
6.3.3.6 Recommendations on Grievance Procedure 
 
The ARC argued that ‗justice and fair play‘ play a vital role for the credibility of the 
personnel system in the public service. The Committee assumed that, in a vast sector 
with a huge cadre and a multitude of decision-making points, there could be 
instances where unknowingly or even knowingly, wrong decisions or misjudgements 
could be made in recruitment, promotion, transfer, and disciplinary matters as well as 
any others. The ARC believed that the public servants affected by any wrong 
decision should have the right to appeal. It was observed that the personnel system 
lacked such an instrument. 
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The ARC, therefore, recommended that, in such matters public servants should have 
a right to appeal to the proposed PSC or an appeal board constituted under it. 
 
The government implemented the above recommendation by appointing an 
‗Ombudsman‘ in place of the PSC for this purpose. 
 
In addition to these main areas of personnel system the ARC made several other 
recommendations such as provision of official transport to senior officials whose 
services were needed outside working hours, provision of soft loans for housing, and 
institution of a scheme of compensation to public officials who were exposed to high 
risks in their performance such as the armed forces, and other public servants 
working in risky areas. The ARC assumed that effective implementation of the above 
recommendations would enhance commitment to public duty, dedication to public 
interest and would retain public service vitality.  
6.3.3.7 Training and Career Development
61
 
 
The ARC outlined three major constraints relating to training of public servants: 
shortage of funds, inadequacy of trained trainers, and reluctance to release public 
servants to undergo training. The Committee stressed that these constraints arose due 
to absence of an authoritative National Training Policy. In addition, the ARC 
highlighted several weaknesses relating to training in the SLPS: the fractured, 
uncoordinated and ad hoc character of the arrangement; lack of integration of 
training with career development; irrelevant content and ineffective methodology of 
training programmes; lack of interrelationship between foreign training and local 
training; and an absence of training units in ministries and departments. The ARC 
particularly stressed many weaknesses in the foreign training: donor driven 
programmes which necessarily did not meet the SL requirements; lack of earnestness 
in the approach; lack of planning based on training needs of the SLPS; ad hoc 
selection; and non-adherence to the regulations stipulated in the Establishments 
Code.  
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There was no planned programme of training at a pre-determined point in a public 
servant‘s career; rather it came about as a result of an individual‘s needs. As a result, 
there were several gaps in capability in the SLPS: limited capacity for planning and 
management of development programmes; inadequate technical skills; lack of 
supervisory skills; inadequate skills of policy analysis and management; inadequate 
awareness of the development environment; and lack of ethical norms and values. 
 
The ARC stressed that effective mobilisation, development, and utilisation of 
personnel in the SLPS were important goals because they helped to build up both 
individual and organisational capacities and good governance, which were critical for 
the success of the country‘s development process. The ARC, therefore, made several 
recommendations to upgrade the quality of the public servants in general. They were: 
      
Formulating a National Training Policy; 
 
Strengthening the existing SLIDA for the training of management grades and 
establishing a Public Service Training Institute (PSTI) with decentralised centres for 
the training of supervisory and middle level grades;  
 
Launching a priority programme of training for trainers through the SLIDA;  
 
Releasing public servants full time to undergo postgraduate programmes, acquisition 
of postgraduate level qualifications prior to assumption of responsibilities at the 
deputy head of departmental level, acquisition of further higher level qualifications 
in public policy management and technical fields prior to assumption of 
responsibilities at the head of department level, and planning regular exposure to 
seminars, workshops;    
 
Placing the National Institute of Business Management (NIBM) under the proposed 
Ministry of Public Service to enhance its role and contribution to staff training  of 
the public enterprises; and 
 
Providing funds for training as a part of the emoluments of each ministry. 
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In addition to these recommendations the ARC gave direction in preparing training 
contents and methodologies for each of the occupational groups in the public service, 
and drafted a National Public Service Policy Statement. The ARC emphasised the 
need for three institutions, SLIDA, NIBM and PSTI, in fulfilling their mandate to 
develop a network of training, constituting non-institutional programmes in addition 
to institutional programmes. Furthermore, it recommended several measures to 
enhance institutional infrastructure of SLIDA, PSTI, and training of trainers.  
 
The first recommendation has never been implemented, the second recommendation 
was partly implemented while the recommendation on provision of funds for training 
was executed in an ad hoc manner. The fourth recommendation was partially 
implemented. 
 
6.3.4. Administrative Changes in Support of Devolution
62
 
 
The ARC recognised that since Independence the centralised polity tended to apply 
prescriptive solutions, which were already discussed in Chapter 5, to development 
problems, ignoring the real reasons affecting those problems which existed in 
different parts of the country. These solutions, for example, DPAs, DM, and DDC, in 
practice created other severe problems leading to disappointment and disaffection of 
citizens. Although, authority was decentralised under these schemes, power remained 
with the central government. In addition, the Committee observed that the 
maintenance of unitary structure in SL was a continuing threat to the government, 
owing to two recent developments: the ethnic conflict and the youth insurrection.  
 
The ARC, therefore, argued that the devolution (transfer of powers from central 
government to local units) would enable public participation in the development 
process. The Committee identified that the proposed devolution structure would 
comprise three levels: the Centre, the Province, and the Pradeshiya Sabah (Division), 
with representative institutions: the Parliament, Provincial Councils, and Pradeshiya 
Sabhas respectively. Each level would have a political executive, namely, the 
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Cabinet of Ministers at the Centre, the Board of Ministers at the Province, and the 
Executive Councils at the Pradeshiya Sabhas.  
 
Accordingly, the Committee emphasised the varying of functions of these three 
levels. At the Centre, would be the macro-planning, formulation of national policies, 
setting of standards and evaluation of policies, plans and standards. At the province 
level, the emphasis would be placed on the formulation of operational policies, 
programmes and budgets, the provision of technical guidance to Pradeshiya Sabhas 
and monitoring and evaluation of programme implementation. At the Pradeshiya 
Sabha level, project implementation and service delivery would be emphasised.    
 
The ARC made several recommendations in this context, as follows:  
 
Allocate operational responsibilities to the provinces optimally;  
Keep the size of the concurrent list
63
 to a minimum; 
 
Demarcate functions clearly between the centre and the provinces. The level 
(whether centre, province, or pradeshiya sabha) to which a subject is assigned should 
carry out the total responsibility in implementing the task;  
 
Establish a Finance Commission; 
 
Allocate resources between the centre and the province based on the devolved 
revenue;  
 
Avoid the use of financial relationships as a control mechanism;  
 
Avoid holding of greater discretionary power in sharing resources by the centre; 
 
Establish a Provincial Planning Council. It was recommended that each Pradeshiya 
Sabha should act as a Planning Council for the purpose of appraising the annual 
development plan and monitoring its projects. Special training in these areas for 
provincial and pradeshiya level cadres should be arranged;   
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Organise the subjects and functions of the province under 7 groups: provincial 
administration and personnel; law and order; local government and rural institutions; 
finance, planning, employment, and labour; agriculture, fisheries, trade, tourism, 
industry; economic infrastructure (power, irrigation, construction, roads and 
transport); and education, youth affairs, culture, health and social services;  
 
Establish four standing committees within each Pradeshiya Sabha: finance and 
administration; agriculture and fisheries; industrial and economic infrastructure; and 
health, education and social services. There should be a Chairman at each 
Pradeshiya Sabha who would preside over the Finance and Administration 
Committee and three Vice Chairmen who would preside over the others. The 
Chairman and three Vice Chairmen would form the Executive Committee of the 
Pradeshiya Sabha; 
 
Organise the future SLPS in five categories of cadres: institution-specific, 
pradeshiya sabhas, provincial, central departmental and all-island services; and 
  
Establish a management pool - Provincial Management Service with different sub-
groups in each province to minimise transfers; and establish Provincial Public 
Service Commissions to handle matters of provincial public servants.  
 
Of these recommendations only the fourth, eighth and final recommendations were 
implemented by the government. The outcomes of the failures were already 
discussed in the Chapter 4. The significance of the ARC report was that in 1987 it 
had foreseen the present problems, and suggested useful opinions on demarcation of 
functions. 
 
6.3.5 Rationalisation of Functions in Government
64
 
 
The ARC viewed the government‘s performance as dependent on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the discharge of its tasks and functions. This, again, depended on the 
logical organisation of functions, and responsibilities among the different ministries 
and departments within the machinery of the government.  
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In this context, the ARC identified several weaknesses in the structure of the 
government owing to the increased number of ministries, departments, authorities, 
and enterprises in the public sector, which had a negative effect on the development 
and the delivery of services
65
. These weaknesses were: a high level of separation of 
related functions within sectors; grouping of unrelated functions within a single 
ministry; creation of parallel institutions to carry out functions already assigned to 
existing organisations; inadequate coordination of policy functions; and inadequate 
institutional mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation of functions at the centre. 
Thus, there were overlapping, duplication, and conflict in functions, overstaffing, and 
lack of a systematic grading of departments.  
 
The ARC, therefore, considered that there was a need to draw up functions, and 
responsibilities of government logically within a framework of well defined 
principles: affordability, sectoral policy cohesiveness and co-ordination, and close 
supervision and monitoring of policy implementation.  
 
In this backdrop the ARC considered that policy formulation should be separated 
from policy implementation, thus a ministry at the centre should focus more on 
policy analysis and policy articulation, monitoring and evaluation of policy 
implementation, and inter-sectoral co-ordination with peer ministries on matters of 
national policy. The departments should focus more on operational and 
implementation functions.  
 
The ARC made the following recommendations within the above framework 
recognising the real world political priorities and imperatives: 
  
Abolish Project Ministries and make provision to have Ministers of State under the 
respective Cabinet Ministers assigning sub-sectoral and programme specific 
responsibilities within a context of much reduced numbers of large ministries;  
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Reduce the number of central government ministries (from 43 to 16) and 
departments, in line with devolution; and expand the range of responsibilities to 
them;  
 
Not to appoint senior public servants concurrently to positions in corporations; 
 
Give autonomy to commercial corporations. The Treasury as the custodian of the 
public investment should monitor their performance;  
  
Establish a National Planning Council and a Planning Commission in the public 
sector; and 
 
Reorganise the Cabinet Office to become a ‗think tank‘ with inter-disciplinary and 
multi-disciplinary experts. The Committee identified that the current functioning 
lacked the necessary analytical support for collegiate decision-making on the major 
issues.      
 
The fifth recommendation was partially implemented. The other recommendations 
were never implemented. 
 
6.3.6 System Improvement
66
 
 
The Committee argued that no work system in the public sector could be considered 
to be permanent; each must be continuously subject to evaluation and modification. 
The Committee viewed that an optimal work system would be one which enabled the 
work to be done within the shortest possible time, at minimum cost, entailing optimal 
utilisation of resources and minimising public inconvenience.  
 
The ARC observed several deficiencies due to lack of efforts in improving work 
systems since Independence: process-related, system improvement and management 
effectiveness. The process-related deficiencies included multi-steps and lengthy work 
processes, a demanding plethora of information from the public sometimes not 
relevant for the purpose, no standard time for each stage in the work system, and 
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inadequate delegation of authority. The deficiencies which impeded systems 
improvement included the lack of management culture in monitoring service delivery 
mechanisms or project implementation, mystification of the public sector work 
system and procedures, and the absence of institutional mechanism for the public to 
seek corrective actions on bureaucratic failures. The deficiencies which affected 
management effectiveness included slow progress in the introduction of information 
technology in service delivery.  
 
In addition the committee observed that highly skilled personnel were employed in 
lower skilled tasks, and lack of attention was paid in ‗system planning67‘. There was 
extensive use of letters and written memoranda as means of communications rather 
than face to face dialogue and telephone conversations in dealing with problems. As 
such, the work systems absorbed high personnel inputs, imposed unnecessary delays 
and burdens on the citizenry, and resulted in sub-optimal utilisation of human and 
financial resources. 
 
The ARC recommended several corrective actions as follows:  
Review and improve work processes in each organisation by each manager in 
relation to her/his responsibility; 
 
Delegate responsibility and authority to lower levels; 
 
Improve the office layout to enhance job supervision; 
 
Enhance the use of computer technology and management information systems; 
  
Establish effective mechanism to address public grievances; and 
   
Devise appropriate work systems and procedures when new services are launched 
and when training cadres.  
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These recommendations were implemented by several ministries and departments in 
various periods on an ad hoc basis, but there has been no cohesive programme of 
action across the public sector.  
 
6.3.7 Financial Management
68
 
 
The ARC observed that as a developing country with a scarcity of public finance, SL 
gave little attention to improving the financial management system despite frequent 
comments and suggestions for corrective action by the Auditor General. The ARC 
also noted that there were several ‗Funds‘69  in the public sector without 
parliamentary accountability and decisions over their use.  
 
The ARC further recognised several shortfalls in various aspects of the financial 
management system, especially in the budgetary process, revenue collection, internal 
systems and audit, and supplies management. The following section examines these 
areas in detail.   
 
 The Budget  
 
The following deficiencies were identified in the budget process from the 
departmental level to final approval in Parliament: 
 
―A conceptual and an attitudinal problem‖. The approach to budget formulation was 
historically based rather than future oriented management decision-making. The 
study undertaken on behalf of the Committee revealed that ―estimates of recurrent 
expenditure for the on-coming year are normally prepared in the mid of the current 
year based on the actual expenditure of the immediately preceding year‖; 
 
―Inadequate and lack of professionalism‖ in budgetary negotiations between 
departments, ministries and the Treasury;   
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―Inadequate consultation‖ of the sectoral heads on preparation of the departmental 
budgets. It was observed that the preparation of the budget was confined to the 
finance division of each department;  
 
―Inadequacies in the budget presentation.‖ The objectives of the department or the 
programmes were shown in general descriptive terms without expected outputs. As 
such the resources sought under each programme or projects were not linked to the 
anticipated outputs in any direct manner in the budget presentation, and  
 
―Inadequate in-depth analysis of the budget proposals‖ at the Committee Stage 
debates.    
 
In order to overcome the above deficiencies the ARC made several 
recommendations: 
 
Obtain inputs from all sectoral heads in the preparation of the budget for the 
organisation, and to conduct training programmes to change their attitudes;  
 
Remove the historical approach process in the preparation of the budget and 
revise the presentation format. The output of each programme under the 
department should be clearly spelt out for the budget period and each output 
should be directly linked to the relevant objective in quantitative terms. Each 
resource input should be clearly linked to the relevant output in the programme; 
 
Establish several ‗Budget and Appropriation Committees‘ which would study 
the budget of each ministry in detail and report their findings and 
recommendations to the full House for formal approval. These committees 
would replace the existing ―Committee stage debates.‖ The ARC expected that 
public accountability would be better served through this reform.  
In fact, although these recommendations would have been very useful for the 
effectiveness of the public finance management, unfortunately little action has been 
taken so far to implement them.  
 
 Revenue Collection  
 
The ARC observed the following weaknesses in the area of revenue collection:  
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Lack of attention to collecting and monitoring revenue by the revenue collection 
agencies;  
 
Lengthiness in the process, and paying-in procedures; 
 
Complicated forms filling exercise; 
 
Lack of payment points in the country; and  
 
Delays in the realisation of inward remittances in government departments.   
 
The Committee particularly observed that recording inward remittances, depositing 
them in banks for collection, acknowledging these receipts to senders and crediting 
to the respective accounts, took noticeable delays. Similarly, there were also delays 
in sending out such receivables. The ARC viewed that these delays were due to poor 
organisation of work, absence of work output norms, and absence of monitoring.  
 
Therefore, the ARC recommended: 
 
Introducing monitoring of revenue collection against pre-set targets and 
institutionalising this practice in the administrative system by using modern 
information technology. The programmes could be arranged both in the 
Treasury and the revenue collection agencies and departments; and  
 
Streamlining paying-in procedures, simplification of forms and documents, 
shortening of payment processes, and expanding the payment outlets by 
using the post offices and the banking system.  
 
In fact, the revenue collection was the main task of administration under colonial 
rule. The implementation of those recommendations would have direct impact on 
their own: overcome the shortages of funds in the government, minimise the levels of 
external and internal debt, and reduce the budget deficit in the country. Nevertheless 
these recommendations were implemented in an ad hoc manner. The Financial 
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Management Reform Project (2003-2007) has addressed some of the issues in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
 Internal Financial Systems, Audit and Procurement    
Management  
  
In addition to the above two key areas, the Committee observed several deficiencies 
in internal financial systems, auditing, and procurement management. The 
Committee viewed that frauds, negligence, wastage, under-utilisation of assets and 
process delays in the SLPS were signs of the deficiencies of the internal financial 
management systems.  
 
Audit  
 
The ARC observed that the audit reviews were essential in financial management, in 
terms of control and public accountability. It recognised that the existing internal 
audit lacked comprehensiveness. The reviews were confined to checking the 
financial integrity of the transactions to see whether transactions were correct and all 
assets were accounted for. It had not focused on whether each operational centre in 
the departments had made use of human and other resources allocated efficiently and 
effectively, enabling the top management to evaluate each cost centre under its 
control and to take necessary corrective actions.  
 
The ARC also observed late submission of annual accounts, and there was no penalty 
or disciplinary action for such delays. There were several other weaknesses: lack of 
comprehensiveness in the external audit, financial data, and information management 
system, in the SLPS. Therefore, the Committee recommended: 
 
Establishing audit units in ministries at the centre and the provinces and in 
departments;  
 
Introducing penalties for late submission of annual accounts; 
 
Introducing a performance audit as a part of the annual audit process;  
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Releasing the proceedings of the Public Accounts Committee to the public through 
media; and   
 
Creating a financial data and information management system in the SLPS. 
 
During the late 1990s the timely submission of annual accounts was emphasised but 
only a little improvement had been made. However, other recommendations are yet 
to be implemented. 
 
Procurement and Supplies Management 
 
The ARC observed that more than 50% of public expenditure was on supplies 
procurement. Therefore, special attention was paid to ensure that they were procured 
at the most economical price and good quality in relation to price, timeliness, 
openness, fairness and objectivity, and that assets were properly managed and 
maintained. The Committee recognised that none of the above criteria were met in 
current practice. Instead, there were unnecessary delays, avoidable variations to 
tender procedure and unnecessary tying up of funds in supplies obtained 
prematurely. The Committee also noticed that although there was a separate 
department for government supplies, its function was marginal and many of the 
procurements were carried out by individual departments and ministries on their 
own.  
 
The ARC, therefore, recommended:  
 
Introducing a team of trained professionals in procurement management under the 
Ministry of Finance;  
 
Giving appropriate training to managers on domestic and international bidding and 
procurement;  
 
Providing training for all categories of staff handling financial management 
functions; 
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Specifying the  authority, responsibilities, duties and rights to Accounting Officers 
and Chief Accounting Officers in assuming their duties and the penalties for failures 
to such responsibilities; and 
 
Reviewing the financial management system periodically and make necessary 
changes periodically. 
 
During the late 1990s the first and second recommendations were implemented. The 
Treasury prepared Guidelines and Tender procedures for public procurement, and 
conducted awareness seminars for senior public officials.  In 2005, a separate agency 
called the National Procurement Agency was established by dismantling the Finance 
Ministry Unit on Procurement. In February, 2008 it was closed down and its 
functions were transferred back to the Finance Ministry. 
 
6.3.8 Public Enterprises
70
 
 
The ARC observed that successive governments in SL had established various forms 
of non-departmental organisations such as corporations, boards, authorities, councils, 
institutes, and agencies in the administrative system to accelerate economic, social 
and political development in an unplanned and inconsistent manner, without any 
rationale. The Committee did not see any real ‗definitive differentiation‘ between 
these organisations. However, it recognised that these organisations emerged due to a 
specific public policy or strategy, for example, the State Plantation Corporation and 
the Janatha Estate Development Board, which emerged as part of the policy on 
nationalisation of plantations. They emerged to handle regulatory, sector specific or 
regional basis functions, infrastructural development, research, and economic 
activities.  
 
During its review, the Committee identified several weaknesses in non-departmental 
organisations: lack of uniform national policy and evaluation of alternative 
institutional mechanisms in creating such organisations; operational autonomy; 
trained staff; parliamentary oversight on accountability; and lack of clarity in regard 
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to relationships with other organisations such as the Treasury, line ministry, and 
national planning.   In addition, there was political interference in the appointment of 
directors and senior managers, delays in project execution, weaknesses in 
deployment of personnel, and high costs of service delivery. 
  
In order to avoid such weaknesses the ARC made the following recommendations: 
 
Non-governmental organisations should not be used to implement regulatory 
functions; 
 
They should be audited by the AG. The audit should include both finance and 
performance audit;  
 
They should be accountable to Parliament through the Public Accounts Committee;  
 
These organisations should be established in clear and time-bound terms. The 
‗Sunset‘71 principle should be strictly applied to these projects;   
 
They should be established under a particular ministry and the interface with the 
Treasury should be through the line ministry; 
 There should be an operational management board at the top and a full-time 
executive head of the organisation. All members of the board should have at least 20 
years of management experience in large organisations;  
 
The Chairman of the Board should be appointed by the Cabinet upon the joint 
recommendation of the sector Ministry and the Treasury;  
 
All investments in the commercial PEs should be approved by the Cabinet; and  
 
A Public Investment Corporation should be established by Act of Parliament to 
handle matters relating to investment, appointment of board members, approval of 
plans, and auditors. 
 
                                                 
71
 The idea of self-retiring government programmes after completion of their mandates embodied in 
the concept of ‗sunset‘ principle.  
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The second, third and sixth recommendations were partially implemented. 
Appendix 8 summarises the key recommendations which were implemented and 
their status up to date, and Appendix 9 summarises the recommendations which 
were not implemented. 
6.4 Critique and Prospects  
 
Given the limited time frame and increased violence in all parts of SL during 1987, 
the breadth and depth of ARC findings, the quality of its analysis and rather robust 
nature of some of its recommendations are astonishing. It was the first serious 
attempt and the only comprehensive study undertaken since Independence in the 
context of SL‘s public sector reforms. In fact, it was a sophisticated reform 
programme for SL. Many of its findings, assumptions and recommendations are still 
valid as is evident in the discussion of the present situation of public administration 
in SL in Chapter 4. If effectively implemented, many of the ARC recommendations, 
particularly establishing an independent Cadre Review Committee, Public Service 
Commission, Ministry of Public Services, and introduction of scientific manpower 
planning systems and rationalisation of functions and responsibilities of ministries 
and departments should undoubtedly contribute towards an effective and efficient 
public service and could reduce the majority of the present problems.   
 
However, unfortunately, the interest shown by the government in establishing the 
ARC appears to have evaporated when it came to the implementation of its 
recommendations. Although the recommendations were fully accepted by the 
government by Cabinet decision on February 15, 1990 (Somasundram, 1997) and by 
the SLPS, the ARC‘s pleas that ―recommendations be considered in totality and 
implemented as a whole‖ and that non-implementation of its recommendations 
would be a ―retrograde step in the administrative development of the country‖ were 
seriously ignored. Instead, their implementation took place in a piecemeal manner, 
thereby putting the administrative system back, rather than pushing it forward. The 
ARC Chair later critically commented, 
There were no initiatives by the Government, the Parliament, the bureaucracy or public 
service trade unions for open discussions and acceptance, modifications or rejections of 
the whole agenda of actions proposed by the Committee. Instead, ad hoc measures were 
taken in response to specific pressures (Wanasinghe, 1994, p. 6). 
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There is no major criticism that can be levelled at this report, except for a few 
omissions. The first omission is that given the large number of specific 
recommendations by the Committee, it would have been useful if the report had a 
summary of such recommendations in priority order and incorporated them into an 
implementation plan. The implementation plan could be phased according to a time 
frame. The second omission is that the Committee‘s findings and recommendations 
in regard to financial management devoted little attention to ‗State Accounts‘ and 
‗State Assets‘ none at all to ‗Debt Management‘, which are very important elements 
in the SL context. The third omission is that the report does not discuss the role of 
the Ministry of Public Administration that existed at the time, in the reform process. 
This represents an important omission.  
 
Despite these shortcomings the ARC report represents an important milestone in the 
public sector policy deliberation in SL. This is mainly because the ARC drew lessons 
from SL‘s own mistakes in the past over ad hoc exposure to public sector reforms. In 
addition, it drew lessons from developing nations, such as India, Malaysia and 
Singapore and developed nations such as Australia and the United Kingdom, where 
appropriate in its analysis. In this manner the ARC was careful not to blindly adopt 
the sophisticated developed country models that evolved during that era. The 
Committee recognised the specificity of reforms in the SL context, so it made 
appropriate recommendations to correct such individual weaknesses in the 
administrative system in the hope of creating a solid base or preconditions for robust 
reforms in the future.  
 
The next section examines why the ARC recommendations were not fully 
implemented by successive governments during the last 20 years under six major 
headings: lack of political will; resistance from bureaucrats/rigid and conservative 
bureaucrats; uncoordinated administrative power relations; lack of citizens‘ support 
or clear direction, prioritisation in the reporting methodology; power struggle by the 
Tamil minority and actions of Sinhalese JVP; and changes in polity and 
governments. 
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6.5 Why were ARC Recommendations not Fully 
Implemented? 
 
6.5.1 Lack of Political Will 
 
The main reason for non-implementation of the ARC recommendations in their 
entirety was lack of political will. This was evident from the very first attempt at its 
implementation in November 1987. The Minister of Finance tabled the first two 
reports of the ARC along with the budget proposals for 1988 accepting the whole 
agenda but the government only accepted three of its key reform proposals for 
implementation: a new approach to salary revision, cadre management, and the 
introduction of a sunset clause to all programmes. As such, from the very beginning 
the integrated approach to implementation of ARC recommendations was 
undermined.   
 
Although the government accepted these three proposals, they were not implemented 
effectively. In January 1988 after it had completed its review task, the ARC was 
transformed into the Salaries and Cadres Commission. However, in practice the 
Commission‘s role was confined to the review of salaries because in the SL context 
politicians need to please public servants who were underpaid; thus they tend to be 
more concerned about salary reforms rather than other type of reforms in the public 
service. H.S. Wanasinghe, the Chair of the Committee, emphasised the lack of 
political will in an interview, 
President Jayewardene never believed in reforms. He took the report and thanked us. 
Nothing more than that. He needed more power. Executive power. Even President 
Premadasa did not want because it did not flow from his initiative. Some of the 
recommendations: devolution, restructuring the centre, senior management group did not 
appear to appeal to him. The whole episode of reform is giving up. Reduce the cadres; 
abolish something, independent commissions…so no one wants to lose. Every party 
needed to win in the next election. No one needs CRC [Cadre Review Committee]. They 
recruit people for totally unproductive areas. If you implement SMG, the politicians 
cannot appoint people they want as Secretaries. Therefore, they resisted the 
implementation (Interview, 22.12.2007). 
 
The majority of the interviewees in this study confirmed that there has been no 
political will for public administrative reforms in SL. Lloyd Fernando, former State 
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Secretary, Ministry of Policy Planning and Implementation (1989-1993), in an 
interview further added, 
The politicians by nature are myopic. They have a short term horizon determined by the 
next election they have to face. Hence, they [politicians] have to deal with issues that 
could see and give them credit. Politicians who run the government are aware of the need 
for public service reforms. But, they always think that such reform could be postponed. 
As a result public sector reform takes a low position in their scheme of priorities.  They 
also feel that such reforms could disrupt the status quo resulting in loss of personal 
control over administrators (Interview, 06.01.2008).  
 
This lack of political will impacts on the whole administrative system and will be 
further displayed throughout the following discussion where appropriate.  
 
6.5.2 Resistance from Bureaucrats/Rigid and   
           Conservative Bureaucrats  
 
The second major reason for not fully implementing the ARC recommendations has 
been lack of bureaucratic support.  There seem to be few reforming bureaucrats in 
the SLPS. This was evident at the second attempt to implement its recommendations 
comprehensively. In the absence of creating a separate ministry as proposed by the 
ARC, the then Ministry of Public Administration, Provincial Councils and Home 
Affairs submitted a Cabinet Memorandum in October 1989, seeking approval to re-
organise the Ministry and increase staffing to manage the implementation of reforms. 
In March 1990, after five months, the Cabinet approved the proposal and referred the 
request for additional staff to the Committee of Secretaries (Nadarajah, 1997). The 
ARC recommended introducing five directorates at the level of Additional Secretary 
but the Committee of Secretaries approved only one. Thus, a policy unit established 
in the Ministry of Public Administration for the implementation of ARC reforms did 
not get the required qualified staff. As such from the very beginning, there was a 
critical mismatch in the management of the integrated implementation of the ARC 
recommendations (Wanasinghe, 1994).  
 
Again in January 1991, the said ministry submitted a Cabinet memorandum to 
implement the recommendation of establishing a Senior Management Group (SMG) 
with some modifications to the form envisaged by the ARC. The Cabinet referred 
this proposal to the Committee of Secretaries, but, according to the ARC Chair, ―the 
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proposal did not find favour with them‖ (Wanasinghe, 1994, p. 10). The Committee 
―rejected the proposal fearing that they may not be selected to it‖ (Somasundram, 
1997, p. 349). They did not want to lose their positions.  
 
Another reason might be that they did not like the suggested entry requirements or to 
undergo the induction procedure to enter into the SMG in addition to their years of 
seniority at that point of time because ―ARC did not envisage automatic membership 
of such a group by virtue of a position in the administrative hierarchy. It envisaged a 
process of talent hunting. The members were expected to display capacity for policy 
management, crisis anticipation, and control, as well as leadership capability‖ 
(Fernando, 2005, p.124). It seems that the senior bureaucrats themselves resisted this 
reform because they were reluctant to introduce competitiveness to enter the SMG 
and for posts inside the SMG. They preferred seniority which was the easiest way to 
get into the highest positions under patronage. However, that system did not 
necessarily permit the most qualified personnel to handle particular tasks.  
 
In 1996 and in 2003 again, there were further attempts at creating a SMG but without 
success. These attempts were influenced by some senior bureaucrats who were 
disappointed with the existing system and had necessary qualifications to be entered 
into SMG, and/or who had genuine desire to implement the new system for the 
betterment of the SLPS. Strong resistance by the rigid and conservative senior 
bureaucrats prevented all attempts at implementation.  
 
Another example of bureaucratic resistance was evident in 1990 when ―the Ministry 
of Finance and Planning, without consulting the Ministry of Public Administration or 
obtaining approval of government invited a UNDP mission to review similar areas as 
already covered by the ARC‖ (Nadarajah, 1997, pp.260-261). This action 
undermined the ARC and the attempt taken by the Ministry of Public Administration 
to implement its recommendations. The details of this project have already been 
discussed in Chapter 5. Thus; it was evident that there has been a lack of political and 
bureaucratic will to implement the whole agenda of the ARC‘s recommendations.  
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6.5.3 Uncoordinated Administrative Power Relations 
 
In addition to the lack of political will and bureaucratic support, uncoordinated 
administrative power relations that existed in the administrative structure might have 
largely hindered the smooth implementation of the ARC recommendations. The SL 
post-Independence administrative structure was largely based on the changes that 
followed the Donoughmore reforms of 1942 as depicted in Figure 8.  
Figure 8: The Post-Independence Administrative Structure of SL  
 
Source: Wijeweera, 1988, p. 11  
 
According to this structure there were several ministries at the top with equal status 
and there was no single body to coordinate all functions at the top. The power 
relations and the chain of command of individual ministries were such that it flowed 
from the ministry to the departmental head office (located in Colombo which is not 
depicted in Figure 8), from there to the departmental branch office of the district and 
backwards, even ignoring the Kachcheri which was the coordinating body at the 
district. Therefore it lacked coherence and created confusion at the district level. 
Each ministry concentrated on its specialised functions, ignoring cohesiveness in 
administration. This network of administration was further complicated later in 1987 
Ministry Ministry Ministry Ministry 
Kachcheri Kachcheri Kachcheri Kachcheri 
District offices of Government Departments 
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with the introduction of the PCs in each province as the second layer of 
administration which was not displayed in the diagram. 
 
As such the above structure was not conducive to the implementation of the full 
ARC recommendations, without establishing a separate ministry or a Secretariat at 
the apex under the President as a coordinating body as proposed by the ARC.  
 
6.5.4 Lack of Citizens’ Support or Clear Direction, 
Prioritisation in the Reporting Methodology 
 
In addition to uncoordinated administrative power relations, there are other reasons 
for not implementing fully ARC recommendations. The first reason was the lack of 
citizens‘ support. The second reason was the reporting methodology adopted by the 
ARC itself.  
 
In an interview, the Chair of the ARC, H. S. Wanasinghe, commented on the lack of 
public awareness, and the weaknesses in reporting methodology, 
The people didn‘t know about the ARC. They did not know whether this was important. 
There was no real attempt by the media to give it [ARC‘s recommendations] to the 
public. Media will report on murders not on these matters. There were no well informed 
civil society groups which were active. Unless there is a tremendous public outcry there 
won‘t be any reforms.  
 
He further said, 
The presentation of the recommendations in ten reports defeated its very objectives that 
had in mind. It contributed to and encouraged a piecemeal approach to implementation; it 
facilitated a tendency to ignore the more difficult changes; it made ultimately the fizzling 
out of the reform process itself. Not being presented in a single document to which the 
public had easy access, the reform agenda also failed to mobilise the level of public 
interest and support which could have countered the implementation inertia (Interview, 
22.12.2007).  
 
Ten reports were published separately at different times, for example, Reports No.1, 
2 and 3 were published in December 1987, Report No.4 in September 1987, and 
Reports No. 5, 6 and 7 in February 1988. Not publishing these reports as one 
document might have adversely effected the implementation of the full ARC 
recommendations. 
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Furthermore, the ARC reports contained no phased implementation plan, no 
summary of the recommendations which could be easily understood, and no priority 
order for the implementations of its recommendations. The Chair of the ARC 
commented, 
Our view was they [recommendations] should be addressed as a group. The prioritising of 
one area would not serve the purpose. We saw it as agenda of reform. It should be an 
integrated agenda. We expected the proposed Ministry of Public Service to plan the 
implementation strategy. They could decide what to do first or to modify. It did not 
happen (Interview, 22.12.2007). 
 
This lack of clear direction on the part of the recommendations meant that other 
actors set their own priorities; for example, there was pressure from the Indian 
Government to implement devolution, and donor pressures for the implementation of 
their specific reforms such as deregulation and privatisation. This also might have 
contributed to the lack of attention for ARC. Furthermore, there was a lack of 
institutional capacity to implement them as a whole.  
 
6.5.5 Power Struggles by Tamil Minority and Activities of 
JVP 
 
Another major cause which distorted the implementation of the ARC reforms 
specifically and other social and economic development programmes in general, has 
been the power struggle by the minority Tamils and the actions of the JVP. The ARC 
released its findings at a turbulent and inopportune time. The years 1988 and 1989
72
 
were politically chaotic ones with the LTTE activities on the one hand and the JVP 
uprising on the other, together with the high cost of living and confusion about the 
future of the newly established PCs which have been already discussed (Fernando, 
2005). The Members of PCs were threatened by the JVP, some were shot dead 
(Shastri, 1992). 
 
As explained in Chapter 5 the government brought the Indian Peace Keeping Force 
(IPKF) to the North and East part of SL to implement the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in 
relation to devolution of power. The LTTE in the North was strongly against having 
                                                 
72
 Whilst LTTE activities spreading throughout the country during this period  the JVP, Marxist party, 
fought against the establishment of PCs under the Indo-Lanka Accord. Thousands of youth died. The 
JVP organized several strikes in work places, and disrupted public transportation.  
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the IPKF in their territory and increased their violence accordingly.  In addition to 
the LTTE conflict, during the same period the Government faced severe threats from 
the People‘s Liberation Front known as JVP, in the South and other parts of the 
country. The JVP was vehemently against the Indo-Lanka Accord and the 
intervention of India in domestic conflict resolution. This was the second youth 
insurrection in the SL post-Independence history (the first insurrection occurred in 
1971 due to the high level of unemployment and the policy of patronage recruitment 
in the SLPS). In this insurrection a number of successful strikes were organised in 
every sphere: government workers including nurses, bank employees, doctors, and 
estate workers. These incidents diverted the government‘s attention from 
implementation of the ARC‘s recommendations.  
 
The ARC‘s Chair, H.S. Wanasinghe, drew attention to the remark attributed to 
President J.R. Jayewardene when asked why he did not comprehensively implement 
the ARC‘s recommendations, 
I am fighting the LTTE in the North and the JVP in the South. Do you think I want to 
have a fight with the public servants in addition? – J.R. Jayewardene 
 
Against this backdrop the government was swift to give salary increases to public 
servants; one of the ARC‘s recommendations, but ignored the logical order stipulated 
by the ARC: comprehensive cadre review, along with a detailed analysis of jobs in 
each public organisation, and failed to identify excess cadres and retrench them. 
Instead salary increases were implemented in the already-bloated bureaucracy. The 
pressure from the trade unions, the PC elections and the Presidential election 
scheduled for 1988 and 1989 respectively influenced the implementation of this 
recommendation. In its report the ARC had stipulated an indicative figure of 20% 
reduction of 72,000 cadres by mid 1989. This recommendation was not implemented 
until 1989. The failure to implement this recommendation led to dissatisfaction on 
the part of the donors who supported the structural adjustment programme at that 
time (Fernando, 2005).  As a result, the Ministry of Public Administration offered a 
blanket retirement option to all public officers without pre-determination of specific 
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categories of actual excess cadres by the circular 44/90
73
. Accordingly, public 
officials who were not in surplus and could get employment elsewhere got the 
opportunity of windfall retirement terms offered while staff actually in surplus 
remained in the SLPS. According to Fernando (2005), some of them were later re-
employed. These actions in fact diluted the objective of reform.  
 
However, the government failed to implement the critical recommendations made by 
the ARC in relation to devolution,
74
 which was aimed at resolving the LTTE conflict, 
except for the recommendation on a number of provincial ministries.  S. Ranugge, 
the Secretary of the Ministry of Export Development and International Trade, in an 
interview said, 
ARC‘s recommendations were very comprehensive, well prepared and documented, and 
superb. With regard to devolution they recommended to have 5 ministries at the 
provincial level. Otherwise we will have more ministries at the provincial level like in the 
centre (Interview, 19.11. 2007).  
 
This failure to implement other critical recommendations on devolution together with 
other reasons led to the collapse the North and East PC, leading to disorder in 
administration as explained in Chapter 4. It also led to the downgrading of the 
process of administrative improvement. ―Sri Lanka has paid a heavy price in terms of 
slow growth, missed opportunities, inadequacy of sustainability in the change 
introduced in the economy, the society and the polity and avoidable budget deficit‖ 
(Wanasinghe, 1994, p. 4). In addition, SL has lost many lives, properties and 
infrastructure facilities. The conflict also created psychological disorders in people.  
 
Over the past 30 years until 18
th
 May 2009 violence has continued aggressively. 
LTTE have dominated in the North as a military group fighting with government, 
considering themselves as the sole representatives of the Tamil community. They did 
not allow democratic politics to play its legitimate role in the North and East and also 
                                                 
73
 Under this circular 30,855 personnel: 1123 in managerial grades, 9676 clerical grades, 8258 minor 
grades and 11,758 teachers were retired. The annual average retirement prior to this circular was 
18,000 (Marga Institute, 1995).  
74
 The ARC recommendations were: (i) keeping the size of the concurrent list to a minimum (subjects 
both centre and province concurrently exercise) (ii) making a clear cut demarcation of functions and 
development sectors between the centre and provinces; (iii) avoiding the use of financial relationships 
as a control mechanism; (iv) limiting the centre‘s discretionary power in sharing resources; (v) 
reducing the number of central government ministries and departments in line with devolution.  
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did not allow maintaining law and order imposed by the central government in their 
area. The civil administration in the entire Northern Province has collapsed and the 
LTTE has established its own administration and judiciary. The LTTE terrorism 
spread to other parts of the country as well as to the world.   
 
This situation led the successive governments to find a firm solution. It seemed that 
all governments tried to do something while still ignoring the ARC 
recommendations. The PA Government in 1995 presented a set of proposals 
including the creation of Regional Councils with more devolved power, and 
rectification of some of the shortcomings of the 13
th
 Amendment to the Constitution 
which established PCs (Somasundram, 1997). In 2002, the UNP Government 
proposed establishing an Interim Administrative Body. However, these proposals 
were unsuccessful due to lack of support from the other parties in Parliament. Thus, 
all successive governments throughout their times in office were preoccupied with 
finding a solution to ethnic conflict but ended up with military actions from both 
sides.  
 
Accordingly, during the last two decades since the ARC completed its report in 1987 
recommending a series of reforms with a view to establishing an efficient, effective, 
responsible and professional SLPS, the internal power struggle by the minority 
LTTE and the actions of the JVP group has diverted the government‘s attention 
towards military actions, hindering reforms recommended by the ARC.   
 
6.5.6 Changes in Polity, and Government  
 
Like the power struggles by various groups, the changes in polity and government 
might also affect the smooth implementation of the ARC‘s recommendations. This 
section examines these aspects in detail since the ARC completed its reports, from 
1987 to 1994 under the UNP regime, from 1994 to 2001 and 2004-5 under the SLFP 
regime and 2001-2004 by the UNP. 
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During the Period of UNP (1977-94) 
 
The UNP Government which came to power in 1977 continued for 17 years, winning 
every election
75
 until 1994. It was the longest regime by one party since post-
Independence. Therefore, one might argue that there was a stable government when 
ARC completed its report in 1988 and there was a possibility to implement its 
recommendations without any prejudice. Although the same party continued for 17 
years, there were several remarkable changes in the UNP itself during 1987-1994. 
These changes badly affected the ARC reforms as well as the UNP itself.  
 
Firstly, President Jayewardene, who established the ARC, completed his second term 
in 1989 amidst severe violence in the country. He appointed the Prime Minister, R. 
Premadasa, who opposed the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord to the UNP leadership. The 
Presidential election was held in 1988 amid unprecedented violence and a near – 
total breakdown of law and order (Matthews, 1989), and Premadasa became the 
second Executive President in SL. Premadasa appointed D.B. Wijetunge as the Prime 
Minister and Minister of Finance by overlooking two prominent and intellectual 
senior ministers, one of whom deserved and expected to be the Prime Minister, 
namely Lalith Athulathmudali and Gamini Dissanayake. He offered relatively 
unimportant portfolios to these two charismatic ministers, mentioning that he would 
rotate the Prime Ministership on a yearly basis, but this did not occur.  
 
Secondly, the new President inherited massive economic, political and military 
problems from the outgoing President. There were two major problems. One was the 
large number of Indian military forces (estimated around 100,000 as at 1988) in the 
country, who were brought especially to disarm the LTTE according to the Indo-Sri 
Lanka Accord (Matthews, 1989). The other was the JVP activities against the UNP 
regime as mentioned before.  President Premadasa gave priority to solving these two 
problems. Once he solved them, by 1991 he went on his own agenda of reforms in 
decentralisation of administration by establishing 300 Divisional Secretariats at 
divisional level, giving more power by taking out the powers and functions hitherto 
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 SL parliamentary election is held in every five years. However, the election scheduled for 1982 was 
not held; instead a referendum was held to extend the period of the government for another five years. 
 254 
vested with the 25 GAs at the district level (Chapter 3). He wanted to take the 
administration to the grass-root level which was a must for the day, and thus, he 
ignored the ARC. 
 
Thirdly, in 1991, President Premadasa was accused by the other members of the 
party of having given arms and money to LTTE to fight against IPKF. He was to be 
impeached with 120 parliamentarians secretly signing the impeachment motion 
(Singer, 1991). The President, having got to know the secret, suspended Parliament 
for one month to find a solution to avoid being impeached.   
 
In addition, he fired corrupt ministers and stopped the common practice of secretaries 
doing personal favours for the ministers for whom they worked.  He became more 
and more authoritarian, and there was virtually no area that he did not involve 
himself in (Singer, 1991). Finally he defeated the impeachment and humiliated those 
who made the impeachment against him by giving them meaningless portfolios and 
depriving them of their power.  
 
Fourthly, the impact of the above incidents weakened the UNP and the President. 
Some senior ministers including Athulathmudali and Dissanayake left the 
government and established another party in 1991. The President‘s party lost its 
majority so they had to look for the support of the minority Tamils or Muslims. 
These internal conflicts in the UNP might also have hindered the effective 
implementation of ARC reforms. As the ARC Chair mentioned, the ARC initiative 
did not flow from president Premadasa and he wanted to do things that he wanted, 
thus, no attempt was taken to implement its recommendations.  
 
Lastly, in 1993, President Premadasa was assassinated by a suicide bomber while he 
was participating in a Labour Day rally and the Prime Minister, Wijetunge 
immediately was sworn in as the President following the constitutional procedures. 
Due to these changes in the UNP the PA (SLFP, Communist Party, Lanka Sama 
Samaja Party, DUNF) led by Chief Minister of Western PC, Chandrika 
Kumaratunga, was able to win the general election held in August 1994.  
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Accordingly, the UNP that established the ARC lost momentum in implementing its 
recommendations in their entirety due to a number of clashes in its own party and its 
leadership.  
During SLFP Regime (1994-2001) 
 
The change of government from UNP to PA in 1994 distracted attention from the 
public sector reform initiatives of the previous regime. This period also saw a lot of 
violence in the country. The new government went along with its own agenda put 
forward at the election campaign: to eradicate corruption, make inquiries into human 
rights abuses, and find political solutions to ongoing ethnic conflict. Accordingly, the 
Bribery Act of 1954 was amended and a Bribery and Corruption Commission was 
established because the SLPS was highly criticised for alleged corruption. In 
addition, the Public Enterprises Reform Commission was established to streamline 
the privatisation programme of the government. Furthermore, the government 
appointed a Committee to Investigate Human Right violations by both previous UNP 
government and the LTTE (Somasundram, 1997). 
 
President Kumaratunga also promised to abolish the Executive President system by 
changing the Constitution because there was agitation to remove it from the political 
system. The concentration of executive power in one person was thought to be 
harmful to democratic governance as President Jayewardene had obtained undated 
resignation letters from all MPs to control them, thus the implementation of ARC 
recommendations was given little attention.  
 
However, later the President herself experienced difficulties in getting information 
from the ministries coming under her purview and witnessed that the SLPS was 
inefficient. ADB pressurised the President for administrative reforms (Wanasinghe, 
2007), thus, she invited international consultants, from the United States and New 
Zealand, to the country in 1996 as mentioned before, drawing attention to reforming 
the SLPS but ignoring the ARC reports completed ten years earlier. However, 
according to the consultants, their recommendations were not implemented 
effectively by the government either (Root et al., 2001). 
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Nevertheless, there were some reforming bureaucrats during this regime who were 
concerned about the ARC‘s recommendations. They introduced a PA system 
(Chapter 5) which was one of the ARC‘s recommendations through the Presidential 
Secretariat in 1998. However, the implementation of this reform to date has been 
inadequate and inefficient as mentioned in Chapter 4.  The Chair of the ARC, H.S. 
Wanasinghe, commented on this attempt,  
The potential of officials who pushed this reform agenda during the UNP and the SLFP 
regime are high, if they had the political will. There is a limit for what public official can 
do. No one could do anything due to lack of political will (Interview, 08.01.2008).  
 
In addition to the change of leadership, a series of elections after 1994 might have 
affected the implementation of the ARC recommendations. Although the Presidential 
election was scheduled to be held in 2000, the President Kumaratunga advanced the 
election by one year. In addition, there were three PC elections in the same year. 
Furthermore in October, 2000, there was a parliamentary election so that the 
government was fully occupied with maintaining its power base, and had no time for 
anything else.  
 
In 2000, the PA once again formed the government. During President Kumaratunga‘s 
second regime the only significant event occurring in the area of public sector reform 
was the creation of an independent PSC in 2001, which was one of the ARC 
recommendations, and which was achieved by amending the Constitution through 
the 17
th
 Amendment (Chapter 5).  
 
However, this government did not last long. The Opposition, UNP, brought a no-
confidence motion against the government. The economic difficulties, (the economy 
recorded negative growth rate -1.5%) and failures in peace efforts led to this 
situation. The President tried to protect her power inviting the Opposition to join 
with her creating a National Unity Government (Shastri, 2001). But the Opposition 
refused her invitation. The President suspended the Parliament on July 11, 2001 for 
two months to strengthen her position.  She proposed to have a referendum for 
constitutional reform but without success. In the meantime some of her key ministers 
crossed over to UNP. Finally she dissolved Parliament in October 2001, calling for a 
fresh election.  
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During UNP Regime (2001-4) 
 
The UNP came into power in 2001 with a much reduced majority under the 
leadership of Ranil Wickramasinghe as the Prime Minister. The Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Government and the LTTE which led to ceasefire was 
reached. Due to cessation of hostilities the government was able to concentrate on 
economic and public sector reforms during its rule.  
 
This government recognised the problem of overstaffing in the SLPS and banned 
public sector recruitment for two years, one of the ARC recommendations (Chapter 
4). H.S. Wanasinghe, the Chair of the ARC, said, 
The SL politicians think what is the use of being a politician if he cannot appoint persons 
to the public service, but Ranil [Prime Minister 2001-2004] personally might think 
otherwise, not others in his party. He realised that they are going to be bankrupted soon if 
the government recruits more people (Interview, 08.01.2008).   
 
In addition, this government initiated new types of reforms according to the political 
and socio-economic condition of the country, for example, Financial Management 
Reforms (Chapter 5).    
 
With the Presidency held by the SLFP and the Parliament by UNP, the government 
faced difficulties in approving policies. The Prime Minister faced problems over 
time. On November 4, 2003, the President took over the control of key ministries 
from UNP ministers and later suspended Parliament. She later dissolved Parliament 
calling for an election. 
 
During SLFP Regime (2004 —) 
 
This was the third election in four years.  The UPFA (led by SLFP) won the election. 
The government was inactive until September 2004. The economy suffered once 
again during 2004 due to political instability and mismanagement of the economy 
(De Votta, 2004). In the same year some members of the LTTE departed and formed 
Tamil Elam People‘s Liberation Tigers. They started a hit-and-run attack on LTTE in 
the East (De Silva, 2005). In December 2004, the Tsunami killed thousands of 
people, rendered over a million of people homeless and damaged the whole 
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economy. In the first few months of 2005, attention was concentrated on dealing with 
the post-Tsunami rehabilitation and welfare in the country. The JVP and UNP 
accused the government of using Tsunami foreign assistance to strengthen its 
political base (De Silva, 2005). As a result, in June 2005, the JVP crossed over to the 
Opposition in Parliament.  
 
These illustrations from 1987 to 2005 show that the power hunger of SL politicians 
above national interest hindered meaningful advancement in the public sector, 
economy and the society. The enthusiasm shown by the UNP leaders in establishing 
the ARC diminished when it came to implementation of its recommendations amidst 
the political turmoil within the UNP itself. The craving of power by other political 
parties and the military groups and the violence throughout the country made the 
situation worse. Furthermore, a series of elections for Parliament, PCs, and the 
Presidency throughout this period, and Tsunami Disaster, distracted political 
attention and will in the implementation of ARC recommendations. Moreover, 
changes in the governments also badly affected the implementation of the ARC 
recommendations because the government of the day tried to implement their own 
agenda put forward by them in the election manifestos.  
6.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter reviewed the ARC report of 1986/88 and examined why its 
recommendations were not fully implemented by successive governments since it 
completed its task.  
 
The ARC in fact attempted to introduce an effective, efficient, politically neutral and 
citizen-oriented public service. However, this hope was eventually thwarted mainly 
due to the lack of political will despite its far-reaching recommendations. Moreover, 
a major puzzle remains as to why President Jayewardene
76
 established the ARC in 
the first place because it was evident that he did not seriously intend to do anything, 
despite pressures for reform by donors. Rigid and conservative bureaucrats further 
blocked the spirit of reforms. The reform agenda failed to mobilise the public interest 
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 President Jayewardene passed away in 1996. 
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due to a lack of publicity. There was no effective citizens‘ group to make the public 
aware of the ARC recommendations and the need for getting them implemented. 
Moreover, there was no central agency to carry out the whole agenda of reform 
consistently as recommended by the ARC. The uncoordinated administrative 
structure was a great barrier for effective implementation of any programme.  
Furthermore, the power struggle by Tamil groups and the activities of the JVP 
political party along with the changes in the political environment and governments 
from 1987-2005, distorted continuous implementation of ARC reforms in their 
entirety. Therefore, it is pertinent to note that these barriers (except Tamils‘ violence 
at the time of writing)
77
 to reform still exist, thus should be taken in to account in the 
future reform exercise suggested in the next chapter.  
 
It seems that there was no holistic effort to push the whole agenda forward, but in a 
piecemeal manner due to various pressures of the day. Many attempts were foiled 
and the majority of the reforms introduced were neither effective nor productive as 
expected by the ARC, for example, establishment of PA, and an independent PSC. 
Non-implementation of the whole agenda is evident and the consequences can be 
seen today (Chapter 4). If its recommendations had been fully implemented SL 
would have an effective, efficient, citizen centred and impartial public service today. 
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 The LTTE was militarily defeated in May 2009. 
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Chapter 7: Study Findings and Future 
Prospects 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
This thesis is based on the assumption that a system of governance reflects the 
specifics of the country and any attempt at reform must be built on those specifics. 
The current status of government affairs and past reform experiences of SL, discussed 
in previous chapters (Chapters 4 and 5 respectively), demonstrate that the specifics of 
SL‘s political and administrative system have been a major impediment to reform.  
 
This chapter discusses the suitability of the theoretical framework illustrated in 
Chapter 2 in explaining the reform experience in SL and revises that framework 
based on the SL‘s reform experiences. It also evaluates the success or failures of the 
reforms while assessing factors which assisted or may have impeded such outcomes. 
Further, it highlights major issues to be addressed, draws some lessons from past 
reforms and reaches some conclusions for future efforts.  
 
7.2 Applicability of the Pollitt and Bouckaert 
Analytical Model   
       
The Pollitt and Bouckaert model discussed in Chapter 2 brings historical institutional 
perspectives to change. It indicates broad forces which drive and resist change based 
on the study of 12 developed countries. According to this model decision makers are 
influenced by various elements such as socio-economic forces (global economic 
forces, socio-demographic changes, and socio-economic policies); political systems 
(new management ideas, pressure from citizens, and party political ideas); 
administrative systems (content of reform packages, implementation processes and 
results achieved); and chance events (scandals and disasters) in the reform process. 
This section discusses the applicability of these elements in the SL context and 
assesses the adequacy of the model in explaining the process of the SL reforms from 
1950-2005.  
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A. Socio-Economic Forces 
 
Socio-economic forces including global economic forces, socio-demographic changes 
and socio-economic policies as shown by the Pollitt and Bouckaert, have had some 
impact on administrative reforms in SL. These elements have already been discussed 
in Chapter 5 and they are reiterated below in terms of their relevancy in SL‘s reforms 
initiatives.  
 
B. Global Economic Forces  
 
The influence of the donor community is a vital background factor for SL‘s reform. 
Multinational and bilateral donor agencies, especially the World Bank and IMF, have 
enforced privatisation, contracting out of public services, reduction of social welfare 
expenditure, and introduction of financial and civil service reforms. This was partly 
carried out under the Structural Adjustment Programme as part of conditional aid in 
the 1980s. It is evident that establishment of the ARC was influenced by the World 
Bank and IMF. Although the IMF office in SL was closed down in 2007 at the 
request of the JVP, it still continues to influence reforms through its reports.  
  
C. Socio-Demographic Change 
 
The other vital factor which influences administrative reforms in SL is socio-
demographic change, for example, unemployment and ethnic disharmony have an 
important impact on administrative reforms. Unemployment created a situation of 
youth insurgency in 1971 and ethnic disharmony created a situation of war from 
1983. The government established DDCs to create employment opportunities in 1971 
and established PCs in 1988 in an attempt to solve the ethnic conflict.  
 
D. Socio-economic Policies 
 
The third background factor of considerable importance is the socio-economic 
policies of governments over time. The closed economy policy (1970-1977) led to a 
contraction of the economy whereas the government that came into power in 1977 
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opened the economy. As a result, the country adopted policies of economic 
liberalisation and deregulation to attract foreign capital.  It also adopted privatisation 
to promote efficiency and relieve pressure on public expenditure, and to bring about 
more market-oriented approaches such as contracting out public services and selling 
public assets to private parties.  Further, it introduced the Janasaviya Programme 
(national poverty alleviation programme) in the late 1980s to reduce poverty 
(Wignaraja & Sirivardana, 2004). The government that came into power in 2005 
adopted the policy of non-privatisation. 
 
E. Political system 
 
Governments in SL change frequently and are often coalition governments. During 
these upheavals the position of the President (prior to 1972 a largely symbolic role) 
has become executive with more powers. The 1978 constitutional reform changed the 
electoral system from first-past-the-post to a Proportional Representation System with 
preferential votes. As a result, coalition governments have become the norm. 
Furthermore, there has been a move away from centralisation towards devolution 
with the major constitutional change in 1987 when provincial governments were 
introduced. Furthermore constitutional changes were introduced with the aim of de-
politicisation of key institutions.   
 
F. New Management Ideas 
 
The New Public Management (NPM)
78
 ideas such as the US re-invention process, 
UK Next Steps, and the NZ and Australian versions of Contractualisation that had 
been circulating around the world during the 1980s with the aim of improving public 
sector efficiency and accountability reached SL in the 1990s. There was an attempt by 
the ADB (1996) to introduce some elements of the New Zealand reforms of the 
1980s, such as the result-oriented management system and decoupling the policy and 
operational functions, but without success (Chapter 5). Nevertheless, it appears that 
                                                 
78
 NPM has become one of the dominant paradigms for public management across the world. The 
principles of NPM are characterised by an emphasis on output controls, disaggregation of traditional 
bureaucratic organisations and decentralisation of management authority, the introduction of market 
and quasy-market  mechanisms, and customer-oriented services (Boston et al, 1991,Hood, 1990, p. 4-
5) 
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the recent reforms, the introduction of the Fiscal Management Responsibility Act 
(2003), establishment of the Management Assistant Service (2005), introduction of 
the Citizen-Client Charter (2006) and financial management reforms (2001-2007), are 
influenced by NPM ideas. In addition, the Productivity Secretariat of SL influences 
government institutions to adopt private sector practices and concepts such as the 5 S 
Concept, Six Sigma, TQM or ISO 9000 principles.  
 
G. Pressure from Citizens   
 
The Language Reform (1956) was influenced by the citizens, religious elites and 
party political ideas. However, in the current SL context pressure from citizens for 
administrative reform is very minimal as discussed in Chapter 6. This is mainly due 
to a lack of effective citizen‘s groups in SL although there are lot of political 
organisations. The media is now emerging but there is a lack of press freedom.  
 
H. Party Political Ideas 
 
The key group involved in the process of reforms in SL are political parties. Political 
parties continuously engage in the process of reforms, for example, electoral systems, 
education, health and decentralisation, because they need new policies and ideas to 
increase their political capital, appease party activists and advance their ideological 
beliefs in order to win elections.  In the SL context party political ideas appear to 
have had much influence in the reform process. The nationalisation and establishment 
of PEs, the decentralisation efforts through the introduction of DDCs,  DPAs and 
DCB by the SLFP, and the establishment of DM system, by the UNP governments 
are a few examples. 
 
I. Chance Events (e.g. scandals and disasters) 
 
The global economic crises as well as domestic scandals and crises directly impact on 
SL‘s reforms; for example, the global food crisis in the early 1970s influenced the UF 
government to establish the DPAs to drive food production locally. Furthermore, the 
majority of system improvements through information technology took place in the 
recent past because of fraudulent activities in the service delivery processes. For 
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example, corrupt activities of issuance of passports, identity cards, drivers‘ licenses, 
and massive fraud in the IRD have led to several reforms. 
 
J. Elites in Decision-making 
 
The Pollitt and Bouckaert framework recognises that most of the changes in the SLPS 
originate from the top, particularly executive politicians and senior civil servants. The 
SL experience supports this theory. In most policy areas the main players involved in 
reforms are elected officials because they have the legitimate power to endorse and 
implement reforms during their administration. As noted in Chapter 5, 
decentralisation of administration through DDCs and the introduction of the 
Executive President came from President Jayewardene while introduction of DSs 
came from President Premadasa. During their regimes a privatisation policy was 
introduced in the early 1980s, although with only partial success and limited public 
support. Privatisation was subsequently banned by the present President Rajapaksa in 
order to keep the coalition partner, JVP, tied to the government.  
 
Associated with the political elites senior bureaucrats are the second-most important 
figures in reforms. They are not only involved in policy development but also 
engaged in their implementation. They have legitimate authority through various 
enactments for improvement of productivity, efficiency and performance of 
institutions under their purview. They also enhance their own interests such as 
retaining their positions and perks, helping their family members and relatives to get 
into public institutions, and achieve promotions by strengthening their relationship 
with political masters. The introduction of DMs, the Citizens‘ Charter and 
Management Assistant Service were initiated by the senior bureaucrats.  
 
In addition, the politicians and the bureaucrats are veto-players in the game of policy 
transfers, for example, the recommendations of the ARC were not fully implemented 
due to a lack of political will. Furthermore, the creation of a Senior Management 
Group and the strengthening of the policy unit of the Ministry of Public 
Administration to implement key recommendations of the ARC were obstructed by 
the senior bureaucrats.  
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As noted in Chapter 5, in addition to the political elites and senior bureaucrats, the 
religious elites, trade unions, professional organisations, student front organisations, 
and political party supporters including businessmen are powerful veto-players in the 
public administrative reform process in SL. Influence of the religious elites was a 
critical factor in the Language Reform and sharing of power to the periphery. Many 
attempts at power sharing through the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact in the late 
1950s, and the Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact in the 1960s were foiled due to 
strong resistance by Buddhist monks. Similarly, trade unions are powerful institutions 
in the reform process. So far trade unions have contributed more in resisting reforms 
rather than supporting reforms, for example, they resisted the establishment of a 
Revenue Authority under the Fiscal Management Reform, and implementation of the 
ARC recommendation on reduction of public service cadres. Student Front 
Organisations resist the introduction of private higher educational institutions. The 
professional groups (Administrators, Lawyers, and Accountants) emerging in the 21
st
 
century played a critical role in the introduction of the 17
th
 Amendment to the 
Constitution. In addition, the Head of State is also a key veto player in administrative 
reforms. The 17
th
 Amendment to the Constitution failed due to resistance from the 
President.  
 
Accordingly, the SL elites primarily considered reforms which interested them, 
particularly focusing on the political feasibility of the reforms where they gain 
political capital rather than technical feasibility. One aspect however, in the SL 
context which is not covered by Pollitt and Bouckaert is pressure groups. This is 
depicted in the revised model introduced by this thesis at Figure 9 below (Box 1(v)). 
The pressure groups influence elites on their decisions on reforms as well as in the 
implementation process. Therefore, the proposition, ―selection of reforms agendas by 
evaluating what is feasible out of what is desirable‖ noted by the Pollitt and 
Bouckaert model (2004, p.25) is not always in operation in every policy transfer in 
SL due to political considerations. As a result, some unfeasible reform agendas were 
hurriedly implemented by the political elites in order to harvest and retain power, 
knowing that they were unfeasible, for example, the Language Act.  
 
In addition, according to the Pollitt and Bouckaert model, elites reassess reforms 
based on results. In the SL context elites reassess reforms not only based on the result 
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but also reactions of other players (Figure 9, 1(v)). For example, after the enactment 
of Language Act in 1956, the government introduced the Language Special Provision 
Act in 1958 due to influence of the pressure groups and then later in 1987 made 
special provision in the Constitution giving equal respect to Sinhala and Tamil 
languages under the pressure of Indian Government (Figure 9, 2(i)).   
 
K. The Administrative System 
 
The Pollitt and Bouckaert model explains that administrative systems are often 
difficult to change in more than incremental ways because the culture and discipline 
are entrenched into the systems. This is evident in the SL context. The administrative 
system of SL is strongly aligned with the political system. From 1970s onwards, 
following the abolition of the independent PSC and assumption of its powers by 
Cabinet, and the abolition of permanent secretaries in 1972, patronage politics 
became progressively and more thoroughly embedded in the administrative system. 
The reform in 2001 attempted to de-politicise several agencies, but expected 
outcomes are yet to be achieved due to reluctance of the political elites to depart from 
the vested interests, culture and discipline. Due to vested interests, this reform did not 
target total removal of political hands from personnel management functions. The 
attempt to introduce a performance-oriented culture also failed. The administrative 
system is more fragmented than before with so many ministries. Consensual and 
corporatist ways of doing things are very rare in the political administrative arena.    
 
Reform from centralisation to decentralisation is somewhat difficult as discussed in 
Chapter 4. The centralised polity and bureaucrats always resist devolving power to 
the periphery. Personnel management powers are decentralised but senior public 
servants in the provinces too are handpicked by the rulers. All the decentralisation 
efforts and other reforms through the ARC failed due to the unwillingness of these 
two groups to delegate their power. This shows clearly that administrative systems 
cannot change radically though they need such change due to the prevalent culture 
and discipline.   
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L. Content of the Reform Package 
 
The main factor in the Pollitt and Bouckaert model influencing content is elite 
decisions. As discussed, the SL administrative modernisation began in 1956 with the 
revolutionary change.  When the Socialist Democrats (SLFP and its allied parties) 
returned to power in 1960, they wanted to make the state machine more responsive 
and accessible to the ordinary people. The content of their reforms were based on that 
theme. They abolished elite services, the CCS and VH system, created the Ministry of 
Public Administration as a symbol of their reforming intent, abolished the PSC and 
took over its functions under the purview of the Cabinet in order to make public 
officials responsive to them. During the 1980s the right-wing UNP gave priority to 
decentralisation of authority to address the ethnic problem and focused more on 
economic reforms during its regime. Deregulation and privatisation were key 
contents. In the SL context reforms content essentially has been based on election 
pledges.  
 
M. The Implementation Process 
 
The most important part of the Pollitt and Bouckaert model is implementation of 
reforms (Figure 1, Box M) i.e. attempts to put reform ideas into practice, because the 
implementation of reforms through a top down approach involves a number of layers 
in decision-making and many levels of administration, from Cabinet level to the 
agency level. The chance of effective implementation of reform programmes 
therefore, depends on the willingness and incentive of politicians and senior civil 
servants to take decisions and implement reforms. In the SL context many attempts at 
public administration reforms have failed due to implementation inertia, for example, 
key recommendations of the ARC. Some of the recommendations were partially 
implemented while others were ignored. All the decentralisation attempts, DPAs, and 
DDCs suffered and PCs are suffering today due to the lack of willingness of the 
central ministers and bureaucrats to delegate adequate powers and functions to the 
sub-national level organisations introduced by the reforms. Therefore, as explained by 
the Pollitt and Bouckaert model the results achieved from the reforms were not 
always the anticipated outcomes of the ‗reformers‘.  
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N. Reforms Achieved 
 
There has been a lack of any systematic approach to evaluate the outcomes of reforms 
in SL so far.  However, there was evidence to say that some of the reforms were 
partially successful but most of them were disappointing. Some were totally rejected 
by elites at the decision-making point while almost all had some type of problem at 
the implementation process. Therefore, almost all the reforms did not achieve 
intended objectives due to one reason or other. Reforms achieved will be further 
discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
 
In summation, this section analysed the factors that contributed and impeded the post-
independent public administrative reforms in SL by using the Pollitt and Bouckaert 
model and assessed its applicability in the SL context. This model provided 
meaningful guidance in explaining the reform experience but the model did not allow 
a full analysis of critical factors that contributed and resisted reforms in the SL 
context.  Therefore, a revised model has been developed.  
7.3 Revision of Pollitt and Bouckaert Model of Public   
Management  
 
The Pollitt and Bouckaert model omits the role of politics and the power of major 
veto-players in the civil society such as religious elites, trade unions, professional 
groups, and political party supporters including businessmen, and the head of state, 
which could support or obstruct reforms in public administration. Similarly, this 
model does not explain the influence of ―Administrative Reviews‖ and ―Regional 
Power Groups‘ in elite decision-making. It explains only ―New Management Ideas‖ 
and ―Global Economic Forces‖ respectively.  This may be mainly because the model 
was developed in the study‘s cohort of 12 developed countries. A revised model 
(based on SL experiences) for the purpose of explaining the reform experience in the 
developing country context is, therefore, developed and presented in Figure 9 below. 
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Figure 9: The Revised Model of Public Management Reform 
 
 
Figure 9 represents what has been learnt about the process of reforms in SL from the 
1950s to 2005. This model depicts the broad forces, domestic and international forces 
and administrative systems that have been both driving and resisting reforms in SL. It 
shows the real complexity and the specificity of reforms process compared to the 
process in developed countries which was explained by Pollitt and Bouckaert.  
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In short, at the centre of Figure 9 (Box 5) lies the process of elite decision-making. SL 
reforms were similar to the Pollitt and Bouckaert model in being predominantly ‗top 
down‘ and conceived and executed by executive politicians and/or senior civil 
servants which enforced elitism. Surrounding the elite decision-making are four 
groups of elements. In the top left there is a group of domestic factors (Box 1i-v), 
political system and party political ideas, socio-demographic factors, socio-economic 
policies, chance events and pressure groups. Unlike the Pollitt and Bouckaert model 
this model recognises chance events, in a broader perspective, emerging from both 
domestic and international forces, especially from the pressure groups. In the top right 
there is a group of international factors (Box 2 i-iii), regional power groups, global 
economic and other forces including donors, and chance events. From the interplay of 
elements 1 and 2 there are two factors (Boxes 3 and 4, new management ideas and 
administrative reviews). From the interplay of these elements (Boxes 1, 2, 3 and 4) 
management reforms emerge. The bottom half of Figure 9, the administrative system 
(Box 6 i-iii), content of reforms, implementation process and results achieved is 
exactly similar to the Pollitt and Bouckaert model but there is a slight difference in 
the feedback loop where the elite not only reassess reforms based on results achieved 
but they are also influenced by the reactions of the pressure groups (1(v)). Then, they 
reformulate policies. The implementation process in the revised model is also 
influenced by the pressure groups. The interaction of those broad elements has 
already been explained in Section 7.2 above with practical examples from SL. 
 
Accordingly, in this model there are two critical points for reforms to be introduced: 
Box 5 (Elites decision-making) and Box 6 (ii) (Implementation process). In point one 
(Box 5) the elites endorse reforms where they can gain political capital, or where 
coalitions support, if not they reject. In point two (Box 6 ii) even if the elites do 
accept reforms,  they can still fail at the implementation stage due to influence of the 
pressure groups, for example, ARC recommendations failed due to resistance from 
bureaucrats and trade unions.  
7.4 Evaluation of the Reforms (1950-2005) 
 
The need for administrative reforms has been recognised by all successive 
governments of SL from time to time and several attempts have been launched, with 
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mixed results. Major influences on reforms are socio-economic policies, the political 
disenchantment with the public service, the political desire to politicise public 
administration and later to de-politicise it by some sections of political elites, 
globalisation and decline of the economy, pressure on public resources caused by 
economic decline and demands of welfare state, internal conflict and scandals, and 
the influence of the new right ideals that favour a more market-oriented approach to 
public administration. As a result, SL adopted economic liberalisation, deregulation, 
privatisation, deconcentration and devolution of political and administrative authority, 
and re-organised the public service over time to be more aligned with the political 
needs. 
 
In general, all reforms so far have been ad hoc and piecemeal. They have not emerged 
out of a meaningful, well-planned programme of public administrative reform 
followed in a phased manner but instead have been influenced by the political 
priorities of the day. There was no holistic, systematic approach to reform, although 
the ARC recommended doing so. The evidence obtained suggests that decisions were 
taken on a case-by-case basis in order to address the perceived problems at that time. 
Thus, all reforms have been implemented in isolation, reactive to crisis situations 
rather than proactive, which displays the pragmatic approach to problem-solving by 
all successive SL governments since Independence (1948).  
 
As a result, the reforms so far undertaken have not delivered any positive outputs or 
outcomes but have had largely negative results. They have had adverse impacts such 
as over-politicisation (e.g. abolition of the PSC, introduction of DPA/DM); 
duplication of functions (e.g. introduction of Provincial Councils); over 
institutionalisation (e.g. introduction of branch offices); and waste, corruption and 
abuse of power (e.g. nationalisation, introduction of PEs and privatisation). Due to 
some reforms (e.g. language reform and abolition of CCS) the SLPS lost many of its 
best men. None of the reforms were intended or led to attracting quality people to 
public service. Missed opportunities were more than those seized. It is evident that 
some of these reforms were misguided by the political elites due to political desire to 
win elections (e.g. the Language Act), take revenge on the Opposition party 
supporters (e.g. abolition of VH), extend the political power base and administrative 
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decision-making (e.g. DCB), and safeguard their long term political survival and 
retain power at the centre (e.g. PCs).  
 
It is evident that all the reforms failed. There were several reasons for this. The main 
reason seems to be that there was a powerful opposition to reforms from a large 
number of forces. These forces have been illustrated in Figure 9 of the revised model.  
The other reason was that there was a lack of foresight and common sense. Further, 
there also had been weak planning and implementation, for example, the DPAs lost 
their momentum due to lack of delegation of powers by the central ministers. 
However, this lesson was not taken into account when designing other 
decentralisation efforts such as DMs, DDCs and PCs. These reforms faced, and the 
PCs are now facing, a similar chaotic situation because they have not been founded 
on a solid policy foundation or theoretical underpinnings as in New Zealand.  
 
The other factor which contributes to the failure of reforms was that there were no 
stable reforms because governments often changed and changed all the former 
policies and reforms with them. Reform on top of reform has been the problem in SL 
after Independence. There has been an inconsistency of policies in the government 
and the provinces due to lack of national policies as discussed in Chapter 4 which 
prevent whole-of-government and collegial actions. Even within the government 
there is a lack of consistency. One minister comes and does exactly the opposite of 
the previous minister, for example, changing school text books and examinations.  
 
Some of the reform initiatives seemed to have had the opposite of the intended effect, 
for example, introduction of DDCs. The DDCs were introduced to solve a political 
problem i.e. agitation of the Tamil minority for greater decentralisation. The DDCs 
took over the functions of elected village and urban councils, thus village level 
participation in decision-making was undermined. Later the government realised the 
mistake and introduced the ‗Gramodaya Mandalayas‘ and ‗Pradeshiya Mandalayas‘ 
to fill the gap by an amendment to the DDC Act, but they were neither elected nor 
effective bodies (Sirivardana, 2004). As such, on many occasions reforms were made 
without adequate examinations of their effects on the system as a whole (e.g. DPAs, 
DMs, DDCs, and Official Language reform). This resulted in more problems or even 
greater complexity. 
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However, some of the reforms were able to solve some of the problems; for example, 
public sector salaries have been raised on the recommendation of the ARC, and the 
language reform paved the way for the majority of people to interact with public 
administration. The creation of a unified CAS and abolition of VH achieved some of 
the objectives of the reform. The reforms helped to remove the ‗caste system‘ 
entrenched in these two systems. The introduction of the unified CAS opened the 
door for educated rural young people to get into higher positions in the public service 
including women who had previously been overlooked. The decentralisation effort 
through DPAs, DMs, DDCs, and PCs gave recognition to the sub-national level. 
Accordingly, these reforms have had some positive effects but they produced largely 
negative outcomes because they were not properly designed and implemented.  
 
On the other hand, other reforms failed due to conflict within the interest groups in 
administration. They have tried to promote their own interest rather than the country‘s 
interest.  Accordingly, in the process of solving problems these reforms created 
another set of problems. For example, language reform had more far-reaching 
adverse, social, political and economic effects than any positive effects to the country 
as a whole. The primary consequence of this reform was the further division of the 
two major ethnic groups of the country, the Sinhalese and the Tamils, and the 
increased ethnic disharmony leading to a civil war. Although this is not the only root 
cause for ethnic conflict, according to the sources and many of the respondents in this 
study, language reform triggered the conflict. SL has suffered from 52 years of 
conflict, lost thousands of lives, missed many opportunities of economic and social 
progress, and spent huge sums of money (SLRs 102 billion only for 2007) (Ministry 
of Finance and Planning, 2007, p.89). The conflict caused by this reform has created a 
situation of unrest throughout the country and displaced thousands of people many 
times. Furthermore, the deterioration of ethnic disharmony and intensity of conflict 
also led to Indian intervention in domestic matters, leading to the signing of the Indo-
Sri Lanka Accord in 1987.   
 
Further, due to language reform, the number of Tamils and Sinhalese who possessed 
fluency in English with which they could converse with each other got sharply 
reduced, and this decline in fluency in the common language of English became a 
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national issue by the 1990s. It created a monolingual society. Further, young people 
have been deprived of access to the wealth of knowledge and skills available to them 
and employment abroad.  Many of the respondents remarked that in the 1960s and 
70s many Sri Lankans held top positions in international organisations such as the 
World Bank, IMF and UNESCO, but today the situation is the opposite due to lack of 
English proficiency. One of the reasons for the high level of unemployment in SL is 
also attributed to the lack of knowledge in English in the educated youth due to this 
catastrophic reform. Therefore, the government has tried to accommodate educated 
youngsters in the public service, for example, the recent appointment of graduates to 
the bloated public service, in large numbers. 
 
The political dimension in public administration is another key area in the SL 
context. The public sector is a sub-system of the political system. Thus, one cannot 
function effectively independent from the other. They are interdependent. Therefore, 
public sector reform will not be successful in the SL context without reforms to the 
political system. Almost all respondents of this study mentioned that public sector 
reform cannot be independent from political reform in key issues.  In this context the 
challenge was that what sort of political reforms are feasible? The key areas that 
need attention in the political system which have direct bearing on public 
administration are: powers of Executive President (Chapter 3); checks and balances 
by the Legislature over the functions of the executive; patronage; and leadership 
(Chapter 4).  
 
In summary, this section critically evaluated the result achieved from the post-
Independent public administrative reforms (1950-2005) in SL. It highlighted why 
reforms failed, what factors contributed for such failures and the overall outcomes of 
the reforms.  
7.5 Major Issues to be Addressed  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis raised numerous empirical and normative issues 
political and administration by nature such as: the plethora of public institutions; lack 
of clarity in government functions; bureaucratic overstaffing; lack of professional in 
the public service; informal appointments; corruption; duplication of government 
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functions; lack of transparency, accountability, checks and balances or good 
governance; greater executive power over legislature; lack of political will to reform, 
the use of official language and political patronage in the public service. They directly 
or indirectly have negative effects on the socio-economic progress and well-being of 
the citizens. Therefore, there is a need for an overhaul and systematic approach for 
reforms to the present public administrative system. This does not mean that all the 
reform programmes have to be implemented overnight. Given the relative 
significance of the issue, the reforms can be lined up for implementation in priority 
order or where possible implemented concurrently.  
 
This section highlights major issues that needs immediate attention and describes 
their relative significance for future prospects in priority order. 
 
7.5.1 Political Issues 
 
In the SL context political dimensions were the major bottleneck for effective reforms 
in the past. The enormous power of Executive President, lack of checks and balances 
by the Legislature over the Executive and lack of will to reform the public sector by 
the political leaders, and political patronage in public services are key issues 
identified by this thesis. Those should be given first priority in reforms. Reforms in 
the political system provide a base for other reforms in the long run.  In addition, 
without addressing political issues, it is difficult to imagine reforms being effective in 
other areas in the administrative system because political dimensions are the 
backbone of the administrative system.  
 
7.5.1.1 Executive Presidency System 
 
The Executive President of SL enjoys enormous powers. The President dominates all 
decisions including control of public finance and other constitutional matters. In 
2001, the 17
th
 Amendment to the Constitution attempted to curtail the President‘s 
power on key appointments, but failed due to resistance from the President. Under the 
presidential system, the legislature has been undermined and there are no checks and 
balances of the President by the legislature. It was evident (Chapters 3, and 4) that on 
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many occasions presidential powers had not been used for good governance but badly 
misused due to the immunity granted to the position by the Constitution.  
 
The Opposition and media highly criticised the Executive over the violation of the 
constitutional provisions in relation to the public service. The CC is defunct due to 
the unwillingness of the President to appoint its members. The de-politicisation of 
key government institutions expected by reformers is yet to be realised for this 
reason. The concentration of enormous powers on the one hand creates a situation of 
undermining the collective activities of the legislature and the Cabinet. There have 
been many occasions where presidents acted as dictators. Under the executive 
presidential system there is a risk of undermining the democratic principles and good 
governance, therefore, it needs a modification. The unusual strength of the Executive 
President is one of the unique features of SL‘s administrative system when compared 
with other South Asian countries (where there are presidencies of more ceremonial 
than real substance) which have similar settings. The Executive Presidency is one of 
the causes of the failure of administrative reforms in SL. Therefore, reform to this 
system is a first priority of the day. 
7.5.1.2 Political patronage  
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, political patronage is embedded and 
encompasses all spheres in the public administrative system including public 
personnel management functions.  Although political patronage in regard to personnel 
management of the national cadre, except secretaries of ministries and heads of 
departments, was restricted by the 17
th
 Amendment to the Constitution in 2001 by 
transferring the powers of Cabinet of Ministers to an independent PSC, the political 
elites refuse to comply with the change. It is evident that they still try to enjoy the 
autonomy envisaged by the 1972 Constitution though it is no longer in operation, and 
the Cabinet no longer has power other than formulation of policies in relation to the 
public service. The Cabinet manipulates the recruitment procedure by making 
temporary appointments in the public service on political patronage and later making 
them permanent without due consideration of necessary educational standards to 
handle positions. The appointments to the higher strata of public service are still 
under political hands under the present Constitution. Therefore, the lack of 
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meritocracy in appointments and promotions procedures in the SLPS is a key issue to 
be addressed. 
 
These issues need immediate attention because these practices could lead to eventual 
degradation of the SLPS and deterioration of the quality of outputs and outcomes of 
the government programmes. Further, this system hinders equal opportunities for 
different communities to access public employment, thus violating constitutional 
provisions. In addition, the SLPS could lose its credibility, and impartiality. 
Moreover, the right people may not be in the right places in the delivery of public 
goods and services and to assist effectively in the formulation of public policies in the 
interest of the country. Because of the appointment to higher positions are on 
patronage public officials tend to get favours from political and bureaucratic elites for 
their promotions,  thus training and development have been given little attention by 
individuals and institutions. This could further exacerbate the quality of services. In 
addition, this system may prevent the attraction of the best candidates from the job 
market for public sector positions.  
 
Therefore, these problems have to be tackled without delay in order to preserve the 
quality of the workforce and to enhance credibility, impartiality, and professional 
public service, attract the best people for public sector positions, and achieve 
organisational objectives and socio-economic development in the country. The 
minority could be better off and bitterness of the war could be sweetened if the 
patronage of personnel management practice is abolished.  
 
Other issues in the public personnel management which need attention are the public 
services structure (with a plethora of combined services), lack of manpower planning, 
effective cadre review, discipline, human resource development especially in the 
senior strata, and effective individual performance management systems. 
Furthermore, the shortfalls in the 17
th 
Amendment to the Constitution and delays in 
functioning of NPSC, the entity responsible for civil service staffing, are other key 
issues that need immediate corrections.  
 
These issues needs short-term solutions because the lack of manpower planning and 
continuous cadre review system in the public service created a situation of 
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overstaffing, underemployment, imbalance in cadres, and under-compensation. Lack 
of discipline in the public service and the legislature led to corruption, malpractices, 
degradation the SLPS and loss of faith and trust by the public over the public service. 
The supply-driven training and the lack of a proper human resource development 
system in the SLPS led to lack of professionalism in the SLPS. It also led to a lack of 
professionals in specialised jobs, especially in the higher strata. The lack of a proper 
individual performance appraisal system has contributed to lowering performance 
standards, reducing morale, causing inefficiency in service delivery, delays, lethargy, 
corruption, and increasing frustration within the SLPS. There is no incentive to work 
harder because there is no difference between the high performers and low 
performers. The shortfalls in the 17
th
 Amendment to the Constitution which were 
discussed in Chapter 5 created a situation of the non-operation of the CC, the agency 
entrusted with the approval of appointments to some positions and the nomination to 
the President on candidates for others including the commissioners of independent 
commissions.  Due to this situation those agencies are run by the personnel appointed 
by the President. In addition, the functioning of the NPSC also needed especial 
attention because some respondents in this study highlighted that there are delays in 
approval of appointments and transfers by the NPSC, thus, public sector institutions 
fail to run public businesses effectively. It lacks powers in relation to key 
appointments in ministries and departments and has no power on the personnel 
management of PEs. These issues need systematic approaches for correction.   
 
7.5.2 Structural and Institutional Issues 
 
The administrative structure is a key instrument which formulates and implements 
policies, programmes and projects for the betterment of the citizens. Therefore, the 
administrative system could be logically arranged in order to encourage the smooth 
functioning of government business. However, there are several structural and 
institutional issues in the present administrative system which include (1) large 
number of ministries with confused responsibilities and functions, (2) a plethora of 
loss-making commercial PEs and non-commercial PEs with duplication of functions, 
(3) duplication of responsibilities and functions in central and provincial 
governments, (4) lack of clear roles and responsibilities of the state and provinces, 
and (5) lack of real devolution. These structural issues have led to several negative 
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outcomes such as delays, confusion, high costs, wastage, corruption, and 
underutilisation of scarce resources. Further, they create institutional problems such 
as overstaffing, inadequate checks and balances, lack of capacity for coordination of 
public policy management and systems and procedures, lack of citizens‘ participation 
or private-public partnerships. These structural issues are interconnected and have to 
be addressed and treated as a package. Otherwise, reforms would be 
counterproductive. 
 
The present size of the Cabinet, other ministerial portfolios and public sector cadres 
exceed the needs of the country, thus, their existence and cost effectiveness cannot be 
justified. The continuation of a large number of loss-making commercial PEs and 
non-commercial PEs in the administrative machinery needs immediate reform 
because they draw significant amounts of public money for their survival, and, thus, 
obstruct investments in other critical sectors. In addition, the confusion of the role of 
the state and provinces is evident in the failed programme of devolution and the 
shifting political attitudes on privatisation. Effective devolution could be helpful in 
the present day context to address the Tamil interests. Further, real devolution may 
enhance Tamils‘ participation in economic and social development which is long 
overdue. The wounds of the war could be healed through such an attempt. Moreover, 
it could lead to lasting peace and national integration in the country.  
 
In addition, there is a low degree of public and private partnership in relation to 
provision of goods and services. Since the introduction of a market economy in the 
late 1970s, the private sector has played an important role in the provision of goods 
and services. However, there is no effective relationship between public and private 
sectors for a common goal, i.e. socio-economic development in the country. Rather 
the ―public sector continued to look with suspicion at the private sector‖ 
(Wanasinghe, 2005, p. 16). These perceptions hinder effective private sector 
participation in development. Public-private partnership has been introduced in 
services like telecommunications, but the full potential of the private sector has not 
been harnessed so far.  
 
Therefore, these structural and institutional issues could be the second priority area in 
any future agenda of reforms because once structural issues are resolved and the 
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structure is logically organised in the short run, it would also resolve a number of 
other institutional and non-institutional issues such as overstaffing, and financial 
problems.  
 
7.5.3 Language Issues 
 
The implementation of a trilingual policy is complex and faces a number of problems 
as discussed in Chapter 4. The lack of Tamil language knowledge on the part of the 
majority of Sinhala public officials, especially those who work in the provision of 
basic services to different communities, is the main concern of the Tamils. As a 
result, they are deprived of access to public services in their own language. This is 
one of the root causes of the 30 years of war. The shortfalls in the following 
constitutional provisions and lack of proper implementation of the Language Act led 
to this situation. 
 
Article 22 of the Constitution declares that Sinhala and Tamil are the Languages of 
Administration throughout the country. It further states that Sinhala should be the 
Language of Administration of all provinces except the North and East while Tamil is 
the Language of Administration in the North and East. According to this provision 
Tamils living in other provinces and Sinhalese living in the North and East are unable 
to transact business with the government institutions in their respective languages. 
Many Tamils living in Colombo and suburbs cannot get their work done in Tamil due 
to the dearth of Tamil translators and interpreters in government offices. According to 
the Official Language Commission (2005), only 8.3% of public servants are Tamil 
speaking. The Official Language Department and the Official Language Commission 
(OLC) have been in the administrative machinery from the early 1990s, but there is 
no significant outcome to improve the knowledge of both languages in public 
officials despite many reports and recommendations. It is reported that the OLC lacks 
autonomy and powers to implement the policy effectively.  
 
SL is a multicultural, multi-religious and multi-ethnic society. Therefore, SL needs to 
meet the needs of the pluralistic society in which the language is a key element. In 
order to sustain the recent war victory and promotion of social cohesion and long-
lasting peace, the service provision could be on both official languages with equal 
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status. Therefore, a long term programme of action is essential in the future reform 
agenda in order to overcome the language problem which is a priority issue of the 
day. 
 
7.5.4 Corruption  
 
As discussed in chapter 4, there have been ‗mega‘ frauds and corruption at the state 
level by the upper echelons of elected and appointed officials in the public service. 
Corruption is institutionalised in some public organisations. A top political leader and 
a higher echelon public official were fined by the Supreme Court in relation to 
corrupt activities in the recent past. It is reported that there are around 300 elected and 
top public officials in the investigation list of the Bribery and Corruption 
Commission. According to this Commission, there were many complaints on corrupt 
activities in the private sector too but there is no law to investigate corruption in the 
private sector. This evidence indicates that the problem of corruption has become 
worse. It seems that the existing anti-corruption measures have been ineffective and 
inadequate. Thus, corruption has become a ‗wicked problem‘ in SL.  
 
In a corrupt public service, citizens are not afforded their democratic right of equal 
access to public services. In addition, corruption causes a loss to government in terms 
of revenues, and tarnishes the image of public services. Further, corruption impedes 
economic development. Although no country has recorded total elimination of 
corruption SL should try to minimise the present level of corruption.  
  
7.5.5 Inadequacy of Transparency, Accountability,  
         Integrity and Good Governance 
 
There is a lack of transparency, accountability and integrity in public administration 
and governance. Currently citizens do not have knowledge and information on how 
public goods and services are delivered, who is responsible for and accountable to 
each action, and how the MPs and officials run the government businesses, except 
from some controversial reports by the media. Even the citizens do not know the 
changes in service delivery mechanisms including changes in ministries and 
departments, since they are very often changed according to the volatility of the 
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political environment. Citizens in SL still remain passive recipients of public goods 
and services. Their participation in governance is minimal due to the lack of 
transparency in the conduct of public business, on the one hand, and the lack of 
political and bureaucratic arrangements at the local community level to obtain 
citizens‘ input, on the other.  
 
The Official Secret Act and the standing Orders of Parliament prevent disclosure of 
information and open deliberations of Committees in Parliament especially the COPA 
and COPE deliberations. The perception of citizens in regard to transparency and 
accountability of public governance and integrity of public officials is not positive. 
The availability of information in areas of public policy and their implementation, of 
the facilitation of economic activities, and the maintenance of law and order, are 
important factors that all stakeholders of public administration are concerned with. 
The recent Supreme Court intervention in administrative matters, the VAT scam in 
the Inland Revenue Department and the Supreme Court judgements on the three 
privatisation deals discussed in Chapter 4 clearly show that there is a lacuna in 
transparency, accountability, integrity and governance.  
 
Improvement in transparency, accountability, integrity, and governance in the public 
administration, therefore, may create a positive image and enhance the credibility and 
trust in public business. There is a need to hold public officials accountable for their 
actions, which also helps to minimise corruption.   
 
7.5.6 Lack of Results-Oriented Management Culture    
         & Deficiencies in Public Financial Management 
 
The government of SL lacks a performance-oriented administrative and political 
culture both at macro and micro levels. The input-oriented budgetary system, large 
scale recruitments to public service, recruitment of unqualified personnel to run 
public offices, lack of a performance measurement system for Secretaries of 
Ministries, ineffective performance appraisal on other categories of officials and lack 
of performance-based promotional and human resource development systems, which 
have been discussed in Chapter 4, clearly show that there is a lack of attention to 
results-oriented management practices in the SLPS. The financial expenditure, high 
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attendance in public offices, and employment data alone do not display the progress 
of public administration. The lack of a results-oriented management philosophy in 
public administration may lead to less contribution of the service sector to GDP and 
disregard the value for money concept, thus, this is a priority area to be addressed.  
 
Associated with the lack of a result-oriented management culture are several 
deficiencies in the financial management system as discussed in Chapter 4. Lack of a 
budget committee in Parliament; non-implementation of recommendations of the 
parliamentary watchdog committees; no response to the AG‘s observations on 
irregularities by the executive; non-adherence to financial and administrative 
regulations are a few examples which lead to loss of billions of rupees to the 
Treasury.   
 
7.5.7 Lack of Policy Management, Competition Policy   
         or Regulatory Regime  
 
The main weaknesses in the current policy management process are the ad hoc nature 
of the task, and a lack of human resources that are needed for effective policy 
management and policy formulation in the political and administrative systems. More 
importantly there is an inadequacy of analysing policy options before reaching final 
decisions.  There is also a lack of consultation with main stakeholders. Each event of 
public policy formulation is not preceded by optimal interaction among relevant 
sectors. Instead, policy formulation takes place in isolation in each sector of the 
economy, which needs cohesive policies. In addition, there is a lack of competition 
policy and regulatory mechanism in the administrative system even 30 years after the 
opening of the economy in 1977.  
 
The ad hoc nature of policy formulation, lack of cohesive policies, policy 
management and regulatory strategies in the public administration hinders effective 
implementation of government programmes, collegial and joined-up government 
actions because each level tries to act independently (centre, province and local 
level). This leads to further wastage of scarce resources, delays in government 
activities, clashes in various sectors in administration and finally creates problems for 
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citizens. Overall, the lack of policy management and regulatory regimes impede the 
socio-economic development, and therefore, need attention in the short run. 
7.6 Lessons Learned from the Past  
  
The lessons learned through past reform experiences and the fact that the ARC 
recommendations were not fully implemented (Chapter 6) are of great value in 
designing and initiating future reforms.  
 
First, no administrative reform initiative in SL would be successful unless there is a 
strong and consistent political will and commitment, including the commitment from 
all constituents of the political gamut, not confined to the ruling elites on the 
objectives and strategies of reform agenda. In the case of the 17
th
 Amendment to the 
Constitution in 2001 the political commitment was there, but it was lost when it came 
to implementation. As yet, there is no consistent political will and commitment in SL 
to ensure the success of reforms.  
 
Second, and related to the first lesson, a reform agenda has not taken into account the 
vested interest of all the stakeholders in public administration. Four groups in 
particular could be identified in the SL context for resistance to reform in the past: the 
political groups, bureaucracy, trade unions and religious groups. Resistance of 
political groups extends across the board and it is embedded into the SL political 
culture.  The senior bureaucrats view reforms as a threat to job security, erosion of 
power and authority that they have enjoyed over time. The trade unions in the public 
sector gained more power over time due to the increased number of members, with 
the large number of recruitments in the SLPS and their affiliation with political 
parties.  
 
Third, there is no attempt as yet to raise awareness and discuss proposed reforms at 
the national level among key stakeholders, including the public, to ensure their 
effective implementation. Therefore, raising awareness and consensus on objectives 
and measures of reforms among political parties and other stakeholders by the 
reformers is a vital factor.  
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Fourth, there was no systematic approach to public administration reform in SL with 
proper plans and infrastructure. The implementation of the reforms was weak. In most 
cases there were no monitoring, reviews or rectification of shortcomings.   
 
Fifth is the question of policy complexity. This is in fact true in the case of ARC 
recommendations because the reform agenda was not designed for implementation 
over the short term and long run given the reality of the polity and the availability of 
infrastructure and the relative significance of the problems. The holistic approach to 
reform does not mean that all recommendations have to be implemented overnight.  
 
Finally, no administrative reforms should be implemented in isolation without 
necessary reforms in the political system or Constitution given the realities of the SL 
polity because the administrative system of the country is a sub-system of the 
political system. However, this requirement cannot be applicable across the board, for 
example, some reforms such as improvement of systems and procedures, reducing 
cadres and number of ministries in public administration, can be implemented without 
major constitutional or political reforms but SL‘s political history proves that even for 
such minor reforms some constitutional change will be helpful. For example, the 13
th
 
Amendment to the Constitution restricted the number of ministers in the PC whereas 
the number of ministers of the national government has no such restriction. Therefore, 
any overhaul of reforms in the administrative machinery needs legal and political 
reforms to support it.          
7.7 Challenges for Public Management  
 
The current situation of SL‘s public administration (Chapter 4) suggests major 
reforms in the political and administrative arenas in the country, without which an 
efficient, effective, and impartial public service cannot be developed. In addition, the 
recent war victory of the government over the LTTE (May 18, 2009) created an 
atmosphere to reform many aspects of government business in order to bring the 
Tamil community into the mainstream administration and to bring everlasting peace 
to the country.The participation of all  political cohorts, public servants, private sector 
and communities in whole-of-government and collegial activities may be helpful to 
achieve peace, social integration, socio-economic development and increase the 
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quality of life of all Sri Lankans. In this connection the centre and province have to 
realign with a new deal. In this attempt a series of challenges are there for public 
management which raises a number of questions.  
 
What is the role of the state? How to define and demarcate it? This is 
important because the role of the public administration depends on the role of 
the government. Similarly, what is the role of the province, district, and local 
governments in economic development and service delivery and 
reconciliation? In addition, there is a need for clarity in the roles, rights, 
responsibilities, freedoms and accountabilities of the public officials in key 
positions in the public service.  
 
What is the appropriate balance between centralisation and decentralisation of 
administrative and political authority? What are the criteria for true 
devolution? 
 
What is the role of the public sector in the development of peace in the 
country? How to bring Tamils into mainstream administration and 
development? How to reconcile the grievances of minorities?  What are the 
priorities?  
 
Can public administrative reforms be independent from political reforms? 
What sort of political reforms are feasible? This is important because the 
administrative reform is a political exercise. 
 
What kind of ‗bargain‘ or deal should exist between top politicians and top 
civil servants? What do they expect from each other?  
 
How to develop a loyal, efficient, impartial, and capable public service? 
 
How secure are senior public service jobs? Can top public servants remain at 
their posts as different governments come and go? Can top posts of 
government be opened to competition from inside and outside the service or 
appointments be made on contract for a limited number of years? Can the 
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appointees be employed on performance-related contracts so that they can 
survive changes of government if performance targets are reached? Who is 
going to set targets and assess their performance objectively?  
 
How can corruption be minimised? 
 
How to judge how much coordination and stakeholder consultation is 
adequate? 
 
What does it mean by to refer to the notion of an ―independent public 
service‖? What are the implications? How can adequate political control of 
the bureaucracy be achieved? This matter has to be cleared in the minds of the 
political elites as well as in the bureaucrats because at present there is no clear 
understanding on this matter on both sides.  
 
How can the lessons drawn from the past on administrative reforms be 
transformed into something useful?  
 
Answers to these questions are not simple but complex and crucial. Many factors 
have already been identified in this thesis as impeding factors for reforms such as lack 
of political and bureaucratic will; resistance from trade unions, coalition partners and 
religious groups; lack of support from citizens‘ groups; and unstable government. 
However, that does not mean no reforms can be successfully implemented. Given the 
political will and commitment, any problems can be sorted out.  
7.8 Conclusion               
 
This thesis critically analysed the current situation and the past public administration 
reform experience of SL from 1950 to 2005 using the theoretical framework 
introduced by Pollitt and Bouckaert to examine reform experience of SL. Due to 
several omissions in that framework, an alternative conceptual framework was 
introduced on the basis of SL‘s reform experience. SL‘s experience in administrative 
reforms has been complex and conflict ridden. Various reforms introduced so far 
have not been targeted to address the inefficiency of the public service. Similarly, the 
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decentralisation efforts have not been able to address the Tamils‘ interests. Almost all 
the reforms largely contributed to negative outcomes. It appeared that many reforms 
were unable to deliver positive outcomes due to political considerations in the design 
and implementation of reforms; instead they created many more complex problems. 
Change after change with each change of government and the leadership in an ad hoc 
way has been the rule since Independence. Thus, while other countries such as 
Singapore, Malaysia and Korea, which had the same per capita incomes as SL in the 
1960s, are moving ahead, SL is going backward. Today, these countries have per 
capita incomes that are several times higher than SL‘s.  
 
How and why SL has fallen into this situation? How and why are all of the factors 
like this? Finding a simple answer is not possible because it is more complex than 
meets the eye. The first and most obvious reason is the 30-year long war which has 
taken a heavy social and economic toll on the country‘s performance. The other 
reason may be the unusual strength of the Executive President. Why was the 
President able to claim all those powers which are quite problematic? Why was the 
Constitution revised in 1978 to give the President those powers?  Why did 
parliamentarians and citizens not oppose this and allow it to happen? Above all, SL 
has a long history of being a democratic country. Why did that democracy not work 
to correct the leader who proposed the revision of the Constitution? Didn‘t the 
Parliamentary Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs or the civil society, 
intellectuals, religious elites, media  and the Opposition foresee the future outcomes 
as they saw in other government proposals in the past, for example, when religious 
elite, intellectuals, civil society and the main Opposition, the UNP, opposed power 
sharing through Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact in 1950s or the main Opposition, 
the SLFP, and the same group were vehemently against the power sharing through 
Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact in the 1960s. Why did such a movement not 
emerge to oppose the introduction of Executive Presidency?  
 
Similarly, why were the ARC‘s recommendations not implemented?  There are many 
factors. The overarching set of reasons would be that ongoing reforms require stable, 
peaceful, year by year continuous governing system. That is the only way the reforms 
are properly developed and implemented, but this was not in the case in SL. 
Therefore, if one tries to build up a model or develop an explanation on why and how 
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SL‘s situation is like that the answer would be complex. The first half of the answer 
would be self-serving political culture and the second half of the answer would be 
that public service is driven by political motivation rather than technical motivation. 
The high echelons of public servants are appointed and beholden to the politicians of 
the day. Therefore, the level of stability and continuous development of public 
services is technically impossible. Self-serving political culture and patronage are not 
confined to SL but they have serious implications on the country‘s public 
administration and reforms.  
 
Therefore, without establishing an enabling political environment the necessary 
administrative reforms would be impossible. The creation of an enabling environment 
is a hard and challenging task. Both political and bureaucratic elites should be ready 
to dedicate and commit for a new era of change. Therefore, the pathway forward is 
not clear but the Sri Lankans are common sense people.  They are always passionate 
and strong about their responsibility towards their next generation.  
 
There are several ways to achieve the enabling environment and a stable government. 
The first approach would be to get the basics right. There is a view that countries 
should get the basics right before attempting more advanced reforms (ADB, 2003). In 
this respect non-compliance to rules and regulations and other deficiencies in the 
administrative apparatus highlighted annually by the AG, COPA and COPE and 
reactivating the key recommendations of the ARC which are relevant today and were 
not implemented hitherto could be addressed first. Once the basics are established, 
during the first three to five years the government could concentrate on establishing 
an enabling environment in the political and administrative arenas. This enabling 
environment could be established through five areas: addressing the root causes of the 
30 years of internal conflict of the country; reforming the political system including 
the Executive Presidency; addressing the key issues in the current public 
administration mentioned above; enhancing the use of information technology in the 
service delivery; and establishment of professional public service. Addressing the 
genuine problems of the minority could be helpful to bring peace and harmony 
among a divers community.  In this endeavour devolution of a substantial amount of 
power and functions to the sub-national level, which was one of the demands by the 
Tamils since Independence, is desired as a long-lasting political solution.    
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Another approach could be establishing a group of reformers with authority who 
would work together to try and shape everything in the right direction because the 
present Administrative Reforms Council does not seem to fully involved because its 
members, including the Chair, are engaged in other priority jobs. It is essential to 
have a separate permanent group who could take an holistic approach to address the 
issues continuously. Otherwise, attempts would be counterproductive. All these 
approaches are immensely difficult and will take time. A huge amount of resources 
will be required.   
 
In all these approaches towards resolving problems, the big challenge faced by SL is 
the ability to respond, which depends crucially on the ability to reform the polity, and 
build and sustain high quality institutions, both private and public. This raises the 
question of scale. Is SL too small to sustain credible, capable institutions in the public 
service? How does SL maintain the quality of private and public institutions in a 
world of increased complexity and globalisation? In what areas would SL effectively 
exercise sovereignty through jointly controlled institutions by Sinhala, Muslim, and 
Tamil leaders? Can Sinhala, and Tamil political leaders and interest groups 
completely forget and give up unpleasant memories of the past which were hitherto 
exercised by taking revenge from each other for narrow political gains and negotiate a 
fair deal for a common goal and interests of all communities in the country?  
 
If the government could overcome the 30 years of terror, then reforms in the public 
administration should not be that impossible. 
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Chapter 8: Post-Script  
8.1 Introduction  
 
This thesis has been focused on public sector reform in SL from the 1950s to 2005, 
in particular in relation to implementation of the recommendations of the ARC 
1986/88 – the one and only comprehensive study of the system of public 
administration in the country. As this thesis was being completed, it was becoming 
increasingly clear that two events in particular had a potential impact on the matters 
raised in this thesis and warranted a short postscript chapter. The first of these events 
was the election of President Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2005 and the subsequent work 
on the ―Mahinda Chintana‖ (MC) (Mahinda‘s Vision) and the second, the military 
defeat of the Tamil Tigers in May 2009. The question that arises is does either of 
these enable the government to address the particular issues of public administration 
and governance identified in this thesis? 
 
First, it is worth repeating the key issues identified by this thesis. It was found that 
the key recommendations of the ARC were not properly implemented due to the lack 
of political and bureaucratic interest, resistance from pressure groups, unfavourable 
political circumstances, and the lack of proper institutional arrangements for 
implementation. Some of its recommendations were attempted through the 
constitutional Amendments, the 13
th
 and 17
th
 Amendments. However, because of 
inadequate implementation (lack of fiscal and human resources devolution and non 
appointment of the Commissioners for the Independent PSC (see Chapter 4 and 5) 
the expected results have not been achieved. 
In addition, this thesis found a wide range of issues in the political system in the 
country:  enormous powers of Executive President, lack of check and balances by the 
legislature over the functions of the executive, patronage and lack of discipline and 
leadership qualities. In the area of public administration this thesis found issues on 
the structure and institutions, personnel management, use of official languages, 
delivery of services, governance, financial management, regulatory and policy 
management. The lack of real devolution as stipulated in the 13
th
 Amendment, the 
main concern of the Tamils, led to many years of terrorism in the country. This thesis 
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suggested several policy measures that might overcome these issues or least 
ameliorate them: to arrange the administrative structure logically and address 
institutional issues such as duplication and unclear functions and responsibilities in 
central and provincial governments, the large number of ministries with confused 
responsibilities and functions,  and the plethora of loss making commercial PEs with 
duplication of functions, In addition, it suggested eliminating  patronage and 
introducing meritocracy in personnel management functions. Further, it suggested 
introducing delivery of services in both official languages in order to sustain the 
recent war victory, promote social cohesion and long lasting peace. Similarly, it 
suggested reducing the present level of corruption by eliminating lack of 
transparency in public business, holding public officials accountable for their actions 
and introducing good governance practices in public management. Further, the thesis 
recommended introducing cohesive policies and regulatory strategies and 
introducing holistic approaches in government actions. It particularly emphasised the 
importance of reducing the power of the Executive President.  
 
The election of the fifth President, Rajapaksa, and the ending of the 27-year war in 
the first four years of his leadership is a remarkable achievement. The President‘s 
economic and social philosophy speculated in the MC became the guiding policy 
document.  The political circumstances of the day (weak leadership in the Opposition 
UNP, and the support of the JVP to Mahinda Rajapaksa) and the MC policy 
document provided
79
 the government with citizens‘ support to win the election and to 
defeat the LTTE in May 2009. The conclusion of the civil war created the possibility 
for further evolution of policies and reforms in the public sector. For example, 
meaningful devolution of power to sub-national level, providing equal opportunities 
to all communities to access SLPS and introducing meritocracy in all appointments 
in the public service including secretaries of ministries, heads of departments. 
 
                                                 
79
 Address by President Rajapaksa at the ceremonial opening of Parliament, Sri Jayawardhanapura – 
Kotte, May 19, 2009, same day the war is over, ―it is necessary to recall at this time the statements in 
the historic Mahinda Chintana that policy statement that was placed before the people three years ago. 
The freedom of our country is supreme. I will not permit any separatism. I will also not permit anyone 
to destroy democracy in our country‖ 
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This chapter discusses whether there are any policy developments in the area of 
public administration reforms due to these recent political upheavals since 2005 in 
SL and see whether those issues identified by the research have been addressed. 
8.2 Issues Identified 
 
8.2.1 Political Issues 
As seen in Chapter 7 enormous powers of Executive President, lack of checks and 
balances by the Legislature over the Executive and the lack of will to reform the 
public sector by the political leaders and political patronage in public services were 
key issues identified by this thesis.  
8.2.1.1 Executive Presidency 
 
This thesis found that the enormous power of the Executive President is a hindrance 
to good governance in public management. Since 1994, there have been calls for the 
abolition of this system and it was discussed in political circles (Vijitha Herath, 
interview, 18.01.2008). In every Presidential election after 1994, the abolition of this 
system was one of the pledges of its candidates, but nothing happened once the 
candidate is elected. In 2005, the ―Mahinda Chintana‖ pledged to change the 
Parliamentary Election System and to abolish of the Executive Presidency. As a first 
step, he proposed to present a Constitutional amendment through which the 
Executive President would be made answerable to the Parliament by virtue of 
holding such office.  However, this is not yet fulfilled.    
 
In the meantime, before the completion of his six year period (2005 December - 
2011), President Rajapaksa called for a presidential election on 23 December 2009, 
two- years before his term was over,  and the election was held on 26 January 2010. 
The main candidates in this contest were President Rajapaksa from SLFP and 
General Fonseka, former Military Chief as the common opposition candidate. 
Winning over peace by establishing democracy would be priority of Fonseka‘s 
election pledge. It will be done by abolishing the Executive presidency, reduction of 
the large cabinet, eradication of corruption and waste and the implementation of the 
17
th
 Amendment to the Constitution and increase of public servant salary by SLRs. 
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10,000 were the main pledges of the Common Candidate among other things. The 
first three pledges were the major findings of this study to be addressed in the future 
(see Chapter 7). President Rajapaksa‘s pledges were: increase of public servant‘s 
salary by SLRs. 2500; cut down ‗unnecessary powers‘ of the Executive President; 
and address the Tamils demand by a home grown solution. However, there were no 
clear statements regarding ‗unnecessary powers‘ and ‗his solution to Tamil 
problems‘. Neither candidate came up with a clear plan in regard to the devolution of 
powers.  The major implications of the Executive President system have been 
discussed in Chapter 3, 4 and 5. Presidential powers need immediate curtailment or 
abolition in order to strengthen democracy and good governance.  
8.2.1.2 Abolishing Patronage and Introducing 
Meritocracy  
 
The ‗MC‘ does not talk about the introduction of meritocracy in all appointments in 
the SLPS but it promised to uplift the dignity of the public service and to take action 
to make permanent all those who have been recruited on casual and temporary basis. 
As discussed in Chapter 4 and 5, under the 17
th
 Amendment to the Constitution, 
public service personnel management functions including appointments, transfers, 
promotions and disciplinary control are entrusted to the Independent PSC and in 
relation to the Police Service, those functions are dealt by the Police Commission. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 4 and 5, these institutions are still defunct due to 
non-appointment of its Commissioners.  
 
Ignoring the 17
th
 Amendment, the powers of the PSC and the Police Commission 
envisaged by the Constitutional Amendment were transferred to the Secretaries of 
Ministries by a circular
80
 signed by the Secretary to the Cabinet (see Chapter 5). 
Accordingly, the authority of decision making in public sector personal management 
functions were transferred to the Cabinet from an independent body. Political 
interference is possible because Secretaries of Ministries are appointed by the 
President and they are under the control and direction of their individual ministers 
(see Chapter 5). Whether the Secretary to the Cabinet or the Cabinet of Ministers has 
the authority to transfer the powers of the independent commissions, which were 
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 Office of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 09/1041/360/034 dated 25.06.2009 
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endorsed by two thirds of majority votes in Parliament, to the secretaries of line 
ministries, is a matter for concern. It seems that there are legal implications in this 
situation.  
 
The Opposition parties in particular have criticised these government actions saying 
that the Government violates good governance practices. The Opposition Common 
Candidate who contested in the Presidential Election on 26 January 2010 made a 
particular point about these problems and his ten points election manifesto pledged 
that he would implement the 17
th
 Amendment to the Constitution if he was elected.  
However, the PSC is still not operative and the Secretaries of ministries enjoy all the 
powers in relation to PSC‘s functions. 
 
8.2.2 Structural and Institutional Issues 
 
This thesis has argued that the lack of real devolution of powers to sub-national level 
was one of the root causes of the 27 years of LTTE terrorism in SL. Until 2005, 
successive governments and the LTTE were unable to reach an agreement with the 
devolution of powers to the sub-national level. Mahinda Rajapaksa, who was elected 
as the President in 2005, pledged in his ‗MC‘ manifesto to protect the unitary status 
and sovereignty of the country by eradicating LTTE, but there was no pledge in 
sharing more powers to the sub-national level. In other words, the MC does not 
contain a firm political solution to this national problem. The strategy adopted in 
eradicating LTTE was the war against the terrorists because President Rajapaksa 
firmly believed that terrorism should be crushed first in order to reach a political 
solution to the national problem.  
 
At the same time the President established an All Party Representative Committee 
(APRC) chaired by Professor Tissa Vitharana, Minister for Science and Technology, 
to arrive at possible political solutions to the conflict, but the main Opposition, UNP, 
JVP and the TNA (Tamil party) did not participate in the committee meetings. A 
summary report of the APRC was submitted to the President in August 2009, but it 
was not published. The BBC (January 15, 2010) reports that ―Mr Rajapaksa has now 
said he does not think any generally acceptable solution has yet been suggested‖. The 
 296 
BBC report further says that after the Presidential election
81
 incumbent President is 
going to put forward his own solution to the problem. In an interview, the Chair of 
the APRC said that ―the government is planning to reactivate the APRC after the 
general election 2010, with a view to obtaining the participation of Tamils parties in 
the North and East in finding political solutions to the Tamil problem‖ (Vitharana, 
interview, February 17, 2010).  
 
Since defeating the LTTE in May 2009, until this thesis was completed in July 2009 
and this Post-Script Chapter written in early 2010 there has not been any policy 
development in regards to devolution of powers which is expected by the Tamils.  
One of the possible reasons for delay in real devolution might be instabilities caused 
by the final stage of war and the attendant large scale civilian casualties, and 
displacement. This situation has led the international community to accuse the SL 
Government of human rights violations. International groups (including the Tamil 
Diaspora) urged the UN to summon the SL government and military personnel 
before the International War Tribunal. Another possible reason for delay in real 
devolution might be that the Government also was busy with demining hundreds of 
thousands of landmines, which were buried by the LTTE, in the North in order to 
resettle the displaced people (about 300,000 in total). The international community 
also pressurised the government to resettle the displaced people in their original 
places without delay. In addition, the Government wants the participation of people 
of the North in the democratic process to select their Local Government members in 
order to reactivate local governments with a view to obtain local participation in the 
resettlement process, something that cannot be achieved until stability returns. 
Another possible reason for delay in devolution is that the government might want to 
give time to the healing process without making any policy changes soon after the 
completion of war.  
 
8.2.3 Equal Opportunities - Language Issues  
 
The other issue identified by this thesis was the lack of equal opportunities to access 
the public services by all communities. Therefore, the post war scenario created a 
                                                 
81
 Presidential election was scheduled to be held on 26 January 2010. 
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situation for proactive reforms in the area of delivery of public goods and services. 
According to many people as SL moves from a post-war to a post-conflict era, it will 
need to find a political solution that involves power sharing, as well as pursuing 
development that is equitable and inclusive (personal observation). They say the 
government needs to take decisive steps towards reconciliation. In this regards, the 
implementation of the official language policy plays a key role. One of the key 
causes of the 30 year LTTE war was the language issue. The Tamils face many 
challenges due to the use of Sinhala language in the delivery of services by the 
majority of government institutions. They believed they were discriminated against 
by successive Sinhala regimes.   
 
According to the most recent Language Resources Needs Assessment Survey 
conducted by the Official Languages Commission (OLC) which covered 50 state 
institutions, there were a very low percentage of officers proficient in Tamil serving 
in the public administration sector (Sunday Times, February 14, 2010). The report 
revealed in areas outside the north and east the percentage of officers proficient in 
Tamil was 9.5%, compared with 18.1% officers proficient in Sinhala in the north and 
east. Sinhala is the language of administration in areas outside the north and east 
while Tamil is supposed to be the language of administration in these two areas. Base 
hospitals, police stations, local authorities, head offices and Divisional and District 
Secretariats are the institutions where language was found to be an obstacle to around 
50% of members of the public questioned. Issues like filling of forms and 
communication with state institutions were the areas those surveyed faced 
hindrances. Even though in around 60% of state institution forms were printed in all 
three languages as the law stipulates, there were many institutions where this rule 
was not adhered to. There was also low compliance with regard to the display of 
name and sign boards, direction boards and information displays in the two official 
languages. The major implication due to lack of attention to these elements might be 
that further division of communities and de-motivation of the minority in 
participation of social and economic development. It is also a drawback for 
reconciliation and development of peace in the two main communities, Sinhala and 
Tamil. Communication gap between two communities, Sinhala and Tamil, still is a 
major concern in post-war scenario thus needs reforms as suggested in Chapter 7 
. 
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 8.2.4 Elimination of Corruption  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, public sector corruption and wastage was a major 
problem in the recent past. The ten-year action plan prepared by the Department of 
National Planning based on MC manifesto does not talk about corruption and 
wastage. However, the Opposition Common Candidate who contested the 
Presidential Election on 26 January 2010 categorically mentioned that public sector 
is corrupt and corruptrion should be eliminated. His ten point election manifesto 
pledged that he would take steps to eliminate corruption and wastage in the public 
sector once he is elected. He highlighted several examples of corruption. Mahinda 
Rajapaksa who was elected for the second time as the President of SL in January 
2010 has promised to address this issue. However, the term of the Commission to 
Investigate Allegations of Bribery and Corruption
82
 came to an end on March 29, 
2010 and the Commission is defunct until new appointments are made to it by the 
President on the recommendations of the CC, which is yet to be reconstituted 
(ColomboPage News Desk, 13 Mar 2010).  
 
The major implication once the Commission's term expires is that new complaints on 
alleged acts of bribery and corruption could not be investigated by the Commission 
and action could also not be taken in relation to ongoing investigations that would be 
concluded after March 29, 2010. If corruption issue is not properly addressed, it will 
lead to misuse of public resources. So that expected economic and social wellbeing 
cannot be harnessed. 
 
8.2.5 Implementation of Remaining ARC Recommendations  
 
Since 2005, the remaining ARC‘s recommendations which have been partially 
implemented or yet to be implemented (see Chapter 6) were: 
Establishment of National Salaries and Cadre Commission in 2006 (see Chapter 4 -
4.3.2.1) 
Linked Salaries to cost of living in 2006;  
                                                 
82
 The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery and Corruption is yet another independent 
commission formulated under the 17
th
 Amendment to the Constitution and appointments to the 
commission are to be made on the recommendation of the CC. 
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Revised salaries to specific posts based on job classifications in 2007; and  
Introduced a uniform salary structure in 2007. 
   
However, it should be noted that other issues which were explained in Chapter 7 
have remained unaddressed since defeating the LTTE in May 2009. It can be argued 
therefore that there has been no significant policy development in the area of public 
administration reforms since 2005. 
 8.3 Conclusion  
 
This post-script Chapter reviewed whether there were any policy developments in the 
public sector management with the recent political developments of the country 
especially the election of President Rajapaksa in 2005 and the subsequent work on 
the ―MC‖ and the military defeat of the LTTE in May 2009. It also reviewed whether 
major issues identified by this thesis have been addressed due to these new 
developments. It is revealed that the major issue, the real devolution of powers to 
sub-national level which was the major demand by the Tamil community, has not yet 
found any political solution since after defeating the terrorism in the country. In 
addition, it is revealed that there is no major policy development since winning the 
war in relation to the structural issues such as plethora of loss making PEs, and 
duplication of functions of the three layers of the government. The other issues such 
as abolition of patronage in personnel management functions, abolition of enormous 
powers of the Executive President and elimination of wastage and corruption in the 
public sector are yet to be addressed. However, the use of official languages, both 
Sinhala and Tamil, in delivery of services is vital for reconciliation and peace. 
 
President wields enormous powers under SL‘s executive presidency system. With his 
re-election for a second term (to commence in November 2010), President Rajapaksa 
will rule the country for a total duration of 11 years until 2016. Added to this the 
UPFA coalition led by the President has a majority in parliament now. This provides 
him an unprecedented opportunity to take positive action including constitutional 
amendments, and to resolve the acrimonious issue of devolution of powers to Tamils. 
Thus he is at the helm at an important stage in SL‘s political history with the strength 
to solve the simmering ethnic confrontation and unite the nation. 
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Appendix 2: Interview Questions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Questionnaire to the Chairman of the 
Administrative Reform Committee 
General questions 
Are you aware of the administrative reform initiatives in Sri 
Lanka since independence? What are they?  
 
What have been the primary motivations (drivers) for 
administrative reforms? 
 
Specific questions  
Why did the government establish Administrative Reform 
Committee (ARC) in 1987?  
 
How did ARC construct the problems which it recommended 
for fixing?  
 
How and why did it derive its recommendations?  
 
Why have the ARC recommendations not been fully 
implemented? 
 
How and why have some of its recommendations been 
implemented? 
 
Why didn‘t ARC prioritise its recommendations for 
implementation with an implementation plan? 
  
Why did ARC recommend setting up a separate Ministry for 
the public service ignoring the Ministry of Public 
Administration that existed during that time?  
 
One of the key recommendations was the re-establishment of a 
Public Service Commission. The government set up a PSC in 
2001, after 15 years. Does it lead to independent and 
politically neutral public service as you expected? If ‗not‘ 
why? 
 
One of the other key recommendations was the establishment 
of a Senior Management Group in the public service. That was 
never executed. Do you still think that SMG is essential? 
Why? 
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Cont..., 
 
Another key recommendation was the introduction of a performance appraisal 
system in the public sector. This recommendation was implemented in 1998. Do 
you think that the present system is effective? If ‗not‘ Why? 
  
Do you think that public sector reform should initiate from governmental reform, 
if it is to be meaningful and effective? Please elaborate. 
 
Another key recommendation was to introduce a scientific manpower planning 
system in the public sector. This was never executed. Why? 
  
The other key recommendation was to introduce National Training Policy for the 
public sector. This was never implemented. Do you think that this 
recommendation is still valid? If ‗yes‘ why?  
 
In report No. 6 you argued that the devolution of administrative authority to sub-
national level would enable public to exercise authority over planning, 
management, and evaluation of activities which contribute to their development 
and well-being. Do you see this rhetoric in practice today? If ‗not‘ why? 
 
In the same report you recommended that there should be clear cut demarcation 
of functions and development sectors between the centre and the province, the 
size of the concurrent list should be kept to a minimum and the use of financial 
relationship as a control mechanism should be avoided. Do you think that these 
recommendations were adequately considered in the devolution? If ‗not‘ why? 
What were the impacts of non-implementation of these recommendations?  
 
What is your overall view on the Provincial Council System in SL? 
  
The ARC Report No 7 highlighted a number of deficiencies in the administrative 
system owing to large number of ministries, departments, and non-departmental 
organisations. Do you see any difference today in this context? Please elaborate.  
 
In your report No. 9 you made several recommendations to improve the work 
systems in the public sector. One of the key recommendations was to enhance the 
use of information technology in the public sector. Do you see any progress in 
this regard? Please elaborate. 
 
Why are there still so many problems in the Sri Lankan public administration 
despite various approaches to reform?  Why and how have key historical, 
structural, sociological economic and political factors since independence 
contributed to the current situation?  
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2. Questionnaire to other interviewees 
Note: Questions were selected and posed from the following according to the 
individual interviewee’s experience on reform 
 
Are you aware of the administrative reform initiatives in Sri Lanka since 
independence? What are they? What were the primary motivations (drivers) for 
administrative reforms?  Who were the architects?  Where did reform ideas come 
from? Why were they chosen for implementation? What have been their impacts? 
What has been accomplished? 
 
Were they really the most important things that should have been reformed? 
 
Are there others that are more important? Why are they more important? 
 
Why are there so many problems in the SL public administration despite various 
approaches to reforms?  Why and how have key historical, structural, sociological, 
economic and political factors since independence contributed to the current 
situation?  
 
What sort of administrative reforms attract the most attention by the media, and 
political and other societal groups in SL and Why?  
 
What have been the major obstacles to implementing public administrative reform 
in SL? 
 
Can public sector reform be independent from governmental reform?  
 
In what way are public administrative and constitutional reforms linked in Sri 
Lanka? 
 
Why have the goals of 17
th
 Amendment to the Constitution not been achieved yet? 
 
Overstaffing, corruption, inadequate delegation of authority to periphery, and large 
number of ministries, departments and public enterprises are the key issues in the 
public sector today. Can you expect efficient public service without addressing 
these issues properly? Please comment 
 
What kind of governance problems do you see in SL‘s public administration? 
Please elaborate. 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that the government regulations or other measures in 
relation to privatised public enterprises are not sufficient enough. What is your 
view? Please elaborate 
  
What do you perceive about the recent reform initiatives of enactment of Fiscal 
Responsibility Act and creation of the Assistant Management Service in the public 
sector?  
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 Appendix 3: Interviewees (in alphabetical 
order)  
 
 Name Position Category Dates of 
interview 
1 Dr. H.A.P. Abeywardene Former Government 
Agent and Senior 
Lecturer PIM 
Public 
official cum 
Academic 
22.11.2007 
22.12.2007 
15.02.2008 
2 Mr. S. Abeysinghe Deputy Secretary to 
Treasury 
Public 
official 
24.01.2008 
3 Mr. J. Abeywickrama Secretary, Ministry 
of Plantation 
Industries 
Public 
official 
26.11.2007 
03.12.2007 
4 Mr. D. Amarasinghe, Former Secretary and 
current Advisor to 
the President  
Public 
official 
14.11.2007 
10.12.2007 
5 Hon. Imthias Bakeer 
Marker 
Former Minister, 
Post, 
Telecommunications 
and Media 
Political 05.01.2008 
6 Hon. Ronnie De Mel Former Minister, 
Finance and Planning 
Political 05.12.2007 
19.12.2007 
7 Mr. Andrew De Silva Former Secretary, 
Ministry of 
Education  
Public 
official 
07.11.2007 
13.11.2007 
8 Mr. D. Dissanayaka Secretary, Ministry 
of Public 
Administration 
Public 
official 
04.01.2008 
9 Dr. Lloyd Fernando, Former State 
Secretary, State 
Ministry of Plan 
Implementation 
Public 
official 
06.01.2008 
10 Mr. Lionel Fernando Co-chair, Salaries 
and Cadre 
Commission 
Public 
official 
22.01.2008 
11 Mrs. H.D.L.Goonewardene Secretary, Public 
Service Commission 
Public 
official 
11.02.2008 
12 Mr. A.P. Gunasekara Secretary, Ministry 
of Petroleum, and 
Petroleum Resource 
Development 
Public 
official 
21.11.2007 
30.11.2007 
03.01.2008 
13 Mr. Asoka Gunawardene Chairman, Finance 
Commission 
Public 
official 
07.01.2008 
14 Mr. Vijitha Herath MP Political 18.01.2008 
15 Mr. Daya Liyanage Former Deputy 
Secretary to the 
Treasury 
Public 
official 
02.01.2008 
07.01.2008 
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 Name Position Category Dates of 
interview 
16 Mr. V.K. Nanayakkara Former Secretary, 
Ministry of 
Education 
Public 
official 
06.11.2007 
14.11.2007 
17 Mr. N. Pathmanathan Former Deputy 
Secretary to the 
Treasury 
Public 
official 
26.11.2007 
02.01.2008 
18 Hon. S. Premajayantha Minister of 
Education 
Political 19.02.2008 
19 Dr. S.W. Ranasinghe Professor, Open 
University of Sri 
Lanka 
Academic 11.12.2007 
20 Mr. S. Ranugge Secretary, Ministry 
of Export 
Development and 
International Trade 
Public 
official 
09.11.2007 
21 Mr. Susil Sirivardana  Former 
Commissioner 
Public 
official 
22.11.2007 
22 Mr. M. Somasundram Former Director 
General 
Public 
official 
11.12.2007 
17.12.2007 
23 Mr. H.S. Wanasinghe Chair of the 
Administrative 
Reforms Committee 
of 1986/88 
Public 
official 
09.11.2007 
02.12.2007 
31.12.2007 
08.01.2008 
24 Mr. Bradman Weerakoon Former Secretary to 
the Prime Minister 
(1956-1970, 2001-
2004) 
Public 
official 
15.11.2007 
20.11.2007 
30.11.2007 
25 Mr. K.H.J. Wijayadasa Former Secretary to 
the Prime Minister 
and the President 
(1984-1994) 
 
Public 
official 
10.12.2007 
27.12.2007 
11.01.2008 
26 Mr. W.G. Wijerathna Additional Secretary, 
Ministry of 
Plantation Industries 
Public 
official 
03.12.2007 
13.12.2007 
27 Mr. D. Wijesinghe Secretary to the 
Cabinet 
Public 
official 
12.11.2007 
19.11.2007 
28 Dr. B.S. Wijeweera Former Government 
Agent 
Public 
official cum 
academic 
09.01.2008 
In addition to above key respondents, the following officials were also interviewed to 
gather information on productivity development, investigation of corruptions, the use 
of IT in public administration and the PCs 
Upali Marasinghe - Director, Productivity Secretariat, 27.12.2007 
Seetha Fernando, Accountant, Ministry of Provincial Council, 09.01.2008 
P. Ranasinghe -Director General, Bribery and Corruption Commission, 
28.1.2008 
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Wasantha Deshapriya - Director (Re-engineering Governance), ICTA, 
28.1.2008  
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Appendix 4: Map of SL - Provinces 
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Appendix 5: Map of SL - Districts 
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Appendix 6: Administrative Structure 
 
Note: MOPAHA- Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs 
          MOPCLG - Ministry of Provincial Council and Local Government 
          PEs - Public Enterprises; PCs - Provincial Councils; MC - Municipal Council; 
UC - Urban Council; PS - Pradeshiya Sabha 
Parliament 
CC  
Courts 
Prime Minister 
&     Cabinet 
Independent 
Commissions 
NPSC/Police 
MOPAHA MOPCLG Other ministries 
Dept Dept PEs 
District 
Secretariat 
Divisional 
Secretariat 
Grama Niladari 
office 
Branch 
offices 
Field Staff 
PCs Governor 
Chief Minister 
Board of Ministers 
MC UC PS 
Citizens / Community Organisations 
Dept 
Chief Secretary 
other ministerial 
secretaries 
Executive President 
-------------------- 
Presidential Secretariat 
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Appendix 7: Delegation of Authority of the 
National Public Service Commission  
Categories of officers Public officers to whom the 
powers are delegated 
Powers to be delegated 
Officers belonging to any of 
the following All Island 
Services 
SL Administrative Service, 
Engineering Service, Scientific 
Service, Architecture Service 
Planning Service 
 
Education Service 
 
Medical Service 
 
Indigenous Medicine 
Agricultural Service  
Accountant Service 
 
Animal Production and Health 
Service 
 
 
Staff Grade Officers not 
belonging to any of the All 
Island Services  
 
Staff Grade Officers not 
coming under the Ministry 
 
 
Secretary to the Ministry of the 
Minister in charge of the subject of 
Public Administration 
Secretary to the Ministry of the 
Minister in charge of the subject of 
Planning  
Secretary to the Ministry of Minister 
in charge of the subject of Education 
Secretary to the Ministry of the 
Minister in charge of the subject of 
Health 
Secretary to the Ministry of 
Indigenous Medicine  
Secretary to the Minister in charge of 
the subject of Agriculture 
Deputy Secretary to the Treasury 
Secretary to the Minister in charge of 
the subject of Livestock 
Development 
 
 
Secretaries to the Ministries of the 
Ministers in charge of the respective 
subjects  
 
 
Respective Heads of Departments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transfers according to 
schemes approved by the 
Public Service Commission 
Disciplinary Control in 
respect of offences 
specified in the Second 
Schedule of offences in 
Chapter XLVII of the 
Establishments Code 
Non-Staff Grade Officers 
belonging to the Combined 
Services 
Non-staff Grade Officers not 
belonging to the Combined 
Services 
Director-General of Combined 
Services 
 
Respective Heads of Departments 
 
Appointment, promotion, 
transfers, disciplinary 
control and dismissal  
 
 
Source: Extraordinary Gazette No. 1295/26 of the Democratic Socialist Republic of SL (2003, July 2)  
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Appendix 8: ARC Recommendations  
                     Implemented Fully or Partially 
Key Recommendations Status 
Cadre Management and Salaries 
 
Establish Cadre Review Committee; 
 
 
 
 
 
Freeze all recruitment for two years and 
rationalisation of cadres; 
Revise salaries upward; 
Link Salaries to cost of living; 
Revise salaries to specific posts based on job 
classifications; 
Reduce number of salary scales. 
 
 
 
Set up in 1989, but not 
effective. Again in 2005 
Salaries & Cadre 
Commission was 
established. 
 
2001, Partially 
implemented 
 
1989/2006 
2007 
 
Partially  
 
Personnel System 
Re-establish independent PSC; 
 
Abolish job bank scheme of recruitment; 
Introduce open, competitive and merit-based 
recruitment; 
Decentralise non-staff recruitments; 
Formulate job descriptions and scheme of 
recruitment for each post; 
Introduce performance appraisal system; 
Implement transfers at the beginning of the year; 
Give three months notice to employee on transfer; 
Not to link transfers to disciplinary measures;  
Make retirement at the age of 60 years; 
Not to extend service after 60 years; 
Facilitate retirement prior to 55
th
 birthday; 
Link pension to cost of living index; 
Introduce appeal tribunal under PSC. 
 
2001 but defunct in 
2005 
1990 
 
1990, not for all posts 
Partially     
 
After 2000 
1998, Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
Partially 
1990s 
2007 
2002, Independent body 
AAT was established 
Training 
Strengthen the SLIDA; 
Release full-time public servants to undergo 
postgraduate programmes; 
Provide funds for training as a part of the 
emoluments of each ministry; 
Establish Provincial Public Service Commissions. 
 
Partially 
 
Implemented 
 
Partially 
1990 
Devolution 
Maximum allocation of operational responsibilities 
to provinces; 
 
Partially 
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Key Recommendations Status 
Establish a Finance Commission; 
Allocate financial resources based on the devolved 
revenue; 
Establish Provincial Planning Councils; 
Establish Provincial Public Service Commissions. 
1988 
Partially 
1990s 
1990s 
1990s 
Rationalisation of Government Functions 
Establish a National Planning Council: 
Greater delegation of responsibility and authority;  
 
Establish effective mechanism to address public 
grievances. 
 
1990s 
To some extent through 
PCs. 
Partially 
Systems and Procedures 
Review and improve  work processes in each 
organisation; 
Improve the office layout to enhance supervision 
and monitoring;  
Device appropriate work systems and procedures when 
new services are launched and when training cadres. 
 
 
All partially 
implemented 
Financial Management  
Streamline paying-in procedures; 
Simplify forms and documents; 
Shorten payment processes; 
Expand the payment outlets; 
Adopt continuous reforms to the internal financial 
systems; 
Establish audit units in ministries and departments at 
the centre and the provinces;  
Introduce a team of trained professionals in 
procurement management; 
Give appropriate training to relevant managers on 
domestic and international bidding and procurement; 
Provide training for all categories of staff handling 
financial management; 
Review and reform the financial management 
system periodically.  
 
All partially 
Public enterprises 
Hold non-governmental organisations accountable 
to Parliament through the Public Accounts 
Committee; 
Apply the ‗Sunset‘ principle (p. 242) strictly to 
non-departmental  organisations; 
Have an operational management board at the top.  
 
Partially 
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Appendix 9: ARC Recommendations Not   
                     Implemented   
 
Cadre Management and Salaries 
Establish a Ministry of Public Service; 
Right-size the cadres; 
Introduce manpower planning; 
Personnel system 
Abolish appointments outside the schemes of recruitment; 
Establish Senior Management Group; 
Link performance appraisal to promotions. 
Training 
Place the National Institute of Business Management (NIBM) under the 
Proposed Ministry of Public Service; 
Give priority to training for trainers; 
Formulate a National Training Policy. 
Devolution 
Keep the size of the concurrent list to a minimum; 
Avoid greater discretionary power in sharing resources by the centre; 
Avoid use of financial relationship as a control mechanism; 
Reduce ministries and departments in line with devolution; 
Organise provincial administration under 7 groups (p.197); 
Establish 4 Standing Committees in Pradeshiya Sabhas ; 
Introduce provincial management pool.   
Rationalisation of Government Functions 
Reduce the number of ministries and departments; 
Reorganise cabinet office with multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary experts. 
Financial Management  
Introduce standard unit cost for different operational tasks;  
Specify the departmental objectives in quantitative terms in the budget; 
Spell out output of each programme in the budget; 
Link each output directly to the related objectives of the department; 
Specify each input to expected output; 
Establish ―Budget and Appropriation Committees‖ in Parliament; 
Introduce performance audit: 
Introduce penalties for the failure to submit annual account on time; 
Establish a financial data and information management system;  
Specify duties and the penalties of Chief Accounting Officers and Accounting 
Officers in assuming their duties; 
Introduce monitoring revenue collection against pre-set targets. 
Public enterprises 
Give freedom to commercial enterprises; 
Introduce performance audit; 
Avoid handling regulatory functions through non-departmental organisations; 
Appoint a full-time executive head in each public enterprise. 
 
